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Diffusing the Korean Bomb

Think Tank Transcripts:Defusing the Korean Bomb

MR. WATTENBERG: Hello. I'm Ben Wattenberg. For 50 years, the mostexclusive club in the world has been the club of nuclear nations. Nowrenegade North Korea some have called it a 'crazy state' -- may beonly months away from joining the nuclear elite. What can be done tostop North Korea from getting the bomb?

Joining us today to sort through the conflict and the consensusare Richard Perle, resident fellow at the American EnterpriseInstitute and former assistant secretary of defense; Paul Warnke,arms control negotiator during the Carter administration, now adirector of the Arms Control Association; Leonard Spector, directorof the Nuclear Nonproliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace and author of 'Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread ofNuclear Weapons, 1989-1990'; and Robert Manning, a senior fellow atthe Progressive Policy Institute and author of 'Back to the Future:Toward a Post-Nuclear Ethic.'

The topic before this house: defusing the Korean bomb. This weekon 'Think Tank.'

Almost 50 years ago, Korea became the first battlefield of theCold War. The United States led the United Nations to fight a bloodywar to defend the South from communist North Korea. Fifty-fourthousand Americans and four million Koreans died in the war, whichended in a draw in 1953.

Today troops from the North and South face each other in a tensestandoff across Korea's demilitarized zone. South Korea's capital,Seoul, lies only 18 miles from the border. And Japan is 120 milesoffshore within missile and bomber range of North Korea.

The United States is committed by treaty to defending South Koreashould the North attack. Thus, the 38,000 American troops on theKorean peninsula are a tripwire.

North Korea, an isolated nation often called the hermit kingdomhas over one million men under arms, and it has an enormous artilleryand rocket advantage over the South. But North Korea lost its chiefpatron when Soviet communism collapsed.

Recently, to the horror of the world, North Korea has apparentlydecided to build nuclear weapons.

The absolute ruler of North Korea is Kim Il Sung, installed in1946 by Joseph Stalin. In 1983, Kim ordered the assassination ofSouth Korean cabinet members. In 1987, he had agents blow up a SouthKorean civilian airliner. These actions and others cause many to fearwhat he might do with nuclear weapons.

On June 16th, former President Jimmy Carter met with Kim Il Sung,who allegedly pledged to freeze his nuclear bomb program and to holda summit between his country and South Korea. Some see this as anopportunity for peace, while others believe that Kim is merelyplaying for time.

But one thing is clear. North Korea is dangerously close to havinga nuclear bomb.

Mr. Manning, what is North Korea like? Who are we dealing with upthere?

MR. MANNING: Well, if George Orwell were ever to construct thestate, North Korea would be probably the most likely product. It'snot your run-of-the-mill communist state. I'd say it's somewherebetween David Koresh and Mao Tse-Tung. It has a lot of qualitiesalmost like a large religious cult even within the sort of Confucianhierarchy system.

MR. WATTENBERG: Do people there really accept Kim Il Sung as thesun god or whatever it is? I mean we heard that about a lot of thecommunist states in Eastern Europe, and then we found out that therewas a whole dissident class.

MR. MANNING: They have been enormously successful at insulatingthemselves from the information revolution. Radios only get onestation in most people's houses. There's really a -- people don'tknow -- the information flow is very minimum outside the elite.

MR. WATTENBERG: Paul, what do you think? That sounded all right?

MR. WARNKE: I've never been there, and I'll take Bob Manning'sword for it. It sounds correct to me.

MR. WATTENBERG: Leonard.

MR. SPECTOR: I would have to say that when I was there two yearsback, you did get that sense of a totally indoctrinated society thatdoes support the leader and doesn't have the slightest bit ofpolitical flexibility or familiarity with the outside world.

MR. WATTENBERG: The hermit kingdom, so-called.

MR. SPECTOR: That's what you see. Obviously, some people do travelabroad and have been there, but the population at large seems verymuch indoctrinated and under Kim's control.

MR. WATTENBERG: Richard?

MR. PERLE: Well, and the population at large in any case hasnothing to say about the policies of the government, which are madeby Kim and his son and a handful of people around him.

MR. MANNING: I would just add from a policy point of view, I thinkthat the elite that I've encountered and seen are quite cosmopolitan.They're aware of the world, they're aware of the desperate situationtheir government is in. And this notion of a 'crazy state' or anirrational actor is a bit overblown. They have an internal logic. Itmay not be our version of a Cartesian world, but there's a logic andalmost a predictability

MR. WATTENBERG: Let me -- you used a very interesting phrase, the'crazy state.' During this 50-year-long debate about the missiles andwho's got them and the -- Herman Kahn and thinking the unthinkableand all that sort of stuff, and I know particularly Paul and Richardwere very much -- as well as our other panelists, were very involvedin this dialogue. What is, as a term of art in that field, a 'crazystate'? Maybe Richard and then Paul.

MR. PERLE: Paul and I have lots of differences, but I think weboth considered that the Soviet leadership was rational in the sensethat it would not undertake a suicidal act, that it would probablynot even take risks so extreme that it could lead to a nuclear war.

I don't think we have any such confidence with Kim Il Sung.

MR. WARNKE: Well, I think we'll see. At this stage

MR. WATTENBERG: 'Crazy state' was part of the debate all theseyears, wasn't it?

MR. WARNKE: It has been. I'd say they're clearly a nasty state.We're trying to find out whether they're crazy in the talks, becauseI think at this point, they ought to recognize that in talking withthem, we have not foreclosed other options. We shouldn't set anyconditions on talking, and they can't set any conditions either.

Now, if they behave in a fashion which requires us to use otheroptions than negotiation, then they're probably crazy.

MR. WATTENBERG: Leonard, isn't something going on right now with atime fuse about the reprocessing rods? I mean it gets kind ofcomplicated, but where there really is a time fuse and you can makethe case that President Carter's initiative is merely giving Kim IlSung an opportunity to, what, let those rods cool in order to build2, 4, 6, 8, 10 bombs?

MR. SPECTOR: Right. Hypothetically -- well, not hypothetically --right now we know that they have spent fuel from this reactor whichis sitting in a cooling pond. The fuel contains enough plutonium forfour or five bombs as soon as it might be processed.

We've said, as long as the talks continue, we don't want you toreprocess this material, don't want you to get the plutonium. Andthey have agreed.

What I am fearful of, however, is that as these rods cool andbecome easy to process, let's say in a couple of months, maybesooner, the North Koreans may decide that these talks don't lookquite so good and they may start to do the reprocessing. They mayeven do it with the inspectors present, in which case they would windup with a stockpile of plutonium. If one day they wanted to kick theinspectors out, they would really have everything they need for abomb, and we would always be on the edge, wondering what was going tohappen next.

MR. MANNING: Well, I think this is -- you know, the situation wehave now is, the worst case is they may have enough plutonium for abomb or two. If they go ahead the next step, then we're looking atseven to eight total possible bombs and then the nightmare scenariosof exports to Iran and Libya, and the things that are reallydangerous about this start to kick in. And so I think we're really atthe beginning of the endgame on this issue.

MR. WARNKE: Yeah, but it's up to us to see to it that that doesnot happen. And I think that by agreeing to talk, we are exploring anoption that may be productive. I think they ought to recognize thatif they now were to recant and to continue their nuclear program, tryand reprocess -- something of that sort, I think that they are now ina position in which they are to be regarded as so flagrant that we'dhave less trouble getting China and getting Japan to go along withour sanctions.

MR. PERLE: It seems to me that while these details are important,and how close they are, how long they have to wait with fuel rods andcooling tanks, the fundamental point is that Kim Il Sung is committedto developing nuclear weapons and becoming a significant nuclearweapons state, and all the rest is maneuver intended to give him thetime and opportunity to accomplish that goal.

MR. MANNING: Well, I can't read Kim Il Sung's mind. His behaviorcertainly

MR. WATTENBERG: You can't. Why not?

MR. MANNING: His behavior certainly suggests, particularly whenthey removed the core of the reactor, that that is their intention.The problem is, I don't believe we've fairly tested it. I mean wehave had a long path of diplomacy, but we've never put a clear andprecise deal on the table and said, here's what we want you to do andhere's what happens when you do it.

MR. WATTENBERG: Let me interrupt for a minute. You said youcouldn't read Kim Il Sung's mind. What about Jimmy Carter's mind?He's suddenly become a big player in this discussion.

In the recent edition of 'The New Republic,' Josh Maravchekoffered some quotes from the past about how Jimmy Carter dealt withand thought -- apparently thought of communist dictators.

He described Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea, as: 'Thecapital is a bustling city where shoppers pack the department stores,which look like Wal-Mart in America's Georgia.'

Earlier of the shah of Iran, he said, 'Your country is an islandof stability because of the love which your people give to you.'

Of Marshall Tito, he said, 'He is a man who believes in humanrights and exemplifies the eagerness for freedom and independence andliberty.'

And of the bloodthirsty Nicolae Ceaucescu in Romania, he said,'Our goals are the same, to let the people of the world share ingrowth, in peace, in personal freedom,' and it goes on and on.

And the last one is of first secretary Edward Gierek of Poland,which the 'The New Republic,' which Josh Maravchek describes as astolid Stalinist. He said, 'Our concept of human rights is preservedin Poland.'

Now Carter goes to North Korea and hugs Kim Il Sung and says, hey,we got a deal there, this is a great guy.

MR. WARNKE: Yeah, but the fact is, we aren't dealing with JimmyCarter in these negotiations, so I find all of that basicallyirrelevant. We have an opportunity to test Kim Il Sung at this point,whether he's serious about really stopping his nuclear program.

And I agree with Bob Manning, we ought to find out what kind of apackage we can present and then present him with the alternatives --this is what you can get if you give up the nuclear ambition, andthis is what you're going to get if you go ahead with it.

MR. PERLE: But Jimmy Carter has derailed an admittedly faltering,halting administration policy that was moving toward some expressionof resolution.

MR. WARNKE: I think we're going to have more of a chance ofgetting tough sanctions if at this point Kim Il Sung proves to be afalse prophet in terms of what he's going to do.

MR. PERLE: Paul, if you think sanctions wouldn't have workedanyway, and I think sanctions wouldn't have worked anyway

MR. WARNKE: Right.

MR. PERLE: -- then it's no great loss to have lost the opportunityto undertake sanctions.

MR. WARNKE: We haven't given up any of the

MR. PERLE: But what we've also done, as long as this so-calledfreeze is continued, is we will be prevented from taking any otheraction. And at the end of the day

MR. WARNKE: I think it depends upon how the talks go. If itbecomes clear that he is just stalling, I see no reason why we can'tmake the necessary military preparations.

MR. PERLE: When will we decide that he's stalling? How long areyou prepared to give him?

MR. WARNKE: Well, I'm not going to be a negotiator, unfortunately.I'd be able to give you a better time table if I were.

MR. WATTENBERG: Let me ask one question just to sort of give ourviewership and ourselves sort of a sense of what we're talking about.It is my view, as much more of an amateur in foreign policy than youall, that nuclear nonproliferation is the single most importantforeign policy issue that the United States and the world faces.

I mean Bosnia is localized, Somalia is localized, all these thingsare localized. If you go into a situation where a crazy state buildsbombs and sells bombs and instead of having -- how many nuclearstates do we have now, 8, 10, something like that? -- you have 20,you have 30, you have 40, do we end up with a world where ourgrandchildren are really in deep stuff?

MR. WARNKE: I think no question about it. I think that PresidentClinton said that in his U.N. speech last September, thatnonproliferation was one of our very highest priority items. And itshould be, which is why we can't get North Korea get away with it.

MR. SPECTOR: But the question is, what does it mean not to letNorth Korea get away with it, because I think what's going to happenis that in a very short time, a couple of months perhaps, we're goingto face this very, very serious crisis as they start to get thewherewithal for the bomb, in other words, as they actually try to getthe plutonium.

Now, sanctions are all well and good, but let's go through thatscenario. Let's suppose that when they start to get the plutonium,everybody says, my God, this is horrible, and we get a greatcoalition and within a month or two, very heavy-duty sanctions areenacted by the U.N., and six months after that, the North Koreansreally begin to feel the pinch.

Well, by then they're going to have what they want, and by thenthey will have the wherewithal for the bomb. So very shortly, I thinkyou're going to be looking not just at a sanctions option if thingsgo the wrong way, if the talks don't work out; you're going to haveto at least examine the military option. And I'm not advocating it.I'm just saying it is going to be looming there sooner than we maythink.

MR. WATTENBERG: Paul, suppose the negotiations work out well.

MR. WARNKE: Right.

MR. WATTENBERG: Have we not set up a scenario where every two-bit,tin-pot dictator around the world says, hey, I'm going to start anuclear program also, and I'm going to get economic aid and I'm goingto get this and I'm going to get recognition in the United Nationsand Jimmy Carter's going to come over. It becomes a great diplomaticbusiness, doesn't it?

MR. WARNKE: Well, what is the alternative, though? I mean, weshouldn't talk? We shouldn't try and find out what we could do toprevent them going ahead with a nuclear program?

MR. WATTENBERG: Don't ask me. We have experts. What's thealternative?

MR. WARNKE: It would be a lot cheaper than a war.

MR. WATTENBERG: Okay, what's the alternative, guys?

MR. PERLE: There is a principle that can be extracted from this,and that is, we have seen now over the last couple of years asuccession of American concessions to the North Koreans. We removedour nuclear weapons from South Korea, we canceled or postponedmilitary exercises. We have done one thing after another to inducethe North Koreans to be cooperative.

And in doing so, we have said to the world we will back down, wewill lay out policies, we --the president said that it wasunacceptable, inadmissible to allow the North Koreans to have anuclear program. That's no longer the American position. We arevacillating, and that has to be an encouragement to others who wouldchallenge the United States.

MR. WATTENBERG: Paul asked an interesting question a moment ago.He said, well, what are you going to do about it if -- and you said,I think actually on an earlier program in this series, that we haveto be prepared to do Osirak, which was the Israeli bombing of theIraqi nuclear

MR. PERLE: In 1981, the Israeli air force attacked and destroyed areactor that was about to come on line near Baghdad. It was abreathtaking display of bombing accuracy. They destroyed the reactorand did no damage beyond the reactor site itself.

The North Koreans have a reprocessing plant at Yong Byong. We knowexactly where it is.

MR. WATTENBERG: But they also have a million men 20 miles awayfrom Seoul, and boom, in they go, and you are talking about a massconflagration.

MR. PERLE: The question is, would the surgical destruction of thatreprocessing facility lead to a North Korean invasion in South Korea,or wouldn't it? And I don't think we know the answer.

MR. MANNING: That's only one of the risks. The larger problem iswe don't know where all the targets are. A hot cell in which you canreprocess is about 8-by-10 size. This is a country that has thousandsof tunnels, that has made an art of building factories intomountains. So we don't know where the targets are. You know, that'snumber one problem.

Secondly, there is the risk -- I think the only scenario I can seethem starting a war is an act of suicide because they know deterrencedoes work. But on the other hand, if they think that we're comingafter them and this is the end, somebody in North Korea may very wellbe tempted to make sure that if they're going to lose, the Southdoesn't win.

MR. WATTENBERG: This is your David Koresh scenario. Is that right?

MR. MANNING: Yes, this is Waco revisited.

MR. WATTENBERG: Waco West.

MR. PERLE: If we don't know where the targets are, then how are weever going to know that they've stopped their nuclear program? Ifthey can do it covertly, then we will never have any assurance thatthey're not doing it, no matter what they agree to in these talks.You can't have it both ways.

MR. MANNING: Well, that's an important point, and what I wouldargue is, there is no 100 percent guarantee. No verification systemis going to give you a hundred percent. That is why we worked withthe South Koreans to get them to agree to a North-South bilateralinspection regime that is more intrusive, and in theory we should setup a challenge regime so that when we do get some information, thenwe can check it out on a rapid basis.

MR. PERLE: If the verification scheme is worth anything at all, itmeans we know basically where the targets are, and I think we do knowwhere the targets are.

MR. SPECTOR: We are going to be left with this very stark choicepotentially. And again, it could be during the congressionalelections this fall, for example, sometime when it would be kind ofstick for us to have to think hard about these issues.

They're on the verge of getting the material for the bomb, let'ssay. Then you have to decide, is it worth destroying this facility,taking some of the risks? Are we going to benefit enough fromdestroying the facility? Will the signal be sent? Or do we shrinkfrom this and have to deal with this through containment?

MR. WATTENBERG: The signal caller in this situation is going to beBill Clinton. An argument that is being made is that in much lessimportant situations -- in Haiti, in Somalia, in Bosnia, Clinton hassent such mixed signals, the flip-flop sort of diagram, that he hasalready self-undermined his own ability to negotiate this terriblydangerous thing. Do you buy that proposition, Paul?

MR. WARNKE: No, I don't. It seems to me that there is no reason weshould not explore the possibility of getting a deal, and I thinkthat the president ought to be involved personally. I think, for onething, that it's quite clear that Kim Il Sung responds to that sortof flattery, and it shouldn't be left just to lower level. I thinkthe president ought to be involved, we ought to see if we can cut adeal. We haven't foreclosed any of these other options.

And it seems to me, the alternative at this point is that welaunch some sort of military action now. And I say that is premature;it should not be tried.

MR. WATTENBERG: Sandy Spector, let me ask you this question. Justa while ago, you were one of the, what, dozen or so people who wereasked into the White House to help brief the president on thissituation. He's a very charming man, he knows a lot. Are youconvinced that he is on top of this thing and understands the fullmagnitude of this?

MR. SPECTOR: I think the White House was in pretty good shape whenthey had this briefing. There were nuance differences among some ofthe players on their side of the table, but among the experts thatwere coming in, there was enormous difference of opinion, and I wouldsay we looked in much worse disarray than the other side. [Laughter.]So I think they are doing fine.

MR. WATTENBERG: What else is new?

MR. MANNING: Well, there is one point I think that needs to bestressed. The one positive thing about the Carter trip to me was thatyou can't deal with a hierarchical system in which there's a very fewpeople, and perhaps only that makes a decision, and deal with a bunchof bureaucrats.

And I think the point that Paul made is important, that when youshow Kim Il Sung you take him seriously, if there's any chance of adeal, that's the way you will get it.

MR. PERLE: The thing that would impress Kim Il Sung mostsignificantly, it seems to me, is if he understood that hisreprocessing facility could disappear in a matter of hours. And bythe way, once that reprocessing facility is functioning and you havenuclear material in there

MR. WARNKE: Then it's a lot tougher.

MR. PERLE: -- it's much more difficult, and we ought to make itclear to Kim Il Sung that we don't want another Chernobyl, thatbefore this facility becomes radioactive, it will cease to exist.

MR. WATTENBERG: Now, let me ask a final question here, if I might.Let me go around the table here, starting perhaps with you, Paul, andask -- here we have a variety of views -- what do you all agree uponand what do you disagree upon?

MR. WARNKE: I'd say what we agree upon is that North Korea cannotbe allowed to become a nuclear power, and we ought to find outwhether we can cut a deal so that they will buy off from theirpursuit of a nuclear capability. I think that's what we agree on.

MR. WATTENBERG: And what do we disagree about?

MR. WARNKE: I guess we disagree on the feasibility of cutting adeal. I guess we disagree on whether negotiations can conceivably befruitful. In my opinion, they can and we ought to try it, but weought to keep our other options open.

MR. WATTENBERG: Sandy.

MR. SPECTOR: Well, I think that's just where I would come out,too, in the sense that there's certainly no harm in activenegotiations. If we get a deal, terrific. Then we can all breatheeasier.

But what would be a mistake, I think, is to put all our hopes onthe deal and not take precautions in the event that they don't workout. I do not think the administration is only looking to the deal. Imean they are also building up some military strength in the region,and that's all to the good. And I think the American people perhapshave to appreciate that there is this other dimension that is lurkingin the background.

MR. WATTENBERG: Do you think Richard is being too tough on this?

MR. SPECTOR: I think you may be ready to launch a strike tomorrow.I don't think so.

MR. PERLE: No, I don't think we need to launch a strike tomorrow,but I think unless you have decided that you will launch a strikebefore you will allow North Korea to become a significant nuclearpower, and I think in practical terms, that means before you allowthem to reprocess the fuel they now have into plutonium -- once youmake that decision, then I think it's fine, sit down at the table,but make sure that your allies know that you've made that decisionand that the North Koreans know that you've made that decision.

MR. WATTENBERG: So you agree with Paul and the rest of the panelthat we ought to proceed with the negotiations?

MR. PERLE: Only after we make the decision that if thenegotiations fail, we will do what the Israelis did and end theprogram in that way, because if you don't make that decision first,there is a risk that you go on negotiating past the point at whichthey take irreversible action and become the nuclear power we'retrying to prevent them from becoming.

MR. WATTENBERG: Bob Manning, you're last. What do we agree upon?What do we disagree upon?

MR. MANNING: Well, I guess I'm looking at it a little bit morefrom a regional perspective. This is a communist dinosaur thatdoesn't have much of a future. And I think prudence dictates that wedo reinforce and strengthen deterrence. But the notion that we shouldinitiate a conflict over this, I'm not quite there yet.

MR. WATTENBERG: Okay. Thank you, Robert Manning, Richard Perle,Leonard Spector, Paul Warnke. And thank you.

As you know, this is a new program and we have appreciated hearingfrom you very much. Please send us your comments to the address onthe screen.

For 'Think Tank,' I'm Ben Wattenberg. END

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