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by George J. Tenet Acting Director, Central Intelligence Agency to the Veterans Affairs Committee CIA's Role in Assessing Information Potentially Relevant to Gulf War Illnesses
9 January 1997 Chairman Specter and Members of the Veterans Affairs Committee, I am pleased to appear before you this morning to discuss CIA's e."forts on the issue of Gulf War illnesses. I am accompanied today by CIA's Executive Director, Nora Slatkin. I want to emphasize at the outset that we know how important this issue is to Gulf War veterans and that we in the CIA will do whatever we can to help. To go over the background first, the CIA has focused its energies on the intelligence aspects of this issue.
After long efforts, we think that everything possible has been done to try to model the chemical release at the Khamisiyah pit. We have learned lessons from our work. We will draw on them in the future. As for next steps, we will continue to work with DoD and the Presidential Advisory Committee to help get answers on these important issues. We are also prepared to address your questions after this briefing.
Key Findings
What is new since our last appearance before you is that we have worked with an Expert Review Group to evaluate the methodologies used in modeling efforts. This is the group requested by then-DCI Deutch and convened by Deputy Secretary of Defense White. John Deutch recognized that the modeling of the demolition activity in the pit area near Khamisiyah was crucial to DoD's efforts to determine possible exposure of US veterans. He wanted to assemble the broadest possible expertise to ensure that the modeling effort was unassailable. To this end, DoD asked the Institute of Defense Analysis (IDA) to convene a panel drawn from the scientific and technical community. The panel first met in late November and we anticipate its final report shortly fox release to the public. CIA briefed the panel on the modeling efforts and shared with it the evidence, assumptions, and methodologies. Although CIA plans to sponsor no further modeling, we will continue to work with DoD as it follows up on IDA's recommendations. I.et me take a moment to review CIA's role in analyzing Iraq's chemical and biological weapons programs to help put into context our participation in investigating US exposure to chemical agents. I will break my remarks into three parts--our intelligence focus before, during, and after the war.
Before the War
During the War A key objective for both military and intelligence personne1 was the early detection of the use of chemical ox biologica1 weapons. We received several reports of detection alarms. CIA operated a 24-hour chemica1 and biological detection unit at the start of the air war and maintained it through the ground campaign to monitor and assess such reports.
After the War During this time CIA also worked with DoD to try to track down and check the validity and possible causes of chemical detections that had occurred during the War. A good example of this was the 19 January 1991 Czech detection of nerve agents in Saudi Arabia. In this case, we sent a detailed to Czechoslovakia to further research the claim. We also had our contractor/modeler look at possible causes for the detections. We concluded that the detections were credible due to the specificity of the equipment and the quality of the procedures used by the Czechs. However, we were unable to conclusively determine the cause. We nonetheless remain convinced that the presence of chemical agents was not due to Iraqi offensive actions such as the use of Scud missiles. In March 1995, CIA began a thorough reexamination of re1evant intelligence. We did so because of the President's expressed concern about Gulf War Illness and because of questions raised by two CIA emp1oyees. This review culminated in the publication of our report last August. During this reexamination, we reviewed thousands of intelligence reports and other intelligence holdings. CIA analysts drew on information from DoD and other sources to clarify intelligence, get leads, and ensure a comprehensive assessment. Our study complemented DoD investigations that used hoop testimony, medical records, and operational logs. Let me address head-on a question that is probably on your mind, and one we have asked ourselves: why didn't CIA and the Intelligence Community focus on the potential exposure issue earlier? A number of reasons contributed to the gap between 1991 and March 1995, when we began this intelligence review. From the beginning, the consensus within the US Government was that Iraq had not used chemical or biological weapons during the war. Analysis since then has maintained that view. Moreover Iraq engaged in widespread deception with regard to where it stored its chemical weapons. Therefore, many reports received during this time were viewed with skepticism. Shortly after the war, the conditions „ now commonly referred to as Gulf War illness „ had not yet been widely reported. CIA's intelligence requirements did not make it a priority to examine all incidents of potential low- level exposure. In these circumstances, the Intelligence Community remained focused on its mission to support UNSCOM and assess the remaining Iraqi CBW capabilities. When we did focus more broadly on potential exposures short of actual Iraqi use, we identified two primary scenarios: fallout from aeria1 bombings in Iraq or fallout from demolition activity in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operation. Let me turn first to fallout from aerial bombings. Based on currently available information, we conclude that Coalition aerial bombing damaged filled chemical munitions at two facilities „ Muhammadiyat and A1 Muthanna. Both are located in remote areas west of Baghdad. (See briefing board) Iraq recently claimed that less than 5 percent of its approximately 700 metric tons of chemical agent stockpile was destroyed by Coalition bombing. In most cases, the Iraqis did not store chemical munitions in bunkers that they believed the Coalition would target. They stored many of these munitions in the open to protect them from Coalition detection and bombing. In addition, Iraq had inactivated or dismantled a11 known CW agent and precursor production lines by the start of the air campaign. At the request of the Presidential Advisory Committee, CIA had modeling pexformed of releases fxorn these facilities. That modeling work indicates that fallout from these facilities did not reach troops in Saudi Arabia. At Muhammadiyat Storage Area, Iraq declared that 200 mustard-filled and 12 sarin-filled aerial bombs were damaged or destroyed by Coalition bombing. Bombing of this facility started on 19 January and continued throughout the air war. Analysis of all available information leads us to conclude that the earliest chemical munitions destruction date at Muhammadiyat is 22 January. We have had models created showing a worst case release of 2.9 metric tons of sarin and 15 metric tons of mustard for all possible bombing dates. For these days, as for the whole time period of the bombing, southerly winds occurred on only a few days. The maximum downwind dispersions in the general southerly direction for sarin and mustard cut off at about 300 and 130 km respectively. Neither the first effects nor the lower exposure levels-known as "general population limit" levels--reached US troops that were stationed in Saudi Arabia. At Al Muthanna, the primary Iraqi CW production and storage facility, Iraq declared that 2,500 chemical rockets containing about 17 metric tons of sarin nerve agent had been destroyed by Coalition bombing. Analysis of all available information leads us to conclude that the earliest chemical munitions destruction date is 6 February. Of the days that the bunker at Muthanna could have been bombed, winds were southerly on only 8 February. For the "general population limit" dosage the most southerly dispersion on 8 February is 160 km, again well short of US troops. Turning to potential exposure from fallout due to demolition activity in the Kuwait Theater of Operations, we now know that on 4 March 1991 US troops destroyed nerve agent-filled 122mm rockets in Bunker 73 at Khamisiyah. On about 10 March 1991 they also destroyed CW rockets at a Pit area near Khamisiyah. The munitions were not marked at either location and, no acute injuries were reported at the time. UNSCOM inspected chemical munitions at or near Khamisiyah in October 1991 and identified 122mm sarin/cyclo-sarin (GB/GF) nerve agent-filled rockets and 155mm mustard rounds. At the time, it was not clear whether the chemical weapons identified had been present during the war or whether, as was suspected at other locations, the Iraqis had moved the munitions after the war and just prior to an UNSCOM inspection. The following information was obtained by UNSCOM during its October 1991 inspection.
The Iraqis claimed during the October 1991 inspection that Coalition troops had destroyed Bunker 73 earlier that year. We viewed the Iraqi statements with skepticism at the time because of Baghdad's widespread use of deception against UNSCOM, because we then had so little other intelligence to confirm the Iraqi assertion, and because UNSCOM itself could not verify that chemical weapons had been destroyed until 1996. CIA concluded in September 1995 „ after narrowing down to three the number of CW facilities where release might have occurred „ identified Khamisiyah as the most probable because of its closer proximity to US forces. We asked the DoD's Investigative Team to look into whether US troops were there. We researched the issue together, and by early March 1996 CIA and DoD developed information that enabled us to believe that US troops did blow up Bunker 73. The potential exposure of US troops was confirmed on 10 March. On that day, a CIA analyst at home heard a tape recording of a radio show in which a veteran of the 37th Engineering Battalion described demolition activities at a facility that the analyst immediately recognized as Khamisiyah. On 1 May, we briefed the Presidential Advisory Committee that US troops probably destroyed chemical weapons in Bunker 73. Any remaining doubts that the weapons were chemical were removed by an UNSCOM inspection in May. The UNSCOM inspectors documented the presence of high density polyethylene inserts, burster tubes, fill plugs, and other features characteristic of Iraqi chemical munitions. In addition, during this inspection Iraq told the UNSCOM inspectors that Iraq moved 2,160 unmarked 122mm nerve agent rockets to Bunker 73 from the Al Muthanna CW Production and Storage Facility just before the start of the air war. According to Ixaq, during the air war they moved about 1,100 rockets from the bunker to the pit area 2 km away. It is important to note that for the first time we were able to corroborate these claims through other sources. We published this information, as well as the results of the modeling of the downwind hazard. These results, as well as the results of the modeling at Muhammadiyat and Al Muthanna, are available on the Internet. Modeling of the potential hazard caused by destruction of Bunker 73 indicates that an area around the bunker at least 2 km in all directions and 4 km downwind could have been contaminated at or above the level for causing acute symptoms including runny nose, headache, and miosis „ that is, constriction of the pupil. An area up to 25 km downwind could have been contaminated at a much lower level. Based on wind models and observations of a video and photographs of destruction activity at Khamisiyah, we determined that the downwind direction was northeast to east. Some of the modeling assumptions we used were based on data from US testing in 1966. That testing involved destruction of several bunkers filled with GB rockets of similar maximum range to Iraqi rockets found in Bunker 73. Iraq told UNSCOM in May 1996 that it believed occupying Coalition forces also destroyed some pit area rockets. DoD's investigation into this possibility has showed that US soldiers destroyed stacks of crated munitions in the pit about a week after Bunker 73 was demolished. From analysis of all information, we assess that up to 550 rockets could have been destroyed. Modeling of the chemical release at the Khamisiyah pit area posed far more difficult challenges &.an the modeling of other sites. For example, unlike the Bunker 73 demolition, in the pit area we do not know the number or the date of the demolition events, how many shells were destroyed, the wind direction, and other factors critical in determining the dispersion of chemical agents. Moreover, our understanding of several of the important inputs changed while the pit area was being modeled. I would briefly like to go through each one of the areas of uncertainty:
As mentioned earlier, we have done about all we can to reduce the uncertainties of the number of munitions destroyed at the pit area. We are now supporting DoD in ifs effort to model the effects of the demolition activity.
Closing We will also declassify and make available to the public any new information wherever possible as part of our declassification program. And, more broadly speaking, we are working to increase our resources and expertise on chemical and biological weapons issues. We want to be well-positioned to deal with future contingencies. The CIA and the DoD teams continue to work together on any chemical and biological warfare aspects of Gulf War illnesses. We inform the Investigative Team of information that might be relevant to chemical or biological exposures. It, in turn, shares its findings with us. If we find information pointing to chemical or biological agent exposures or affecting the issue of Gulf War veterans' illnesses, we will collaborate with DoD to assess those findings.
In closing, I pledge that we will commit whatever
intelligence resources are required to support the
President and the DoD in their continuing effort to
identify the causes of Gulf War Illnesses.
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