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| The UN's record of monitoring Iraq's weapons arsenal has been mixed. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the Security Council resolution governing this latest round of UN weapons inspections in Iraq and how could they affect the outcome of the inspectors' work there? |
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James S. Robbins,
NATIONAL REVIEW Contributing Editor
On paper, Resolution 1441 establishes a comprehensive and robust inspection regime, and withdraws many of the concessions given Saddam Hussein's regime over the past ten years. The provisions in Section 7, particularly those providing for "immediate, unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted access" to any sites in the country, and the unilateral ability to "remove, destroy, or render harmless" prohibited materials and weapons, have the potential of making the inspections fruitful, if these provisions are enforced rigorously. Furthermore, the threat of "serious consequences" in the case of Iraqi noncompliance in Section 13 gives teeth to the process; again, assuming these provisions are enforced. The strengths of the resolution are thus obvious on its face. The weaknesses would reside not in the resolution itself but in its implementation. Thus far the UNMOVIC inspectors have only engaged in preliminary inspections, and the resolve of the UN has yet to be tested by Iraqi noncompliance. What this represents for the UN is an opportunity to prove its continued relevance to the disarmament process by responding instantly and vigorously to any recalcitrance on the part of Saddam Hussein's regime. Whether the UN is up to the task remains to be seen.
Ian Johnstone's Rebuttal:
So far UNMOVIC and the IAEA have done their jobs well and the Security Council is holding the line pending review of Iraq's 12,000 page declaration. When we talk about the relevance of the UN and whether it is up to the task, it is important to remember that the UN is not separate from its member states. The effectiveness of the inspectors and the collective resolve of the Security Council depend in large measure on the role of the major powers working with and within these bodies.
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Ian Johnstone,
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
Resolution 1441 was adopted by a vote of 15-0, signifying an important moment of consensus in the Security Council. However fragile that consensus may be, it is a long way from the divisions of 1998 and 1999. There are some elements of the new resolution that could strengthen the hand of the inspectors: unconditional access to all sites and the possibility of interviewing scientists outside Iraq, for example. But ultimately it is Saddam Hussein's perception of Council resolve that will determine whether the inspections work. He will only cooperate if he feels he has no choice, which means he must believe two things: that the threat of military action is real and genuine compliance will forestall that action. Resolution 1441 is ambiguous about the use of force. The US and UK believe it commits them to a new round of Council deliberations if Iraq fails to cooperate, but not to waiting for a new authorization before acting militarily. Other members insist that a new resolution is necessary. This deliberate ambiguity is a potentially lethal source of division, but for now the Council has sent a surprisingly strong signal that, one way or another, the obligation to disarm will be enforced. Despite Iraqi obstructionism, the inspections did achieve a lot between 1991 and 1998. They can work again, if the threat of force is credible and seen as commanding broad international support, and the inspections are not seen as a set-up for military action no matter what.
James S. Robbins's Rebuttal:
I agree. The credibility of Resolution 1441 lies in the implicit threat of force behind it. The lack of such a threat was why disarmament efforts from 1998 to 2002 were frustrated, and the renewed emphasis on military consequences is responsible for the relative success of recent inspection and verification efforts.
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