Q: Three years ago, you said the U.S. would not be morally justified to invade Iraq. What do you think today?
A: I think that initial assessment has been proven to be true, to be right. I think the facts on the ground have confirmed those of us who felt the war would not be just. Unfortunately, as you look at the ongoing quagmire, carnage, however you want to describe it, it is very difficult to maintain that this war was initially just, and certainly its continued prosecution doesn't fulfill the criteria of the just war ethic. So I think basically that judgment was confirmed. I think, too, the overwhelming majority of ethicists who took that position feel confirmed in that judgment. Now obviously that raises a lot of contemporary questions about where do we go next, and those kinds of things, but it also raises a number of questions about how the just war ethic was used and applied. If you're in this business, you look at wars both retrospectively and prospectively. In other words, you try and learn from the last episode lessons that might be applicable in the current ethos, and now ethicists are beginning to consolidate our conclusions about the Iraq war, about its justice or its injustice.
Going in, the overwhelming majority of ethicists who study the ethics of war were opposed to this war on just war principles. Obviously, the pacifists were against it by definition. For those of us who look at the just war ethic, the overwhelming majority looked at the war, looked at the prospects, looked at the ethic and said this is not going to be a just war. However, there were a number of folks, a small number but a significant number nonetheless, who used the just war ethic to try and justify this war.
One group looked at only a selective set of the criteria and cherry-picked a couple of them and tried to make a positive case for war. But they didn't look at all the criteria. One group looked at it really from a partisan perspective, I would argue, and in this category I would put a number of conservative Catholic laypeople who were very much caught up in promoting the relationship between the Catholic Church and this administration, and it seemed like they were trying to provide an argument or set of arguments to the administration. Interestingly enough, the administration never picked up on those specific arguments, and the fact that two popes and 170 American Catholic bishops said this war, in fact, is not just really didn't stop this group of partisans trying to use the just war ethic to make a justification of going in.
There was a group that some scholars would call the enablers -- very sophisticated theorists and ethicists who know a lot about the history and the theory of the ethic but, frankly, are not very good at looking at specific cases. In the medical profession there is often a distinction between research doctors and practitioners, in other words, clinicians. And the same is true in the division of labor within the just war ethic. There are scholars of its history and its theory, and then there are also practitioners who apply it to specific cases. I think some of the folks who tried to justify the war, frankly, weren't very good at making that transition from the theory to actually analyzing the facts on the ground as we knew them going into Iraq.
Q: Do you think that in order for a war to be just it needs to meet all the just war criteria?
A: I would argue that's the case. You have to meet all of them. Some ethicists say, well, no, you need to meet a certain threshold, although that's very fuzzy in their minds. I do think a preponderance of the criteria had to be met. You can't simply take one or two and say okay, I've made a comprehensive case here. You need to go through all of them and apply all of them, and then say what does this information look like, what does this data present to me, before you make the final judgment. I personally believe you have to make a credible case on all of them before you can say yes, any particular war is justified.
It was very hard to do in Iraq, I think. If you went through systematically, there were three or so of the criteria that were very difficult to make a comprehensive and persuasive case for, and [in] the view of most ethicists who oppose the war, the case had simply not been made by [that] handful of folk who were trying to make the pro-war case.
Q: Some people say the cause of going to the aid of people who were suffering under oppression was strong enough that it merited going in. They cite, for example, Rwanda and the lack of intervention there, and people now say, "Why didn't anybody do something to stop that?" How do you respond to that?
A: First of all, it's very important to look to actual justifications that were used to go into war, and the humanitarian argument was not the centerpiece of the Bush administration's argument. That's very important to see. The centerpiece arguments were [Saddam] had a nuclear program, he had weapons of mass destruction, and he had links where he aided and abetted Al Qaeda. We now know both of those, in fact, were not true. I think the members of the Senate and the Congress who voted to authorize the war didn't think they were voting for a humanitarian intervention. That was an add-on argument that was brought on, actually, later. That wasn't the central case. It's important to keep your eye on the ball of what really was argued by the administration.
Secondly, sure, you can make a case for humanitarian intervention in theory. We should have intervened in Rwanda, just as somebody should intervene in Sudan at this very point. The question about Iraq was, did it in fact actually meet any threshold? Was the humanitarian crisis large enough to merit outside intervention? And that case was never fully argued on either side, so we never had that discussion. There are a lot of other places in the world, including Sudan, where there's a real genocide going on right now, and we don't see this administration making an argument for humanitarian intervention. That argument falls when you look at the real justification that was given by the administration, and the fact that there truly are genocides going on right now in parts of the world, and this administration seems to have no compulsion about military intervention in addressing it. I think that's a specious argument, the humanitarian question. I don't think it meets the thresholds. I think there are other cases that are perhaps more pressing.
Q: Let's talk about imminent threat and the administration's pushing the notion of a preemptive war. Does preemptive war fit with just war tradition?
A: This is a common mistake -- that the [just war] ethic talks about the possibility of preemptive war. The Bush national security doctrine was not a doctrine of preemption; it was a doctrine of prevention. And the ethic is very clear that preventive war is ruled out. What's the distinction between preemption and prevention? Preemptive war is simply when there is an imminent, grave, and visible threat. If somebody is on the verge of attacking you, you can viscerally respond with a first attack. Therefore you have to have a grave threat, it has to be imminent, and you have to have no other options available to you. It's a defensive move.
Preventive war is when you look down the long-time horizon and you say, "I have an enemy lurking out there, and I'm fearful if I wait much longer they are going to be stronger and more of a threat down the road, so I'm going to go attack them now and preventively keep them from ever attacking me in the future." The ethic is very clear. That kind of long-term preventive argument is not permissible morally, and that's precisely the kind of argument that you find in the initial Bush security strategy, which they've recently reaffirmed.
The difficulty with preventive war is that you deal to yourself a right to look at the long horizon, the long time line, and attack somebody, but you would never accept that argument being aimed at you. [There is] a lack of applicability, a lack of reciprocity there. Certainly the ethic says you have the right to attack preemptively, if in fact you see this imminent, visible threat, and you have no other options. [Those were] not the circumstances we faced with Iraq. We now know they had no weapons of mass destruction, they had no ability to deliver any had they possessed them, and we had United Nations weapons inspectors on the ground at that time. Had we allowed them to do their work, we would have learned this in a fashion that would not have required 2,300 United States deaths, 17,000 casualties, and tens of thousands of dead Iraqis, if we had allowed that process to play out.
Q: How great a concern do you have about how people handle the last resort criterion of the just war principles?
A: That was one of the most disturbing pieces of the whole just war discussion -- that almost without exception, the folks who tried to make the case for war in terms of the just war ethic either ignored last resort or explicitly said, "Well, we don't need to observe that because times have changed," and it's just plain inconvenient when, in fact, last resort says if you have any peaceable avenues to pursue that might be fruitful, you have to try those avenues and exhaust them first. Those of us who argued against the war said we had United Nations weapons inspectors on the ground doing their work, and had they been allowed to do their work in an unfettered way, we would have learned that Saddam didn't possesses these weapons.
As George Will put it, the war in Iraq was an optional war, and the just war ethic says optional wars are not acceptable. Last resort says only necessary wars can be fought, and clearly that was not the case in our invasion of Iraq.
Q: Going back to prevention and preemption, isn't it tricky to determine when a threat becomes imminent?
A: As Michael Walzer says, you have to have concrete evidence, and that's what we lacked at the time, and now we have people saying, "Oh, well, we're surprised that they didn't have any weapons," or "Oh, there wasn't any link to Al Qaeda." There was no direct evidence that either of those things was, in fact, true. The ethic demands concrete evidence, not just a hypothesis on the part of a nation that wants to invade another one. Sure, that can be very nerve-wracking if you have an enemy you don't particularly trust, or you have an enemy like Saddam Hussein, who doesn't have a particularly good record in terms of invasions and handling of weapons.


