EXTENDED INTERVIEWS General Bambang Darmono

General Bambang Darmono was in charge of military operations in Aceh from 2002 until a peace deal was reached in 2005. When martial law was declared in the semiautonomous province in May 2003, Darmono oversaw strict press controls placed on local and foreign journalists covering the conflict. When the tsunami struck Aceh in December 2004, Darmono led the military’s humanitarian response. Here FRONTLINE/World reporter Orlando de Guzman asks the general about accusations of brutality by government forces under his watch.

Here Darmono talks with FRONTLINE/World reporter Orlando de Guzman about his role as a military personnel and peacekeeper answering questions about brutality by government forces under his watch and the growing calls for justice from a conflict that took 15,000 lives.

Q: Orlando de Guzman: So when did you go to Aceh for the first time?

A: The first time I went to Aceh it was September 2002. To me, it was surprising. Why? Because I am a Christian. Aceh is predominantly Muslim. So it was a big challenge for me, because I didn’t want my religion to become a hindrance. Being a Christian in a predominantly Muslim region, I wanted to be able to interact well with the Acehnese. But there were never any problems with religions.

Q: What do you think is the cause of the conflict in Aceh?

A: I’ve read that the cause is injustice -- I don’t think it’s that simple. In the beginning, Daud Beureueh [founder of the Free Aceh Movement] demanded to establish Islamic law in the region. So the Indonesian government granted them autonomy to make the region Islamic. Religion wasn’t the only issue. It wasn’t only about injustice. It’s more about how the Acehnese interacted with each other. In the past, the government might’ve committed things that were not so great in Aceh.

The reason why the founding fathers didn’t choose a federal government was because of the kind of development we were doing at that time. When people saw progress in Jakarta, they thought that everything was brought to Jakarta, for the people in Jakarta. That’s the rumor being spread around and drove [the conflict] to happen. Let’s not talk about injustice before we talk about other issues. There are more issues involved.

Q: So what did you think when you first came to Aceh? What do you think of the Acehnese?

A: It didn’t feel any different. It felt [like] any other area in Indonesia, and I felt like I could interact with everybody. I could even celebrate Christmas with other soldiers, with the Christian community. It wasn’t a problem. So I didn’t feel any different -- I felt like I was in Indonesia.

Q: So the Acehnese, specifically members of the GAM [Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or Free Aceh Movement] they don’t want to be a part of Indonesia anymore?

A: These groups, who were fighting for Aceh’s independence, started spreading [the] rumors [I mentioned before]. When the Acehnese started to believe these rumors, of course, they felt justified. It’s OK, right? But I didn’t feel that because I interacted with everyone there.

Q: Did you ever think that you would sign the peaceful agreement with your nemesis Irwandi Yusuf [present governor of Aceh Province]?

A: Not in the beginning, but I believe the problem in Aceh is very complex. It involved social, cultural, security, ethnic and other problems. That’s why we had to approach it from the humanitarian point of view.

Q: If you look at the history of Aceh, the Indonesian government has always used the military approach.

A: A military approach could be seen as the government’s conclusion. What I did was part of the military approach from the government, but as a commander, I didn’t approach the issue using the military point of view. I was using the humanitarian approach. They’re completely different.

It’s true that most of the time the government uses a military solution. But as a soldier, I don’t always use the military approach. I’d rather solve problems using the humanitarian approach.

Q: So do you think the military emergency drill in Aceh was a part of the military approach?

A: Obviously, it was. It’s called the military emergency drill. If other people said that it was not a military approach, then they’re wrong. We applied the military emergency drill when it was decided that we had to use the military approach, in order to handle the situation in Aceh. But my basic mission was to win the hearts and the minds of the people. If I approached people as a militant, I wouldn’t gain anything from them.

Q: Is GAM still considered a threat to the Republic of Indonesia?

A: If we look at the past, we could say that GAM was still a threat to the Republic of Indonesia. The issue here is whether GAM still has the same voice after signing the Memorandum of Understanding. They had already agreed to work together with the Indonesian government as a part of the Indonesian territories. So from there, we may say the Acehnese have a desire to be a part of Indonesia.

Q: Does the military still have suspicions of what GAM’s real intentions are [with regard to it signing the Memo of Understanding]?

A: Being suspicious is a normal thing -- in the military and also among the people. GAM is still suspicious toward the Indonesian Armed Forces and the police. Do we want to heighten those suspicions? Of course not. The leaders have to work hard to minimize the gap using the Memo of Understanding, the basic principles of which are DDR -- decommissioning, demobilization and reintegration. We’re now in the integration stage. Is it easy for a community to integrate? It’s not. But it must be done, so everyone can realize that good things happen when there’s peace.

Q: But will the suspicion ruin the peace in Aceh?

A: If we don’t manage it very well, if the acting governor, Irwandi [Yusuf] didn’t try to decrease the gap, it could get worse. We don’t want that gap to exist. We need to decrease it, and that’s Irwandi’s job. He’s the governor; he’s the highest authority in Aceh now.

Q: Governor Irwandi said that he had found out the military intelligence community’s plan to shake his administration. Is this true?

A: I have to say that it’s not true. Irwandi wasn’t supposed to make that statement. Why? Because it is the business of the armed forces. I am the one who was supposed to make that kind of statement.

Probably, you were shown a document. Well, that document was not something that had to be executed [on] during the operation. There was a suspicion that GAM would always want to be independent. If you were an Indonesian, and the Acehnese got what they wanted, wouldn’t there be suspicion? I had to keep the balance. We had to play down the phenomenon.

Q: During the election in Aceh last year, did you know that Irwandi was going to win?

A: Since October 2005, I knew that any independent candidate would win the election.

Q: After the Tsunami, do you feel any differently about Aceh?

A: Three days after the tsunami, I was sent by the armed forces to Aceh, to lead the humanitarian relief effort. I led because I understood the situation very well. Aceh is where it is now is because I was the commander there. Everyone is aware of that fact. Change will always happen because life is about change. Life without change is not life, it’s death.

Q: Can you tell me about these changes?

A: There used to be a conflict, and now there’s no conflict. That’s a change. People can sit together now. They couldn’t do that before.

Q: And you’re proud of your contributions?

A: I was appointed to lead the humanitarian relief in Aceh. Three months later, the emergency situation was under control. I was involved in the process until there was peace. How can I not be proud about it?

“When Irwandi made the statement in Bangkok that there are many problems, th[at] was not the right time. Why did he make this statement? Because he knew that everyone violated human rights laws -- it wasn’t only the Indonesian Armed Forces, [but] the cops, the government, the GAMs.”

Q: There are humanity organizations in Aceh that want to form a committee to fight for reconciliation and what they consider truth because there have been many human rights violation in Aceh.

A: If we keep digging up the past, the problem in Aceh will never be resolved. When Irwandi made the statement in Bangkok that there are many problems, th[at] was not the right time. Why did he make this statement? Because he knew that everyone violated human rights laws -- it wasn’t only the Indonesian Armed Forces, [but] the cops, the government, the GAMs.

In Central Aceh, people’s heads were minced, chopped, buried everywhere. The GAM did that. Do we want to keep talking about that? If we do, we will always talk about violence and there will be no peace. But if we want to have peace, we have to bury everything. When I began the integration project, I put all these problems aside into an album. We have to look at the future.

“In Central Aceh, people’s heads were minced, chopped, buried everywhere. The GAM did that. Do we want to keep talking about that? If we do, we will always talk about violence and there will be no peace.”

When they’re put into an album, we have to remember all the pictures, so they won’t happen again in the future. But we have to put them in the album.

Q: What if we shut the album away?

A: That’s OK. If you want to talk about human rights, I want to ask you, as a journalist, what about the Javanese? They were not allowed to live there [in Aceh]. Wasn’t that a violation of human rights? There were hundreds of thousands of Javanese who got evicted from East Aceh and South Aceh, and they moved to Binjai. I’ve met with them. They were not allowed to stay and their houses were burned, weren’t those human rights violation? Am I correct?

Q: Yes, that’s also a violation to the human rights, but…

A: That’s why I said before that in the [2005 Peace] agreement, it stated and agreed that all violations before August 15th wouldn’t be processed. When the Aceh Monitoring Mission arrived in Aceh, all the reports before the 15th were closed. I understand that you want to keep bringing this up, because you’re a journalist. You can’t be reporting about peace, you have to talk about the conflict.

Q: This is not coming from me. There are many Acehnese who demand justice for all the violations committed by the armed forces.

A: Maybe you haven’t been to the regions where the victims’ relatives live. You haven’t met the Javanese. You’ve only met with a few Acehnese. I don’t know how many days you’ve spent in Aceh. How many people have you met? I’m not sure. Did you meet with the Javanese who lived there? No. So your report is not that accurate. If you’ve met with the Javanese who escaped to Binjai, then your reports are accurate and balanced. If you only talk about the Acehnese, then you’re not being fair.

Q: We will also mention the Javanese who were evicted from Aceh…

A: That’s why I said, we didn’t bring up this issue in Helsinki [during the final peace negotiations.] Why? Because if we kept bringing them up, they would never end.

Q: So we have to forget everything?

A: Yes, forget everything. Excuse me, I don’t mean to say to forget about them, I mean to put them in an album. If we put them in the album, we can open the picture anytime we want. We can see the implementation on the field. But we can’t forget about them. If we forgot them, one day, people would do the same thing. I don’t want that to happen.