BOB ABERNETHY, host: This past week in Washington, the administration’s top political, military, and diplomatic leaders gathered to think through US options in Afghanistan. On October 7, the US will have been involved militarily in Afghanistan for eight years. What’s our mission there? Can it be achieved, and what are the moral dimensions of the debate? William Galston is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington. He brings to the discussion a strong grounding in the just war tradition. Bill, welcome.

WILLIAM GALSTON (Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution): Good to be here.

ABERNETHY: What can we say about what the mission in Afghanistan should be?

GALSTON: Well, we have to understand the mission in light of 9/11. The attack on the United States, which killed thousands of civilians, was conceived and launched by Al-Quaeda using Afghanistan as a base, with the Taliban government sheltering them, and the piece of the mission on which everyone agrees is the importance, the urgency, and the moral justification, the defensive justification, of making sure that Afghanistan cannot again serve as a base for terrorist attacks on the United States.

ABERNETHY: Okay, so what are the means to that end? How do we do it?

GALSTON: That’s one of the questions that’s being debated in Washington right now, and there are two basic options. Option number one is to try to create an Afghan government that is legitimate, enjoys the consent of the people, and has the capacity to prevent Al-Quaeda and other terrorist groups from acting on its territory. The other possibility is to abandon the hope of creating such a government on the grounds that we don’t have the capacity to do it, and focus instead on direct attacks on Al-Quaeda and other terrorists, using drones, using bombs…

ABERNETHY: In Pakistan as well as …

GALSTON: …and special forces, in Pakistan as well as Afghanistan, absolutely.

ABERNETHY: And so can we do either of those?

GALSTON: That is a very important question, as we learned so painfully decades ago in Vietnam. It is wrong not to ask the question at the threshold, can we do what we want to do? It is immoral to send young people, young American men and women, to die in pursuit of an end that cannot be attained, and it is even worse if political leaders have good reason in advance to believe that the end that they are publicly declaring is unobtainable, and the worst of all is to use American troops for the immediate political advantage of the party of the administration in power.

ABERNETHY: One of the issues here is whether we can create the trust of the Afghan people in our ability to stay and do what’s necessary. Can they trust us to see it through?

GALSTON: That is a critical question, because by having anything to do with us in these remote villages they are risking their lives, and it would be wrong of us to send a signal that we’re in for the long haul and then leave our local allies in the lurch. Unfortunately, we have done that from time to time since the Second World War, and the results are never pretty, and the policy is never justified. If we tell people that they can depend on us, we’ve given a solemn promise on which they are wagering their lives, and we better honor that promise.

ABERNETHY: And so how do you come out, quickly? How do you come out on it?

GALSTON: I think that we have to go forward, and I have reluctantly concluded that an investment of additional troops represents the best way forward. Others that I respect differ with that conclusion.

ABERNETHY: William Galston of the Brookings Institution, many thanks.

GALSTON: My pleasure.

FRED DE SAM LAZARO, correspondent: Jakarta looks like any other modern Asian capital, but here, alongside the glittering office towers, you’ll also find imposing houses of worship. At the Istiqlal mosque recently, about 10,000 worshipers gathered for Friday noon prayer. It’s part of a religious revival that’s been taking place alongside a booming economy in recent decades. It is visible in mosques—and in malls. At this crowded shopping center, the most popular garment seems to be the head scarf.

INDONESIAN WOMAN: I’m here because Islam tells women to wear the scarf.

Dewi Fortuna Anwar

DE SAM LAZARO: This 40-year-old accountant began covering her hair three years ago.

INDONESIAN WOMAN: I feel ashamed, because I should have been wearing it since I was young, but at least I am wearing it now.

DE SAM LAZARO: Islam is making a comeback in Indonesia along with democracy that began 10 years ago. For years after independence from the Dutch in 1945, and then under decades of Suharto’s dictatorship, religion was officially tolerated at best.

DR. DEWI FORTUNA ANWAR (Indonesian Institute of Sciences): Islam and the traditional, customary laws were regarded as being backward and primarily blamed for, you know, the defeat for many Muslim countries under European rule, so that many of the earlier nationalist leaders, many of the educated elite, in fact, turned their back on religion, and among the younger generation there seems to be a greater willingness both to be openly religious and to be modern and educated at same times. I think maybe this is not just a search for greater spiritual anchor, but also I think it’s greater self-confidence.

DE SAM LAZARO: She and others say this growth of religious expression is spawned by the new democratic freedoms. It’s neither fundamentalist nor militant, notwithstanding recent terrorist incidents. Bombings in two Jakarta hotels killed nine people last July, and a 2002 attack in the tourist haven of Bali killed more than 200. But religion scholar Ulil Abdalla, with the liberal Islamic Youth Association, says such extremism is not widespread.

ULIL ABDALLA (Islamic Youth Association): For some people, Islam as practiced in this country is corrupted. Movies and food and, you know, lifestyle and so forth, it’s pretty much influenced by the American cultures. So when radical Islamic ideologies was introduced by some activists to Indonesia, it appealed to young people, but that’s, you know, the appeal is limited to a fringe in the society. It’s not a predominant trend.

Ulil Abdalla

DE SAM LAZARO: The more accurate gauge, he says, is Indonesia’s recent election, in which secular incumbent [president] Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono won easily. Islamist parties, which had surged to 40 percent of the vote in 2004, lost ground, to less than 30 percent.

ULIL ABDALLA: Some people feared that if democracy, if the democratic space is opened it will allow Islamist party to dominate the arena. That is not true.

DE SAM LAZARO: Significantly, the reaction of the Islamist and other parties after the election indicates a commitment to democracy, says Anies Baswedan, a scholar of political Islam.

ANIES BASWEDAN (Paramadina University): We have around 40 parties. Only nine were able to gain seats in the house, yet we do not see significant problems from supporters who are not having their parties in the house. Acceptance to political result, democratic result, is very important.

DE SAM LAZARO: He says Indonesians, especially the 14 percent who survive on less than a dollar a day, have much more pragmatic concerns—food prices, the economy in general, and corruption—even voters who’d like to impose stricter Islamic law or sharia.

MARTA: From what I understand about Islamic states, the people live in prosperity, and the law is enforced very strictly. Those who steal, those who are corrupt, they cut off their hand, rather than here, where people who can bribe judges and police get away with things.

DE SAM LAZARO: Yet Marta, who like many Indonesians uses just one name, voted for the secular president. So did his neighbor, Samsuddin, who praises a government initiative that’s helped the poor.

SAMSUDDIN: Number one is cash for poor families, and the second is cheap rice. We get $10 a month in cash and 15 kilos of rice. We are a Muslim family, but we are not that strict. I voted for the party that is already helping people. It doesn’t matter whether it’s Islamic or not.

Anies Baswedan

DE SAM LAZARO: That kind of sentiment has moved Islamist parties to the center.

ANIES BASWEDAN: People understand now, campaigning, that “we are Muslims, we are an Islamic party, this is a sharia platform” does not sell. People ask, “Tell me what else, tell me in reality, what will you deliver beyond the slogans?”

FAHRI HAMZAH (Member of Parliament): We don’t name it sharia, because if you name it sharia people then from beginning suspicious to see.

DE SAM LAZARO: Fahri Hamzah is a Member of Parliament with the most successful Islamist party, called Prosperity and Justice, which joined the ruling coalition government. Although it once campaigned for Islamic law and more conservative women’s attire, Hamzah says they are happy to govern by consensus in a liberal democratic framework.

FAHRI HAMZAH: We are an Islamic party, but what we talk about Islam is Islam as the universal value, because we believe every religion, you know, inspired by God. We follow this direction that anti-corruption is Islamic agenda, clean government is Islamic agenda, you know, welfare, manage our economy, open economy, you know, liberalize our economy is one of the, you know, good agenda.

DE SAM LAZARO: That interpretation might well have its roots in the history of Islam in this vast, diverse archipelago.

DR. DEWI FORTUNA ANWAR: We are used to living in differences. Indonesia is composed of islands, over 17,000 islands and over 700 different ethnic groups with different languages, different cultural traditions. Islam came to Indonesia fairly late, from 12th century up, mostly through traders and Sufi teachers. They found Indonesia already very rich layers of cultures, and to be accepted a new belief, a new religion would have to adapt to local circumstances from the beginning. I think that was the case when Hinduism came here and when Buddhism came here and then when Islam came here, when Christianity also came here.

Fahri Hamzah

DE SAM LAZARO: So even though it’s 85 percent Muslim today, Islam here reflects Indonesia’s polyglot culture, readily evident in architecture, language, even in the mall scarf shops.

YUDI TOZA (Shop Owner): We believe in Indonesia that Islam is more modern, more moderate. People who wear the plain dress, it’s not our way.

ROSA LESTARI (Shop Clerk): It will look strange if an Indonesian woman wore that kind of plain clothes, especially nowadays. They probably think you are a terrorist’s wife.

DE SAM LAZARO: Shop owner, saleswoman, and customer told us there’s no contradiction between Islam and fashion, that the notion of a plainly dressed, fully covered woman is—foreign. Shopping here was Nur Inani, who was buying for customers in her own clothing business in the island of Sumatra.

NUR INANI: Mostly they are looking for clothes this long and this long, which is basically covering the butt and the arms. I look for the dress first, and then I will find the matching scarf, the color, the style.

DE SAM LAZARO: Terrorist incidents aside, Indonesia is enjoying a period of stability rarely seen in its independent history. Indonesians are free to choose their government, and they are free to pursue religion, and they’ve made it clear in elections that they want to pursue each separately, that is, to keep religion out of government.

For Religion & Ethics NewsWeekly, this is Fred de Sam Lazaro in Jakarta.

BOB ABERNETHY, host: There were controversial developments this week in the debate over how the CIA interrogated terrorism suspects after 9/11. The Justice Department released details of a 2004 CIA inspector general’s report detailing chilling interrogation techniques, including waterboarding. The attorney general ordered an investigation of what happened and appointed a veteran prosecutor to find out.

Did CIA interrogators go beyond the guidance they had? If so, should they be punished, and should Bush administration officials who authorized the techniques also be punished? We explore the moral issues with Shaun Casey, professor of ethics at Wesley Theological Seminary in Washington. Shaun, welcome. Let me take you back to the atmosphere right after 9/11. There was tremendous pressure on the administration to prevent another attack, to do whatever was necessary, to find out whatever they could about whether there was going to be another attack. Didn’t that justify the interrogation techniques that were put into place?

SHAUN CASEY (Professor Ethics, Wesley Theological Seminary, Washington, DC): I would argue that it’s precisely at those moments of crisis that we need to rely on our moral and legal tradition and resist giving up things like respect for the dignity of the human person, and I think that moral tradition argues that no matter who the person is, as a result of that dignity, they shouldn’t be subjected to the kinds of torture we suspect went on.

ABERNETHY: And even if you’re pretty sure you might be able to save several thousand more innocent lives, that would not trump the dignity of the individual prisoner?

PROFESSOR CASEY: What’s interesting even at the time, and now we know for sure, such information did not exist. We did not extract through torture any information that directly led to preventing another similar sort of tragic event. So in essence no, I think we should resist, because we don’t possess that kind of advance knowledge.

ABERNETHY: Apparently the CIA tried hard to keep what was done within the guidelines that existed but that in some cases people did exceed those guidelines. Should they be punished?

PROFESSOR CASEY: Absolutely. I think if in fact we gave guidance to those interrogators, and they still violated those guidelines, there needs to be a moral accountability in order to reinforce this notion that we do respect the dignity of human beings.

ABERNETHY: And what about up the chain of command? If the investigations reveal that high officials, maybe up to the vice president and the president, authorized things that shouldn’t have been done should they be punished?

PROFESSOR CASEY: I think they should be held morally accountable, and that doesn’t necessarily mean criminalization or actual legal punishment, but I think in a democracy that espouses certain moral values we need to have accountability, not only of what has happened, but it also prepares us morally to face the future when we may find ourselves in a similar sort of situation when we’re facing a crisis and we face pressure to abandon legal and moral precedents that we’ve observed.

ABERNETHY: But if a new administration can have a criminal investigation of it’s predecessor and put people perhaps on trial, that creates an enormous partisan gridlock and nothing else would be done.

PROFESSOR CASEY: Well, that’s right, and I think that’s what the president is struggling with right now. We’re looking at simply about 10 cases where he is, actually where the attorney general has asked the prosecutor to investigate. At this point I’m not aware of any attempt for a comprehensive criminal prosecution. On the other hand, I would argue it might be better to think about a bipartisan commission that in a sense grants amnesty legally to all the participants so we can learn what really happened from the top of the system to the bottom, as a way not only of holding them accountable morally but also preparing us to face the future when we may find ourselves under similar circumstances, and I think that’s a way to in a sense take some of the air out of the partisanship which seems to be growing at this time.

ABERNETHY: You have read what you could of the CIA inspector general’s report in 2004. Quickly, can you sum it up? What did you find? What did they conclude?

PROFESSOR CASEY: They concluded that there weren’t a lot of rules in place, and they had to move very quickly to give guidelines, which they did. Secondly, they confessed that some of their own employees violated those guidelines. But perhaps most importantly of all they concluded they cannot say these enhanced interrogation techniques led to unique knowledge that could not have been gotten by other means, and so that really casts a light of doubt on the effectiveness of these techniques.

ABERNETHY: Many thanks to Shaun Casey of Wesley Theological Seminary.

Heidi Litle, an American Baptist living with her family in Haifa, describes losing her 14-year-old daughter in a suicide bombing in 2003 and how that affects her view of the peace process.

Burcu Munyas, program manager for Catholic Relief Services, discusses the difficulties her agency faces trying to get food and other relief supplies to desperate people in Gaza.

BOB ABERNETHY, anchor: In the ongoing national debate about the morality of torture, the question is whether it is ever the lesser evil. We want to identify the underlying principles in the debate, beginning with part of President Obama’s reply at his news conference last Wednesday (April 29) when he was asked whether he thought the Bush administration had sanctioned torture.

President BARAK OBAMA (at White House news conference): What I’ve said, and I will repeat, is that waterboarding violates our ideals and our values. I do believe that it is torture. You start taking short cuts and over time that corrodes what’s best in a people. It corrodes the character of a country.

ABERNETHY: But can torture sometimes be justified?

Jean Bethke Elshtain is a professor of social and political ethics at the University of Chicago Divinity School and at Georgetown University. She joins us from Nashville. Shaun Casey is a professor of Christian ethics at Wesley Theological Seminary in Washington. Welcome to you both. Shaun — never?

Dr. SHAUN CASEY (Professor of Christian Ethics, Wesley Theological Seminary, Washington, DC): I think the bulk of the Christian moral tradition says that torture is never morally permissible. If you go to Christian Scripture, you go to the wide arc of Christian social teachings, you get a very consistent historical answer that it is never right to torture another human being.

ABERNETHY: What’s the underlying reason for this?

Dr. CASEY: Well, you look at basic Scripture, you look at Jesus in the Gospels about love your neighbor as yourself, do not repay evil for evil, love your enemy—so there’s this sense that each person is created by God in the image of God and has an inherent dignity, and torture would render that dignity undermined.

ABERNETHY: And Jean, what are the underlying principles for you?

Dr. JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN (Professor of Social and Political Ethics, University of Chicago Divinity School and Georgetown University): Well, the underlying principle for me is what I would call an “ethic of responsibility.” That’s an ethic that is especially important when we’re talking about statesmen and stateswomen who often have the lives of thousands in their hands, quite literally.

ABERNETHY: So they have a different rule, a different ethic, a different moral standard than somebody would if he’s just acting as an individual?

Dr. ELSHTAIN: Not entirely different. We don’t want a huge chasm to emerge. But I would say that there are extraordinary circumstances when harrowing judgments must be made by those we tax with the responsibility of keeping us safe, and at those times there may be a “lesser evil” kind of calculation to be made.

Dr. CASEY: We have about a 60-year tradition of international law and domestic law that regulates the behavior of those who, in fact, are called to be our political leaders and there is a consistent prohibition of the use of torture. In fact, the United States has been a leading catalyst in that international movement, so I agree with that. But I think we have some rules that are in place that prohibit torture.

ABERNETHY: But beyond what’s legal is what’s moral. I mean, they’re not always the same, are they?

Dr. CASEY: That’s true, and as the president said the other night in part of the clip that you played for us, that he believes that a leader in his position who faces those harrowing decisions ultimately is going to decide on both, of the angels and on responsibility if in fact we as a country refrain from using torture.

ABERNETHY: So, Jean, the president then has this primary moral responsibility, would you say, of protecting the people?

Dr. ELSHTAIN: Yes, that’s why we have states. That’s the reason that people made the deal back in the 17th century to organize the state — to prevent capricious power and the slaughter of human beings willy-nilly. That’s the reason we have states and have leaders to protect us.

ABERNETHY: And do you think people generally, American people, expect that a president will, somebody has written, have, you know, has to have dirty hands?

Dr. ELSHTAIN: Well, the problem of dirty hands is a perennial problem in politics. What it means is that one can’t remain absolutely morally pure, that you take actions. You don’t know what the full ramifications of those actions may be. Now I fully agree, by the way, that torture is something that should be ruled out as a general norm. My concern is with certain very specific and tragic circumstances, if there are severe forms of interrogation that may well fall short of torture as we usually understand it but are certainly severe — whether those are permissible.

ABERNETHY: And Shaun, the classic argument for permitting an exception, an extraordinary circumstance is the ticking bomb scenario, you know, that somebody in your custody has information about when a terrible, terrible thing might happen that would cost the lives of thousands of innocent people. Under such circumstances, perhaps others, don’t the people in authority have the responsibility to do something extraordinary if they think that can give them information quickly?

Dr. CASEY: Well, the fist thing we should observe is that there are no historical examples of that being lived out in reality. That’s a hypothetical contrary to fact, that it never obtained in the real world. What I worry about is the lack of rules to govern that exception. Many people argue that because they can create a hypothetical case like this there should be no rules against torture, and I think that is a grave moral error. The problem is we never know if that information can be elicited by other means. There’s no way to verify that, indeed, torture is the only option in those cases. So what happens if you torture that person and you turn out to be wrong, the information proves not to be true? But what do you say then to the person who’s tortured at your hands?

ABERNETHY: Jean, you want to comment on that?

Dr. ELSHTAIN: Yes. I would say that the resort to extreme techniques would be used only after all other possibilities had been exhausted. It wouldn’t be the first resort; it would be the last resort, and again we’d have to be clear about what we’re considering torture here, because some of the most severe forms I think must be ruled out. But there are other forms of enhanced interrogation that, I think, under those extreme circumstances and as an exception, may well, under the ticking time bomb scenario, be resorted to.

ABERNETHY: There is a recent poll by the Pew Research Center that found that 71 percent of Americans — American adults — said torture can be justified often or sometimes or rarely. Only 25 percent said never. Is that influential to you at all?

Dr. CASEY: I think that shows the influence of the Rupert Murdoch school of ethics — that we’ve been watching Jack Bauer, where torture is routinely shown to be effective on our television screens. I don’t think we decide what is moral and what is immoral based on the latest Pew poll about American opinion.

ABERNETHY: Jean, and what do you think of investigation and perhaps prosecution of those who authorized what was done?

Dr. ELSHTAIN: Well, it strikes me that, number one, it would immediately be politicized in a way that would be egregious and unacceptable, and number two, there’d be the question of how far back you go. Extraordinary rendition began under President Clinton, for example. So I think that that kind of going back and second-guessing those who in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 were dealing with shock and horror and fear about another imminent attack and were asked by CIA operatives in the field whether certain things were permissible—it strikes me that the best thing for now is to go on and to make clearer what we expect from those who are interrogating even high-value targets and operatives of Al Qaeda, for example.

ABERNETHY: Shaun — investigation, prosecution?

Dr. CASEY: We need a thorough moral accounting of what’s gone on. We’ve had an air of moral permissiveness in the last administration under which tens of thousands of innocent people have been tortured — not simply the special Al Qaeda cases. We need to find out why that happened. We need to find out who was accountable in order to build a very tall wall against this kind of behavior. We need to empower the folks who do the interrogating with very bright lines about what’s acceptable and what’s not acceptable. At this point that, in fact, is not clear.

ABERNETHY: But, quickly, would you come out saying that there could be sometimes an exception to the “never” position?

Dr. CASEY: No.

ABERNETHY: No. Never?

Dr. CASEY: Never.

ABERNETHY: Thanks to Shaun Casey and Jean Bethke Elshtain.

Dr. ELSHTAIN: Thank you.

Rabbi Jack Moline is the rabbi at Agudas Achim Congregation in Alexandria, Virginia:

There is an old joke about a group of tourists taken prisoner by a guerilla group in a distant country. The leader of the gang tells them they will be executed one by one, but they will each be granted a last request. An Israeli member of the group volunteers to go first, and as his last request asks to be kicked in the rear end. The kidnappers are mystified, but after a little back and forth agree to the request and one of them plants a swift boot on the Israeli’s back side. At that point, the Israeli spins around and, with a combination of fists and guns, disables all the guerillas.

Qassam rocket destroys home of an elderly woman in Sderot. Courtesy of The Israel Project.

Stunned, the survivors turn to him and one of them asks, “Why did you ask for a kick in the rear before you did that?” The Israeli answered, “Because otherwise the headlines would read ‘Tourists Rescued After Unprovoked Israeli Attack.’”

War is very bad business. No one with an ounce of compassion wants to cause suffering to innocents, heartbreak to parents or terror to civilians. But when those without that ounce of compassion promote suffering, heartbreak or terror, then the only inappropriate response is no response at all.

“Just war” theory is a philosophical term, and I am not a philosopher. This war is a necessary war because all other efforts to end the rain of missiles on undisputed Israeli territory by Hamas operatives from Gaza have been unsuccessful. Those efforts have come from within and without Palestinian quarters, Arab society, the Muslim world and Israel itself. Arguments about proportionality, cycles of violence and broad concepts of justice overlook the unwillingness of Hamas to respond to any appeal or pressure to end the immediate cause of danger to civilians in Israel and in Gaza. Absent from all of the protests about Israeli military action is “proportionate” protest over the past years against the terrorizing of Israeli children and their parents by Hamas. The only reason Israeli civilian casualties are fewer is because Hamas is bad at aiming those missiles, not because they are more compassionate.

I am persuaded that Israel’s military is doing its utmost to minimize casualties among non-combatants. With cynicism and cruelty, Hamas has used human shields and compromised religious and humanitarian institutions to stage its own operations.  “Collateral damage” seems part of their plan. And when innocent life is lost, there is no rejoicing in the Israeli press, the Israeli streets or the Israeli military. Israel knows that there are two losses it cannot endure: the loss of this war and the loss of its humanity. The vigorous debates among Israelis and the long-time supporters of Israel about the conduct of this operation are an indication that both priorities are being pursued.

There are larger questions about justice in the region that are relevant to address when a dependable cease-fire takes place.  But at the moment, only willful ignorance of the circumstances that provoked Israel’s current operation would lead an individual to question this sovereign government’s responsibility to protect its citizens.

Israel has endured close to 7000 kicks in the back side. Somehow, for some folks, that wasn’t enough.

Kevin Carnahan is Visiting Assistant Professor of Religion at Hendrix College in Conway, Arkansas:

Family members watch a loved one being taken to hospital after being wounded in the violence. Photo: Fady Adwan, Freelancer Gaza.

I was in Jerusalem when the current Israeli military action began. As usual, the region was divided not only by the lines of battle, but also by the stories people were telling about the ongoing violence. Even as Israeli public opinion swung in favor of the action to defend their fellow citizens against rockets fired by Palestinian militants, a friend from East Jerusalem challenged me to explain how it could be that Israel might escape international sanction for targeting noncombatants. There are no easy judgments in a time of war, and there is little common ground for moral dialogue in Israel/Palestine.

Still, the current conflict raises important just war questions. In terms of proximate cause, it is clear that Israel was justified in taking military action. There is no moral justification for shooting rockets at civilian centers in a neighboring territory. Doing so invites military response. But there are questions about moral responsibilities in the longer term relationship between Israel and the Gaza Strip. Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 allowed it to set aside its responsibilities as an occupying force while maintaining strict limits on Gaza’s borders, and thus its social and economic potential. The fact that the withdrawal was a unilateral action weakened the Fatah party in Gaza. Hamas could now claim that its aggression had succeeded where Fatah’s political efforts had failed. This set the stage for Hamas’s later electoral victory and its success in the ensuing civil-military conflict with Fatah in Gaza. Israel’s reaction to the political rise of Hamas (supported by many Western powers) was to clamp down all the more on the flow of goods and people in and out of Gaza. In the face of worsening humanitarian conditions and a politically hobbled Hamas regime, Israel has maintained that it bears no responsibility for any supposed injustices in the Gaza Strip.

None of this is to suggest that Israel is simply a malign protagonist in the story. Hamas has not withdrawn its constitutional aim of eliminating the state of Israel. Israel is right to attempt to maintain its own security in the face of a de facto authority that has declared itself in a state of war with Israel. Further, Hamas is either unable to prevent rocket fire into Israel, in which case the Gaza Strip is something like a failed state, or Hamas is actively allowing or supporting rocket attacks, in which case it is undertaking unjust forms of aggression. The point to take away is that something like “just cause” is usually more complex in the real world than the designation of a single act. In most cases, like this one, multiple actors share responsibility for the outbreak of a particular conflict.

More serious are concerns about the ends of the current conflict. As often happens in this ongoing small war, it is unclear what constitutes victory for either side, and it is unlikely that the aims of either side are realistically realizable. Given the political climate, is doubtful Hamas could bring the firing of rockets to a complete halt (even Israel was not able to stop rockets or prevent smuggling when it occupied the Gaza Strip prior to disengagement in 2005), and there is little political incentive for Hamas to participate in a sustained peace agreement so long as it is sidelined from real political power by Israeli and international pressure. It is doubtful Israel is willing to allow Hamas the place at the political table that would be necessary to see to what extent they could rein in other militant movements in the Gaza Strip. Another option for ending rocket fire would be a sustained reoccupation of Gaza by Israeli forces. This, however, is unlikely to be something for which either the Israeli or the Palestinian populace has a stomach.

So what is Israel’s end game? It is hard to know. Domestic and international political contingencies, however, may have played more of a role than the particular situation on the ground. In the light of an impending election, it seems likely that the need to appear tough on national security may have been a factor in the decision-making process for the incumbent coalition (which is likely soon to be out of power). There may also have been a wish to push for the conflict and resolution prior to the new American presidential administration, which is widely perceived as less friendly to Israel’s cause. Such concerns are hard to fit into the boxes of the just war criteria, but who can doubt that they play a significant role in the process of real-time statecraft?

My Arab friend in East Jerusalem raised the question of noncombatant immunity, which is a perennial concern of just war theorists with a deontological bent. Certainly, Israel’s attempts to provide telephone calls alerting the residents of buildings suspected of housing weapons caches of impending strikes is a positive sign of its will to avoid noncombatants. But Israeli actions have not been unquestionably just in this regard. One of Israel’s first targets in the conflict was a police graduation in Gaza. Not only does this target raise questions about the appropriate effort to avoid collateral damage, it also raises questions about the very definition of combat in an irregular situation like the Gaza Strip. Is the police force of Gaza a proper military target? Doubtless many police members saw themselves not as functionaries of Hamas but as common civil servants attempting to maintain a relatively orderly society in unfortunate circumstances. Does reticence in preventing militant groups from firing rockets into Israel render the entire police force of Gaza a viable military target? If the police force is not a viable target, what does constitute a viable military target? Situations like Gaza remind us that even the most ethical of criteria depend on prudence in application and are thus imperfect at best.

More questions should be asked about the proportionality of Israel’s current military actions. In a simple tally of lives, there is no proportionality to be found here. Rockets from the Gaza Strip, though backed with lethal intent, are vaguely aimed and rarely bring about casualties. Israel’s military force is unparalleled in the region and has brought about more destruction in a number of days than rockets fired at the rates prior to the incursion would in years. As such, one should wonder if a set of targeted reprisals would have been more suitable to the task at hand. Still, proportionality is measured not only retrospectively but also in terms of future possibilities. Here again there is the problem of determining what the end game might look like for Israel. No matter what it might be, I have problems justifying the destruction thus far.

In this conflict, absolute statements are rarely of much use for purposes other than inflaming further conflict and obscuring muddy realities on the ground. There is all too much blame to go around and all too little realism about one’s own relative injustices and the relative justice of the opponent. In the midst of this, one thing is clear. It is time for the United States again to take an active interest in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict and to attempt to overcome the oversimplifications that have reigned in its absence. In the meantime, I will pray for my friends in Jerusalem.

Paula Cooey is the Margaret W. Harmon Professor of Christian Theology and Culture at Macalester College in St. Paul, Minnesota:

Grad Missile Attack on Ashkelon in the South of Israel. Edi Israel photography.

One of the difficulties with just war theory is that the criteria are subject to interpretation and vary depending on circumstances. So, for example, some ethicists recently argued that the doctrine of preemptive strike fell within the criteria governing just war; likewise the definition of “terrorism.”

Ethicists have also argued that intentions distinguish the violence done to civilian life such that collateral damage, while inevitable and regrettable, does not fall under the category of terrorism, unlike killing civilians with bombs strapped to their bodies. Taken together and coupled with the argument of self-defense, the criterion of preemptive strike and the definition of terrorism justify Israel’s response to Hamas in Gaza. By contrast, those ethicists of the 1970s and 1980s who theorized “just revolution” in South and Central America based on just war theory would arguably defend the actions of Hamas.

Either way, civilians suffer the primary burden of death and wounding, not to mention displacement, terrifying fear, and all the other exigencies of destabilization wrought by the continued violence. Why are we not theorizing an ethical advocacy for civilians? What has happened to the criteria of minimizing civilian contact, proportionality, and the rejection of total annihilation of material resources, central to just war theory (some of which trace their origins to Torah and to the rules governing jihad developed by medieval Muslim jurists)? What has happened to the UN Declaration of Human Rights and the Geneva Accords?

Instead of trying to figure out whether Gaza is just, we need to put more effort into stopping the violence in a lasting fashion.

Anthony F. Lang Jr. is Senior Lecturer at the School of International Relations, University of St Andrews:

Photo: Palestinian Red Crescent Society

The just war tradition is not a checklist that can give policy makers a “justification” for what they can and cannot do in certain situations. Rather, it is a set of categories that can provide a framework for public debate on the use of military force. The three key elements of the tradition as they relate to Gaza are just cause, authority, and proportionality. Others may be relevant for some, but these strike me as key.

Authority: The authority of both Israel and Hamas deserves critical scrutiny in this conflict. Importantly, authority can be understood in different ways, both internally and externally.    Israel’s actions suggest its leaders understand their authority in two ways: First, they are being attacked and have an authority in relation to the citizens of Israel. Second, and not stated but implied by their actions, they are acting as the authority within the Gaza Strip by seeking to coerce the population as a whole. In terms of the latter form of authority, Israel is not justified to act in the way they have. It is a sovereign state, which would seem to give it an obvious authority. But the people of Gaza contest their sovereignty, and Israel officially renounced its claims on Gaza some time back. Moreover, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs website states clearly that the Israelis do not want to govern Palestinians.

The just war tradition, however, does give a community the responsibility to protect its own citizens from attack. This authority Israel clearly does have, for they have been subject to rocket attacks by Hamas. Such authority would justify a response that takes out the rocket sites and those manning them, but not a full-scale response designed to destroy the economy and polity. This means the use of “coercive diplomacy” to force the larger Palestinian population in the territory to turn on Hamas is unjust as a tactic. In other words, the Israeli authority to respond with military force to Hamas does exist, but the Israelis overextended it by effectively coercing a whole population.

The authority of Hamas must also be subject to criticism. While they may have been elected, their behavior does not correspond to a just authority, either in the way they treat their own population (using them as shields, hiding from Israeli power in Damascus) or in their failure to act as a responsible member of the international community. This undermines their claims to govern the Palestinians. As I note below, if the authority of Hamas is not just, then their claim to be representing the just cause of the Palestinian people as a whole should be called into question.

Both Israel and Hamas have abused their authority. Any outcome of this conflict must address the underlying status of the Palestinian territories and the Israeli settlements on those territories. This problem cannot be resolved with just a ceasefire. It needs a final decision about who has the proper authority in what areas. In fact, it needs to be resolved on two levels—the internal Palestinian situation and the relationship between Palestine and Israel as two sovereign communities.

Just Cause: In the long term, this situation results from Israel’s unjust treatment of the Palestinians. Since the founding of the state of Israel in 1948, the predominant view among Israeli public and political opinion (with limited, albeit vigorous examples of dissent among Israelis) has been that the Palestinians do not “deserve” the land as much as the Israelis do. This is manifestly unjust. No matter what the religious claims of the Israelis are to the land, they do not justify their treatment of a population that had been resident there. The West Bank and Gaza Strip should be considered “occupied territories,” illegally occupied in my view. The overall cause of resisting Israeli oppression seems to rest with the Palestinian people.

Yet the Palestinian people are not represented by Hamas, and the short-term responsibility of this particular outbreak falls squarely on them. In other words, Hamas does not have a just cause (although the Palestinian people may). Their refusal to deal with the Israelis honestly and openly, their anti-Semitic rhetoric, and their use of short-range missiles to terrorize Israeli citizens demanded a military response. This may appear to contradict the first just cause point, but I don’t think it does. There may be a justified Palestinian anger at the Israelis, but the Palestinians have been dealing with the Israelis for the last 20 years, so for one group—Hamas—to disrupt those relations has caused a huge problem for both sides.

This point reinforces the overall thrust of the just war tradition—that just cause cannot be understood outside of just authority. There may be a just cause, but if an unjust authority takes it up, this vitiates the justice of the action. The Palestinians may have a just cause in resisting Israeli occupation, but the fact that Hamas took up this issue undercuts its justice. The larger just cause may rest with the Palestinians, but the immediate just cause my rest with the Israelis.

Proportionality: The Israeli economic and military response has been profoundly disproportionate on three levels. Their initial economic blockade of the Gaza Strip, which is run by Hamas, has created huge economic hardships. Economic sanctions, as we saw in Iraq, punish entire communities. Perhaps in some cases entire communities deserve punishment, but this seems rare, and I cannot imagine one, so this first step was disproportionate.

Second, the air campaign, by the very nature of such campaigns, has been indiscriminate. While modern air forces claim they have become capable of increasing precision in targeting, and while the Israeli Air Force has been impressive in some cases, strikes from the air will remain indiscriminate when targeting heavily populated areas.

Third, the ground campaign had the potential to be more discriminating than the air campaign. This is because when soldiers confront actual people they can sometimes make judgments based on morality and law. Unfortunately, perhaps as a result of Israeli public discourse about Hamas and the Palestinians, some of that moral sensibility has been undermined. As a result, the Israeli ground campaign has been less discriminate than it could be, but more discriminate than the air campaign.

A further point to keep in mind is that both sides are defining the category of “civilian” differently. For Israelis, any young man who wears the green of Hamas is a “terrorist” and thus a legitimate target. For the Palestinians, most of those young men are just young men. It is difficult to judge this, however, because the definition of civilians who are resisting an occupation is complicated, both in morality and law. Overall, I would say the Israelis are abusing the term “terrorist,” while the Palestinians are abusing the term “civilian.”

Proportionality is not simply an added point that rests under the authority and cause issues. While Israel may have had a short-term just cause, their disproportionate response has undermined the justness of their response.

It is important to commend those trying to resolve the crisis, including the Egyptians, French, and UN officials. Of these, I find the response of the Egyptians to be the most impressive. Egypt is the only Arab government that has any real respect in Israel, and it borders Gaza. Its tradition of using diplomacy to resolve conflicts in the past 30 years has clearly been evident here. This is not to say Egypt is an ideal state, especially internally, and it may have ulterior motives, but that does not undermine its efforts, which the international community should applaud.

As far as short-term immediate responses, Israel needs to lift the entire blockade of Gaza, and Hamas needs to commit to ending its rocket attacks. These are the two primary issues. After this, Israel needs to remove all its settlements from both the Gaza Strip and West Bank. Next, Palestine needs to be declared an official state, by all parties, with a single government and with some contiguity between the territories. These points have already been largely agreed upon, so they are not really long-term impossibilities. Both sides need to stick to their agreements and stop violating the accords.

A long-term ideal solution would be twofold: Jerusalem needs to be no one’s capital but an international city. This condition is highly unlikely, but it is my firm view of what is best. Second, the only real solution would be a single state in which all religious and ethnic groups can live together under a democracy. This is highly unlikely, but it is what I would hope for.

What can the US do? First, it needs to stop supporting Israel so uncritically in the UN and other public forums. Second, while it has already cut back its funding to Israel, it needs to use the funds it does give to pressure Israel into adopting the tactics suggested above. Third, the US needs to pressure the two main Palestinian parties to agree on a single democratic regime, again using its power of the purse. I don’t think US military troops should be involved at all in the region, although perhaps as part of a UN ceasefire force they may be of some help.

Joining me with more about the implications of all of this is Timothy Shah, adjunct senior fellow for religion and foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. Tim, welcome. Tell us how religion was tied up in this.

TIM SHAH (Adjunct Senior Fellow, Religion and Foreign Policy, Council on Foreign Relations): In a number of ways, and in really two big ways in particular. First is that the group that was most likely involved in these terrible attacks in Mumbai was not just a militant group, as we often see in the press, but it was a group motivated by religious ideology. The group is known as Lashkar-e-Taiba, which means “Army of the Pure,” and it continues to operate openly in Pakistan today. It has reconstituted itself as a faith-based NGO, but it is still a radical Islamic organization motivated by religious ideology. The second way in which religion is involved is that these attacks help to intensify a very volatile mix of religion and politics in India, which especially involves the Hindu nationalist movement and its political wing, the BJP.

LAWTON: Now where does this leave India’s Muslim population?

Timothy Shah

Mr. SHAH: It raises some questions and suspicions in the minds of many Indians and also people outside of India as to whether India’s very large Muslim community was in some way involved in this, if not as the prime instigators perhaps as accomplices. India has a very large Muslim community. It’s the third largest Muslim population in the world, making India the third largest Muslim country in the world of about 130 million people, and so there are questions —so far no concrete evidence I should emphasize — but there are questions and suspicions about the role of India’s Muslims.

LAWTON: But India’s Muslims have not been part of some of these movements by and large, is that correct?

Mr. SHAH: That’s right. There have been a number of attacks — terrorist attacks in India in the last five or six years and there has been evidence in some cases of local, home-grown Muslim groups involved. One group is called the Students Islamic Movement of India — SIMI. That has been involved in some attacks. But by and large the vast majority of India’s Muslims are not only not involved in these kinds of attacks, but have no sympathy whatsoever with them.

LAWTON: And you mentioned, because of — there’s also a violent streak in some of the Hindu nationalist movement …

Mr. SHAH: Yes, absolutely …

LAWTON: … as well, that this really puts the future of India as a multifaith democracy in jeopardy?

Mr. SHAH: That’s right. In fact, it’s actually very striking that in the last few weeks a Hindu terror network was uncovered by Indian police, and there are some elements of the Hindu nationalist movement that have violent tendencies. We’ve seen one group, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad or World Hindu Council, conduct very violent attacks against Christians in eastern India in Orissa, just in the last few weeks and months. So yes, and one really fears that in the light of these attacks these groups would really want to attack Muslims and other religious minorities in a more dramatic way.

LAWTON: All right, Tim Shah from the Council on Foreign Relations, thank you very much.

Mr. SHAH: Thank you.

Mumbai’s Gateway of India

Though the Mumbai attacks were deeply disturbing, the role of religion in this tragic case does not seem to be much different than in most other cases of so-called “religious terrorism” in recent years. That is, they are more about terrorism than religion. Having ruminated for the past twenty years over the question of what religion has to do with public violence, my conclusion is that religion is seldom the sole factor. It is a mistake to focus only on the religious language and images associated with a terrorist act. Yet religion does play a role: when social and political dissension is framed in religious terms, it can conduce toward extreme positions. But terrorism is not the monopoly of any one religious tradition. Only recently we were witnessing the terror of Hindu and Sikh activism in India, and we’ve seen an abundance of Christian terrorism in the US, especially in the years preceding the bombing of the Oklahoma City federal building. So religion plays a role in making a tense situation problematic and contributes an ideological justification for violence. But it is an error to think that religious leaders have the power to dissuade activists from carrying out their violent missions. Muslim leaders cannot reverse Islamic terrorism any more than Christian leaders could have deterred the terrorism in Northern Ireland or the tide of Christian militia activism in the United States in the 1990s, including Timothy McVeigh’s Oklahoma City bombing, which killed more innocent victims than those tragically lost this weekend in the Mumbai attacks.

–Mark Juergensmeyer is director of the Orfalea Center for Global & International Studies and professor of global and international studies, sociology, and religious studies at the University of California at Santa Barbara. His most recent book is “Global Rebellion: Religious Challenges to the Secular State” (University of California Press, 2008).

BOB ABERNETHY, anchor: This coming week (September 13), with the sighting of the new moon, Muslims around the world will begin celebrating the holy month of Ramadan. Muslims are expected to abstain from eating, drinking, smoking and sex during daylight hours. It’s also a time of increased giving to the poor. But many American Muslims say the U.S. government’s war against terror is hurting their efforts at charity. Kim Lawton has our report.

KIM LAWTON: Sudan’s war-torn Darfur province is one of the most desolate and dangerous places on earth. Anwar Khan of Islamic Relief USA has seen that desolation firsthand. Islamic Relief has several projects in Darfur’s refugee camps. On this day, Khan’s team is training women to make cooking stoves out of mud. The less often the women have to leave the camps to gather firewood, the less likely they are to be raped by roaming militia men. Khan says doing such humanitarian work is a way that he lives out his faith.

ANWAR KHAN (National Development Director, Islamic Relief USA): To us, the way that you see a Muslim is not by the size of his beard or the clothes. It’s not a fashion statement. It’s a state of mind. It’s helping others to make this world a better place.

LAWTON: But in a post-September 11 world, doing charity work has become much more complicated. In the wake of 9/11, many Muslim groups say they’ve been unfairly targeted by the U.S. government’s war against terrorism. Several Muslim charities have been shut down because of suspected links to terrorists. There’s a lot of fear among potential donors that they could come under suspicion as well.

SALAM AL-MARAYATI (Executive Director, Muslim Public Affairs Council): I think a lot of people have fear about giving, and I think it’s justifiable.

LAWTON: Muslim leaders say the situation is putting new constraints on one of the most basic obligations of their faith: helping the needy.

Mr. AL-MARAYATI: The term is called zakat, and what that means in Arabic is called “the purifying dues.” So by giving, I purify myself in the process.

LAWTON: Like praying five times a day, zakat is one of the five pillars, or core requirements, of Islam. Under the laws of zakat, Muslims must give 2.5 percent of their yearly income and total assets after their basic needs have been met.

Mr. KHAN: Like in many of the churches you have to give a certain percentage of your income to the church. The zakat is a tithe. It’s an obligation to give back to God. But you’re not giving just to him, you’re giving actually to the needy.

LAWTON: According to the Qur’an, there are specific categories of people who should receive the money. In some Muslim countries, the government automatically deducts zakat from people’s bank accounts to use for state-sponsored welfare work. Charity is especially important during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan, when Muslims believe they get extra rewards in this life and the next.

Mr. KHAN: Any act of worship we do, any good action we do in Ramadan, we have been told we will receive 70 to infinite times the number of reward. So if I smile at you, that’s a form of charity. But if I do it in Ramadan, I get 70 times the reward. It’s the blessed month.

LAWTON: Khan says it’s a good time of year for humanitarian groups like his.

Mr. KHAN: But in Ramadan, its people want to come and they want to give us money. The rest of the year we have to go to them and say, “Hey, hey, hey. People still have to eat.”

LAWTON: And so Islamic Relief sponsors a host of fundraising events, such as this concert at LA’s Shrine Auditorium, headlined by the international Muslim rock star, Sami Yusuf.

SAMI YUSUF (Recording Artist): I honestly believe that, if every human being on this planet gave zakat, just 2.5 percent, I don’t think there would be any poverty in this world.

LAWTON: Islamic Relief USA is affiliated with the U.K.-based Islamic Relief Worldwide. It’s the largest Muslim charity in America, with projects here at home and overseas. The group, like others, has come under increased monitoring from the U.S. government. Since 9/11, the Treasury Department has stepped up investigations through its Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes.

DANIEL GLASER (Deputy Assistant Secretary, U.S. Treasury Department): Unfortunately, we have uncovered a number of charities that have been engaged in terrorist financing for a range of terrorist organizations, organizations such as Hamas, organizations such as Al-Qaeda, organizations such as Hezbollah. And in these cases, these organizations are quite frankly taking advantage of the impulses of the American Muslim community.

LAWTON: One of the most prominent Muslim nonprofits, the Holy Land Foundation, was shut down by the government in December 2001, and all of its assets were frozen. The group and its leaders are now on trial in Texas. Five other American Muslim groups have also been designated as supporters of terrorism. Deputy Assistant Secretary Glaser says charities are uniquely suited to be exploited by terrorists.

Mr. GLASER: They deal in raising money and moving money across borders often. They often deal in cash. They have perfectly legitimate reasons to be in conflict regions and post-disaster regions. So for a terrorist organization, they provide a fantastic opportunity to take advantage of.

LAWTON: Salam Al-Marayati of the Muslim Public Affairs Council says the investigations have provoked deep concern within the American Muslim community.

Mr. AL-MARAYATI: Muslim charities are going through more scrutiny, and I think that’s understandable. Nobody is saying we shouldn’t, and that’s just a reality of the post 9/11 era. The question is, can we allow for a safe harbor for Muslim charities to operate under without the fear of getting harassed, targeted and shut down by the U.S. government?

LAWTON: Many Muslims believe the government has been overzealous, relying on little evidence and making very indirect connections between legitimate charity work and terrorists. There’s a widespread perception that the U.S. government wants to shut down all Muslim nonprofits.

Mr. GLASER: Well, it’s a great challenge that we face. I mean, the easy answer is that of course we are not targeting Muslim charities as a whole. Unfortunately, it is the terrorist organizations that are targeting Muslim charities.

LAWTON: The Treasury Department has released a set of charitable guidelines, but Muslim leaders are urging more dialogue between top federal officials and their community.

Mr. AL-MARAYATI: We want to develop a partnership between the Muslim community and the U.S. government. Treat us as partners, not as suspects.

LAWTON: Al-Marayati says government officials should be worried that their policies could be backfiring.

Mr. AL-MARAYATI: Now you hear stories about people, instead of giving money to a charity, they’ll just send cash overseas. And you don’t know where the cash is ending up. This becomes a source of anti-American sentiment when people view that the United States is blocking aid to a certain region where people are really in need.

LAWTON: Islamic Relief is trying to work with the government. They just announced a new joint project in the West African nation of Burkino Faso. But Khan admits it’s a challenge to counter the perceptions.

Mr. KHAN: Many people are afraid. And we have to fight their fear. People are saying that the U.S. government won’t allow us to pay our zakat. I’m saying they will.

LAWTON: Despite the concerns, Khan says some good has come out of the government scrutiny.

Mr. KHAN: The surprising thing is that with all of the checking that’s being done, it’s increased our transparency. So the same information we give to the government, we can give to anybody.

LAWTON: In order to avoid the complications, some are urging Muslims to simply give to non-Muslim charities. But Khan says it’s vital that Islamic faith-based groups stay in business.

Mr. KHAN: We have access to communities that others don’t go, and I try to explain this to my Muslim friends that if you don’t give money to us, there’s nobody else you can give money to.

LAWTON: And, Muslims leaders say, it’s also vital that government investigations not hinder the free exercise of their religious obligations.

I’m Kim Lawton in Los Angeles.