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THE CASE
Despite the proliferation of nuclear power plants in the decades following World War II, by 1979, only three states (Nevada, Washington, and South Carolina) had created disposal sites for the low-level radioactive waste generated by these facilities. Of these three states, two had temporarily deactivated their disposal sites and were threatening to close them permanently, while the third -- South Carolina -- announced it would drastically reduce the amount of waste it would accept from other states.
In 1980 Congress, in order to address this serious issue, passed an act that made states responsible for providing for the availability of capacity either within or outside the state for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste generated within its borders. The act, which had the support of the National Governors' Association, mandated that each state determine the most efficient ways to handle disposal of the waste within its borders. Yet, five years later, in 1985, only three states -- again, Nevada, Washington, and South Carolina -- had developed acceptable policies. Under the terms of the act, in 1986 these states could, if they chose, begin turning away the waste of all the other states from their disposal sites. Where, Congress wondered, would the radioactive waste go?
Prompted by this imminent crisis, Congress passed another act, the Low Level Radioactive Waste Management Amendments Act of 1985, which created a compromise. In exchange for a promise that the federal government would put an end to the other states' reliance on their disposal sites, Nevada, Washington, and South Carolina agreed to extend access to the sites for an additional seven years. Under the terms of the new act, states could either work alone or create "regional compacts" with other states to dispose of the low-level radioactive waste their nuclear power plants generated. The act offered states three incentives to comply: a monetary incentive, an access incentive (states could raise access costs to sites and ultimately restrict access to waste generated in non-compliant states), and a take title incentive (states failing to provide for disposal by the deadline could be forced to take possession of the waste, thereby assuming liability for any damages the waste caused). By 1992, the federal government had approved nine regional compacts covering 42 states. New York State, a substantial source of low-level radioactive waste, had opted not to join a compact, but to create and maintain its own disposal facility.
In 1990, facing opposition from residents of Allegheny and Cortland counties (who, predictably, did not want radioactive waste management sites built in their neighborhoods) the state of New York, along with the two counties, filed suit against the federal government. In its suit, New York claimed that the Low Level Radioactive Waste Management Amendments Act was unconstitutional. New York did not take issue with the right of the federal government to regulate waste disposal but argued that Congress did not have the power to direct states to regulate waste disposal in a particular manner. The incentive provisions of the act, New York argued, violated the Tenth Amendment, which held that "powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States."
THE ISSUE
New York State's case against the United States brought to the fore a debate as old as the Union itself -- namely, the balance between state and federal powers. At issue was whether Congress had the right to create legislation that directed state governments to regulate internal, domestic issues in prescribed ways. In other words, had Congress overstepped its authority with the Low Level Radioactive Waste Management Amendments Act of 1985?
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