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INTERVIEW:
John Esposito
December 15, 2006    Episode no. 1016
Read This Week's May 16, 2008
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Read more of Kim Lawton's interview about Turkey with Georgetown University professor John Esposito:

Q: How tricky a line does Turkey walk between trying to be a secular country and also a religious country?

A: I think it's important to note that Turkey was established as a modern state by Ataturk, and at that time, when new states emerged, he basically had three models. At one end you had totally secular. That was Turkey. At the other end [you had] self-styled Islamic, [with] Saudi Arabia and the rest of the countries in between. Ataturk promoted aggressively a notion of secularism which was a very absolute separation of religion and the state, although the state did control religion. Many, many institutions were suppressed. Historically, the military has seen itself as the protector of secularism in Turkey, and so it's been a very fine line, particularly in the last 10 or 15 years when, for example, in the nineties for the first time in Turkish history an Islamist party, the Welfare Party, came to power. How do you accommodate that with a secular state? That issue continues down to today.

Q: How big are the pressures to move more toward an Islamist point of view?

Photo of john A: There are certainly some pressures in Turkey, as there are in many Muslim states to move towards a more, if you will, Islamically profile state. But the reality of it is that the current party, the AKP Party [the Justice and Development Party, which leads the government], a number of whose founders belong to an Islamist party, has defined itself now much more broadly as basically Turkish culturally, and it fully accepts the notion of Turkey's secular identity within Islam, respected within the state. However, there are still tensions between, if you will, the military and many of the secular elites and now the alternative that exists within Turkey.

Q: Where are some of those tensions? What are people feeling between these wings?

A: For the more secular oriented or the very secular oriented -- and I think it's important when I use the term secular to realize that, from my perspective, if you look at secular elites in Turkey, their notion of secularism is not simply separation of church and state. They basically have a very negative attitude towards religion itself, and so they have a problem with religion. It's a little bit like -- again, from my point of view I see the Turks and the French as similar. Their notion of "laiklik" or secular is really anti-religious, whereas in America we consider secular as meaning separation of church and state, which means that no religion is privileged, and it means that all religious people and nonbelievers have space. What in fact the current [Turkish] government has advocated is that kind of notion of secularism with space. For the secular oriented, they are very worried. They don't trust the current government. They think that maybe they're really not saying what their ultimate agenda is. I think it's also important to realize that what you have here now is what I would call an alternative elite in power, and so your secular elite are faced with a challenge to their power and privilege. I mean, that's what they worry about also -- their power and privilege in terms of the fact that their folks are not the dominant people in power, the dominant people in the parliament. So you have that tension.

You can see that tension playing out with the current president of Turkey, who is on his way out after a seven-year term. He is very staunchly, in a formalistic way, secular and at times he himself clashes a bit with the government. Symbolically you see it played out by the fact that every year the president has a big public affair for the other government officials in the parliament, and you have a situation now where at least three-quarters of the parliament members and the prime minister and the foreign minister would not be able to have their wives attend the function, because women who cover their heads are not allowed in government buildings. At a variety of levels you see this identity issue being discussed and played out.

Q: What are some of the restrictions? What outward religious clothes and symbols can people wear or not wear?

A: Within Turkey, in public life there has been for many years a ban on the hijab, on the head scarf. What that means is you cannot go into public buildings, government buildings. You cannot work in that climate in universities. You cannot be a student in a university or at medical school if you wear a head scarf. A number of years ago you had some women elected to the parliament, and one of them showed up with a head scarf. There was an absolute disturbance within parliament, and eventually there was an attempt to pull her citizenship. So there have been major issues. Some women who've tried have been forced out of university or out of medical school, and, indeed, some government officials send their daughters to the United States to study because their daughters wear a head scarf. The head scarf is almost a symbol and a dividing line. What's ironic here is that you will find that secularists will say their fear is that if people who are in power are Islamically oriented, they're going to be forced to wear a head scarf, and somehow that violates liberalism, etc. But they have had no problem for years with the fact that they force women not to be able to wear a head scarf. This is a real sort of challenge, and in many ways the secularists remain adamant on that issue, whereas the current ruling party remains very open and flexible and, indeed, it has not pushed for lifting the ban on the head scarf, and that has raised some issues with some of its constituents.

Q: How does this all work out for the day to day lives of Turkish people, especially people who want to practice their Islamic faith in some way?

A: If you're a woman who wears a head scarf, for example, no matter how bright and talented, areas of education, areas of employment are cut off. If you're a woman who has a first-rate university education and you want to teach in the university and you wear a head scarf, you will find that you cannot get a job. This still remains common. It was true before and I think is somewhat still true at a cultural level that if you're in the military, and in a number of areas, you don't want to be seen as having too high a religious profile. You wouldn't want to be seen as somebody who prays regularly, and you'd want to avoid religious symbols, and that causes tension within the society. Even a group like the Gulen movement, the followers of Fethullah Gulen -- Fethullah Gulen and his movement tend to keep a separation of religion and politics. They have had problems. At one point Fethullah Gulen wound up leaving Turkey not just for medical reasons but because, I think, there was some concern that he might be arrested. This is under the previous government.

Q: How important is that movement? How influential is it?

A: The Fethullah Gulen is a very interesting movement in that many of the followers of the Fethullah Gulen movement are business men, are professionals. They are people who own corporations; they're also people who are in the media, etc. But where the movement has had an incredible impact is at schools, not only in Turkey but at schools in Central Asia and many parts of the world. It's developed a very successful educational system which combines, if you will, modern disciplines with religious education, but a strong emphasis on modern science, modern mathematics, technology, etc. Their schools throughout the world have a very remarkable track record.

Q: And where do they fit religiously in the Islamic spectrum?

A: They are clearly not secular. On the other hand, they are not Islamists in the sense of being Islamic political activists. They very much emphasize their secular profile, their nationalist profile, Turkish nationalism, etc. and that's part of the irony, that given how strong the secular culture of Turkey has been that in the past, even with that profile they still were subjects of suspicion by those who are what I call secular fundamentalists in their mentality.

Q: Why do they arouse that suspicion? What is the threat?

A: People have an allergic reaction to religion. Whether they're in Western society or any society, some people are what I would regard as excessively secular-minded -- again, not separation church and state, but a secularism that really sees religion as a problem and wants to completely marginalize religion. For people like that, they see religion as necessarily backwards, and you see this in other societies. I've been in Southeast Asia in, let's say, a non-Muslim country in Southeast Asia, and you can talk to government officials and others who will privately worry that if people become more religious, they are going to re-embrace traditional values which will make them less amenable to modernization, to a hard work ethic, that they'll simply be living for the next life rather than this -- a kind of exaggerated, what we would regard here in many ways as a more old-style notion of the tension between secularism and religion.

Q: Describe some of the tensions for religious minorities and for Christians of all stripes living within the broader environment of Turkey.

A: Turkey's a very interesting country in that, for example, historically Jews found refuge in Turkey as they did in North Africa when they were forced out of Spain many centuries ago. And Turkey has a longstanding Christian community that goes back centuries. For example, you have Patriarch Bartholomeos in Istanbul, so you have the seat of one of the major Orthodox patriarchs in the world. But there have been tensions. Turkey itself can be seen as a kind of pluralistic society, but on the other hand there have been tensions both between the very secular-minded and at times between the more militant Islamically-minded folks. That has meant not only tensions, but there have been some recent conflicts: bombings both with regard to a Christian center as well as with regard to a synagogue, for example, in the last year or two. So there are tensions within the society. The current government has tended to move towards emphasizing, trying to build those bridges. Building those bridges at times gets complicated, because the patriarch is also seen as representing Greek interests, and given Turkey's relationship with Greece, which has been very tricky, and the problems over Cyprus between Greece and Turkey -- that has complicated the relationship. So it's not simply a matter of religion in that relationship. It's also a matter of politics.

Q: How have the discussions about Turkey joining the European Union (EU) affected all of this?

A: I think it's interesting to watch the discussions related to Turkey joining the EU. To begin with, if Turkey were to make it to membership in the EU, it would probably be anywhere between 10 to 15 years, and yet the European Union acts almost on a day by day basis as if every day there's a new crisis. It's very interesting, because you don't see the EU having had that problem with any other country.

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The EU has raised some very important points with Turkey, and Turkey has had to measure up. It has questioned its human rights record in the past, it's questioned treatment of Kurds in the past, a number of things, and also being concerned about some economic issues, etc. But what has been interesting is that the EU often fulfills the belief of many, not only in Turkey and not only in the Muslim world but also outside, that many in the European Union don't feel that they are ready to acknowledge a Muslim country within Europe.
This is ironic, because it's not simply a question of whether Pope Benedict raises the question because he sees Europe as Christian when, in fact, so much of Europe is post-Christian. The churches are emptying out in terms of England, in terms of Germany itself, etc. But I think that you also have people who would not be seen as religious forces or religiously minded in the EU also having a problem, and they would have a problem -- they will define it culturally, but a lot of the problem has to do with the issue with immigration. There's a concern, for example, you have a large number of Muslims in Europe. Within a 30- or 40-year period, Islam has gone from being relatively invisible in Europe and America to basically being the second or third largest religion. So a) that's an issue [and] b) in many European countries in addition to religion falling off you have a growing anti-immigrant attitude by the right. Now it's towards all immigrants, but in a number of these countries a large concentration of the immigrants are Muslim, so you've got a double "problem." They are immigrants, foreigners, but they are also representing a different faith, and that seems to, at times, affect if not poison the relationship. Therefore, even when you have leaders, such as the leaders a year or two ago, of Germany and France who would say that they would support Turkey's membership, they then say but of course they would give it ultimately to a referendum of their people, and they know from polls that majorities have indicated that they would vote against Turkey being admitted to the EU, and it's clear that it's along cultural and religious lines.

Q: To what extent is Turkey a model for other Muslim nations? Is it a model in how it tries to work out religion and state questions?

A: I think Turkey's an interesting place to look at, but I think we've had a problem for more than a decade where, at one point in Washington, it was almost part of American policy to say they wanted to promote the Turkish model. What they meant was they wanted to promote secularism throughout the Muslim world, without even realizing that Turkey secularism, as I said before, is not an American notion of secularism. The signal that they'd be sending to a lot of societies is that secularism is anti-religious. I think that Turkey's an interesting place to watch in terms of the lessons that you can learn. For example, if you look at Turkey you see how those who started an Islamist party -- that many of them as a result of their political experience, as a result of just their maturation, as with other folks who are politicians and [who] change opinions as they grow, more and more have dealt with the realities of Turkey and realize that they need to define a political party. If you're going to have a political future and help your country, it's got to be one that is fully representational, and so you see people who had been part of Islamist parties now part of a much broader party that looks more like, let's say, the Christian Democrats in Europe. Even though the prime minister would not even want to say that they're Muslim Democrats, he would just simply want to say, you know, we are a Conservative Democratic party and we are aware of our Muslim culture. Turkey shows this change that can take place. It also shows, though, that there will be tensions within society, that many societies are dominated by elites, and when you wind up with alternative elites, whether they are religiously minded or not -- in this case they're religiously minded -- that represents a challenge. Turkey's also interesting to see the playing out on the movement of issues like human rights and issues of pluralism. But I think every Muslim country is going to have to deal with defining its reality in terms of the demographic realities of that country. So, yes, one can learn something from the Turkish experience, but one wouldn't necessarily say that there's going to be an absolute emulation of the Turkish experience.

Q: I'm curious to hear your perspective on how much damage was done across the Muslim world by Pope Benedict's speech at Regensburg.

A: I think that significant damage was done, and I think that one of the things one wants to look at is you always want to look at the context in terms of, you know, why people react the way they react. Context becomes important. Americans will react one way in a certain situation than, let's say, people in Bangladesh, and people bring to bear their culture, their sense of history, etc. So, for example, in a new Gallup world poll, that poll which looks at a billion Muslims from North Africa to Southeast Asia, when Muslims are asked in an open-ended question what do you resent most about the West, the majorities of Muslims bring up the fact that they resent the fact that Islam is denigrated in the West, that it's equated with terrorism, that Muslims are looked down upon. Now within that context one can understand the reaction to the Danish cartoons, but also one can understand the reaction to the pope. It's important to remember that in Muslim countries the pope is not only a symbol of Catholicism. In many ways they don't distinguish between Catholics and Protestants. He's Christianity. Just as for many people in our country, they just think Muslim; they don't distinguish between Sunni, Shia, Israeli. So when the pope speaks, from their point of view he is this very prominent, authoritative religious leader, and given the fact that the pope cited a text that was very critical of the Prophet, even though he didn't say it was his words, the fact that he cited it -- that's an issue. And also the fact that when he made a statement about the Qur'an and the Qur'an's attitude with regard to, in effect, freedom of religion, that he got it wrong in terms of some of the comments that he made. They were simply textually and historically wrong. That has a tremendous repercussion, because it's occurring at a time when many Muslims in the world feel under siege. Many see the war on global terrorism as a war against Islam, as an attempt to impose or redraw the map of the region. Many see Islam as denigrated, and they see it as denigrated in Europe and in America. They see the issue of civil liberties, they see the cartoon controversy. So when the pope made his statement, even though it was made somewhat privately and innocently, with globalization and communications it shot across the Muslim world and that damage was there. That was exacerbated by the fact that there was no direct apology -- that, in effect, what has been consistently said by the Vatican is, you know, we are sorry that we caused pain; that wasn't the intention. But there was no apology that in any way said that somehow we got it wrong, and I think that's a major issue. I think there is some significance to the visit of the pope to Turkey and how that visit goes. Is it simply going to be seen, as I'm told in Turkey, as primarily a visit between heads of state? Between the Vatican, etc? Or, as the Vatican puts it, that it's primarily a visit between the pope and Patriarch Bartholomeos. If that's all that happens it will, I think, have a negative impact in Turkey and in the Muslim world. On the other hand, the visit of the pope can be taken as a time to seize the day and to reaffirm commitment to interreligious dialogue and to demonstrate in a variety of ways an awareness of the importance in Muslim-Christian relations and an awareness of Christian-Muslim relations in Turkey itself.

Q: Do you think that church leaders, the Vatican, and the pope himself have an accurate enough understanding of the amount of damage that was done and the amount of effort it will take to repair it?

A: It's hard for me to know where the Vatican is at this point, because I'm not directly linked into the Vatican. But I can say that the early reactions would have indicated that, no, that awareness is not there, hasn't been there, and the continued response -- I think it's terrific that the church has reached out but, for example, when the Holy Father called in a delegation of Muslims, he called in ambassadors when in fact the more effective [thing] would have been to call in religious leaders and to sit and talk with them about the issue: for him to say what he was trying to say and what he meant, and for them to tell him why it was offensive, etc., to have that dialogue. Now Muslim leaders have called for that dialogue. The pope has talked about the fact that he's committed to interreligious dialogue, and I think that's what we need to see. There need to be more instances of that. John Paul II had a terrific ability at that human level to know how to have those interactions. I think that's important, and I think that, again, in an age of global information and communications, many people are aware of the fact that some of the people around the pope are more hardliners on Muslim-Christian relations. Indeed, in the late days of John Paul II, in some of the publications in the Vatican and even in the early days of this papacy, some of the Vatican publications and certain senior clergy have made statements that would be regarded as rather hard-line and retreating from the progress that the Vatican made over decades in relations between the Muslim world and Catholics and certainly the progress that was made, considerable progress, in the United States.

Q: As someone who has devoted so much of his time to these issues, do you see this as an opportunity right now for more Muslim-Christian dialogue, or do you think those relations are at risk at the moment?

A: I think this is an opportunity precisely because it's risky moment. You know, when you have the risky moments, that is when you can also have the greatest opportunities, because when people see it as risky, when some people feel rejected, others frightened, others feel challenged, if positive moves are made that can actually reassure people and one can really move forward. But this is a very sensitive and risky time, and I think that the better Muslim leaders have realized that and tried to reach out to the pope as opposed to some who have made more [confrontational] statements. I think the same thing has to be seen in an even greater way on the part of the Catholic Church and the part of the pope. When somebody like the pope reaches out -- we saw it with John Paul. When John Paul reached out to other faiths, not just Islam, they notice it. This is extraordinarily important in reality, but even more important symbolically. I think the pope has that ability and the Vatican has that ability. Whether they're wise to the challenge I think is still an open question. The pressure is also on, if you will, the Muslim community and Muslim leaders to rise to that occasion. There was a statement made by 38 major religious leaders that attempted to address this. On the one hand, they reached out, embraced more dialogue. On the other hand, [they] indicated some of the issues that they saw.

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