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A Conversation with Michael Howard

Think Tank Transcripts: Sir Michael Howard

ANNOUNCER: 'Think Tank' has been made possible by Amgen, a recipient of the Presidential National Medal of Technology. Amgen, bringing better, healthier lives to people worldwide through biotechnology. Additional funding is provided by the John M. Olin Foundation, the Randolph Foundation and the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation. MR. WATTENBERG: Hello, I'm Ben Wattenberg in London. We seem to be living in an era unprecedented in human history, where a single nation, America, spans the globe as a dominant power. But historians tell us there is a precedent for everything. On this program, we talk with Britain's leading military historian, Sir Michael Howard. He is one of the world's preeminent authorities on war, power and military strategy. From London, this week on 'Think Tank.' Today we are the Royal Society of Arts in London. Joining us is Sir Michael Howard, president of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and former Regis professor of history at the University of Oxford. He was also Lovett professor of military and naval history at Yale University. He is the author of many books, including 'The Lessons of History,' 'The Causes of Wars,' 'Clausewitz' and 'War in European History.' Thank you for joining us, Sir Michael. Let us begin with the great German strategist Clausewitz, who wrote that 'War is the extension of politics by other means.' You are a Clausewitzian. Can you first tell us what that means? And then, does it still apply in this strange new world? SIR MICHAEL: Yes. He said it to make it clear that war is not just a game. It's not something which takes place in a kind of vacuum governed by its own laws, that wars are fought for purposes and they are political purposes, and the political objective has got to impregnate the whole of the conduct of war. Now, the difference is that when he wrote at the beginning of the 19th century, he was thinking about war between states. Now we have got war within states. And I'm afraid it is perfectly true that if one looks at the former Yugoslavia, war is being conducted there as politics continued by other means, the politics of the individual, separate ethnic groups attempting to assert their independence, extend their range and assert their individuality and using force to do it. So the answer -- the short answer is yes, what Clausewitz wrote is still valid. MR. WATTENBERG: Is it still valid in terms of war between states in an era of nuclear weapons? You have written that war is much less likely in the modern circumstance because the weapons have become so horrific. SIR MICHAEL: Certainly war between states armed with nuclear weapons is less likely because neither side sees any political advantage to be gained from a conflict in which they are likely to suffer at least as much as their adversary. But other types of war between lesser armed states, as between Iraq and Iran or between Iraq and the coalition put together five years ago to keep Saddam at bay is still -- happens, and I'm afraid it's likely to continue to happen. MR. WATTENBERG: Why can't we put a coalition together to do something about Bosnia? SIR MICHAEL: I think very largely because the whole Bosnian situation is infinitely more complicated than that in the Gulf. The Gulf was a wonderful simple situation. In the first place, there was a single adversary, a bad guy straight out of central casting, Saddam Hussein. You only had to see him on the box to know that he was bad. Secondly, there was an absolutely straightforward infringement of international law with his invasion of Kuwait. And thirdly, the oil resources of the Western world were at risk. Now, put that together and you have got a full flush. MR. WATTENBERG: Plus a program to build nuclear weapons just as an added -- SIR MICHAEL: Exactly, yes. I mean you couldn't have a better scenario. Bosnia is such a mess. It is by no means clear which side is right. They all have got very good cases. The whole conflict escalated suddenly from low-level confrontation by the time it was realized that we had got a war on our hands. By us, I mean the international community. It was by no means clear what ought to be done about it, and there were totally different views between the Europeans and the Americans and the Americans and the Russians. We got dragged into it for two reasons. First, a general sense on the part of the international community that there is an obligation on our part when one does see suffering and tensions and death that we should intervene to do something about it. Secondly, a fear, which I personally think was greatly exaggerated, that this was going to be a forest fire that would spread indefinitely unless we did something about it. Now, my own feeling is that if we had left it entirely alone, we would have reached within possibly six months, certainly a year, the conclusion which we are now reaching today. That is to say, a war which is settled on the spot within the theater in accordance with the balance of power, with the strongest guys, who aren't necessarily ever the nicest guys, winning. MR. WATTENBERG: If Clausewitz and political warfare still obtains in civil situations within a nation, and as you say, between nations, because of the -- or between big nations in any event, because of the threat of nuclear weapons, war is less likely than ever, what is -- I mean, is the game worth the candle? What are we, we Americans and we as an international modern industrial democratic alliance, what are we trying to accomplish? SIR MICHAEL: What we in the West are trying to accomplish is the continuation of a peace which is very much to our advantage. We are the winners in a succession of wars. We have established a global dominance which suits us very well, which enables our economy to flourish, which enhances the lifestyles of our people, and what we want is to preserve that. That means we're in favor of peace; we're in favor of the status quo. There are, however, always going to be people in the world who see themselves as losers, who don't like the status quo and who try to disrupt it. If they have no other means, they will try to disrupt it by force. MR. WATTENBERG: Is it merely the status quo, or is it in our best interest that this way of life that you describe, dealing with democracy and markets and individualism, isn't it in our best interest that that philosophy be extended as well as maintained? SIR MICHAEL: It is in the general interest that it should be extended so far as it can be extended. I think there's a certain optimistic feeling that ultimately the whole world will be like us, will think like us, that the Anglo-Saxon type democracy is going to be the answer for everybody irrespective of their race or culture. That is something that I myself do not necessarily believe. I think cultures are too diverse. I don't think that Western-type democracy goes down necessarily in Islamic states. I don't think it goes down necessarily in Confucian states. All of them have got their own ways of doing things. What matters is that we should have a global system in which they all, whatever their philosophy, feel comfortable and are comfortable with one another. MR. WATTENBERG: Well, yeah, I would certainly not be in favor of imposing an external culture, but if you have a global situation now where, for example, American movies and television are dominant, they are everywhere -- I mean, I guess in Europe, 80 percent of the box office receipts are going to American movies, and the same is true in these non-Western countries, I mean, give or take a few percent here or there, in Japan, in Asia, in parts of the Muslim world -- isn't it plausible that, given this communications revolution, that these ideas will indeed spread globally? SIR MICHAEL: Well, the image which is projected of the United States by your media is not one which is universally welcome, acceptable or admirable. I think everybody enjoys watching American movies; I think everybody enjoys the American culture as it is spread. But the lifestyle which is depicted there, the human relations which are depicted there cause genuine shock and disapproval, to my mind not unnaturally. In, say, Japan or in China or in India, they don't want to be like Americans if America is as it is depicted on Hollywood movies. MR. WATTENBERG: What should America's role in the world be now? I mean, the Cold War is over. For most of this century, we Americans and the modern industrial democracies had a clear cause. There was totalitarianism of the right and of the left -- SIR MICHAEL: Yes. MR. WATTENBERG: -- and it was clearly defensive. With all that changed now, what ought we be doing, and why? SIR MICHAEL: Can I answer this by saying what I think America is doing, whether or not it ought to be, and then perhaps we might look at the ought side of it. America is still infinitely the most powerful community in the world. It is the only superpower. It is deeply engaged throughout the world whether it likes to be or not. There are occasional nostalgic hankerings after isolationism in certain areas of the United States, but it is impossible, you've gone too far. Your economy is too tied up with that of the rest of the world. Your culture, as you quite rightly say, is tied up with the rest of the world. You are a part of the world community. Now, as part of the world community and as the most powerful element in the world community, you are enormously influential whether you want to be or not. And it has always struck me that the American elites -- the intellectual elites, business elites, all the rest -- are very happy about being involved, and indeed are very active in enhancing this involvement. There is practically nowhere in the world where the United States is not heavily involved economically, socially, culturally. Certainly in all the trouble spots in the world that one goes to, the money which the United States is pouring into it, the goodwill, the technical know-how is immense. And that seems to me what you are doing and what you ought to be doing. That is to say, using American wealth, technology, expertise to assist the rest of the world, to identify its problems, help to solve them insofar as you can. Now, sometimes I think you tend to go overboard in believing that the American model, as you indicated a little earlier, is going to be all right for everybody. And the American desire to spread democracy throughout the world is something about which I always have certain doubts. But the American desire -- MR. WATTENBERG: But I mean, isn't it useful not to inflict it, but to offer it? SIR MICHAEL: Oh, well, it is there. I mean whether you offer it or not, people can see it. If they like it, they will take it, so I don't think you need push that one. But I think that what does need to be offered and is always on offer is American know-how, American technology, American money, all those things to be available to the rest of the world. MR. WATTENBERG: A lot of that is related culturally to American openness and American political democracy. I mean those things don't operate, I don't think, in isolation. SIR MICHAEL: That again is, if I may say so, a certain conventional wisdom, but one only has to go to somewhere like Singapore to see a country which is very prosperous and very happy and booming economically, but does not believe in American political standards and does very well without them. I would have thought probably the same will apply in the People's Republic of China indefinitely. The American desire to turn the People's Republic of China into a Western-style democracy, observing all human rights as we understand them, does seem to me to be totally counterproductive. MR. WATTENBERG: Well, if you look down the road a decade or two or three and you say, who could possibly threaten this global democratic alliance that we enjoy, it seems to me you come up with China, that that is the biggest alien force in the world. And that would be a much more amicable situation if the Chinese -- they don't have to be -- you know, have an American political system, certainly not, but if they had a more open, more democratic situation, wouldn't that be safer for us? SIR MICHAEL: Well, it would be a great deal nicer, but don't expect that you're going to get it. I think that it's not a black and white situation that we are looking at. On the one hand, you have got a peaceful, democratic, cooperative China. On the other hand, you have a totalitarian, threatening China. I think that there is a wide spectrum of possibilities in between, and I do not see why one is not going to have a continuing authoritarian China and a prosperous China and a China which is competing in many respects with the United States, but whose economy is involved with the United States as closely as they are to other parts of the world in which there is no threat as such. Again, one of the problems, it seems to me, is that, if I may say so, Americans are always looking for threats. Okay, there's no threat now; when is the next one coming up? Well, why should there be one coming up? MR. WATTENBERG: Sir Michael, you said that Americans are always looking for threats. Speaker Gingrich said something recently that I'd like your comment on. He said, 'You do not need today's defense budget to defend the United States. You need today's defense budget to lead the world. If you are prepared to give up leading the world, we can have a much smaller defense system.' And it seems to me the thought you raised about a threat and what Speaker Gingrich is saying are related. If there is no threat to the United States, how do we go to the American public at an election time and say, oh, by the way, please drop $250 billion per year into the Pentagon? Why -- I mean, why should we do that? SIR MICHAEL: Well, frankly, it does seem to me that you are spending an unnecessary large amount on your defense budget for the very simple reason that, having built up a defense structure of that kind, it's extraordinarily difficult to exit without causing a great deal of unhappiness and economic dislocation to all the interests involved in keeping it going. And if you were to start from scratch now, I very much doubt whether you would have the size and the structure and the expense of the armed forces which you at present have. MR. WATTENBERG: Do you think that America today is a declining power or an ascendant power? We had a great big argument about that in the States. SIR MICHAEL: I know you did, yes. MR. WATTENBERG: Is America in decline? And everybody was crying -- SIR MICHAEL: But I mean, I don't accept either of those adjectives. I think it is a changing power. It's a changing power reacting to a changing world, that you did achieve an enormous military presence and capability in facing down the Russians, which you very successfully did. MR. WATTENBERG: No, we did, we the NATO alliance. SIR MICHAEL: That's very kind of you to say so, but basically the Americans did. I mean, it was American technology and power, and it would be nice if the Europeans had contributed more, but I'm afraid we didn't contribute all that much. No, you did it. As a result, you grossly overextended yourself and overspent yourselves, so you have now got very considerable problems as a result of balancing your budget after that. But although you are now deeply in the red and are getting more deeply in the red because you find it impossible to cut things that you -- for political reasons, to cut the things that you ought to cut, you still are the major maximal power -- force, I would say, in the world. And you are not declining in relation to anybody else. And if there is nobody out there by whom you can assess whether you are rising or declining, as I said, these are no longer really relevant considerations. MR. WATTENBERG: Has there ever been in recent history, or in human history as recorded, a nation as relatively powerful or influential on a global scale as the United States? SIR MICHAEL: Well, I hate to say it, but yes: Britain in the 19th century. Very comparable situation, that we were unique in our capacity to project power anywhere in the world, which we did. We didn't, I'm glad to say, attempt to do it in North or South America. That was sagacious of us, and we might not have been sort of terribly successful. But everywhere else, thanks to our maritime supremacy, thanks to our lead in industrialization and technology, Britain dominated for about 50 years, from 1815 until 1870, 1880s, when the Germans and the Americans started catching up with us. MR. WATTENBERG: What lesson should we Americans take from that English experience in the 19th century, when indeed the English were the most dominant power in the world? SIR MICHAEL: I'm never happy about lessons, you know. All I can say is say what happened. Well, what did happen was that inevitably we lost our unique status because competition arose from other people who -- as I say, the Germans and the Americans -- who worked harder, who were more up to date with upcoming technology; in the case of the United States, had vastly greater resources and reserves. MR. WATTENBERG: Than England did. SIR MICHAEL: Than England. In the case of Germany, simply worked harder. And we then felt ourselves challenged, and that challenge and the perception of that challenge was one of the major causes, I think, of World War I. I suppose one could say that sooner or later, you're going to have to accept that there will be somebody who is catching up with you in various respects. And if it does happen, don't panic, don't see them as being necessarily threats. Now, Britain saw Germany as a threat, if only because Germany felt that they could only assert their status as a world power by dominating over England. We didn't see America as a threat, although it was far more of a threat. We adjusted to, first of all, American equality and then American superiority in what some people saw as being a rather cowardly fashion, but others saw as being sagacious. So I think the lessons you have to draw about that, as from anything else in the past, is flexibility. MR. WATTENBERG: In a world where people see through television the blood and the guts and the horror of military actions so clearly in their own living room, does war and the projection of military power have much of a future? I mean, we saw in the United States a few Marines being dragged through the street in Somalia, and that was the end of Somalia, because of the television cameras. Has that diminished the ability of great nations, big nations, any nations to project power and to use force? SIR MICHAEL: Well, I think you have got to define the nation and the culture that you are talking about. MR. WATTENBERG: Well, say England. SIR MICHAEL: I think that in Western Europe and the United States, it certainly is a disincentive to get involved in war. But I think it is much more so, if I may say so, with the United States than with the Europeans. We have had in Bosnia several dozen British troops killed. It hasn't affected our will to go on there. We are, I think, rather more used to having our forces killed. It awakens, if anything, sort of a desire for revenge or determination to go through with the job. The body bag factor, I think, in the United States is particularly acute, and it is something which does very considerably reduce your influence in the world. It is no good having this marvelous, great capacity for power projection, this enormous budget, which Mr. Gingrich says is necessary to lead the world, if when the moment comes, you say, 'Well, we're going to lead the world so long as no American blood is spilled. Go on and do it yourselves.' That isn't exactly leadership quality. MR. WATTENBERG: Okay. Thank you, Sir Michael Howard. And thank you. Please send comments and questions to: New River Media, 1150 17th Street, NW, Suite 1050, Washington, DC, 20036. We can also be reached via e-mail at thinktv@aol.com, or on the World Wide Web at www.thinktank.com. For 'Think Tank,' I'm Ben Wattenberg. ANNOUNCER: This has been a production of BJW, Incorporated, in association with New River Media, which are solely responsible for its content. 'Think Tank' has been made possible by Amgen, a recipient of the presidential National Medal of Technology. Amgen, unlocking the secrets of life through cellular and molecular biology. Additional funding is provided by the John M. Olin Foundation, the Randolph Foundation, and the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation. BEN WATTENBERG Return to ThinkTank Online Home Page Think Tank ® is a Registered Trademark of BJW, Inc. All Content © Copyright 1995 New River Media, Inc.

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