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James P. Rubin: All right. We're 18 months into the Bush administration. The president has spoken out very clearly about his desire to get rid of Saddam Hussein. But in practice the new policies appear to amount to a modification of the economic sanctions regime and providing some greater support, but rather minor, to the opposition to Saddam.
What is your recommendation to the president and the secretary of defense when you've had your opportunity of what should be done, and how do you account for the fact that it's still 18 months and not much has changed?
Richard Perle: It takes a little while to make a transition. But it's in process now. I would hope the president and others in the administration will see this film. I think it would have an influence on them. When the president made his State of Union message, it was very clear he intends to remove Saddam from office. I don't think he's ever wavered in that, based on everything that he's said. Precisely how we go about it, the nature of the force that's assembled to do it, the relationship between American forces and the Iraqi opposition, all of that I assume is being discussed intensely within the administration.
But that this president understands how dangerous it is to leave Saddam in place, of that I have no doubt. And when you consider that we've seen his involvement in chemical and biological weapons and he is working feverishly to acquire nuclear weapons, you have to ask the question, what will our options be when he crosses that nuclear threshold. There's something unique about the possession of nuclear weapons that will change everything in the region, and so narrow, so diminish our capacity to deal with him that it would be catastrophic if he got there first. So we have no time to lose, and I think the president understands that and it's probably taken too long already, but I don't think it'll be much longer.
James P. Rubin: All right. So it won't be much longer. Let's talk about what the "it" is. There are basically two views. One view appears to be that we can use a model like we used in Afghanistan, where we have allies on the ground, American air power helping them, and see the overthrow of a terrible regime, the Taliban in Afghanistan, and hopefully Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Another view is that the opposition on the ground is rather weak by comparison to the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, and the United States has to be prepared from the beginning to put forward a large, massive ground operation. How do you come out in this debate?
Richard Perle: I'm not normally in the middle of a debate like this. But in this case I think I am. I think the opposition has much greater potential than we give it credit it for. The Northern Alliance looked pretty feeble on the day the first American arrived to examine their capabilities after September 11. That opposition includes the Kurds in the north, who have had lots of combat experience. It includes ...
James P. Rubin: We saw some of that in the film.
Richard Perle: Indeed. And they've got a strong motive, as we've seen in the film. There are the Shi'a in the south, who have been the victims of Saddam in many ways for a long time. I think there's a great deal of potential there. Secondly, Saddam is much weaker than we think he is. He's weaker militarily. We know he's got about a third of what he had in 1991. But it's a house of cards. He rules by fear because he knows there is no underlying support. Support for Saddam, including within his military organization, will collapse at the first whiff of gunpowder.
Now, it isn't going to be over in 24 hours, but it isn't going to be months either. And if I had to guess I would guess that a strategy that combines effective collaboration with the opposition and a readiness to send in Americans if necessary is where we'll wind up.
There's one last point. The evolution of American air power since the last war against Saddam Hussein has been phenomenal. We can now see what's going on on the ground, and from a safe distance. And what we can see we can destroy with great precision. Saddam has no notion of what's coming. But what's coming is the ability to target precisely everything of consequence in his military establishment.
James P. Rubin: Those who advocate large ground force to be used to overthrow Saddam Hussein believe that you can't be sure that our allies on the ground in the north, the Kurds, will succeed. And they may in fact not succeed and be subject to slaughter from Saddam Hussein's forces, leaving us in a situation where we provoke them to act and allowing them to be slaughtered. So that we need a large ground force to be ready, to be deployed, and to be able to be put in place quickly. Do you agree that we have to be ready for the worst scenario, namely that Saddam doesn't collapse in a matter of days?
Richard Perle: Yes, of course we have to be ready for the worst scenario. But a proper integration of the opposition in Iraq with American air power, backed up by American Special Forces, and ultimately a larger force if necessary should be sufficient. Both to assure that we won't have a debacle, we have to have an integrated approach. And that means the use of American air power to prevent Saddam from massing his forces to attack the opposition on a ...
James P. Rubin: And what about American ground forces?
Richard Perle: Well, we'll need some American forces.
James P. Rubin: So what would your guesstimate be of the level of effort that would be involved?
Richard Perle: Well, I would be surprised if we need anything like the 200,000 figure that is sometimes discussed in the press. A much smaller force, principally special operations forces, but backed up by some regular units, should be sufficient. Of the 400,000 in Saddam's army, I'll be surprised if ten percent are loyal to Saddam. And the other 90 percent won't be completely passive. Many of them will come over to the opposition.
James P. Rubin: So let's talk about that ten percent, the hard core. In the Gulf War it has been judged that Saddam Hussein did not use the chemical and biological weapons that he had because he was deterred. He knew that if he did, the United States, as President Bush and Secretary of State Baker indicated, would use overwhelming force against him. If we set as our objective overthrowing Saddam Hussein, there is a strong body of opinion that he would issue orders to use chemical and biological weapons that you believe he has.
So do you think that those responsible will carry out that order? And how big a risk do you think it is that chemical and biological warfare will result from this invasion?
Richard Perle: There is certainly some risk of that. These are not effective weapons in terms of the outcome of military engagement. They're weapons of terror. The United States is not going to be defeated by a chemical or a biological weapon. If we go into Iraq, we will destroy Saddam and his regime. So the question is, in an act of vindictiveness will he use chemical weapons or biological weapons probably against his neighbors, against the Israelis, against the Saudis, against Kurdish villages as he's done before?
And there can be no guarantee that he won't. We have to make it very clear to the people who would carry out orders to use these weapons that they will be held individually accountable for war crimes. And the extraordinary thing about the Saddams of the world is that when it becomes clear that they are vulnerable, when it is clear that they are headed for the ash heap of history, they have no friends. So I think there's a reasonable chance that those orders will not be carried out. And there's also a reasonable chance that we will be able to prevent the physical movement of those weapons and the effective delivery of those weapons.
James P. Rubin: Let's focus in on that. If we assume that there are several thousand hard core supporters of Saddam Hussein that stay with him because they know if he goes, they go with him, how many people does it really take to use chemical and biological weapons. By the experts estimate, 150, 200 people, well trained, as they have been, could use chemical and biological weapons against the American soldiers or the alliance forces that are on the ground trying to take control of Baghdad. Don't you think we have to assume given that we're starting this war because he has these weapons, that he's going to use them in this conflict?
Richard Perle: We would certainly not allow American troops to be completely exposed and vulnerable to chemical weapons. There are things we can do to deal with that. Not 100 percent effective to be sure - but it's important to recognize that Iraqis who today may believe that if Saddam goes they're going with him will have a new choice once there's an actual military engagement. And it will be up to us to say we are in this to remove Saddam Hussein and his regime, those of you who are ordinary soldiers have a choice to make.
We saw this in Afghanistan. Many people who had choices made the right choice. They wanted to survive. And as between a suicidal act of the release of chemical or biological weapons and survival, I think a lot of Iraqis who today associate with Saddam Hussein will make the right choice.
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Richard Perle, chairman of the Defense Policy Board
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