Thatcher: Look, sanctions don't work. There's a possibility that we would cut off a lot of the money flowing to Iraq, by cutting out the oil. Sanctions are still on Iraq. They haven't worked now. You have to put sanctions on and make it quite clear that you are doing so, but I'm afraid that there's a great deal of smuggling which goes on across borders. There always is and proof positive is, they don't work, is there still there, and indeed if we hadn't taken action, Kuwait would still have been occupied and the people under the most terrible tyranny.

And of course you know the Iraqis took hostages as they retreated, they took hostages. Not only prisoners of war but hostages. They just gathered them and pulled them out of the house and took them back with them and some of those, I think something like between 500 and 600 of those are still not back at their homes in Kuwait. This is what you are dealing with, this is the sort of person you have to deal with firmly.

Q: But how concerned were you about the fate of our troops in the desert,I mean there were all sorts of possibilities, what went through your mind?

Thatcher: Oh, I broached the problem of chemical and possibly even biological with the President and we all knew that if they did, we hadn't chemical or biological weapons. That we had to threaten much worse than that and that the threat would be enough to stop them using it, which it was.

I often had to say to some of our generals, look I'm concerned that we haven't any chemical to deter chemical, biological should never be ...... what is the answer? And they would say, the answer is, if anyone uses chemical weapons, you in fact use a nuclear weapon, and I used to say, now, just give me your view, do you think that would deter them. He said it's a much more effective deterrent than chemical weapons back.

So it was not used, the threat didn't need to be used, but it was known that it was always there...

Q: Saddam Hussein understood, you think, that the nuclear option was there?

Thatcher: He knew, that if he used chemical or biological, there would be a terrible reply. You make it clear that you would consider it in order to secure the non-use of those things. Now I think they did. We have had experience of Saddam Hussein using it during the Iraq/Iran war, we'd had experience of him using it on his own people, on the Kurds.

So you never make it explicit, they just understand.

Q: But you as British Prime Minister would have sanctioned the use of nuclear weapons against Iraq, if they had got ...

Thatcher: You would have considered the situation with which you are faced. That was where were your own troops, would it affect them, and what were the alternatives? But, you would not rule it out.

Q: Can we move now to the incident on 26th August, when you received news and so did the President, that an Iraqi tanker was sanction-busting. You wanted strong action taken immediately. The President refused.

Thatcher: Yes it was quite clear, that there was an Iraqi tanker, trying to run the gauntlet of the sanctions and coming down the Gulf. Now we didn't know if it was loaded with oil or not. And if it was you tried not to sink it in the Gulf because of the tremendous consequences and effect of the Gulf when that happened, although we were very much better at dealing with it at that time, as you know, than we had been before.

And also, we found that the British Navy is quite used to boarding a foreign vessel. Now the Americans are not used to, so we have a drill, we know how to do it and deal with it. And the question was whether we should board there, in the Gulf and I got on to the President who thought that we should first find out whether it had any oil on board and therefore we would follow it. Get outside the Gulf and therefore follow it and take a decision later, if need be.

We don't think as it happened, that it had anything or anything significant on. But I knew and recognised what I'd had to cope with earlier, in the Falklands.

The first time you actually go to the use of force is quite a decision for the person who has to authorise it. And so you do tend to say, well look let's just see if there's anything else we can do. And so this was the reason why I said, "look George, this is no time to go wobbly, we'll do it this time, but we can't fall at the first fence, just this time."

You see if they thought that they were cracking our resolve and will, then the first crack can become a bigger crack and if you're not careful, you don't go the job, you set out to do, which is to free the lands of Kuwait, the lands and the people and in fact you encourage an aggressor to go further, happy in the knowledge that the West wouldn't have the leadership or the guts to tackle him.

We had both.

Q: Could you describe your meeting with King Hussein, because some accounts have it that you pinned him to the wall at 10 Downing Street?

Thatcher: Well not quite, but I was very firm, as I've indicated, I had no doubt about what we had to do. I was deeply concerned. We'd had an ancient relationship with the Jordanians and with King Hussein, an ancient relationship, it goes back a very long time and we've always done training and helped them to defend their own interests.

And then of course, I knew full well what was happening, they formed a foursome alliance, between Jordan, Iraq, Egypt and the Yemen, and naturally Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf countries were deeply concerned, and I found it very difficult to understand how, King Hussein could form an alliance with Saddam Hussein, after all it was Saddam Hussein's ancestors who had murdered King Hussein's cousins in Iraq and had taken control, and I thought that in Arab terms, you know the family matters very much.

I think what he found was, that there were quite a number of people in Jordan who were supporting Iraq because they thought that Iraq was very, very tough and in fact would do what they wanted to do, would tackle Israel. We in fact were desperate that Israel should not come in, and Israel was very, very wise indeed.

So he was in very great difficulty. But the views that he put up, that there should be kind of enormous whole redistributive mechanism around all of the Arab states and that.....they were entitled to take, be friendly with Saddam Hussein, but it just just didn't tie up.

King Hussein is the most decent person. I have seen him on television. The first television performance he did. He was torn. He really was torn, between what he knew was right and between what he knew was the view of some of the extreme Muslims in his territory. But there was no suggestion to me, no question of saying that you could kind of carve up the territory or carve up the em, oil revenues in any way.

I was not discourteous. I was firm. Very firm indeed. Wouldn't you be firm? Do you know what was happening. The oil could come out, straight along the road from Iraq, straight along, out, through Jordan. They were getting their petrol, they were getting supplies and supplies we felt might be going in, so of course I was very tough. I had to be.

But it gave me great sorrow to be tough in that way, but the most important thing, perhaps at that time, we simply could not have taken it if in addition to all of the other problems, if King Hussein had been toppled in his own country. It would have been catastrophic for us all.

Q: Do you think King Hussein was guilty of duplicity?

Thatcher: No, I think he had a very, very difficult hand to play. He played it as best he could. But for us to do anything to de-stabilise him when we had enough on our hands, with fighting Saddam Hussein, it was just not possible.

Q: How did you feel because of your resignation in November, that year, how did you feel about leaving this crisis unresolved?

Thatcher: I've never felt to strongly about anything in my life. I didn't understand it.I have no regrets about leaving office, I decided after all to go, when I didn't get enough support, but of all of the things that I've ever thought of, and I have again, bear no grudge at all, but that I thought was astonishing.

Q: That you were, in real terms, in the middle of fighting a war.

Thatcher: That yes, and that I had had perhaps a good deal of influence on persuading people that you could not let this aggression stand.

Q: What did you think the aims of the war should be. As far as you were concerned, was it simply to reverse the invasion of Kuwait, or was it much more than that?

Thatcher: It's not enough just to reverse the invasion. If you leave them with an army strong enough to come back and do it again. You've got, as we knew, you've got to destroy their army. We couldn't bring down Saddam Hussein. What I thought it was our job to do, was to make it quite clear to the world and particularly the people who'd been wronged, that he'd been totally and utterly defeated and his army had been totally and utterly defeated. So that he couldn't come back again.

And it didn't seem to me that that part of it was fully achieved. And you know full well they went and attacked the Kurds, they went and attacked the Marsh Arabs and the Republican Guard, I'm afraid, were not dealt with.

Q: Your reaction to the way the war ended...

Thatcher: I was surprised, because it seemed as if they've said, its been 100 hours. Kuwait is free. But they hadn't then said, we've not completed the job, because many of the army is still there and they could be able to repeat the action.

Q: Were you annoyed that the war had been stopped....

Thatcher: No point in being annoyed. I wasn't there then, and as always happens, everyone is very pleased when a war comes to an end. The next thing that really happened, it was, happened during the Easter recess. I was in London, and there weren't many officials or ministers in London, and I had been told there was going to be a deputation of Kurdish women, to come and see me and I said, look, it's not me you want to see, I no longer have any power. You really want to see the ministers of the Foreign Office, but they were out, they were away, and I asked if I could speak to one of them and was told that no relevant person, was not in London, so I saw them. Someone had to see them, and then put their view very strongly to the Foreign Office, and then there was some action taken the next day.

But they were desperate and we hadn't in fact to me, dealt with the full consequences of that war sufficiently effectively.

Q: Do you think that the West in fact, betrayed the Kurds and the Shi'a?

Thatcher: Well, we'd tried and the Prime Minister then got the idea of safe havens, it was at least something. But the fact was that the Iraqis were still in a position to cause great turmoil, unfortunately.

And of course again, they went agin their own people, in the Marsh Shi'ites in another part of Iraq. So we hadn't in fact really defeated their army.

Q: And you think the job wasn't done properly?

Thatcher: I think they stopped, rather too soon. I think there may have been some confusion about the information they are getting. That often happens during wartime. But, Saddam Hussein is still there.

Q: What do you think the war aims should have been? Should the coalition forces have gone onto Baghdad, should an attempt have been made to arrest...?

Thatcher: I don't know that it was necessary, I don't know that it was necessary to go onto Baghdad, I wasn't there at the time, nor what changes they made to the rules of engagement. You're asking me views on things er to which I was not privy. But I had after all, I hope, managed as Prime Minister, things reasonably successful before, successfully before, and, just look now. Its not over.



Q: How concerned were you that the American Secretary of State was prepared to go that extra mile for peace?

Thatcher: Well, I've always found Jim Baker very good to deal with. After all it was he who came to see me to say look I know that you are sending one armoured brigade, please the President would like you to send another one. I said, I'll go and see, I'll do my level best to to comply with what the President wants because I understood this absolutely vital thing in America that their allies have to be seen to be doing their task fully and not just relying on America.

Q: But you must have been concerned when you heard that he planned to go to Baghdad?

Thatcher: I find these things very strange. It's too much negotiating you know. Once you've started the job, its not starting a job, its carrying on until its well and truly finished, that is the real strength.You know Drake's prayer-- "it is not the beginning of any great venture, the completion of the same, until the task be well and truly finished, which yieldeth the true glory", I rather agreed with that.

Q: Did you counsel either James Baker or President Bush against going to Baghdad...

Thatcher: I was no longer there, I was out. I was out in November. They didn't in fact start the ground war until middle January. I was no longer there, nor consulted, and rightly not consulted.