Inside the Secret SEAL Team 6 Mission to North Korea and What Went Wrong

HARI SREENIVASAN: Paula, thanks. Matthew Cole, thanks so much for joining us. You just recently published a piece in the New York Times about a SEAL Team six mission that most Americans did not know about. This is 2019. The administration is trying to figure out how to denuclearize or negotiate with North Korea. Right? The administration, like every party in any negotiation, wants as much of an advantage as possible to try to get an edge. Well, what are they thinking? What are they saying? Let’s tap the phones. but getting something into North Korea is not that easy. Why did they go with this particular route? 

MATTHEW COLE: Let me just say that, you know, even in our reporting, and we’re very explicit in the story, that there were some details that we withheld because of the sensitivity and the nature of, of the, you know, listening device or the, you know, the, the capabilities that the US government has that we wanted to err on the side of caution of. 

In 2018 the US government saw an opportunity to place a listening device in North Korea. In the middle of a series of negotiations, let’s understand and get an idea of what the negotiators on the North Korean side are saying to Kim Jong-Un. 

And secondly, there was a sort of longer term, a potential for a longer term strategic advantage to get access to North Korean communications, period. And so the question is, is how do you get a device into North Korea? 

You know, one of the reasons why the Navy SEALs get these missions in the end is because they can come in through the water. Right? There was not a possibility to parachute into North Korea. You weren’t going to cross over land via China or South Korea. So the only way in is through the water. And ultimately the Navy SEALs and in particular the elite SEAL Team six unit, they are the best at the ability to get in. 

And so the planning and the rehearsing for this went on for months in late 2018. And meanwhile, the SEAL Team Six, the Navy special operations, was looking at the place that they were going in North Korea to see when an opening would be – when they could get in, when when was the best possible time. And so there was an opening in early 2019 in the winter. The water was extremely cold, and they just determined that that was when they were gonna do it. And it came days, weeks before the proposed summit in Hanoi. So there was an enormous amount of tension around whether, you know, being able to get in, get out undetected, and whether doing so could derail the possible summit.

And so the large submarine gets out into the Japanese Sea and eventually makes its way to North Korea. They get into North Korean waters, the, deploy these two seal delivery vehicles each with roughly six SEALs in them. And they motor their way underwater. They’re, they’re considered wet subs, which means everyone’s in a suit with scuba gear. And the water is so cold that they had to have neoprene suits that had heating elements to them to keep them from freezing because it was a two hour ride into the, their location where they were going. The mini subs got about 150 between 100-200 hundred yards or meters from, from their location at the shoreline. And the SEALs get out and they make their way. 

SREENIVASAN: They have practiced this over and over again, what just seems like a physically grueling task. And a lot of things have to go right. What went wrong?

COLE: You’re right. So much has to go right. I mean, it has to be almost perfect. There were in the after action several things that the SEALs believe went wrong. We should say, first of all, there is a certain amount of ambiguity and lack of fidelity about what went wrong, because the nature of the operation started with the fact that, you know, SEALs and Seal Team Six and special operation forces have been, since 9/11, you know, fighting wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in the Middle East. And it, during all of those missions, what they had were live overhead cameras. They had video feeds, so in, often in high definition. And so you had the ability to see what was going on above them and communicate with them. Well, there was none of that for this. (10:21):This is, this was old fashioned. Behind enemy lines, no communications. And so  had to make decisions based on the, what they could see in front of them. And so there’s a limitation in terms of understanding what may have gone wrong. 

What may have gone wrong though, was one of the two mini subs missed its landing mark. It released, it turn, turned itself around, it released the SEALs. The SEALs, staying underwater, made their way towards the shore. The, both the mini sub and the SEALs at that point missed the, any indication that there was a fishing skiff, that there was a small boat on the, on the water. 

Meanwhile, it’s middle of the night. The sea is calm. It’s quiet. These fishermen are alone out there. And the mini sub, having missed its mark, turns itself around. And when it turns itself around, there was essentially a theory that in doing so, because the water was so, it was in such shallow water that its engines made a wake, essentially, so that from above the water, you could hear or see movement in the water and caught the attention. 

So, as that may be happening, the SEALs have now made their way to shore. They’re on the beach. They’re at you know, waist, between knee and waist high water. They’re taking off their suits and their gear. And at that point, at least one of the SEALs sees the boat with three North Koreans on it. And one of the three, two or three North Koreans dives into the water. Now, at that point, one of the SEALs on the mission has concluded that they have these North Koreans who they’re not sure, are they fishermen? Are they security, are they armed? Do they have a radio to call back for help? That they have discovered the mini sub. And that this one who’s, who’s dives into the water is trying to look at the mini sub. Right? And so as soon as that person pops back up, that seal decides to, to fire his weapon. And at that point the SEALs had been under strict orders that had they interacted with any humans, whether it was security or fishermen, that they had to abort the mission.

They opened fire, the rest of the SEALs open fire on the people in the boat. They make their way back to the boat to see and inspect. They discover that there’s no weapons, there’s no radio. It appears to be just north, North Korean civilians, fishermen. And they ditch the bodies in the water, and they get back into the mini subs. And they call in with a distress signal to the nuclear submarine off offshore. And that nuclear submarine has to come in to shorten the distance, but for the route for the mini subs into the, the large sub and get them out. And they were able to. 

SREENIVASAN: You know, in, in your reporting, you talk a little bit about how this SEAL team was formed in 1980, how it’s become kind of this almost legendary unit in part because of Hollywood, part because of some of their successful missions. But you also go on to write that, “among some in the military who’ve worked with them, the SEALs have a reputation for devising overly bold and complex missions that go badly.” Most of us never hear of any of the risks that they take that did not work out. Give us some examples.

COLE: Sure. I mean, you know, it’s important to remember that the job that these men sign up for, train for and then go out and do is incredibly risky and hard. And it is by no means you know, I don’t wanna leave the impression and I don’t think we did in our article, that what they’re doing is a piece of cake. It’s the opposite. These are essentially the hardest missions that the government has or asks its soldiers to do. They do them. That said, they’re still human. And so, and they make mistakes. 

They’ve had a series of missions after 9/11 where you know, part of it was, it’s less about misconduct and more about when they make mistakes, and they have a, they’ve had a legacy of coverups, of lying about trying to avoid scrutiny or accountability for their errors. And so we cited a few operations. One was in Afghanistan, which was a hostage rescue in 2010 of a British citizen who was being held in Afghanistan. And, and SEALs accidentally killed her. But the problem was, was that in the Hostage Rescue, after they killed her, they lied about how she died, and the fact that they knew that they had likely done it. And so it led to a, a, a very embarrassing moment for President Obama at the time, who had to report to the British government that what they originally said had happened, did not happen. 

And more recently under the first Trump administration, he green lit a very risky mission into Yemen to go after Al Qaeda, in 2017. And it was, it led to 30 civilians being killed in a village. Lost, they lost huge airplane and a member of Seal Team Six died. And the, you know, the point we try to make in the story is that members of the special operations community and of the military, you know, one of the reasons why they were, were speaking about this mission was it was sort of twofold. It was not just that the SEALs you know, as a reminder that even among the elite mistakes are made, but also that these things carry incredibly high risks. And we as a, you know, civilian government is no different than the rest of the American public. If the vision and the view of Seal Team Si–x are only their great successes, the death of, you know, the killing of Osama Bin Laden or saving Captain Phillips in the Indian Ocean from, from Somali Pirates, is that they are, you know supermen that can do anything. And in fact, it’s not like that at all. It’s incredibly difficult. And so, you know, there has to be more oversight and scrutiny and awareness about what the risks are when, when a president signs off on using these units on these kinds of missions.

SREENIVASAN: So, getting back to this mission I’m sure it spurred a lot of different internal reviews. What did they find? Was there some accountability?

COLE: Well, not really. I mean, the, there were multiple investigations first under the Trump administration, and then when President Joseph, Joe Biden came into office and discovered that this operation had happened and what they ultimately came down to was it was just a series of unfortunate occurrences that, you know, at the end of the day, the SEALs that opened fire on the North Koreans were working with the assumption that they had been compromised. And at that point, the most important thing to do was to protect their lives and get out safely and without being caught. And so the, the deaths were ruled legal, they had operated within the rules of engagement. There was no determination of any kind of misconduct. It was just a, you know, it, you picked every possible thing that could have gone wrong. It went wrong.

I think there is, what we understand is that because there was essentially only the story of the six to eight SEALs who were on the mission there is, there was nothing else to go by. And so the military investigators had the same issue because what they didn’t have was any kind of overhead video. They had no other ability to know what was happening or what happened. And so the circumstances were so unique. You know, they get the, the SEALs, I think appropriately, get an enormous amount of leeway here. And what it was, was, you know, military determined that it was just a series of unfortunate events, and there was no one really to blame.

SREENIVASAN: So when did members of Congress know about this, hear about this? Because usually these kind of missions, there are select members of Congress who head different committees who are in the loop.

COLE: Yeah. Well, one of the most surprising things in the reporting on this story was that the President during his first term never informed Congress at all about the mission before or afterwards. And so the mission was first briefed to what they call the Gang of Eight by the Biden administration. And the Gang of Eight is the top four – it’s the top Republican and Democrat in the House and the Senate, and then the two leaders of both the intelligence committees. And so that’s, it gets your eight. And so they didn’t learn about it until at least two years after the mission had occurred, and that we believe may have violated law about not notification, notifying Congress when a president is required to notify Congress. 

SREENIVASAN: You, your, your story came out, the President was asked explicitly about this story, and he stated, quote, “I don’t know anything about it. I’m hearing it now for the first time.” Yet, in your reporting, you point out that this mission had explicit authorization from the President of the United States when that nuclear submarine was close to North Korea. What do you make of his response?

COLE: Well, I’m not gonna get into the head of the President of the United States, but I can tell you that our sources were, we had plenty of them. And it was very clear that President Trump had approved the mission all the way through. He was very well versed with what happened to the extent that he paid attention, we can’t spec, I’m not going to speculate. I, I am comfortable with the report, very confident with our reporting, and I’m sure my colleague Dave Phillips is as well. And I think the safest thing to say is that what the President said in the aftermath was not accurate.

SREENIVASAN: It, it’s hard to know whether the failure of this mission impacted those talks in Hanoi. But now, you know, we literally, one of the images of 2025 is gonna be President Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, Kim Jong-Un, and Randa Modi at this meeting, and just last week the anniversary of the end of World War, Big Military Parade. President Xi Jinping and Kim Jong-Un pledge deeper ties, and I wonder, is there is this, you know, all connected, I mean, these missions don’t happen in a vacuum. The reactions don’t happen in a vacuum. 

COLE: Yeah. So you know, I, I think the question is whether or not President of the United States, when they make president, makes a decision to take such a huge gamble, what the risk versus rewards are. And, you know, I think, you know, the act of journalism is – in, in a particular case where even Congress was kept in the dark about a mission like this – you know, it’s in the public interest to have some understanding of what the president has authorized, what the US military, what the US government has done in secret. And in particular, when things go badly or wrong, not necessarily because anyone, you know, made, did something, any misconduct, but, you know, this is how wars can, you know, this is how, how tensions and confluence can escalate. And especially when things are in secret and not to mention the issue of separation of powers here between Congress and the Executive Branch. And so you know, I, I try to not to think about or speculate too much on the dynamic that this mission, or publishing this mission, may or may not have on, you know, what foreign governments or how foreign governments are gonna view it. And rather about how, and I think the the point is, is, you know, how the US government behaves and acts and conducts itself, especially behind closed doors.

SREENIVASAN: Investigative Reporter from the New York Times, Matthew Cole, thanks so much for joining us.

COLE: Thank you, Hari.