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INTERVIEW:
Hume Horan
December 19, 2003    Episode no. 716
Read This Week's September 5, 2008
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Read more of Kate Seelye's interview in Baghdad with Hume Horan, a former U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia and a senior Coalition Provisional Authority adviser on religious affairs in Iraq:

Photo of Hume Horan When you speak of an Islamic state, the thing that pops into not just our minds but the minds of most Iraqis is the idea of Iran, and I have to say that is a very unappealing image, because it doesn't have much attraction for many in Iraq. Those who stand to benefit are the clerics themselves. This is not the image or model which appeals to average Shia. There are quite a few Shia I have met who are moderate and observing, who are somewhat secular, who say, "I want some of these clerics to butt out of my life, yet I respect them." This is why I respect Ayatollah Sistani [Iraq's highest-ranking Shia cleric] so much. He is called to take a position but does so in a way that is moderate, and by and large we don't want clerics to be overly prescriptive in our daily lives. That probably does represent the subdued majority of educated Shiites.

There are other groups -- the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). What is their position? To us they say, "We want freedoms." Their role has not been disruptive. All they do is roll bandages, yet they look awfully paramilitary with their Badr Corps. If there is a problem there, it's a problem deferred for us now and probably for independence in Iraq, come the end of June next year.

Then there's the group of Moktada Sadr [leader of one of the more radical Shiite parties]. They are much more of a spoiler than the Badr Corps. They find themselves at opposite poles of Shia political ambitions; he benefits from the big name of his father [a beloved ayatollah assassinated by Saddam Hussein]. His popularity is more pronounced among the young, rootless Shiites of Baghdad who are only slightly less educated than he himself. His reputation in Najaf is like that of a sophomore in college who has flunked out of school and is trying to pretend he has academic qualifications. But he has personality and name and charisma ... and he's ruthless, very ruthless. He uses his muscle in places like Baghdad to expand his influence. We have the Supreme Council, whose ultimate position -- I cannot divine how they will come out, and we do have the Moktada Sadr Mahdi Army, whose position is clear. They pose a problem now and will pose a problem later on.

The Shia probably haven't made up their minds [about what kind of government they want]. They probably think they don't want anything like Iran. I have heard no one say, "Ah, Iran, if only we could be like that, if only we had a Khomeini." One ayatollah told me, "I spent 25 years in Iran because that was the only place I could go. But I hated that place so much that when I left Iran, I would not return to my country via the border. I went to Jordan. They were very harsh, and it was an exile within an exile for me."

[The Shia] have never had a chance to talk this out. I'm pretty sure there is going to be a huge amount of ferment as we lift the top off the pot of independence and things begin to boil, and they ask themselves what they want. It's not a matter of sitting back and saying to oneself, "Well, one of these days in the sweet by-and-by we're going to be independent, and we're going to have to figure things out." Suddenly, we have set the timer. You have to do something. You only have six to seven months to come up with some positions. Forget about the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA); we have work to do at home, and I imagine there will be a lot of huddling, a lot of discussions within the Shiite community as to what future will we have, because these are decisions we are going to have to take.

I think the reality is probably going to be untidier than we would like. We will not have an Iran. We will have some clerics in actual political roles. Some compromises will have to be made. It's not just compromises in their own community; if they want power, they are going to have to appeal, to some degree, to powers outside their community. But in their own community, I think the intense radicals, like Moktada Sadr, will no longer appeal once the targets for their emotions -- the U.S., the alliance, the occupation -- will be gone. Then people will say, "You look like another strong-arm fellow," [and] your religious credentials won't be any greater.

The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) has shown a certain statecraft between them and the more moderate Shiites, some who have lived for many years in the West and have been attracted to the life they saw and the polities they lived in. And there is a sense in Islam, certainly a sense in Shiism, "Let the state do what the state wants; give unto Caesar what is Caesar's." There is that tendency that could blunt the impact and the role of explicitly political clerics in a future Iraqi government.

Now, when it comes to personal status, there will be a lot of talking about Islam, but there are, even in the Governing Council, some Shia of dignity and stature [who] would certainly fill the role of the kind of leadership that we would like them to. There are others, like Akila Hashemi [Governing Council member who was assassinated in late September], who have even now a certain prestige.

There will be clashes. There might even be fisticuffs in the Shia community, as have already taken place. Will they end by establishing any kind of ascendancy? I think there will be tensions, but the tension will be contained. I think the Sadr group will go to the wall. They will not be successful; the little red index pointer will settle down somewhere in between the position of Sistani and the activist position of the SCIRI people. It would probably be a little more prescriptively religious and Shiite than some of the Shiites on the council want, but certainly less so than what those who are speaking for a specifically Islamic state, whether Shiite or Sunni, would want -- a sloppy, messy, untidy compromise, that is, a compromise not just in the Shiite community but within the other religious communities, one that is full of discord, disagreements, jockeying for positions, occasional violence, but that would remain erect partly as the sum of its own weaknesses. No one is going to be the big boss; the Shiites will to some degree be divided among themselves, and we'll see a state freed from Saddam Hussein.

Photo of Hume Horan I see Moktada Sadr as a flash in the pan in the Shiite movement. His negatives are piling up at too fast a rate, and even some of his followers are becoming disillusioned and taking their distance from him. I know of one ayatollah who walked away from him saying that his lines and Sadr's were not compatible. He will find himself surrounded by fewer and fewer people.

There has been nothing like this in the Muslim world yet, ever, where you have had a Shiite majority becoming empowered in a state that has, in this case, however, a very substantial, almost blocking non-Shiite minority. And how are they going to work it out? They have been through the most arduous political experiment of Baathism for 35 to 40 years; they saw what can go wrong if things go wrong -- the imperative to get along in some fashion or another, because if they didn't, the next strongman might come out of the woods. Many are afraid that the Sunnis may come back and take over.

Responsible, sensible Shiites say, "Should we fall out among ourselves, the possibility of a Sunni restoration should not be excluded." These people have got money and arms and organization and, as one said, the habit of command, a disciplined, ruthless minority of 20 percent when faced with an undisciplined, confused majority of, let's say, 60 percent. The 60 percent better watch out; that's a reason for them to hang together or hang separately.

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The Christians are apprehensive. Not that they really liked Saddam; they didn't like Saddam, but as a powerless minority they said, "No one snatched my gold cross from me under Saddam." But they just have to play along with whatever emerges. They will play along with whatever moderate group emerges.

The Sunnis have a real identity problem. For 400 years they have predominated in this area, and how can any of the several alternatives before them reconcile them to the loss of 400 years of privilege, power, immunity, and even the power to abuse? Is there anything that the future of Iraq can offer them that is going to be quite as intoxicating as what they had? Some of their leaders say, "Let's make the best of it." What's the alternative? Because the Shia have been, at least publicly, very forbearing. I've never encountered a disposition on the part of the Shiites whom I've spoken to -- "Don't you think it would be nice to pay them back a little bit?" They say, "No, no, we must live together as brothers and sisters in a unified Iraq." And I would think some of the Sunnis, when they go to bed tonight, are a little anxious, thinking, "After independence, if things go badly, if we're too provocative, there might be a Shiite backlash."

Everyone is circling around, not Mexican standoff style, but cautiously, realizing they have to handle the others with some care, some respect, with some diplomacy. The Sunnis say, "Better not provoke the Shiites; they have long memories." The Shiites say, "Look, those Sunnis, keep an eye on them. We have to live with them, but let's not look for a fight." It will be an extraordinary political stew that is going on. So you look for what is the center, about which the state can emerge. There are a couple of moderate Sunnis and Shias -- in their public lives secular, in personal lives pious. Will they be sufficiently strong to make a bridge to connect the communities?

I really hope that the system, after 35 years of the school of hard knocks under Saddam, can keep that sufficiently clearly in their rearview mirror as they drive forward. As far as ethnic and religious communities living in secular amity with one another, this would be the first place this would ever happen. The whole world will have its eyes on them. There will be a substantial international force here. They will have the Four Freedoms of Franklin Roosevelt written into the Iraqi constitution. It's not like they're going to be handed the keys to the car and told to drive off. There will be a lot of support factors that should make it harder for them to go off the road. They will be independent with a lot of help from their friends. With that plus an economy that gradually becomes stronger, I believe they will be able to stagger along. There would be enough factors there saying, "A little more to the left, a little more to the right. Are you sure this is wise? Yes, you are independent, but ...". A lot of people, not just the U.S., will be having a say and an interest in Iraqi affairs. This will be a benevolent one. This will head off fender benders.

Photo of Seelye Hume Horan This is why we moved away from elections in 2005. We have caught the pulse of the acceleration of events here in Iraq and responded sensitively, perceptively, to it, and we prevented a problem from arising that otherwise would have been -- not a General Maude problem [British general who captured Baghdad in 1917, then faced Iraqi tribal rebellion against British rule], but a further delay would have widened the distance between us and the Shiites. That is something that really must not happen. In the coming months there is going to be the mother of all caucusing -- the engineers union, the chamber of commerce, they are all going to be canvassed for: Who are your leaders? Begin to think about your future. What kind of state do you want? Because at some point you are going to have to choose a delegate. We are vigorously going through all segments of Iraqi society: Who will be your leader? Who speaks for you? It's not elected, but it will be selected. There they are, and wow, that's going to be a very effervescent time in Iraqi politics. We are out there working hard to get the Iraqis to come up with truly representative groups of reps who can express their viewpoints at the governing level. It will be an interesting experiment.

Get away from Najaf, and you find that Shiites are religious, but you can see them living lives in the modern world just the same. The Shiite and Kurdish areas in Iraq are the most peaceful, and in the Shiite areas we are welcomed not just because we liberated but because of who we are. Many people say, "The kind of state you have, we would like to have ourselves." And insofar as the future state is colored by the kinds of people that I have met and worked with, that other Americans have worked with, its tone is one that's compatible with stability and a modicum of democracy.

I have met a number of Shiite clerics, and they are impressive. Some of the grand ayatollahs are straightforward exponents of democracy -- not Shiite democracy, but democracy, emphatically so, and they are extraordinarily tolerant. When it comes to their points of view, they do seem to be democrats, and some of the Shia leaders I have met in Baghdad are the same, and there is enough commonality between their views to give me reason to be hopeful as to what will happen when these people are left on their own to some degree, without a CPA context.

If Iraq succeeds, it could help pull the Arab world out of a great dismal swamp that it's been stuck in for the last 50 years. Iraq could be the turning of the tide. It could be opening a new front. It could be getting away from the millstone of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It could remove the greatest impediment for the Arab-Muslim world to join the modern world. And if moderate Shiites can show that they and Sunnis and Christians, as a sidebar ornament, can make it in a modern state, all the more reason for some of these dictatorial states who purport to treat everybody all right, but if your church steeple falls, don't hope you get a building permit to rebuild it. It's going to cause changes there too. People talk about the Islamic extremists wending their way to Iraq to make trouble for the coalition. But we will help to reconcile not just Iraq but Islam to the modern world.

The Shiite clerics are much more intellectually flexible and open and attuned to modernity, much less bogged down in the uncreative, constantly repetitive view of theology, religion, and the world. The grand ayatollahs incomparably have been the most intellectually open Muslim thinkers that I have met -- having sought out clerics because, as a Presbyterian elder, I am interested in Islam. This is our sister religion; why is it not performing better? But for me, it has been one of the most liberating and uplifting experiences finally to talk to Muslim thinkers who had arrived at the same destination that I had in entirely different ways. We had parted ways in the Middle Ages. They had gone one direction, we had gone another, and yet on matters that really mattered, on faith and morals and politics, we found ourselves at pretty much the same place today. I thought, "My God, it's not Saudi Arabia." The happiest discussions I have had in the Muslim world have been in Iraq.

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