
 (continued)

Q: Fighting the enemy......
Samarrai: Saddam was very boastful. For instance, when we told him that they brought Stealth jetfighters, the F117, he said
"This--what you have read in the papers--can be seen by our shepherds!"
When we mentioned, for instance, a cruise missile, he would say
"A cruise missile on its way to its target. We will just blind it. We will suppress its course. It will mislead, it will mis-hit its target." We say "How do we do that?"
He would say that "We will fire mud and water to the screen of these radars that are leading these cruise missiles." Okay, we would say "How would we do that, when we are facing the Apache helicopters, these machines that can deal with six targets simultaneously at a very long distance?" He said "Oh no, don't bother. This is just a myth."
As a military person, he was very reckless. Yes, he had some experience and some capabilities, but he is not a professional military leader.
We had a different opinion; that these technological advances will force our troops to leave their positions, and that the Americans will use these technologies to apply the scorched land policy.
We never dared to say "withdraw", but we kept feeding him in our intelligence reports that there was a massive allied build-up and that their missile strength and their air power, will destroy the country, and this will lead to social disturbances, due to the inconsistency in the social fabric in Iraq. We will have supply shortages, and Iraq will be destroyed. These reports really mandated that he should withdraw, but to him that was impossible.

Q: Terrorism....
Samarrai: Frankly speaking, the first two terrorist regimes in the world are the Iraqi regime and the Iranian regime. This is a fact. This is not a mere accusation. Saddam had really pinned great hopes on his terrorist attacks to eliminate his political opponents and his military opponents.
Secondly, he wanted to shake the stability of his neighboring countries. After his invasion of Kuwait, a higher committee was formed under the chairmanship of the Vice-President. It was called the Guerilla Action Group. This is really terrorism. Its objectives were to attack Western interests around the world, and in the Middle-East in particular, and to attack the military leaders and the political leaders in the neighboring countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
I was a member of this committee, but I declined to engage in the activities under the pretext that I had other commitments. But this committee, despite its activities and the selection of groups, could not really attain much success.
Some leaders of the Palestinian factions claimed to cooperate with this committee, but they did not cooperate. Targets: Schwarzkopf and Sir Peter de la Billiere, were top of the list of wanted targets, but the Iraqi regime could not really do anything against them. Sir Peter de la Billiere was the Chief of the British forces in the Gulf area. But the receding morale in Iraq and the international circumstances, and the deterioration of conditions inside Iraq did not really make this group do anything.

Q: On using biological or chemical weapons....
Samarrai: I wish to talk frankly. Really I think that the weapons which Saddam possessed are directed against the Iraqi people. And we also wish to comply with the international resolutions.
Hours before the air attack, we had not less than 200 containers of biological germs. As for nuclear weapons, as far as I know, we did not have... any. As an intelligence officer I am not specialised in production, but I am quite sure that these weapons were biological weapons.
For instance I've heard some of the germs cause Black Death, but I am not really quite sure of how authentic this information...
Saddam wanted to stall for time, in order to produce nuclear weapons, so that he can have a deterrent power. But he failed. I do not think that Saddam was capable of taking a decision to use chemical weapons or biological weapons, or any other type of weapons against the allied troops, because the warning was quite severe, and quite effective. The allied troops were certain to use nuclear arms and the price will be too dear and too high.
Perhaps now I'm seriously considering that Saddam might use this weapon when he's about to die. Perhaps he will use it before he dies. And perhaps he would say to himself that he will be immortalised in history text books.

Q: Taking the war to Bagdad.....
Samarrai: He did not think that the Americans and their allies would go as far as this. Except perhaps in the final stages, when the land assault took place. He asked me directly, "Did you think that the allies would come as far as Baghdad?" And he was quite desperate, and he was quite frightened.I said no, I did not think so.
He said "Why?" And I gave him a number of reasons. And he was quite comfortable and gratified.
I did not think that the allies would come to Baghdad. First, their announced objectives was to drive the Iraqi forces from Kuwait. And the Iraqi forces left Kuwait. So the justification is done.
Secondly, the USA would not want to repeat its experience in Vietnam. But, had the US gone into Baghdad, there would never have been a second Vietnam, and the people would have applauded the USA. But from the US point of view, they thought they would incur heavy losses, and this contradicts Bush's commitments to the US people. Additionally, going into Baghdad would require huge arms, and a bigger number of troops.
The other essential point is that an alternative government was not ready. So they faced a choice of either installing another military regime in Iraq, or face a devastating civil war. And they did not want to do that, or do either.

Q: Nuclear weapons...
Samarrai: I heard in 1989 ... some people talk at the General Command that we might not need more than one year to produce a nuclear weapon. But then it appeared that this was not accurate. We certainly needed more.
General Hussein said the other day, we had only three months' difference between the first test trials of nuclear weapons. This means that, had Saddam waited for more three more months, we would have been a nuclear state. This may give rise to talk that Iraq then supports to join the nuclear club of states. No, in effect this means that we want to get rid of Saddam and end this war.

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