Scowcroft: It was a general meeting first of all, with an intelligence briefing about what we knew about where the Iraqi troops were and what was happening, in Kuwait.

And then there was a multi-briefing about the disposition of US forces in the area. Then there was a discussion about what the significance of all this was and it distressed me because it was sort of "Well, it's happened now, you know, do we have to change the way we do business or whatever" but it was a sort of a resigned approach to a fait accompli and I thought that was not appropriate.

But it was a meeting constrained in time because the President had to leave to go to Aspen, Colorado and give a speech.

Q: But as you left the meeting....

Scowcroft: I told the President I was very distressed by the meeting, that there seemed to be no appreciation of the significance of this event to the national interests of the United States, and that if he didn't mind at the next meeting we would have, which was right after we came back from Colorado, that I would do something that I usually didn't do and make introductory comments about the significance of what had had happened and, and how it affected vital US interests, and he said " I agree with you, I was, I was bothered by it too. Maybe I should do it" And I said "No, Mr. President, I don't think you should, you should sit back and listen, let let me make the presentation."

Q: So it was clear to you after the meeting...

Scowcroft: Oh, very much, the President felt very much the same as I did about it, about the sort of, well not lackadaisical, but resigned tone of the meeting and that there was no sense of outrage or no sense of the imperative that this affected vital US interests and had to be dealt with firmly.

Q: You get to Aspen...Thatcher is there...

Scowcroft: I wish I could remember the first words because it would, it was like two soulmates finding each other. They found from the very first words that they were exactly on the same wavelength, that this was a tremendously serious event, that it could not be tolerated and something had to be done.

And, then they just talked at each other with great rapidity about what had to be done.

I think it was a welcome mat for both of them because each one reassured the other that what they'd been thinking about it was right.

Q: He returned, you guys returned from Aspen...

Scowcroft: Well the President of course, always opens the meeting, and then he said he would like me to say a few words, and then I simply laid out the case for this action having effected our vital national interests, and that it was a matter that we could not avert our eyes from, that it had to be dealt with and it had to be dealt with directly and strongly.

And when I finished I believe Larry Eagleburger spoke up and pounded the table and said, "Absolutely right".

And then, then the tone of that meeting was entirely different from the meeting the previous day.

Q: What was the consensus...

Scowcroft: Well the decision was that we started to look at practical things, and one of the first questions was "Is he going to stop at the borders of Kuwait? Saddam, is he going to stop there, or is he likely to go on into Saudi Arabia and move down to the oilfields?"

That if we had to liberate Saudi Arabia we had a much bigger job. That led to discussions about getting in touch with the Saudis and, what practical steps could we take to help?

I think the significance was that everybody knew that the result of this meeting, this was the most important issue facing the United States and that we had to do something about it. The President summed up by saying that there was no question that this was an issue of great importance for the United States and I believe he said that he expected everybody to treat it as such and that he would I believe it was at this meeting and he said that he wanted to have his National Security Team go up to Camp David the next day for practical military discussions on next steps.

Q: You went up to Camp David ...

Scowcroft: It was just what are the practical next steps and General Schwarzkopf had given a brief summary of his forces at the meeting.

He went into it in greater detail and as I recall he outlined what forces he thought it would take in order to create a defensive line along the Saudi border...

Q: The primary worry at that time was...

Scowcroft: We were very worried. First of all we didn't know what he was going to do. Secondly, our intelligence was not great.

We had, of course we had satellite intelligence, but at that time the satellite intelligence was once every twelve hours and that's a long time when you're in a circumstance like this.

And of course, we didn't have our tactical air assets over there at that time to be able to fill in the gaps, but it soon became clear that the next step had to be consultations with Saudi Arabia.

Q: What happened then?

Scowcroft: I asked Prince Bandar, the Saudi Ambassador to come in and then we had a very frank talk and we said that we were prepared to send forces to support them, and he said that the Saudis weren't at all sure they wanted to be helped by the United States and he cited a couple of examples where the United States had offered help and then demonstrated enormous weakness and he said "Frankly we're afraid, you say you'll help and then the going'll get tough and you'll pull out and we'll be left."

It was a very, very dramatic conversation.

For example he said, "At the time the Shah fell, the United States government offered to send an F15 squadron over to Saudi Arabia as a demonstration of resolve, and we said yes."

Then he said that "Planes got in the air and half way over there you're government announced that they were unarmed and he said that's an example of the kind of US behaviour that we fear". I said "That will not happen. We're serious, we're deadly serious, and we know, want to know if you are."

And then they turned around, they said "Well, you send a team over here and we'll talk about cooperation."

Q: Do you recall the moment and what you felt?

Scowcroft: Well it was a moment of great relief because, you know first he said we don't want to--don't think we want to be saved, and then it was "Why, we'll send some Lieutenant Colonels over here and we'll meet with the people in the Pentagon and we'll work out something" which you know, will go on and on and on and meanwhile you have this build up going on and they're sending more serious signals to the Iraqis.

The danger was that Saddam might think he had a green light and he'd better move before anything happened and we did get forces over there.

Q: At the Camp David meeting, can you relate its importance?

Scowcroft: The significance of Camp David meeting was that we decided or that General Schwarzkopf said he needed I think he said a hundred thousand, a hundred thousand troops to be able to confidently defend the Saudi border and, so the President said "You'll have them."

So this was the first clear military step in the conflict.

Q: Were you surprised when the President said...

Scowcroft: No. Not at all. I took it for granted that that's what he would say.

Q: The President after that meeting...

Scowcroft: Well, I didn't come back with the others, but I came back early and I talked with the President after I got back and so on, and I said "You'll have an enormous stake out on the White House Lawn. I think it will look strange if you don't say something."

So he said "Alright" and so we prepared some remarks for him, got everything set up, and when he got off the helicopter he ad libbed and surprised everyone.

Q: What did you think of his ad lib?

Scowcroft: I liked it. I liked it very much. Others -- Colin Powell says "That'll teach us to leave you up at Camp David alone with him."

Q: Colin Powell said that that was policy making on the hoof.

Scowcroft: Yes I think he has said that. I don't think it was policy making on the hoof.

I think it was a clear realisation which we all had at least, he and I had made, and we spent about seventy two hours almost constantly together that US interests demanded this kind of a response and to me it was, it was fairly open and shut.

It didn't take a lot of finely honed analysis to see how relevant what happened was to US interests.

Q: Do you remember Dick Cheney calling back to the White House about the Saudis saying `yes'?

Scowcroft: Yes. Well we were waiting because even though the Saudis had accepted our conditions for Dick Cheney going over there we still weren't sure how it would come out and direct military to military conversations were still going on and, and from the Pentagon's point of view the Saudis were still planning to send a team of Lieutenant Colonels over here, so we were quite apprehensive.

And it was I don't know if we literally shouted with glee but it was great relief when, Dick called and said "It's a go" I was surprised however, because not only of unease about US seriousness of purpose, but also that this represented a major invasion of what in essence was a hermit kingdom in the sense of foreign presence and to have at this time a hundred thousand American troops there is pretty breathtaking.