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James P. Rubin: So we've looked at this film, we see some rather disturbing charges in the film, dangerous possibilities. You believe the government should investigate it. And you've been a strong advocate of taking action against Saddam Hussein. How quickly do you think we should act and what specifically do you think the United States should do militarily in this situation?
Richard Perle: This evidence is very powerful. There is collaboration between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda, which means to destroy us. It entails chemical weapons, biological weapons, training in their application. And he's working on nuclear weapons. The message is very clear - we have no time to lose, Saddam must be removed from office. Every day that goes by is a day in which we are exposed to dangers on a far larger scale than the tragedy of September 11.
James P. Rubin: So what specific military plan would you put forward and discuss with your colleagues and friends in the government right now?
Richard Perle: There is an internal opposition to Saddam Hussein. The Kurds in the north, and we've seen what their motives are for his removal, the Shi'a in the south, who have risen up without support in the past, together with American air power, American special forces, and potentially American ground forces beyond special forces, we have the ability to remove Saddam Hussein and his regime. And it will be quicker and easier than many people think. He is far weaker than many people realize.
James P. Rubin: Top officials of the Pentagon, top Department of Defense officials, top military officials from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on down appear to be telling members of Congress and the media that the only serious way to go about this problem is to deploy a large ground force that can deal with all unexpected contingencies. You've put forward an optimistic scenario, and it may be right, but don't you think it's the job of the administration to be prepared for the worst? And what is your reaction to the military's suggestion that you need 200,000-plus forces for this mission?
Richard Perle: The 200,000 number sounds large to me. But if we're going to err, we should err on the side of too many rather than too few. Provided that reaching for that large number doesn't make it impossible for us to establish the base and the infrastructure from which to operate. If it were self-defeating then it would be foolish. I think we discovered in 1991 that we really didn't need the very sizeable force that we sent in. It was over very quickly with little resistance. There were people surrendering to journalists after all.
You always want to err on the side of caution. But it's possible to be too cautious.
James P. Rubin: So you would agree that one has to prepare for a large ground force. Whether one needs to use it in the end is an open question. In preparing for that force, many experts have suggested that we will be signaling our intent and even the public discussion of overthrowing Saddam signals our intent. And in that window between now and when you overthrow Saddam Hussein, he will decide to lash out and use these very weapons that we are trying to prevent him from using.
Is there a danger that during the time between our decision and its implementation that he will use chemical and biological weapons that you're worried about against the American people here at home perhaps by some of these terrorists he's been training?
Richard Perle: Yes, there certainly is a danger, and that danger would exist whether we were planning to remove him or not. It could happen tomorrow. The target could be the United States, it could be Americans abroad, it could be American forces deployed now in the region, and it could the Israelis or the Saudis. He has the capacity to do great damage, and at any moment he may do so. If the conclusion we draw from that is that we shouldn't take action against him, then I think the situation only gets worse - it deteriorates.
He gets more chemical weapons; more biological weapons, makes them more effective, and develops new means for their delivery. And at the same time - and I can't stress this too much - he is working on nuclear weapons. And he will cross the nuclear threshold - it's simply a question of when.
James P. Rubin: Isn't there a risk that we'll provoke Saddam Hussein into using the very chemical and biological weapons against Americans here at home that he has not done for ten years? He's been capable of doing that, he's chosen not to do it. If we announce our intention to overthrow him and we build a force to do so, might we provoke the very reaction we're trying to prevent?
Richard Perle: He has the capacity to do great damage to us, and has probably had it for some time. And has in fact done considerable damage, not least of all as we've seen by collaboration with Al Qaeda. I think in a case like this you have to ask yourself is it safe to leave him in place, is the provocation, as you term it, a larger risk than giving him the freedom to choose a time and place when he may take action against us.
James P. Rubin: You've put forward some optimistic scenarios, I think you would agree, but they may turn out to be realistic. They're certainly more optimistic than any in the military. They fear that if we get started with this mission and the American people haven't been prepared for the difficulties, the uncertainties, the unknowables, that they wouldn't be doing their job. Do you think that we need to very carefully prepare ourselves for all the problems that may exist, whether it's their weapons of mass destruction or whether it's needing more troops rather than less troops? And isn't there a risk that we all might think this is too easy?
Richard Perle: Of course we need to be prepared, and we need to assume that things will not go as we hope they will. - that engagements will not turn out as we anticipate. We have to be ready for contingencies. I think you can worry the problem to the point where you're paralyzed, where you take no action. It isn't going to be easy. I don't mean to suggest it will be easy. But neither is it the enormously risky undertaking that some people anticipate both because Saddam is weaker and we are stronger. But of course we have to be prepared for things turning out as we did not expect.
James P. Rubin: The use of chemical and biological weapons, for example.
Richard Perle: Well, we would certainly not put American forces on the ground without the chemical and biological protection that we have. It's not perfect, to be sure. That may be one of the reasons why ...
James P. Rubin: We have to be prepared for significant casualties at the hands of Saddam's chemical and biological weapons. Is that fair?
Richard Perle: We have to do two things. We have to be prepared for his use of these weapons resorting to those protective measures that are available to us. And we have to design a strategy that minimizes his capacity to do that. That means moving quickly, it means using air power to the maximum possible extent. It will affect the way that American forces on the ground are engaged in a military operation.
And it also means sending a very clear message to those Iraqis troops who might be asked to use chemical or biological weapons. And the message must be "if you follow Saddam's orders, you like he will be destroyed." Because it's not at all certain that when it becomes clear Saddam is not going to survive this campaign that those he is counting upon will carry out his orders.
James P. Rubin: So let's project forward. We use military force and it goes reasonably well. There is some use of chemical and biological weapons, significant casualties, but not overwhelming. Saddam is gone. How do we make sure that what comes next is not some other form of Iraqi dictator that will still have access to these chemical and biological weapons spread out among the country, and we'll change Iraq's policies so that we can disarm Iraq finally after ten long years?
Richard Perle: This is a very important question. And what we need to do is work together with a reasonable successor government. That means political collaboration now with the opposition. It means associating ourselves with those Iraqis who are committed to pluralism, democratic institutions, and the renunciation of weapons of mass destruction.
The Iraqi National Congress, which is an umbrella group of organizations opposed to Saddam, has adopted a program very much like that. And I think we should be working closely with them and with others in whom we can have some confidence.
James P. Rubin: But in order to be sure that that kind of group is the one that takes power, that will require an American presence on the ground. Would you agree that we need to be prepared for a long-term American presence on the ground in Iraq, perhaps as long as a decade or many years certainly?
Richard Perle: Yes. I think that we have to be ready to assure that what emerges after Saddam Hussein is the kind of Iraqi government that will govern the Iraqis decently and will be a friend and ally of the United States.
James P. Rubin: That means a long-term commitment and a financial commitment. And here's where we get into the question of allies. We in the United States have had our allies often pay for much of the peace keeping and the nation building and the reconstruction of places like Afghanistan. Right now the United States appears alone in terms of advocating the overthrow of Saddam Hussein - perhaps the British support us. Isn't there a risk if we don't get allied support before we undertake this action that they won't be there to help defray the billions and billions and billions of dollars we'll need to spend for a long time in Iraq?
Richard Perle: We'll get lots of allied support when it's over, when it's clear that the result was as we anticipated.
James P. Rubin: Plaudits, yes, but money?
Richard Perle: Well, first of all, Iraq is a very wealthy country. Enormous oil reserves. They can finance, largely finance the reconstruction of their own country. And I have no doubt that they will. The Iraqis are enormously talented. They've suffered horribly under Saddam Hussein. You liberate ...
James P. Rubin: They're still doing pretty well even after ...
Richard Perle: Well ...
James P. Rubin: ... ten years of sanctions. It's remarkable, isn't it?
Richard Perle: It's partly because Saddam controls and manipulates the flow of money. This idea that the sanctions have been killing women and children - there are billions of unexpended dollars that could be going for food and medicine. Saddam has an iron grip today. Once that's gone I think we will see the very talented Iraqis re-build their country and use the resources available to them. So I don't think we need the Europeans and their bank accounts.
James P. Rubin: But would it be preferable? And certainly it would be preferable to have support from our allies in a post-Saddam environment where there may be some reconstruction, there may be some terrible damage done in this war. And there may be a need for a long-term Western presence to help this kind of regime you want in power to be in power. It would be preferable, wouldn't it?
Richard Perle: Yes. The same phenomenon that leads the Europeans to tolerate Saddam Hussein - that is they accept whoever is in power - will lead them to support the successor regime to Saddam. They will change quickly. And they'll change as they see the result.
James P. Rubin: But would we want them to make financial contributions? Or you're not too concerned about that?
Richard Perle: I'm not terribly concerned about that. They'll do what is in their own interest. I mean, they're jamming the hotels in Baghdad now to sign contracts that will take effect when the sanctions are lifted. They'll be in the same hotels looking for the same contracts with the next regime.
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Richard Perle, chairman of the Defense Policy Board
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