Can the U.S. Strike a New Nuclear Deal with Iran?

>> IRAN IS STRENGTHENING ITS NUCLEAR AND MILITARY FACILITIES AS IT PREPARES FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF RENEWED FIGHTING WITH AMERICA.

THAT IS ACCORDING TO A WALL STREET JOURNAL REPORT RAISING QUESTIONS ABOUT WHAT REMAINS OF TEHRAN'S NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES.

INSPECTORS HAVE NOT BEEN TOLD HOW MUCH ENRICHED URANIUM SURVIVED LAST YEAR'S ATTACKS OR HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO VISIT THE DAMAGED SITES.

ERNEST MONIZ WAS THE U. S. ENERGY SECRETARY UNDER PRESIDENT OBAMA, AND HE JOINS WALTER ISAACSON TO DISCUSS WHERE AMERICA STANDS NOW AND WHAT IT WOULD TAKE TO REACH A NEW NUCLEAR AGREEMENT.

>> THANK YOU, BIOH AND SECRETARY MOW NOISE.

WELCOME TO THE MONIZ.

YOU WERE A PART OF THE 2015 NUCLEAR DEAL WITH OBAMA WITH IRAN.

TRUMP CALLED IT A TERRIBLE DEAL AND PULLED US OUT.

DID THAT MAKE IT HARDER OR EASIER FOR IRAN TO DEVELOP NUKES?

>> WELL, FIRST OF ALL I THINK THE DEAL WAS FRANKLY TERRIFIC.

BUT I GUESS I'M A BIT BIASED.

CERTAINLY IF THEY WERE STILL SOMETHING WE AGREED WITH TODAY, IRAN WOULD CERTAINLY NOT BE BUILDING A NUCLEAR WEAPON.

WOULD NOT BE CLOSE TO IT.

IN FACT, THE RESTRICTIONS ON THE NUCLEAR DIMENSIONS OF THE IRANIAN PROGRAM WOULD BE IN PLACE UNTIL 2031.

WE ARE STILL FIVE YEARS AWAY FROM THAT.

BUT EVEN MORE IMPORTANT, WALTER, AND I'D BE HAPPY TO DISCUSS THIS IN MORE DETAIL.

THE REALLY DISTINGUISHING PART OF THE 2015 AGREEMENT WERE THE EXTRAORDINARY VERIFICATION AND TRANSPARENCY MEASURES.

I BELIEVE THOSE ARE GOING TO BE VERY, VERY DIFFICULT TO RECREATE.

>> PRESIDENT TRUMP HAS SAID THE ATTACKS ON THE IRANIAN FACILITIES THAT HE DID, AND THE ATTACKS WITH ISRAEL OBLITERATED IRAN'S NUCLEAR CAPACITY.

>> TONIGHT, I CAN REPORT TO THE WORLD THAT THE STRIKES WERE A SPECTACULAR MILITARY SUCCESS.

IRAN'S KEY NUCLEAR FACILITIES HAVE BEEN COMPLETELY AND TOTALLY OBLITERATED.

>> IS THAT TRUE?

AND DO THEY ACTUALLY HAVE ENOUGH URANIUM EVEN IF IT IS NOT FULLY ENRICHED THAT THEY COULD MAKE A BOMB NOW?

>> WELL, THE IT HAS SOME ELEMENTS OF TRUTH AND SOME EXAGGERATIONS.

CLEARLY THINGS LIKE CENTERFUGES WERE KNOCKED OFF.

I THINK AFTER THE BOMBING, THERE WERE STILL PLENTY OF ROOM TO NEGOTIATE SOMETHING I WOULD NOT SAY FOLLOWING THE ALL-OUT WAR THAT STARTED THIS YEAR.

BUT GOING BACK TO THE QUESTION.

LOOK, THE FACT IRAN HAD CROSSED IN MY VIEW A RED LINE IN GOING TO HALF A TON OF URANIUM.

THE STATEMENT IS OFTEN MADE THAT 60% ENRICHMENT IS NOT QUITE WEAPONS GRADE.

THAT'S TRUE BECAUSE WEAPONS GRADE BY DEFINITION IS 90%, BUT IT WOULD BE INCREDIBLE TO ASSUME THAT 60% CANNOT BE USED DIRECTLY IN A NUCLEAR BOMB.

IN FACT, THE BOMB WE DROPPED, WE, THE UNITED STATES DROPPED ON HIROSHIMA IN 1945 WAS NOT WEAPONS GRADE BY THAT DEFINITION.

SO THE REALITY IS THAT MATERIAL STILL EXISTS.

NOW, WE DON'T KNOW IF IT IS ALL BURIED UNDER THE RUBBLE.

THEREFORE AT LEAST AT THE MOMENT, UNUSABLE.

I PERSONALLY DO NOT AGREE WITH THE CONCLUSION THAT IT IS.

IRAN HAD A STRUCTURALLED NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM UNTIL 2003.

THE ONLY THING IT WAS REALLY MISSING WAS THE MATERIAL TO MAKE A BOMB.

WELL, THEY HAD IT IN 2025.

THEY STARTED IN 20221.

BY 2025, THEY HAD MORE THAN 440 KILOGRAMS OF THAT MATERIAL.

SO MY ANSWER TO THAT IS, YES.

I CANNOT RULE OUT THE FACT THEY HAVE THE MATERIAL AVAILABLE, THE NUCLEAR MATERIAL FOR A NUCLEAR BOMB NOW.

>> WHY IS IT NOT POSSIBLE TO JUST KEEP SETTING BACK THEIR NUCLEAR PROGRAM TO AIR ATTACKS?

>> WELL, I GUESS IT'S POSSIBLE.

SO-CALLED MOWING THE LAWN.

BUT THAT IS JUST NOT A VERY CREDIBLE LONG-TERM PHILOSOPHY IN MY VIEW.

I'VE NOTED IN THE PAST, WE DON'T HAVE A GREAT TRACK RECORD OF LONG DRAWN OUT MILITARY AFFAIRS.

VIETNAM DID NOT END WELL.

AFGHANISTAN DID NOT END WELL.

I DON'T THINK IRAN WOULD END WELL IF WE CONTINUE THIS MOWING THE LAWN PHILOSOPHY.

ESPECIALLY WHEN YOU THINK IRAN AS THEY'RE APPARENTLY ALREADY DOING WITH SO-CALLED PICK AXE MOUNTAIN IS PUTTING THEIR PROGRAM DEEPER AND DEEPER UNDERGROUND, AWAY FROM AT LEAST MOST ATTACKS FROM THE AIR.

SO I JUST --I WOULD MAINTAIN, WALTER, THE ONLY REAL PATHWAY TO RESOLVING THE ISSUE FOR THE LONG TERM IS GOING TO BE DIPLOMACY.

>> DO YOU THINK DONALD TRUMP COULD MAKE A DEAL?

>> I'M VERY, VERY SUSPECT THAT THAT'S POSSIBLE.

FIRST OF ALL, HE DID AS YOU NOTED EARLIER A WITHDRAW FROM THE AGREEMENT IN 2018 THAT DID NOT EXACTLY SEE A LOT OF TRUST.

>> DO YOU THINK THIS WAR HAS MADE IT HARDER?

>> YES.

AGAIN, NOT THE BOMBING LAST YEAR IN 2025, BUT THE WAR IN 2026 I BELIEVE HAS MADE IT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT.

IN FACT, IRAN IS NOT SURPRISING.

ELEVATED THE QUESTION OF THE FREE NAVIGATION THROUGH HORMUZ.

A NATION THAT WASN'T EVEN PRESENT BEFORE THE WAR.

THAT'S GOT TO BE RESOLVED.

SO I JUST THINK IT IS MUCH MORE DIFFICULT, AND I DON'T THINK THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION WOULD BE ABLE TO NEGOTIATE A GOOD DEAL.

THEY COULDN'T NEGOTIATE A BAD DEAL, OF COURSE.

FOR EXAMPLE, A DEAL BASED UPON THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING THAT PRESIDENT TRUMP TRUMP SIGNED WITH THE IRANIAN PRESIDENT IN JUNE OF 2026.

THAT WOULD BE AN EXAMPLE OF A FOUNDATION FOR NEGOTIATING A BAD DEAL.

IT HAS MANY FEATURES IN IT, WHICH ARE VERY, VERY PROBLEMATIC.

I'LL MENTION JUST ONE.

IN 2015, WHEN THE ORIGINAL IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL WASN'T NEGOTIATED, THE SANCTIONS THAT WERE LIFTED AND CONTRAST OF WHAT MANY WOULD THINK TODAY.

IT SON-IN-LAW A PIECE, MAINLY THOSE SPECIFICALLY PUT IN PLACE TO ADDRESS THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM.

SO THE LEVERAGE WAS STILL THERE TO NEGOTIATE ON MISSILES, ON REGIONAL PROXIES, ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ETC.

BUT IN JUNE, THE MOU WAS NEGOTIATED A FINAL DEAL NOT REACHED.

IN THAT MOU, IT SAID THE UNITED STATES UPON REACHING A FINAL DEAL WOULD LIFT ALL SANCTIONS.

THAT'S A TERRIBLE MISTAKE TO LIFT ALL THE SANCTIONS.

WE NEED A FRESH START.

IT IS PROBABLY GOING TO REQUIRE A NEW ADMINISTRATION, WHICHEVER POLITICAL PARTY TO SIT DOWN AND START DENOVO WITH A CONSTRUCTION OF A GOOD DEAL.

>> THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION HAS NEGOTIATED A CIVILIAN NUCLEAR DEAL WITH SAUDI ARABIA.

WHERE DOES THAT STAND?

AND DO YOU THINK IT IS A GOOD IDEA?

>> WELL, THE AGREEMENT, FIRST OF ALL, STANDS BEFORE CONGRESS.

ANY OF THESE PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY AGREEMENTS HAS A PERIOD IN WHICH THEY STAND BEFORE CONGRESS.

IF CONGRESS DECLINES TO ENDORSE THE DEAL, OF COURSE, THE PRESIDENT COULD ALSO VETO THAT AND STILL PUSH IT THROUGH.

NOW, WHETHER IT IS A GOOD IDEA?

FIRST OF ALL, I THINK IT IS A GOOD IDEA TO HAVE A NUCLEAR AGREEMENT FOR PEACEFUL USES WITH SAUDI ARABIA.

IT FITS INTO THE WHOLE POTENTIAL RENAISSANCE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY.

IT FITS IN WITH THE UNITED STATES DESIRE TO BE A PART OF THE GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN FOR NEW NUCLEAR BUILDS, SHOULD THEY OCCUR.

SO I THINK THAT IS ALL VERY GOOD.

HOWEVER, I DO HAVE MAJOR PROBLEMS WITH THE AGREEMENTS, SPECIFICALLY IT GOES BACK TO OUR EARLIER DISCUSSION OF IRAN.

IT SEEMS TO ME WE SHOULD BE DISCUSSING ANY NUCLEAR ISSUE IN THE GULF REGION AS A REGIONAL ISSUE.

THE AGREEMENT WITH SAUDI ARABIA FAILS TO REQUIRE THE SAUDIS TO JOIN THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, FOR EXAMPLE.

IT'S SILENT ON VERIFICATION ISSUES.

NOW, IN THE REGIONAL CONTEXT, I FIND IT WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT TO GO BACK TO IRAN AND REESTABLISH THE VERIFICATION MEASURES LIKE THE FINAL PROTOCOL WHEN THE NEIGHBOR ACROSS THE GOLF ARE NOT BEING REQUIRED TO DO SO.

THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL IS WHAT ALLOWS THE INTERNATIONAL INSPECTORS TO GO TO SUSPECTED COVERT SITES.

THE INSPECTORS ARE LIMITED TO THOSE PLACES THAT IRAN OR SOME OTHER COUNTRY WOULD DECLARE TO BE NUCLEAR FACILITIES.

SO I THINK THE SAUDI AGREEMENT IS GOOD IN TERMS OF ESTABLISHING NUCLEAR RELATIONSHIPS.

BETWEEN THE SAUDIS AND OUR COUNTRY, BUT I THINK IT FALLS SHORT ON VERIFICATION, AND WILL VERY MUCH COMPLICATE ANY POSSIBILITY OF A NEW NUCLEAR AGREEMENT WITH IRAN.

>> WELL, THEY'RE SAYING THE SAUDI DEAL WOULD MAKE MORE SENSE IF IT WAS A PART OF COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK FOR THE MIDDLE EAST.

YOU SAID THIS IS AN IDEAL MOMENT FOR THE UNITED STATES BY FORGING A NEW APPROACH TO NUCLEAR ENERGY IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

HOW WOULD YOU DO SOMETHING COMPREHENSIVE?

>> THE FIRST THING IS SITTING DOWN WITH PARTICULARLY THE SAUDIS, THE EMIRATES, AND THE IRANIANS, AND TO ADVOCATE FOR THE IDEA OF THE REGIONAL, WHAT'S CALLED NUCLEAR FIELD CYCLE.

MEANING ALL THE ELEMENTS YOU WOULD NEED TO MAKE NUCLEAR ENERGY, NOT JUST THE REACTOR ITSELF, BUT ALSO THE FUEL, THE INSTANT REACTOR, TO GO INTO THE FUEL.

THE ENRICHMENT, THE MANAGEMENT OF THE FUEL THAT WILL COME OUT OF THE REACTOR.

WHAT YOU WOULD DO IS YOU WOULD HAVE A NEGOTIATION IN WHICH ESPECIALLY THOSE THREE PARTIES, THERE COULD BE OTHERS INVOLVED WOULD AGREE ON DIFFERENT PARTS OF THAT SUPPLY CHAIN BEING IN ALL OF THEIR COUNTRIES.

SO NO ONE COUNTRY WOULD CONTROL ENOUGH OF THE SUPPLY CHAIN TO MAKE A NUCLEAR WEAPON.

>> LET ME GET IT STRAIGHT.

YOU THINK IRAN AND SAUDI ARABIA COULD DO THIS TOGETHER?

I MEAN, WHY WOULD THEY TRUST EACH OTHER TO DO THAT?

>> WELL BECAUSE THEY ALL HAVE INTEREST.

IRAN, FIRST OF ALL, I SHOULD SAY IN 2015, WHEN WE WEREN'T NEGOTIATING THE IRAN AGREEMENT, THE IRANIANS PROPOSED A REGIONAL FUEL CYCLE.

IT WAS PREMATURE AT THAT TIME.

I THINK THE TIME COULD BE RIGHT NOW.

BUT SECONDLY, THE SAUDIS, AND BY THE WAY, THE SAUDIS AND THE EMIRATES HAVE THEIR OWN INTERNAL PROBLEMS AS WELL.

NOT ONLY WITH IRAN.

HOWEVER, THE SAUDIS AND THE EMIRATES, AND ALSO QATAR AND SOME OF THE OTHER REGIONAL COUNTRIES, THEY HAVE A DESPERATE NEED TO HAVE A SECURE AND ESSENTIALLY PEACEFUL SITUATION IN THE GULF REGION.

THE EMIRATES AND THE SAUDIS HAVE A STRONG COMMITMENT TO DIVERSIFYING THEIR ECONOMIES.

ATTRACTING TOURISM.

THEY CAN'T DO THAT WHEN THERE IS A WAR GOING ON.

SO THEY HAVE A STRONG INTEREST.

THE IRANIANS HAVE A STRONG INTEREST, ESPECIALLY NOW WITH THEIR INFRASTRUCTURE SO BADLY DAMAGED.

THEIR NEED FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AGAIN, WHICH WAS THERE BEFORE THE WAR AND NOW, OF COURSE, IT IS WITH THE WAR.

SO YOU KNOW, THE ARAB COUNTRIES IN THE GULF REGION ALSO HAVE A LOT OF RESOURCES.

THEY COULD, IF THEY WERE PROPER RISK, THEY COULD INVEST IN PART OF THE REBUILDING OF IRAN.

BUT I MEAN INVEST FOR A RETURN.

THAT WOULD REQUIRE A LOT OF INTERNAL REFORMS IN THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT.

SO THIS IS NOT A SIMPLE THING.

BUT I DO THINK IF YOU TAKE ALL THE INTEREST OF ALL THE GULF COUNTRIES TOGETHER, I BELIEVE THERE'S A STRONG INTEREST IN TRYING TO REBUILD A PEACEFUL FUTURE.

>> YOU RECENTLY COCHAIRED A BIPARTISAN TASK FORCE.

IN OTHER WORDS THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO OTHER COUNTRIES.

TELL ME WHAT YOU ALL DECIDED AND WHAT YOU RECOMMENDED?

>> IT IS ONE THAT'S PUT TOGETHER, I WAS THE CEO OF THAT AT THE TIME.

AND THE INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND AT THE HAZARD KENNEDY SCHOOL.

SO THE THREE OF US PUT TOGETHER A COMMISSION, BIPARTISAN COMMISSION THAT WAS INSPIRED BY A COMMISSION THAT PRESIDENT LBJ HAD PUT TOGETHER IN 1965 CALLED THE GILL PATRICK COMMISSION.

AND WE ASKED THE SAME QUESTION, FIRST.

SHOULD THEY REMAIN A KEY PILLAR OF U. S. SECURITY POLICY?

AND THE ANSWER WAS, YES.

THE SAME IT WAS IN '65.

PEOPLE FROM VERY, VERY DIFFERENT SECURITY BACKGROUNDS THAT ARE AGREEING ON THAT.

HOWEVER, WE ACKNOWLEDGED THE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION SCENE IS A VERY DIFFERENT ONE.

CHINA IS SCALING UP ITS NUCLEAR ARSENAL VERY DRAMATICALLY TO BECOME A PEER STOCKPILE COMPARED TO RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES.

THAT DYNAMIC IN AND OF ITSELF MEANS THE HISTORICAL APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL BETWEEN THE U. S. AND THE USSR AND THEN RUSSIA IS KIND OF NO LONGER OPERABLE WITH A THIRD MAJOR ARSENAL.

WE HAVE, OF COURSE, THE IRANIAN SITUATION.

WE HAVE NORTH KOREA HAVING TESTED AND BUILT UP A STOCKPILE OF MANY TENS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIS CENTURY.

WE HAVE THE ONGOING RETENTION BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN.

IT'S JUST A WHOLE DIFFERENT WORLD.

AND SO WE DID CONCLUDE WHILE THEY REMAIN IMPORTANT, IT MUST BE ADDRESSED BY THE UNITED STATES IN A NEW WAY, SPECIFICALLY, OH, I SHOULD HAVE ADDED ANOTHER VERY IMPORTANT FEATURE, AND THAT IS, OF COURSE, OUR ALLIES AND FRIENDS OF THE UNITED STATES, EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA, ETC., HAVE COME TO QUESTION MUCH MORE THE LIKELIHOOD OF THE UNITED STATES COMING TO THE DEFENSE OF THOSE COUNTRIES SHOULD IT BE REQUIRED.

SO THAT UNCERTAINTY IS A MAJOR ISSUE.

OUR SUGGESTION WAS THAT WE CONTINUE WITH SO-CALLED EXTENDED DETERRENCE.

THAT IS WE CONTINUE TO PROVIDE A NUCLEAR UMBRELLA OVER THESE COUNTRIES.

HOWEVER, THAT SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY A SUBSTANTIAL AND COORDINATED BUILD UP OF THE CONVENTIONAL DEFENSES OF THESE COUNTRIES.

THE LINE BETWEEN CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS, HAD ANYTHING GOTTEN MORE BLURRED, CERTAINLY WITH THE DELIVERY SYSTEMS AND THE LIKE.

AND SO WE WOULD ARGUE THAT AS IT IS HAPPENING WITH NATO AND EUROPE, THAT NATO, JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA, PERHAPS OTHERS NEEDS A MUCH STRONGER INTEGRATED CONVENTIONAL SYSTEM, BACKED UP BY THE NUCLEAR DETERRENT OF THE UNITED STATES AS ONE ELEMENT OF A CONTINUUM OF DETERRENCE.

IT SHOULD NO LONGER BE THOUGHT OF AS A NUCLEAR ISSUE.

>> SECRETARY MONIZ, THANK YOU SO MUCH FOR JOINING US.

APPRECIATE IT.

>> THANK YOU, WALTER.