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DALJIT DHALIWAL: Can democracy promotion in the Muslim Arab world prevent terrorism? Where's the evidence that that is going to happen?
AMBASSADOR ROSS: I do not know that one can say that democracy is a perfect antidote. You can't say that. But what you can say is frustration and hopelessness and exclusion and corruption and the absence of the rule of law are all, in fact, ingredients that help to produce the appeal of the jihadis. The sense of grievance, the sense that somebody has an answer to this sense of grievance, the sense that the jihadis do what they basically are offering is the following. They offer an explanation for your predicament. And they offer a prescription for how to get well. It is very simple. But unfortunately, their prescription never produces wellness for anyone. One of the things you have to do is you have to deal with sources of grievance and sources of anger that create a basis on which the radical Islamists recruit. We learned something on 9/11. What you are going to have to ultimately win, is what is a war with radical Islam. It has never been a war on terror. Terror's an instrument, it is not an ideology. It is employed by the radical Islamists. To win the war with the radical Islamists we cannot defeat them. We can defeat in terms of those who use violence. Those who use violence, you have got to use violence against them. There is no alternative. But to win that war you have to discredit them. And we cannot discredit them. They have to be discredited from within. The moderate Muslims in the Islamic world have to take them on. They have to discredit them.
DALJIT DHALIWAL: Are they strong enough to do that?
AMBASSADOR ROSS: The fact is that they will become weaker if they do not take them on. Our role, our responsibility is to focus on how we help them. That is one of the reasons I say create strategic dialogues everywhere. Because you want to focus on policies and programs, both, that can help empower those who believe, in the end, in a moderate form of Islam. Not as a favor to us. Because it is their own salvation. Self interest has to be the main motivator. No one's going to do it because we want them to do it.
DALJIT DHALIWAL: Is it also a prescription for reducing anti-Americanism in the region?
AMBASSADOR ROSS: For the jihadists, actually, it is a prescription for producing anti-Americanism. I am talking about creating a sense of inclusion, a sense of possibility, giving people a pathway to think that there is a future in their life that is sufficiently hopeful that they want to follow that path. Now, the more they do that, the more they are going to want a normal life. You know, President Clinton gave a speech when signing the Declaration of Principles at the White House in 1993. The most telling part of President Clinton's speech was talking about peace and wanting to give Israelis and Palestinians the quiet miracle of a normal life. Now, truth be told, almost everybody that I meet when I go to the Middle East wherever I am, what do they want more than anything else? They want a normal life. And they want the possibility of a better life for their kids.
DALJIT DHALIWAL: But when you travel in the region, what do people tell you about why we have such a huge credibility problem? Is it not to do with U.S. policy in that region?
AMBASSADOR ROSS: I would say absolutely it has to do with U.S. policy. Look, there is a perception of us as being imposers, arrogant, indifferent to the needs of people in the region. There is a perception that somehow the U.S. wants to impose on Islam. There is a perception that basically we are launching a war.
DALJIT DHALIWAL: In some parts of the Arab Muslim world, it seems to be more than a perception. When it comes to the Israel/Palestinian peace process, for instance, Palestinians, Muslims, Arabs in the region do not consider the United States to be an honest broker in that process. You were a broker in that process.
AMBASSADOR ROSS: You know, the interesting thing is that they do not want an honest broker in the process. They want someone who will back their side. I've said this in Gaza. I gave a speech in Gaza last year. And when I was listening to people say America can't be an honest broker, and I said you know what? You do not want an honest broker. But what you do want is an effective broker. We are seen as being very strong supporters of the Israelis, and in a way that many in the region would say is unfair. The U.S. is always going to have a special relationship with Israel. But the reality is there is a difference between the Clinton administration and this Bush administration. The perception, at the time, was that at least they care about the issue. One of the failings of the Bush administration was to send a message that they didn't care about the issue. The Palestinian issue may not be, in fact, embraced in a serious way by Arab leaders. They'll talk about it. They do not do much about it. But as an issue, where there is a sense of deep injustice, it pervades the Arab world. It pervades much of the Islamic world. And one of the mistakes the Bush administration made was sending a signal that they were indifferent to it. Something that is so fundamental to most of those who are on the "Arab street" appeared to be something that didn't matter to the Bush administration. Under Clinton, however, they saw what was an inexhaustible, seemingly inexhaustible, effort. I can tell you, everywhere I went in the region people would come up to me, and thank me. It didn't mean they always agreed with everything I was doing, or always agreed with what President Clinton was doing, but they said they care about it. They care about the issue.
DALJIT DHALIWAL: The Arab Muslim leaders and Palestinians were thanking you?
AMBASSADOR ROSS: Yes. Absolutely. Since that, I have to tell you, they say they miss us. The point is not that somehow we've changed, the point is what they saw was a commitment. They saw a passion. They saw determination. They saw an effort. So what they saw was something, even if they didn't always agree with what we were doing, even if they felt that we were too supportive of the Israelis, nonetheless they said, "At least they care about the issue." One thing you have to do, if there is an issue that creates such a basic sense of grievance throughout this part of the world, is show it matters to you. You can disagree. You know, there is nothing wrong with us having a different approach to policy than their view of policy. And the irony is that they will accept a lot of that, as long as they see at least we care about things that also matter to them. We are not going to agree on everything. And our having to agree with them should not be the measure of what we do. What we do should be governed by what we think is right.
DALJIT DHALIWAL: Where is the peace process now? What happened to the roadmap?
AMBASSADOR ROSS: Well, the peace process basically doesn't exist. There hasn't been a peace process, in truth, since 2001. Peace process means you are working on an active dialogue. And in fact, you are using words as the medium of exchange, not violence as a medium of exchange. Now the fact is the roadmap itself was never serious. The roadmap was basically a set of rhetorical guideposts.
DALJIT DHALIWAL: What do you mean it wasn't serious?
AMBASSADOR ROSS: It wasn't serious because it was negotiated with the EU, the Russians and the UN. It wasn't negotiated with the Israelis and the Palestinians. They are the ones who had the obligations in the roadmap. Because it wasn't negotiated with them, every single obligation in the roadmap is interpreted by the two sides in completely different ways. You ask the Palestinians about what the Israelis are supposed to do in terms of freezing all settlement activity, they'll give you a very broad definition. If you ask the Israelis they'll give you a minimalist definition. The fact of the matter is there was never any effort made to work out what each obligation was so there would be a common understanding of what it meant. There was never even an effort made to establish what we at least publicly saw as the criteria for fulfilling each of the obligations.
DALJIT DHALIWAL: It sounds like a bit of a travesty.
AMBASSADOR ROSS: It was more a rhetorical set of guideposts. It was not an operational plan. There wasn't the investment in it.
DALJIT DHALIWAL: Now you are out of government, if you had a blank slate how would you begin to redefine US policy in the Middle East?
AMBASSADOR ROSS: I think first things first, I would have to deal with what are the major problems. You cannot just pretend Iraq doesn't exist. Iraq has a major effect on where we are. My approach to Iraq right now would be two-fold. Number one, I would talk to the new Iraqi government, which after all is the first elected government. It is also one a four-year term. I would talk to them and basically say, "Let's talk about a time table for the American withdrawal. We are not going to leave you in a lurch. But, at the same time, you will have to assume responsibility. So let's negotiate between the two of us on what would be an appropriate time period for our having a presence here in terms of a military force." Number two, I would also talk to them about creating a national reconciliation conference. There you would bring everybody together, representing all the groups, and not let that conference disband until they had reached an agreement on the amendments to the constitution. Sunnis ran the election last December precisely because they had an expectation not just that they were going to be in the government, they had an expectation that there would be amendments to the constitutions in areas that were particularly troublesome to them -- like revenue sharing, like the right of provinces to succeed, like the role of Islam. Now that hasn't happened yet. Sunnis have to understand where they are going to be in the country, and that is why the constitution is so important. They have to understand what the relation is going to be. It would also be good for Shia. Because they too will then see whether the Sunnis are buying onto this or not buying into it. As long as their militias are a focal point, as long as you do not have a national compact that is a reflection of this national reconciliation conference, you are going to find it very difficult to change the reality on the ground there. So those two steps would be where I would start in terms of Iraq.
DALJIT DHALIWAL: And how would you fill your blank slate beyond Iraq?
AMBASSADOR ROSS: Well obviously I would work on the Israeli/Palestinian, Israeli/Arab issue. Because the fact is when the US disengages from this problem, it is pretty clear it gets a lot worse. You know our engagement is not the panacea. Our engagement does not guarantee great results. But disengagement has proven itself to be a real failure. The world gets much worse in terms of even the possibility of peace. You look at where we were in the year 2000. We thought we could settle the conflict; turns out we couldn't. But we were in a world where people talk to each other. When they are talking to each other, they are much less likely to be shooting each other. Now we cannot even talk about peace as a possibility. Now our first focus has to be how do we even create a basis in which to stop enduring conflicts? Once we do that, once we create cease fires, can we build from there? Our fundamental focus right now I think has to be with Palestinians -- especially given the problem with Hamas. How do you get the Palestinian Authority to be able to function in a way that isn't dependent on a Hamas program that isolates Palestinians from the world? If Hamas is not prepared to change, then Hamas has to fail. So you have to build up alternatives to Hamas. And you look to try to promote those who believe in peace and reconciliation. Then you are going to move in a more favorable direction.
DALJIT DHALIWAL: What kind of changes should the Israelis make?
AMBASSADOR ROSS: What is interesting is Israel withdrew from Lebanon. And what they got for that was, a few years later now, rocket attacks. They withdrew from Gaza, they got the same thing. There is an important narrative in the Arab world that says, "Violence is a function of occupation." Now here's two places where the Israelis ended occupation, but it did not stop violence. So I think one of the things the Israelis have to do is also understand there are not going to be unilateral approaches that can work. I am not against the Israelis trying to figure out how to withdraw. But I would like the Israelis to adopt a position at a couple different levels. Number one, if a conflict withdrawal, then let's approach it from the standpoint of reciprocal obligations. Even if you feel you cannot produce peace right now, let us least create parallel, unilateral steps. So that it is not just one step on one side. The other thing is the Israelis have to find a way to try to reconcile what are their security needs, with the Palestinian ability to breath. They have to be able to breathe economically. If they can't breathe economically, it ends up being bad for Palestinians, but also bad for Israelis.
DALJIT DHALIWAL: And is the wall separation the solution as far as Israel is concerned?
AMBASSADOR ROSS: I think the barrier in many ways is a passive response to terror. If we had our next-door neighbors launching attacks from us with impunity. And nothing was being done by the local authority. We would do a lot more than just build a barrier. The barrier may be part of an answer. But the reality is the barrier also cannot create a total cutoff; a total isolation economically. Because if the economic circumstances remain catastrophic on the Palestinian side, it is going to have political consequences.
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Ambassador Dennis Ross, former U.S. Envoy to the Middle East peace process
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