TRAC
Interview Transcript

Paul Pozner     (cont)

Finally, they understood that we need a new agreement between the Republic, and they made a referendum, as you know. And 80 percent of the population of the Soviet Union voted for the Soviet Union under another form, but it was too late. Here came the egos of the two or three guysÑYeltsin, Kravchuk, and others and they made their agreement, and plus, the old guard was a so-called coup, which was not a coup; itÕs just hilarious, itÕs just not serious. But still, they pushed them to make this agreement on the separation of the Republic.

So I would say that Gorby representing in a lot of ways the trend of the development of the country which started from the death of Stalin, did a lot of stuff. But on the same time, because of his weakness, he couldnÕt control the process, and the process went out of his hand completely, because he was weak.

Question: Okay, would you review for us, as you did for the whole history, the history of the KGB in this transition, going back, and its evolution?

So now about the KGB, I donÕt think that the evolution of the KGB differs much from the evolution of the country. ItÕs one of the country evolutions; itÕs not a separated entity. I mean, compared to any special or secret services in any country, there are periods where they are more independent from the government and the society; there are periods when they are more controlled. But the people who work in the services are the same people from the same society with the same cultural background, so you cannot just separate them from the society.

So the development of the KGB is almost the same as the development of the country. And during StalinÕs purges, I would say, if you take the percentage of people killed in different structures, I would say that the most difficult purges happened in the central committee for the party leadership, and in the secret services. The people who really were the executor of the churches were killed too, came under the same churches. ThatÕs how it happens. So, you cannot say that KGB development was a little bit different than the different, than the development of the whole country.

Question: So, you come now to, say, the 70's and 80's. You have AndropovÉ

Pozner: Andropov came in the 70's, before there were other people. Normally, at the KhrushchevÕs time, because to be sure, the professionals does different. There were always the professionals. But as the head of the KGB, the career was, normally, he won in the Komsomol, which is the young Communist organization. Yes? The head of the Komsomol, he stood for, became, normally, the head of the KGB, which was, that, well, that how it happened that Semichastny became the head of the KGB. And, then, in the 70's, came Andropov because they wanted to reinforce the role of the KGB, and he came there as a member of the Politburo. And, also, you have to separate very much because the inside work and the outside work of the KGB because when it was created, it was not created. At that time was Cheka, with Dzerzhinsky, a Pole leading it. And that was during the civil war and a little bit after the civil war, say, through the end 20's. But, slowly, it crept, was separated in two parts inside. If you take the United States in comparison, CIA and FBI. So the CIA part have nothing to do with FBI. It was just another world. And there were professionals doing intelligence work. And the FBI part is, it what you understand was in the worst misunderstood in the KGB, hearing after everybody, looking into everything and everybodyÕs life. That was the Soviet FBI part. And you can compare it, if you want to understand what it was, say, slightly, not at StalinÕs time, but, say, KhrushchevÕs time, KhrushchevÕs time. You could compare it with the, with the FBI at the McCarthy time. ThatÕs a little bit, Khrushchev and Brezhnev period of KGB part, inside part, could be compared and would be exactly the same, and not worse, than the FBI at the McCarthy time.

Question: But under Andropov, now, when the, letÕs call it the CIA part, the intelligence gather into the West. They became a conduit for a lot of information about the West, and they then would submit to the stories that they were secret informers. Is that, in other words, did Andropov have a strong role in revising the thinking of the leadership at the time? Is that true?

Pozner: But normally when you have professionals, you know, when you have professionals, who are getting the true information, then their obligation is to put to the leadership of the country the information on the table. Uh, they want it or not. They changed their approach. And, maybe the old guy, the top guy, he cannot change his mind. It doesnÕt change it. But all his advisors, all the group working for him, much younger, these people get information and they prepare for him the document that he will sign. So, it a, it is done in a very smooth way, that he would understand. But, still, itÕs exactly like with Reagan, with Ronald Reagan, who is not supposed to change his mind. HeÕs not that type of a person. And he had no aides to change he mind, but look how he changed slowly in, gave up his rhetoric on the "empire of evil", because his advisors, and the CIA, and the information of the CIA put on his table, and his advisors slowly putting that under his nose. I would say it is not exactly the good example, but itÕs very similar.