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Up for Debate: Privatization: Who Wins? Russia's Reform Compromise
Was loans-for-shares privatization necessary, and what are its consequences? Central protagonists in Russia's reforms square off.
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Acting Prime Minister of Russia, 1992
For former prime minister Gaidar, the risks of not carrying out loans-for-shares -- losing elections to resurgent Communists -- far outweighed the scheme's evident drawbacks.
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Deputy Prime Minister of Russia, 1990
For economist and opposition politician Grigory Yavlinsky, loans-for-shares entrenched "criminal capitalism" -- playing on dangers perhaps deliberately overstated, and harming Russia's future.
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First Deputy Prime Minister of Russia, 1994-1996
An architect of loans-for-shares, reformer Anatoly Chubais decried cronyism, but focused on the final defeat of communist policies -- in his view, a far more important outcome.
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World Bank Senior Vice President and Chief Economist, 1997-2000
Economist and former World Bank official Joseph Stiglitz saw Russia's peculiar privatizations as a logical consequence of flawed shock-therapy liberalization policies.
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Professor of Economics, Harvard University
An early advisor to the Russian government, Jeffrey Sachs perceived a rise in corruption as time went on, perhaps because "Russia had a lot to steal."
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Senior Associate, Carnegie Moscow Center
Russian political analyst Lilia Shevtsova balanced the near-term dangers of corruption and inequality with the longer-term potential of generational renewal -- an argument for patience.
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