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 (continued) Q: At the outset, what [were] Cheney's hesitations about Schwarzkopf?
Atkinson: Cheney was a man of very few pretentions. A fellow from Wyoming who didn't like other fellows on high horses and he knew quite well what Schwarzkopf's reputation was within the army. That this was a man who was basically known as a screamer and he had some concerns about whether the temperament of his commander in chief was the kind of temperament that he needed for someone who was commanding a coalition of thirty-six or thirty-seven countries. Cheney himself saw a couple of episodes that bothered him. They flew together, Schwarzkopf and Cheney, to Riyadh, in early August to talk to King Fahd about stationing troops in Saudi Arabia. At one point, Cheney saw one of Schwarzkopf's aides, a Colonel, ironing Schwarzkopf's uniform shirt on the floor on his hands and knees. On another occasion there was a long line that formed to use the bathroom as everyone woke up after this transAtlantic flight and there was a young officer in the line and he got to the head of the queue and turned around and said, "sir" and he'd been Schwarzkopf's place holder. These kind of things offended Cheney and added to his doubts about Schwarzkopf and he wondered frankly whether Schwarzkopf was going to have to be replaced. He kept a close eye on him. He appointed Colin Powell as basically the manager of the Schwarzkopf account as they called it. And essentially over the coming months came to the conclusion that this was in fact a man who if not the perfect man for the job was adequate to the job.
Q: And, the problem particularly with the night flyers and the pills.....?
Atkinson: Well, American military pilots since World War II had occasionally used amphetamines as a way to stay awake, not falling asleep on long flights. In the Gulf War it became a cause of great concern to some of the Air Force commanders. There were go pills, dexadrine, speed, which were used by about two thirds of the pilots at one time or another and then there were no-go pills which was kind of sedative to put them to sleep. It was a particular problem for pilots who were flying on the night shift where they had to take their body with them and completely up-end them. They had to become creatures of the night and trying to sleep at a busy airfield in the middle of the day was something that many of them found much more difficult than they'd anticipated. So the no-go pills were to knock them out after a long night of flying. Missions that would last for five, six, seven hours and then the go pills were to get them up and running the next night.
Atkinson: Well, there was concern in some squadrons that the pilots were becoming psychologically if not physically addicted to the pills. The issue was handled largely on a squadron by squadron basis. Some commanders became concerned enough to ban the flight surgeons from issuing further go pills. No more dexadrine. It became an issue in which the night shift and the day shift had a falling out. The night shift guys would say, you don't understand how difficult this is. You don't know what it's like to try to change your body rhythms completely. The day shift guys would say, you're just whining. We don't want to hear anymore about this. It became remarkably divisive within some squadrons.
Atkinson: Well, the first night there were about 50 Iraqi airplanes up. And they basically flew in circles and landed again. There was no meaningful Iraqi resistance other than air defense, which was substantial. But Iraq had more than 700 airplanes. They had top of the line fighters, French F-1 Mirages, they had MIG 29s, very good Soviet-built fighters, and they basically did nothing. Schwarzkopf and others were perplexed by this. Calvin Waller, Schwarzkopf's deputy, had figured that there would be perhaps 20 to 25 Allied airplanes lost that night. Others thought it might be as high as 50. And in fact only one plane was shot down. Losses were virtually nil. The belief was at the time, and probably was quite accurate that Saddam had recognized that throwing his air force against this armada coming north across his border was the quickest way to lose his air force. And that his best strategy, really his only strategy was to husband his forces, hunker down, wait and try to wait out the coalition as best he could.
Atkinson: Well, in the history of 20th century wars--major wars-- only one had been decided in one day, and that was the Arab-Israeli war of 1967. At the end of the first night of the Persian Gulf War there were two wars that had been decided basically in a single day of fighting. Saddam's air defenses had been badly battered. The Allies had demonstrated that they could penetrate Iraqi air space to the heart of Baghdad with impunity, striking some of the most critical strategic targets, without suffering a scratch. They had showed that they could launch 700 sorties, individual flights, across the border into Baghdad, into Iraq, suffering only a single loss. They had in fact demonstrated although it wasn't entirely clear at the time that the Iraqis didn't have a chance.
Atkinson: The Air Force believed that they could leap over the army of occupation that Saddam had in Kuwait and the related forces in southern Iraq to strike at the heart of Iraqi power basically. They believed that there were certain centers of gravity which would cause the Iraqi regime to buckle and perhaps to topple that didn't involve going out and taking out every artillery tube or every Iraqi tank. So the game plan was initially to suppress the Iraqi air defenses so that you could get air supremacy, after a period of time, flying in and out without opposition really. And within the course of the first couple of weeks to hit these center of gravity targets, which included leadership targets that were command bunkers, in effect. And things like petroleum refining facilities and so on. That by hammering away over and over again at these various target sets you could cause Saddam's regime to cave in like this. And the belief was among some of the Air Force planners that you could perhaps so weaken the regime, so damage the Iraqi government by knocking the pins out from under the Iraqi government that Saddam would be overthrown by his own people.
Atkinson: Powell had great suspicions as most ground pounders, fellows who are wearing the green suits of the Army to Air Force claims. This is something that had been going on since the advent of the airplane.....this rivalry between air and ground. Powell was skeptical that air power alone would bring Saddam to his knees or force Iraq out of Kuwait.
Q: Give me a thumbnail sketch of Air Force General Glosson. What's his background, character?
Atkinson: Buster Glosson was really one of the more interesting characters in the United States Air Force. Buster, first of all, it's important to know, is his real name; it's his given name. It's not a nickname. He's from North Carolina, he had come up as a fighter pilot through the ranks of the Air Force. He was a man who had been appointed by General Horner, the commander of the Air Forces in the Gulf, to be chief targeteer, and he was the commander of all of the wings that were there, all of the Air Force planes. He was only a one star general, but this empowerment that had been granted to him by Horner and his own natural autocratic bearing, gave him the weight of someone who was actually wearing three or four stars on his shoulder. He was a man who had made many enemies over the course of his career. He was a man who was called behind his back, Bluster, by some of those in the Gulf who didn't like him. And yet a man who could get things done. He always had a telephone in his hand, if not a telephone in both hands. He was tireless. He was profane. He was relentless. And he was absolutely a true believer that air power could save the lives of thousands of American and Coalition soldiers if he were given the opportunity to carry out the air campaign as he, Buster Glosson believed it should be carried out.
Atkinson: Glosson told Schwarzkopf that it didn't really matter what the scheme was for the ground attack. That air power would have so reduced the Iraqis that anything would work. He had a meeting with the senior Army generals a couple of weeks before the war began. And in the course of a really remarkable briefing to them, essentially promised that they wouldn't have any Iraqi opposition to speak of because he was going to be damn certain that the Air Force and the Navy, had so reduced the Iraqis that the biggest obstacle that the Army could conceivably face as it drove north would be the Allied airplanes stacked up whacking away at the Iraqi defenses. The Army commanders left this session shaking their heads, wondering if there was any point in even hanging around Saudi Arabia anymore, because it was clear that Buster Glosson was convinced he was going to win the war by himself. Atkinson: Schwarzkopf had been invited on January 15, a day before the war was going to start, to come over and see the Air Force planners in the basement of the Saudi Air Ministry. He got a little tour. He was invited to shake hands and pat people on the back for all the hard work that had gone into planning. And toward the end of this he was showed a schedule of the attack sequence of the first night. Suddenly the pleasant demeanor that had been on his face falls away and he says, why aren't we attacking the Republican Guard the first night, the best equipped, the best trained of the Iraqi forces? And it was pointed out to him on the spot that in fact there were going to be attacks against the Republican Guard within hours after the campaign started. But first it was necessary to reduce the air defenses. He went absolutely bonkers. He erupted in one of his famous rages, saying you've disobeyed me, you've deliberately contradicted my orders. I told you I wanted the Republican Guard bombed from hour one. And you're not doing it.
There was an attempt by Horner and Glosson and the other senior commanders to calm him down and to explain what the rationale was for this. He would have none of it. He basically threatened to relieve his senior commanders on the spot. Said, if you can't follow my orders I'll find somebody who can. Glosson, who had a temper himself, immediately the hackles went up on his back. He said, you tell me how many B-52 crews you want to lose and that's how many we'll put out there right off the bat the way you want us to attack them. Schwarzkopf said, you know that I would never needlessly risk crews, that's not fair. Well, that's what we're talking about says Glosson. They retreat upstairs to Horner's office. Schwarzkopf says, you don't understand the pressure I'm under. Don't ever contradict me in front of men like that again, but you don't understand the pressure I'm under. Glosson started to reply and thought better of it. Thought to himself, you have no idea of the pressure we're under. Horner simply thinks -- give me a break.
Q: And Schwarzkopf's public pronouncements about the scuds? Atkinson: Schwarzkopf was very dismissive of the scuds. At one point he said -- I would rather stand out in the streets of Riyadh when scuds are raining down than in South Georgia during a lightning storm. scuds are less dangerous than the chance of being hit by lightning. This didn't sit well with the Israelis. Senior Israelis began referring to scud attacks as another lightning storm. There was a belief that Schwarzkopf was not appreciating either the danger that the scuds posed to
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