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| Observers have noted UN peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan have been driven by the need to stave off international terrorism, rather than by the need for humanitarian intervention alone. How do you see the need to preempt terrorism shaping the focus of UN peacekeeping operations elsewhere in the world? |
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Ian Johnstone,
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
There are three separate operations currently underway in Afghanistan: the US-led military campaign against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban; the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF); and a UN civilian mission (UNAMA). Only ISAF and UNAMA are "peace operations", the first authorized by the Security Council and the second established by the UN. Their primary function is to assist in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, not to fight terrorism. If successful, they will help to deny a safe haven for terrorist organizations, but it is important to remember that the UN's role in Afghanistan (though not peacekeeping) precedes September 11. Conceivably new peace operations will be established in other so-called 'failed states' that may be terrorist havens, but it is hard to imagine UN peacekeeping ever becoming a principal tool against terrorism. It was not designed for that and would not be effective in performing the sorts of tasks counter-terrorism requires. That being said, terrorists do sometimes operate in places where peacekeepers are deployed. The drama of 9/11 has sensitized the UN to that fact, and it is now well-understood that peace operations can play a role in making those environments less hospitable to terrorists. Any peace-building effort that promotes good governance, law and order, respect for human rights and economic rehabilitation makes it harder for terrorists to operate. But peacekeeping should not and will not be conceived primarily as a counter-terrorist activity.
James S. Robbins's Rebuttal:
Agreed, peacekeeping is not primarily a counter-terrorism activity, or concerned with ending conflict through force. Yet, as the dividing line between peace operations, humanitarian assistance and humanitarian intervention blurs, so must peacekeepers, NGOs, and military forces find new ways to work in an integrated fashion. To the extent the UN can facilitate this integrated approach, it would be beneficial for all concerned.
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James S. Robbins,
NATIONAL REVIEW Contributing Editor
The dividing line between humanitarian intervention and the use of force has never been clear, and in many cases is a false dichotomy. Humanitarian operations have traditionally been hampered by a variety of actors, state and non-state, which seek to divert foreign assistance to their own ends. This may be in the form of corrupt bureaucrats looting medical supplies, warlords hijacking food shipments, or terrorists committing violence against aid workers simply to make a point. Furthermore, some forms of humanitarian intervention necessitate the use of force, such as in 1999, when NATO intervened in Yugoslavia to end violence and oppression against Albanians in Kosovo. The concept of peacekeeping implies that there is a peace to keep, but as the UN gets involved in increasingly complex and nuanced conflicts (more so than simple state versus state conventional disputes), the nature of peacekeeping must also evolve. Peace-making and peace enforcement missions require different types of forces, different rules of engagement, and occasionally the use of force to establish conditions under which humanitarian operations can be conducted. Deterring, pre-empting or responding to terrorist attacks will necessarily play a role in such operations in the future, particularly when it is the terrorists or their sponsors who have created the conditions to which the UN is responding.
Ian Johnstone's Rebuttal:
I agree that force must sometimes be used for humanitarian purposes. I also agree that the conflict-suppression and humanitarian purposes of peacekeeping and peace enforcement can contribute to the fight against terrorism. But if UN peace operations come to be seen primarily as counter-terrorist activities, those humanitarian and other purposes may be neglected. If, for example, the U.S. were to suddenly withdraw support for UN and ISAF peacekeeping in Afghanistan because it felt the war against Al-Qaeda had run its course, the long-term humanitarian and peace-building efforts there would be jeopardized. The international community must stay the course; at least for now, the U.S. seems to agree.
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