China Scholar on Taiwan, Trump-Xi and the Chinese View of U.S. Power

PAULA NEWTON: Particularly as we, you and I have been discussing the fact that the U.K. — the U.S., pardon me, may be looking for an off- ramp. Do you see this as an opportunity for China to demand some concessions from President Trump on Taiwan? And I say this because certainly in opening, even at the state banquet, President Xi really had quite strident remarks about what the risks are in Taiwan.

XIANG LANXIN: Yes, I think on that issue, China is actually quite consistent in that. Because the United States side offered several statements before that the U.S. side wants stability in the Strait. China knows that. China understands that. Taiwan issue is the only issue that could bring U.S. and China into a real war. Here we’re talking about not just conventional, but even potentially, once U.S. and China are actually in the war, nobody dares to say that nuclear weapons can be ruled out, no matter what. So, in that sense, China proposed, I noticed the language the Chinese used this time. They accept the American argument about the importance of stability in the Strait. But they add one thing this time, which is new for me. It’s called the constructive strategic stability — or no, it’s called constructive stability building. So, that is a suggestion to say we may need to find some new idea for both sides to reassure each other, or sometimes I believe during Obama administration, at one point, they call it a strategic reassurance. That kind of language of each other, you know, both sides will be at ease, not leading to a confrontation. So, this is why Chinese keep on emphasizing. You know, also, in the context of the U.S. had a large quantity of weapons on the table to be sold to Taiwan. So, this is why Xi Jinping is emphasizing that. Yes.

NEWTON: In this light, do you believe the status quo is acceptable to China right now on Taiwan?

LANXIN: Well, if United States sticks to what the traditionally called strategic ambiguity, which is pretty much abandoned by Biden administration, if you recall, Biden basically turned this into a strategic clarity, abandoning Nixon-Kissinger period of American strategy. So, if U.S. stick to strategic ambiguity at the same time, which also means double deterrence, right, against China, as well as against Taiwan independence. That’s what strategic ambiguity functions. You know, when you go to strategic clarity means war, basically. So, this is the point they have to negotiate. They need or the Chinese would hope Trump administration to come up with some new language to assure Chinese that strategic ambiguity is still there.

NEWTON: Interesting that that will, in fact, present a change in strategy, as far as some American policy analysts might say. I do want to move on to what the Chinese opinion is of the United States at the moment. We had an American writer in Shanghai, Jacob Dreyer, wrote in The New York Times that China has stopped looking up to America, that ordinary Chinese now see the United States as a cautionary tale rather than a model. What do you think?

LANXIN: That’s exaggeration. I do believe majority of Chinese still look up to the United States. They know the United States, you know, the history and the advantages. I’m talking about the systemic — the system. United States is perhaps one of the best to provide the best competitive economic system, competitive economic system, economic opportunities. I live in the States for many years as a student. I know most Chinese still quite admire American system culture. Yes, many of them looking at what Trump is doing. They now increasingly become disappointed. Venezuela, for example, you know, those kind of behavior, grabbing a president out of his bed. Those kind of behavior is certainly no matter what you say, it’s against the U.N. charter, and not to mention Iran War. So, this kind of behavior apparently upset many Chinese as well. But on the whole, I do not believe the idea of the U.S. in decline, China in the rise, China would take over. That is a small minority of people who really believe that not the majority.