Baker: Primakov was I think one of the leading Arabists in the Soviet Union. He personally knew Saddam Hussein. He had come over to see us with at least one proposal before and I think that he had quite a bit of influence on Gorbachev as we drew closer to a land war. His idea was we should not help America in the Persian Gulf, that America is on a track here to establish a permanent military presence, this is against our interests. This is a Soviet client state it's always been a friend of ours and we ought to do whatever we can to avoid a ground war here. The Arabists in the Soviet Foreign Ministry were all coming up all the time with proposals to get Iraq out of Kuwait but to give Saddam some face saving gesture not to get out unconditionally as the UN resolution required. So they kept coming at us with these proposals and we kept turning them down.

Q: Why didn't Gorbachev just send Primakov packing, saying 'No , no, not interested?'

Baker: Well I think that Gorbachev was at the time becoming weaker and weaker. He was under attack by the conservatives, one of the things they were attacking him for was the fact that they had sided with the United States against their client state Iraq. And I think he was having to tack a little bit towards the right. He was having to listen to the military. He was having to listen to those people who were essentially opposed to his reform efforts. And one of the main issues that they kept harping on was the alliance with the United States against Iraq.

Q: Could you describe the call that Gorbachev made?

Baker: Well Gorbachev called the President, I don't remember the exact date, to try and convince the President that he had gotten Saddam Hussein to commit to withdrawal. And we had a long conversation with Gorbachev, I don't know how long it lasted but quite a while. During which he proposed this scheme whereby Saddam Hussein would state an intention to withdraw and then there would be some conditions that would apply to it and one of the things I remember distinctly was that the other 8 or 9 resolutions in addition to the 660 and 678, the first one condemning the invasion and the use of force resolutions--yhat those resolutions would be eliminated and Iraq would not be subject to the penalties that the Security Council had ordered by way of resolution.

So we basically told Gorbachev that this was not an acceptable approach. It would not result in an unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. I think Gorbachev was basically saying 'Look I've worked this out whereby we can get Saddam out of Kuwait without a war.' And we were saying back to Gorbachev 'Well that's fine but there are so many conditions attached to it here that it is not an unconditional withdrawal which is what the United Nations Security Council resolution requires and therefore it's not acceptable'.

Q: Was Gorbachev really trying ?

Baker: I think he was really trying. Yes. He was under a fair amount of pressure I think internally. But I also think he was motivated by a desire to, if possible, adopt a statesmanlike approach and come up with some sort of solution that would avoid war. But our problem with his solution was it would have rewarded aggression.

Q: That evening, after that phone call you all gathered in the Oval office because George Bush just wanted to have a final talk. Dick Cheney was saying he thought it was time, I think the phrase was, just to "stiff" Gorbachev. How anxious were you though to keep Gorbachev on your side?

Baker: Well I think it was important to keep the coalition together throughout the air war, throughout the ground war. Because of the issues that would arise in the aftermath of Iraq's ejection from Kuwait. And as it turned out I think it was important to keep them on board, we did keep them on board, and we basically did stiff Gorbachev, we kept coming back to him and saying 'No, you are continually are suggesting approaches which do not require an unconditional withdrawal' and we were never, never, never, never going to accept a negotiating down from the UN resolutions. We weren't going to accept it in Geneva, we weren't going to accept it in bilateral diplomacy, diplomatic efforts from the Soviet Union or anybody else.

Q: And just as the land war was about to happen, Gorbachev called again......?

Baker: Yes my recollection is he called the President at Camp David -- I was up there with him that weekend. And we were in the gym as a matter of fact and the President took the call in the locker room. And at that point I think Gorbachev had a proposal for withdrawal but it would have, in effect, cancelled all of the UN resolutions providing for reparations, providing for destruction of nuclear and chemical weapons capabilities and all those collateral UN resolutions, it would have required that they simply be eliminated and therefore was not acceptable. And his message was 'I appreciate your sincere efforts at trying to bring about a peaceful resolution of this dispute but we will not accept anything other than an unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait.'

Q: What warnings were sent to the Iraqis about using chemical weapons?

Baker: The President's letter to Saddam Hussein which Tariq Aziz read in Geneva, made it very clear that if Iraq used weapons of mass destruction, chemical weapons, against United States forces that the American people would demand vengeance and that we had the means to achieve it. I also reinforced that message in my presentation with Tariq Aziz at Geneva and we made it clear that in addition to ejecting Iraq from Kuwait, if they used those types of weapons against our forces we would in addition to throwing them out of Kuwait, we would adopt as a goal the elimination of the regime in Baghdad.

And we never did that, we never expanded our war aims or our political aims to include that -- we never went beyond the scope of the United Nations Security Council resolutions but we made it very clear to them that if they used weapons of mass destruction on our forces that would be one thing we would consider doing and further that we had the means to obtain vengeance.

Q: We've talked to a lot of the Air Force people, special forces people. It's quite clear that during the war great efforts were made to kill Saddam Hussein...bombing the bunkers...Did you hope that Saddam Hussein would be killed during the war?

Baker: Well, that's a question you should direct to the military. We were very careful to observe the executive order which prevents action leading to the assassination of foreign leaders. On the other hand I think the legal experts had told the military that it would be perfectly legal and within our laws and regulations in the context of war, to kill anyone involved in the command and control establishment of Iraq. And since he was the Commander in Chief of the Iraqi armed forces if he were killed in combat that would not violate the executive order.

Q: Would you have shed any tears if a bomber had happened to hit him?

Baker: I think we've said on a number of occasions that we would not shed any tears if the Iraqi people replaced Saddam Hussein. We would not shed any tears if he were eliminated as the leader of Iraq. We would have been happy to see him replaced yes, politically replaced by someone else or overthrown by his army or his rule ended there. At the same time we were very careful not to do something that would result in the fragmentation of Iraq because we didn't think that would be in our national interests.

Q: Could you describe what was the process that led to the war being ended.

Baker: The President was advised by his military advisers that we had achieved our war aims. It was the view of the political advisers that we had achieved our political aims. Iraq was out of Kuwait. The Iraqis were taking rather massive casualties on the Highway of Death. There was a feeling I think on the part of some that what was happening there was sort of un-American, the military particularly felt that we had accomplished our goals and the President after talking to General Powell and after talking to Secretary Cheney and Norman Schwarzkopf concluded it was time to wrap it up. And I think said, 'Well when we reach 100 hours' I think that was what he said, which was several hours yet, maybe half a day into the future,then we ought to end it. And that it was a decision that as best I can recall there was absolutely no dissent from on the part of any of the Presidents' advisers.

Q: What were the key factors that led you all to think 'Hey, it's time to finish this.'

Baker: The key factors were that we had ejected Iraq from Kuwait which is what was required by the uh UN Security Council resolution. That if we kept going a whole lot longer we would be acting beyond the resolution. The war aims had been achieved. The political aims had been achieved. A lot of people trying to flee were being killed literally thousands and the military advised the President that it was time to wrap it up in terms of our war aims and I think the President's decision was absolutely the right one. All the second guessing about going to Baghdad and all of that, people that make those kinds of suggestions are not taking into consideration a whole host of factors. How many more American lives would have been lost? How far beyond our authority from the UN would we have been acting if we had prolonged the war further, if we had occupied Southern Iraq, if we had gone to Baghdad? How long would we have to fight a guerrilla war in Iraq if we'd occupied any of the territory? A whole host of factors. People also forget that it was never a war aim or a political aim of the United States to eliminate the Saddam Hussein regime.

Was it something we would like to see happen? Was it something that most of us felt probably would happen in the aftermath of such a significant defeat? Yes. But it was never something that was authorised that we'd do by the United Nations Security Council. We would have lost our coalition. The Arab elements I think would have left for sure. There would be no peace process in the Middle East today. So people don't focus on those things.

Q: When I talk to the Army commanders on the ground they wanted another 12-24 hours.....

Baker: Well, first of all I didn't hear the phone conversation between the President and General Schwarzkopf, because I was in the room and the President was on the line, I didn't hear General Schwarzkopf's side of the conversation but I'm not aware that General Schwarzkopf said 'No, we want another 12 or 24 hours Mr President' I think if the military had made that request to the President he would have gone along with it just as he went along with almost every request that the military made. But the military were recommending to the President that it was time to end it from General Powell on down.

Q: The military guys would assume it was you and Bob Gates and so on saying 'Hey,100 hours has a nice ring to it, let's end it at 100 hours.'

Baker: Well, I don't remember one person saying to the President 'Don't end it now, it's prematurely ended' nobody said that. Nobody in the political adviser group, nobody in the military adviser group. Now what some general down the line out there on the ground might have thought or felt or said I don't know, I can't speak for that.

Q: Could you recall the advice you gave the President, in that meeting?

Baker: Well I don't recall any specific language that I used in that meeting but my sense was that we had achieved our war aims we'd achieved our objectives, of course the military told us we had, General Powell had said we were killing literally thousands of people. Based on the President's conversation with General Schwarzkopf it was time to end the war. That was enough for me as a political adviser. I think I've already spoken to the fact that I think if we had gone on much longer we would have lost the coalition. The Arab coalition partners particularly I remember, the Saudis, wanted us to leave as promptly as possible-- get our forces out of there after the end of the war--when there was a question of whether we should occupy some of southern Iraq. There was a clear chance that if we overdid it, that we would lose the coalition or that cracks would begin to develop within the coalition and there was no reason to consider continuing when the military were telling the President 'It's time to end it.'

The President nor any of us thought, at that time, that Saddam would continue in power. Having suffered such a resounding defeat there were some suggestions I think at the time and later about having him acknowledge defeat in some way. About having him come down to Safwan and maybe you know you could say in retrospect it would have been better to do that. I don't know whether that would have made a lot of difference in terms of his ability to continue in power in Iraq. I think the uprisings in the South and in the North gave Saddam a cause around which he could rally support from his military. If he were going to be deposed the most likely scenario was that he would be deposed by his military. When the Shia in the South and the Kurds in the North started their uprisings, it gave him a pretty solid basis to argue to his army 'stick with me or we'll all be out.' I mean I think that may unfortunately be the way that worked.