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« Back to Is the Relationship with Britain Still Special? main page    Transcript for: Is the Relationship with Britain Still Special?Think Tank Transcripts: Britain and the U.S. ANNOUNCER: 'Think Tank' has been made possible by Amgen, arecipient of the Presidential National Medal of Technology. Amgen,bringing better, healthier lives to people worldwide throughbiotechnology. Additional funding is provided by the John M. Olin Foundation, theRandolph Foundation and the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation. MR. WATTENBERG: Hello, I'm Ben Wattenberg with 'Think Tank' inLondon. For a very long time, America and Britain had what diplomatscall 'a special relationship.' It was built on a common heritage oflanguage, law and culture. And so in this century, we stood togetherthrough two world wars and the Cold War. But now after the end of theCold War, some Englishmen are concerned that that relationship is onthe rocks. Joining us are four prominent observers of the English scene:Kenneth Minogue, professor of government at the London School ofEconomics and author of 'Alien Powers: The Pure Theory of Ideology';Norman Stone, professor of modern history at Oxford and author of'Europe Transformed: 1878 to 1919'; Anne Appelbaum, the foreignaffairs columnist for 'The Daily Telegraph' and deputy editor of 'TheSpectator,' author of 'Between East and West: Across the Borderlandsof Europe'; and Geoff Mulgan, president of the London think tankDemos and author of 'Politics in Anti-Political Age.' The question before this house: Is the relationship with Britainstill special? From London, this week on 'Think Tank.' The linkages between America and England have been both culturaland strategic. The original colonial states of America, of course,were British. Both nations share a democratic tradition, and eachnation speaks what the other considers to be a dialect of English. In this century, when pushed by big events, America and Britainended up side by side: in World War I, in World War II and during theCold War. Now the Cold War has ended, and Europeans are consideringwhat might become a United States of Europe. America often lookssouth to Latin America and west to Asia, and Brits are askingnervously, is there anything special about the relationship? Let's just begin by going around the room, first to you, NormanStone of Oxford University. Let's just all sort of try to agree onwhat this term 'the special relationship' means. MR. STONE: Oh, I think it's something that's pretty well unique inhistory. It means, in effect, that when a British prime ministerdoesn't know what to do, then he gets on a special link toWashington. And that's been true for well over a century now. I suppose you could even say that there were more Americans thatfought for George III than fought for George Washington. And Isuppose nowadays, there would be a lot more British people who wouldactually regard President Clinton as a more significant figure thanJohn Major. It's a very close relationship. MR. WATTENBERG: Geoff. MR. MULGAN: There are many special relationships between Britainand America --cultural ones, personal ones, business ones. But theidea of a Special Relationship with capital `S' and capital `R' Ithink is a very specific one. It really emerged at the moment whenBritain first became aware just how quickly it was declining as aworld power. It promised, too, at this chance to become a partnerwith America in governing the world even, Greece to America's Rome. And I think looking back now, many people in Britain feel thatperhaps it was part of our own self-deception, part of Britain notactually coming to terms with the reality of just how much it wasinvolved in a relative decline, and so in a sense it's been part of apretense which is now looking rather threadbare. MR. WATTENBERG: Kenneth Minogue of the London School of Economics. MR. MINOGUE: I think the phrase 'the special relationship' comesfrom Churchill's Fulton speech in 1946, and that's a significantpoint because that is the high point at which Anglo-Americanrelations were almost uniquely focused in the hostility tototalitarianism. It also gives us, I think, the clue that one of the fundamentalpoints about the special relationship is that it works best whenWestern civilization is threatened by ideological enemies of one kindor another. Under those circumstances, Britain and America almostinstinctively stand together. MR. WATTENBERG: Anne Appelbaum. MS. APPLEBAUM: I would agree with Professor Minogue that theimportant moment for the special relationship was the end of theSecond World War and the beginning of the Cold War. And I think Iwould add that it's important to remember that there were importantinstitutional functions of the special relationship. There was anintelligence-sharing aspect of it; there was an actual role thatAmerica played in translating -- excuse me, that Britain played intranslating American ideas to Europe and translating European ideasto America. So there was actually a diplomatic and a political function of thespecial relationship which may not exist anymore. MR. WATTENBERG: Geoff, you said that there was a certain Britishpretense about this. And I was just wondering, the fact that this isa topic of concern here in Britain and we hear very, very littleabout it in the United States, would that sort of bolster your case? MR. MULGAN: Yes. I mean very few Americans have intensivediscussions about the special relationship and whether it is well,whether it is unwell. Britain in this century has moved from beingthe world's largest empire, its primary industrial nation, to being amiddle-level nation. And the special relationship and our still veryimportant role in NATO, in intelligence, in a whole series ofinternational institutions which were bolstered by it, the postwarones, is part of actually a British myth of trying to keep thatalive. For example, we have a much larger army, much higher defensespending than most countries of our size. And we like these phrases,'punching above our weight' in the international scene. Well, thespecial relationship is part of that, which appeals to a sense ofnational pride. Whether it makes much sense anymore I think is whatpeople are worrying about. And in a way, that doesn't in any waythreaten the quality of the relationship with America as a body ofideas, a body of ways of living, and so forth. MR. MINOGUE: Yes. I think the important point is that there are awhole variety of different relationships. There's the strategic one,the intelligence one, the cultural one, and these vary a great deal.It's important that the British have often supported the Americans,and that's given them a fig leaf of internationality which hassometimes been useful to them. But of course -- MR. WATTENBERG: What have some of the symptoms of this sort oferosion been? MR. MINOGUE: The erosion of? MR. WATTENBERG: Of the special relationship? MR. MINOGUE: I think one of the main symptoms of it is -- MR. WATTENBERG: I mean -- MR. MINOGUE: -- conflict between Britain and America about whatought to be done, and it's clear that as time goes on, America hasless -- sorry, as time goes on, Britain has less influence about whatAmerica does because America understandably is looking right aroundthe globe, whereas we are simply one small part of the globe. MR. STONE: I'm not sure you're right, you know, Ken. I mean,British interests go right around the globe, too, very much so. Imean, if you look at what the City's up to, which it's still -- Imean, it's not a medium-sized power at all. It's a very big one. MR.MINOGUE: Yes. MR. STONE: Its interests are very much global, and it much prefersto cooperate with the Americans than with the inward-looking,protectionist-minded Europeans. MR. MINOGUE: Yes, I think that's an important point, that Britain,because it's in the middle of the ocean, has far more sensitivity towhat's going on in the rest of the world than Europe does, on the onehand, and also I think than middle America really does. MR. STONE: Imean, I think we should jump over the temporary blip which has beencaused in things by Bosnia, where I mean I think the Americans wereabsolutely spot-on right and wish they'd gone much further. I can'tunderstand why the British government has been so negative about thewhole thing and discouraged the Americans from doing the right thing.I really don't understand that. So I think we're in a temporary blip where no one would reallybother in America with what somebody like John Major would say,disregard him as a piece of furniture to be got out of the way--rightly, in my opinion. (Laughter.) MR. WATTENBERG: Anne. MS. APPLEBAUM: I don't think it's a temporary blip. I mean, Ithink something fundamental has changed in that the use that Britainhad for America, and in fact the use that America had for Britain, isnow different. I mean, it hasn't evaporated. As you say, the City isstill very connected to America and the world of journalism, themedia. MR. WATTENBERG: When you say 'the City,' what are we talkingabout? MS. APPLEBAUM: I mean the British financial markets. MR. WATTENBERG: Oh, I see. Okay. MS. APPLEBAUM: Sorry. MR. WATTENBERG: That's all right. MS. APPLEBAUM: That's the -- MR. WATTENBERG: Because you said it and you said it, and I just -- MR. STONE: It's still true that -- MS. APPLEBAUM: It's the same expression as Wall Street. MR. WATTENBERG: Right, okay. MR. STONE: But a huge proportion of our investment goes toAmerica. I mean, not less than -- MS. APPLEBAUM: Sure, but it's a different -- but that's adifferent relationship. It's a different relationship. Therelationship of financial markets and business and investors toAmerica and the relationship of, say, the media and sort of massculture to America are ever more intimate, but the politicalrelationships are changing. MR. MINOGUE: The special relationship became incredibly close inthe '80s because Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan saw them asengaged in a parallel struggle, and that had parallels, actually, inthe '70s, maybe a little bit in the '60s. And it's the fact thatwe're now comparing now, when there are a prime minister here and apresident who don't actually see eye to eye. Bill Clinton believesthe British -- MR. WATTENBERG: And there is no Soviet Union to be parallelagainst. MR. MINOGUE: And it appeared to Bill Clinton the BritishConservative Party was actually supporting George Bush against him,which I think is still not forgiven, even though that's a very smallthing. Add that on to Bosnia and compare it with the mid-'80s, whenthere was this incredible bond, and it looks as if the specialrelationship is in trouble. MR. WATTENBERG: There were two events that we read about in theStates that seemed to have the essence of this. One was whenPresident Clinton invited Gerry Adams of the IRA to visit the UnitedStates, and the other was this sort of ceremonial event during theV-E Day celebrations where President Clinton chose to fly to Moscowfor the celebrations and sent the vice president here, I guess. Did those things seem to sort of snap the twig? I mean, did theybecome great sort of symbolic events? MS. APPLEBAUM: I think the first was more important than thesecond. MR. WATTENBERG: The IRA? MS. APPLEBAUM: Yeah. It was seen as something that a past Americanpresident never would have done, simply out of courtesy to hisBritish colleagues. He would never have invited an IRA leader toAmerica in that way. MR. MINOGUE: And not merely out of courtesy to his colleagues, butalso out of keeping America out of the internal politics of anothercountry, which does seem to me to be an extremely perilous act. MR. WATTENBERG: Was this -- I mean, the line on Clinton that Ihave heard overseas is, 'Ich bin ein beginner.' (Laughter.) Is thatwhat this was about? Was this just an error, or was it, as somepeople say, for domestic American political consumption? MR. MINOGUE: Most certainly the latter, was it not, because inforeign policy terms, it made no sense whatever, but it clearly wouldhave an effect upon the Irish vote, or at least President Clintonthought it would. MR. MULGAN: It was a symptom, though, of devaluingthe British view of things, the British interest. And -- MR. WATTENBERG: Well, but it did bring about a truce, at least atemporary truce, didn't it? MS. APPLEBAUM: No. MR. WATTENBERG: No? MS. APPLEBAUM: It was brought about by other things. No, it had no-- it didn't have -- it wasn't important at all. MR. MULGAN: And in a way, it also symbolized perhaps a broaderBritish concern with the way American foreign policy is being done,which is a mixture of symbolic moves without a great deal ofsubstance and total inconsistency and dithering, which I think hasrather -- that undermines the special relationship if it appearsthere is not actually a clear strategy being pursued in Washington. MR. WATTENBERG: Is that the view of the British people today aboutAmerican foreign policy, that it's just dithering? MR. MULGAN: I think it's the view of Bill Clinton, that he can'tmake his mind up and that he has very little sort of steel to followthrough decisions. MR. WATTENBERG: Let me go on to something else because you --several of you, when we began talking about this specialrelationship, brought up sort of cultural issues. Does this specialrelationship got something to do with culture, with popular culture,with common heritage, rather -- and that would make it stronger thanany mere political linkage? MR. MINOGUE: I think it's got quite a lot to do with commonculture, common heritage and, above all, common law and legaltraditions, and this has become more visible in British politicstoday because of the conflict with Europe. That is, I think thatBritain's membership with the European Community makes a lot ofBritish people very aware of the fact that they are, in certaincultural respects, not European and much closer to the United States. MR. WATTENBERG: Does that make you a Euro-skeptic? MR. MINOGUE: It makes me a Euro-skeptic, certainly, yes. It's oneof the problems that arise from trying to create a superstate out ofcountries which have very different traditions, and in this sense Ithink I am an Anglo-Saxon exceptionalist. I think the English and thetradition of English law is different from the corporatism that tendsto dominate continental thinking. MS. APPLEBAUM: Although it is ironic that the United States has infact always encouraged the creation of a federal Europe, or at leasta united Europe -- MR. MINOGUE: It has, yes. MS. APPLEBAUM: -- for its own reasons. MR. WATTENBERG: When you look back on it, it is perhaps somewhatbizarre that after World War II, when Prime Minister Churchill wastalking about an English-speaking alliance around the world, that theAmericans, as you say, Anne, sort of pushed England toward Europe andsaid, No, we want a united Europe. I mean, if we were sort of a power-hungry influence, hungrynation, we would have said, Come on with us. MR. MULGAN: Well, it's probably in America's interest to haveBritain in Europe arguing for relative openness, relative free tradeand the avoidance of a superstate. But I think the cultural linksbetween the UK and America around music, television, all these otherthings which we share are very strong, but there's one bigdifference, which is a surprising one. The British are much more internationalist relative to the FarEast, to the Japanese. We have had none of the anxieties overJapanese inward investment and competition which have happened bothin America and in France -- and in Australia and all around theworld. And there's a degree of cosmopolitanism, I think, in Britishculture which both makes us open to America, but in some ways oddlydistant from that 'America first' strand which is becoming verystrong there, very fearful of the outside world. MR. WATTENBERG: Anne, you said before that you thought perhapsthis cultural connection was getting tighter as the politicalconnection was getting looser. Why is that, and for example? MS. APPLEBAUM: It's mostly to do with the technological change.Technological change has made cultural transfer much easier. In myprofession, in journalism, the number of British editors in theUnited States is constantly -- MR. WATTENBERG: Is smothering us, right. MS. APPLEBAUM: -- constantly remarked upon. But, you know, thenumber of American pop groups in Britain is also remarked upon. Imean, the traffic, I think, goes both ways. MR. WATTENBERG: Doesn't that same technology, though, I meanlooked at from an American point of view, transmit American popularculture everywhere, not just to the UK? MS. APPLEBAUM: It does transmit it everywhere. The difference isthat here the native language is English and it's easier for us totake up American ideas and American culture here, for better or forworse. They get here faster, they get here first, before anywhereelse. MR. MULGAN: But there are important differences between Americaand Britain. The idea we are simply part of the same civilization Ithink is misleading. And one very important one is religion. I mean,America is an enormously more religious country than Britain, whichis essentially secular. And that's one of the reasons why the Britishoften read about America or watch it on their television screens witha bit of bemusement. They don't understand the things which are goingon from this not only very religious culture, but obviously a mix ofdifferent cultures, which makes it very different from us. So the problem with these -- the Samuel Huntington's analyses ofthe world is you have to say where the boundaries are, and it'sactually quite hard often to say where the boundary lines between thecivilizations are. MR. MINOGUE: I think that's true, and one of the aspects of thisis that Britain has a very slight relationship with what you mightcall religious America. It tends to have a relationship withpop-culture America and with elite America, which is as secularist asBritain is. MR. STONE: Well, I mean this business of saying that becauseEngland is a secular country --more than Scotland, incidentally,that, you know, we don't understand American religiosity, I'm notsure. I'm afraid I always think that, you know, religious ideas areso powerful that they can last into a generation which has for sometime given up the actual formal religious belief. So you can findAnglican ideas, whatever these -- however you want to define them,mirrored in people's ordinary behavior, ordinary morality. MR. WATTENBERG: Here? MR. STONE: Yes. MR. WATTENBERG: As we saw in the Soviet Union, where religion wasabolished in theory, and as soon as the communists left, it justbloomed again. MR. STONE: Yes. I mean, I think if -- it takes quite atime before the secular forms of religion or the secular reception ofreligion is obliterated. So -- I remember having this out with a verybright research student of mine called Stephen Bellow, who looked atthe cultural history of the Jews in Vienna around 1900. Andinevitably you ask the question, what's so special about Mahler,Wittgenstein, Freud, who were not practicing Jews at all, butnevertheless make up about 90 percent of Viennese culture? And youbegin to ask yourself the question, what is the difference between aJewish atheist and a Catholic atheist? (Laughter.) It's a question of that order. It's very, very difficult, ofcourse, to pin down, but the simple fact that the English don't go tochurch doesn't mean to say that they haven't got ideas of moralityand how to deal with each other and attitudes to when you get drunk,what your standards of honesty are, how you treat your children,which are not in the end religious. MR. WATTENBERG: Some years ago,there was a great discussion in America that America would becomevictim to what was then called the English disease, which was thatnobody worked very hard and it was becoming more socialist andwhatever. And everybody was sort of wringing their hands about that. I wonder now, in terms of this cultural connection that we weretalking about, whether there is concern in England that England isbecoming victim of the American disease, which is crime, too muchperceived immigration and pluralism, welfare, a certain coarseness inour -- and vulgarity in our language and culture. Is that a concern? MR. MINOGUE: Charles Murray has emphasized the fact that teenagepregnancy rates have been going up in Britain in the last 10 yearsand are now approaching the American level. I think this isinternational trends, though. I don't think it's a matter of Americainfluencing Britain. There are very similar things going on here towhat's going on in America, but I don't think that's a matter ofinfluence. MR. WATTENBERG: Is the crime rate going up in England? MR. MULGAN: Well, it seems to be falling just at the moment. Ithink the interesting thing about the English disease is the firstversion of it was that we wouldn't work very hard. Britain andAmerica now work longer hours than any other industrialized countryexcept Japan, and their hours are going up. We're becoming peculiarin that respect. MR. WATTENBERG: That's funny. Just when everybody was talkingabout how the work ethic is eroding, hours worked -- MR. MULGAN: Well, this is partly perhaps because we are both insome respects undergoing relative decline, so we have to work harderto maintain our standards of living. But I think there is a lot ofconcern in Britain that it's following America in respect of innercities, underclass, social fragmentation, a variety of phenomenawhich perhaps manifest themselves in single-parent families, crime,and so forth; and also a sense, perhaps as in America, that theseseem totally intractable to any of the available political solutions,whereas I think in other, certainly European countries, there isstill more of a faith that these should be soluble. MR. WATTENBERG: Geoff, you said before the magic words, 'Americain decline.' Is it your view that America is in decline as a globalinfluence? MR. MULGAN: No. I think America is actually being remarkablyresilient and strong as a nation at the moment. I think it has todecline relatively even if it succeeds as a nation, just becauseother countries, like China, are growing so rapidly, and so itsrelative weight has to decline. But I don't see it -- I mean, in away, the great navel-gazing of America in the late '80s about declineI think looks rather absurd now, you know, five, seven years later. Imean, it clearly has enormous strengths which other parts of theworld don't have. MR. MINOGUE: But that really means that America isfollowing Britain in the same sort of trajectory. I mean, Britainalso was preeminent during the 19th century and for part of the 20thcentury, and then began to decline not just because of any sort ofabsolute decline, but because inevitably other countries were comingup. And America is now going through something like the same process,but two generations later. MR. MULGAN: Well, I think the special problem for America is, eventhough it economically remains very successful, it is much lessattractive as a model to the rest of the world than it was 20 yearsago, precisely because of these serious endemic problems of crime andcities and so on. And so the new nations of Eastern Europe or EastAsia do not look to America as the shining model which they have -- MR. WATTENBERG: Well, Anne Appelbaum, you are a student of EasternEurope and you grew up not only in America, but on the same streetwhere I now live in Washington, D.C. Is America perceived to be indecline? MS. APPLEBAUM: It is different in different places. I'm afraidthat in most of Eastern Europe, the myth of America lives on, theidea that this is a country where everybody can get rich and where -- MR. WATTENBERG: Why do you say you're afraid that it lives on?Shouldn't we be happy that it lives on? MS. APPLEBAUM: Well, I'm neutral on this one. I mean, that was afigure of speech. MR. WATTENBERG: I see. MS. APPLEBAUM: But it -- well, I suppose I am afraid in the sensethat it's an unrealistic vision of America. They don't know muchabout America except that it's very rich and important and it wouldbe nice to live there one day if one could. I mean, I don't thinkit's -- I don't think the admiration for America in Eastern Europe isbased on much that's very different from admiration -- the same kindof admiration you would have found a hundred years ago. I think in Western Europe, there is a perceived decline, but it'sa -- as I said before, it's a political and institutional decline.America seems less interested in NATO, it seems less interested intrying to have influence in different parts of the globe. When it'sless interested, it becomes less important. People like MalcolmRifkind or Jacques Chirac are less concerned about what America willdo if they choose one path or another. So yes, there is a kind ofinstitutional decline, which doesn't necessarily mean that there isan economic decline or a cultural decline. MR. WATTENBERG: Americans are -- keep asking on the issue ofBosnia, you know, why don't the Europeans take care of it? This isnot World War II, this is not the Soviet Union. It's a little placewith a few people. You have all the European forces, great militaryestablishments. Norman, I mean, how do you answer an Americanaudience about that question? MR. STONE: Oh, I think an Americanaudience would know perfectly well quite how multinational committeesmight simply split up over things. I mean, you've got the UnitedNations, bless its cotton socks, sitting on your doorstep. Why Idon't know, given that it's a useless organization. And I'm afraid that the Europeans, when they sit down and dosomething, are a committee trying to devise some sort of solution. Sothis power comes up with this, and another compromise goes on fromthat, and everybody bites their fingers and they come up with somemouse. I mean, it is actually very difficult to think of any single thingthat the European Commission has done which it's got right. MR. WATTENBERG: Thank you all very much. Thank you, KennethMinogue and Norman Stone, Anne Appelbaum and Geoff Mulgan. And thank you. Please send your questions and comments to: NewRiver Media, 1150 17th Street, NW, Suite 1050, Washington, DC, 20036.We can also be reached via e-mail at thinktv@aol.com, or on the WorldWide Web at www.thinktank.com. For 'Think Tank,' I'm Ben Wattenberg. ANNOUNCER:This has been a production of BJW, Incorporated, inassociation with New River Media, which are solely responsible forits content. 'Think Tank' has been made possible by Amgen, bringing better,healthier lives to people worldwide through biotechnology. Additional funding is provided by the John M. Olin Foundation, theRandolph Foundation, and the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation. BEN WATTENBERG Return toThinkTank Online Home Page Think Tank ® is a Registered Trademark of BJW, Inc. All Content © Copyright 1995 New River Media, Inc. Back to top  Think Tank is made possible by generous support from the Smith Richardson Foundation, the Bernard and Irene Schwartz Foundation, the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, the John M. 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