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A marvelous thing about the stock market is that it's all about the future. It's the most amazing machine ever built for predicting what's about to happen, and it's record puts any psychic to shame.

When stocks started climbing in August 1982, with recession and high interest rates the main features of the economy, the conventional wisdom couldn't see any justification. But the market correctly foresaw the beginning of an economic boom, which turned out to be the greatest economic expansion in history, 18 years' worth interrupted only by the extraordinarily brief and mild recession of 1990-91. All hail the clairvoyance of Wall Street!

Now the market seems to be doing it again. As I write, stocks are up more than 20 percent from their March low at the beginning of the Iraq war, up 26 percent from their October low. And once again, the conventional view of the economy holds no justification for this sharp rise. So investors must now deal with the big question, Is Wall Street once more predicting a future no one else can see?

It's a tough question because while Wall Street's predictions are good, they aren't perfect. The old joke says the stock market has forecast nine of the past five recessions, and it applies just as well to expansions. So how about this time? Are the markets seeing the future or seeing a phantom?

You might accuse me of being trapped in the conventional wisdom, but here's why I'm skeptical that the markets are right in expecting an economic boom. The evidence consists not of government statistics but of three scenes from my life in the past week.

Scene 1: I'm sitting at a large square table in a midtown Manhattan hotel. Around the table are chief financial officers of about 20 very large U.S. companies in a wide range of industries: heavy manufacturing; financial services; consumer products; business software; and others. Also joining us is a former Secretary of the Treasury. The occasion is a FORTUNE forum on the urgent issues of the day. The ground rules of the discussion prohibit me from quoting anyone directly, but the prevailing sentiment is overwhelmingly clear: These guys are glum.

The former Treasury Secretary puts to them the case for why happy days should be here again:

• The war, with all its associated risks and uncertainty, is over.
• Spending on the war and increased defense, plus a big tax cut, are creating a giant fiscal stimulus.
• Monetary policy is extremely easy.
• The dollar is weak, which is good for U.S. exports.
• Result: All the pieces are in place for an investment-led recovery.

The CFOs aren't buying it. They say the picture is still missing one vital piece: demand. If they don't foresee increased demand, and they don't, then there's no point in making new investments, no matter how cheap money is. What's more, they can't even raise prices on what they already make. All product prices are static or falling, they say. They can occasionally raise prices on services. But that's not enough to get them very far.

Scene 2: I'm speaking to about 600 members of the Grocery Manufacturers Association. In the question-and-answer period, the very first question is, What about pricing power? Do you foresee any relief? I have to tell them I don't, but the big-picture message is that here's another massive sector of the economy that can't raise prices. Conversations with individual participants at the conference confirm that this is their top concern.

Scene 3: I'm talking with the CEO of a very large computer hardware, software, and services company. The conversation quickly turns to -- guess what? -- demand and prices, both of which are as flat as week-old Champagne, at least in his business. I tell him about my meeting with the CFOs, who say they can at least raise prices on services now and then. He frowns and shakes his head: Not in my business, he says. Unlike the CFOs, he recently borrowed a big slug of money that he has no current use for, simply because he could lock up a seven-year interest rate so low that he's sure it won't be available in a couple of months. But if he doesn't find a productive use for that money soon, he'll regret what he did, low rate or no.

Whare are we to make of all this? The picture seems remarkably consistent, and this is the view from the ground, not from 50,000 feet above the action. I'd love for this anecdotal evidence to be proven wrong and the market to be proven right -- and the lesson of history is that you truly never know. It could happen. But at the moment it's just particularly hard to see how.