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Lewis Strauss's Complete Statement After Bravo and the Japenese Government's Response
March 31, 1954
AEC Chairman Lewis Strauss made the following statement to the press
on March 31, 1954 regarding the March 1st detonation of the "Bravo" hydrogen
bomb test in Bikini Atoll. Initially, the test had been kept a tightly guarded
secret. But when a Japanese fishing vessel that had been caught in the
fall-out returned to port, the U.S. was forced to respond.
"The President has authorized me to make available those portions of my report
to him the publication of which would not compromise information vital to our
national security. I have just returned from the Pacific Proving Grounds of
the Atomic Energy Commission where I witnessed the second part of a test series
of thermonuclear weapons. Weapons powerful enough to take out a city. Early
this January, men and supplies began to move out to the proving grounds for
this series. The first shot took place on its scheduled date of March 1st and
the second on March 26th. Both were satisfied. No test is made without a
definite purpose and a careful determination that it is directed toward an end
result of major importance to our military strength and readiness. The result
which the scientists at Los Alamos and Livermore had hoped to attain from these
two tests were fully realized. An enormous potential has been added to our
military posture by what we have learned. It should also be noted that the
testing of weapons is important likewise in order to be fully aware of a
possible future aggressive ability of an enemy, though, we now fully know that
we possess no monopoly of capability in this awesome field.
Now as to this specific test series, the first shot has been variously
described as devastating, out of control and with other exaggerated and
mistaken characterizations. I would not wish to minimize it. It was a very
large blast in the megaton range. But at no time was the testing out of
control. The misapprehension seems to have arisen due to two facts; first,
that the yield was about double that of the calculated estimate, a margin of
error not incompatible with a new weapon. The range of guessing on the first
A-bomb covered a relatively far wider spectrum. And second, because of the
results of the fall-out. For the day of shot number one, the meteorologists had
predicted a wind condition which should have carried the fall-out to the north
of a group of small atolls lying to the east of Bikini. The survey aircraft
carefully searched the area and reported no shipping. The shot was fired. The
wind failed to follow the predictions but shifted south of that line and the
little islands of Rongelap, Rongerik and Utirik were in the edge of the path of
the fall-out. A Japanese fishing trawler appears to have been missed by the
search but based on a statement attributed to her skipper to the effect that he
saw the flash of the explosion and heard the concussion six minutes later, it
must have been well within the danger area.
The 23 man crew members on the ship, 28 American personnel manning weather
stations on the little islands and the 236 natives on these islands were
therefore within the area of the fall-out. The supposition, however, that the
actual blast of the bomb extended over such enormous areas is of course
entirely incorrect. The task force commander promptly evacuated all the people
from these islands. They were taken to the island of Kwajalein where we
maintain a naval establishment and there placed under continuous and competent
medical supervision. I visited them there last week. Since that time it has
been determined that our weather personnel could be returned to duty but they
are still being kept on Kwajalein for the benefit of extended observation.
None of these 28 weather personnel have any burns. The 236 natives also appear
to me to be well and happy. Today, a full month after the event, the medical
staff on Kwajalein have advised us that they anticipate no illness, barring of
course, diseases which may be hereafter contracted. The situation with respect
to the 23 Japanese fishermen is less certain, due to the fact that our people
have not yet been permitted by the Japanese authorities to make a proper,
clinical examination. It is interesting to note, however, that the reports
which have recently come through to us, indicate that the blood count of these
men is comparable to that of our weather station personnel.
I concluded my report to the President with the observation that one important
result of these hydrogen bomb developments has been the enhancement of our
military capability to the point where we should soon be more free to increase
our emphasis on the peaceful uses of atomic power at home and abroad. It will
be a tremendous satisfaction to those who have participated in this program
that it has hastened that day."
On April 12, 1954, the Japanese government presented a response to Strauss's
statement. The following are extracts.
Copy Of Aide-Memoire Prepared By The Embassy Of Japan
To The United States
April 12, 1954
It is reported that on March 31, Mr. Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman of the Atomic
Energy Commission, made the following statements, among others, concerning the
thermonuclear test which took place at the Bikini Atoll on March 1, 1954.
. . . . A Japanese fishing trawler, the 'Fortunate Dragon', appears to have
been missed by the search but, based on a statement attributed to her skipper,
to the effect that he saw the flash of the explosion and heard the concussion
six minutes later, it must have been well within the danger area. . . .
. . . . The situation with respect to the 23 Japanese fishermen is less certain
due to the fact that our people have not yet been permitted by the Japanese
authorities to make a proper clinical examination. It is interesting to note,
however, that the reports which have recently come through to us indicate that
the blood count of these men is comparable to that of our weather station
personnel. . . .'
The portion of Mr. Strauss' statement quoted above not being entirely
consistent with information officially received here, the Japanese Embassy
wishes to place it on record that facts ascertained by the Japanese authorities
on these points are as follows:
1. Upon investigation, it has been established that the crew of the Fukuryu
Maru No. 5 heard the detonation of the explosion seven or eight minutes after
the crew saw its flash. It is estimated that the position of the vessel when
they saw the flash and the spot where the ash fell upon them were respectively
19 miles and 26 miles outside the danger-zone which the United States
Government had previously established and publicized by the official
publication 'Notice to Mariners'. For the details as to the movement of the
vessel, reference is made to the . . . Aide-Memoire handed in Tokyo to
Ambassador Allison by Vice Minister Okumura of Foreign Affairs on March 27,
1954.
2. Dr. John J. Morton, of the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission examined the
Japanese crew members on the 19th of March in Tokyo and on the 20th at Yaizu.
Dr. Merrill Eisenbud of the Atomic Energy Commission viewed the affected
persons, accompanied by Dr. Morton, on March 25th, in Tokyo and on the 26th at
Yaizu. Their visits included an examination of the injured fishermen both by
external observation and by obtaining specimens of their blood and excreta.
The more thorough check-up offered by the doctors has not yet been undertaken
because of the special psychological situation in which these simple fishermen
find themselves. They resent and refuse the type of clinical examination which
they feel might place them in he position of experimental objects. This is
especially true where the examination is to be conducted by physicians other
than Japanese. The Japanese authorities, however, are continuing their efforts
to persuade the patients to undergo a more complete examination by American
personnel at the earliest opportunity.
3. As to the question of the blood count of the exposed fishermen, information
furnished to the American Embassy in Tokyo by the Japanese Government would
appear to show that there is little ground to conclude the conditions of these
fishermen are not serious, especially when the extraordinary nature of these
cases are taken into consideration.
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