The National Security Threat You May Never Have Heard Of

CHRISTIANE AMANPOUR: Now, it could soon become one of the biggest national security risks of our time. Experts warn that quantum computing risks making today’s encryption protections obsolete, exposing everything from government secrets to banking data. China and Russia’s projects are already in motion. Former U.S. deputy national security adviser, Anne Neuberger, argues that the next global arms race won’t be over missiles, but a battle for quantum supremacy. And she joins Walter Isaacson to explain what this is and what’s at stake.

 

WALTER ISAACSON: Thank you, Christiane. And Anne Neuberger. Welcome back to the show.

 

ANNE NEUBERGER: It’s wonderful to be here.

 

ISAACSON: For the past year — and especially in the past couple of weeks — we’ve been hearing about all the potential risks, national security risks that can come from artificial intelligence. But your new piece in Foreign Affairs looks at the next risk we may face, which is quantum computing. Explain why.

 

NEUBERGER: Absolutely. So our world really relies on cryptography: the padlock on our browsers when we’re shopping online, we’re accessing our medical records — and frankly, the cryptography that protects the nation’s secrets as it moves around the internet. That cryptography relies on a math equation, which would take classical computers a very long time to solve. Because of the difference in the way quantum computers potentially process information, there is a mathematical algorithm that says that a quantum computer of the right size could potentially break that encryption that our world’s digital trust rides on. And the belief is that that’s coming sooner rather than later. Google really kicked off a lot of interest in this when they moved their timeline to move to a new generation of cryptography that can resist a quantum computer when they move that timeline closer to 2029, as did the Trump administration in its recent executive orders on quantum. 

 

ISAACSON: You know when we break cryptography like in World War II – when they broke the enigma code of Germany. And Germany finds out, well they just add another couple more rotors and it makes it impossible to break again for a while. Why can’t we just do that?

 

NEUBERGER: It’s a good question. You know, cryptography today — so think about for example, when you’re shopping online, that padlock has an entire ecosystem behind it that allows you, one individual sitting at home, to connect to any number of entities around the world. Whether that’s a, you know, a digital storefront in Tokyo or whether that’s your medical records that may be stored on a cloud anywhere around the world. So that broader ecosystem is a lot larger and broader than when we think about a military application, we’re – pretty much both ends of that communication are known. So as a result, that entire ecosystem that implements the cryptography needs to be updated with a new generation of cryptography. 

 

The last time we did that as a global, you know, ecosystem of businesses and individuals and governments, it took us roughly 10 years. So it’s not something that happens at the snap of a finger. And that’s why governments have started that transition, companies have started that transition, because quite frankly, if we had a surprise announcement that, or learned via intelligence, that an adversary had a quantum computer, we couldn’t just, as you note so well, add a couple of rotors and be safe. There would be a lot more that would need to happen.

 

ISAACSON: Well let’s try to explain what quantum computing is. I know there’s a great physicist once said that, anybody who says they understand quantum mechanics doesn’t. But quantum mechanics tells us that like a normal computer uses zeros and ones. But quantum mechanics tells us there can be something in between. There could be something that’d be both zero and one at the same time. And that they can even affect different particles way at a distance. Is that how quantum computing works?

 

NEUBERGER: You did a really fantastic job at describing it. And the way you put it is exactly the crux that takes us sometimes, you know, it’s hard to wrap our minds around. We’re traditionally thinking of computing as like you said, a zero or one, an on or off. And because quantum, essentially quantum computing relies on the strange behaviors of atoms at very, very cold temperatures where they can indeed maintain a connection between on and off so they can be both at the same time. And that allows for a certain kind of computation that classical computers can’t do. And that’s, for example, the reason that potentially cryptography is at risk. It also explains a more interesting, a more positive advancement in quantum, which is quantum sensing. Because quantum sensing relies on essentially core measurements of the earth’s gravity and the magnet at the core of the Earth, it can do position anywhere around the world — as a result, navigation and precise time in both a very ultra precise way and without connecting to the global constellation of satellites known as GPS, known as China’s Baidu, that is typically the way commercial airlines, military ships, figure out where they are and what time it is anywhere around the world. So as a result we’re starting to see quantum sensors and their role in helping in a world where there is far more of both GPS denial and spoofing happening today.

 

ISAACSON: So what you’re saying is that these quantum computers can break codes — cryptography — and they also can be much better than GPS at doing location sensing. Let’s do location sensing. How would we use that? And are we using it, and is China using it?

 

NEUBERGER: So, today, to give one example of how you know, ships try to do GPS spoofing. So if for example Iranian ships or the dark fleet tries to bypass sanctions, what they’ll do is they will turn off this beaconing system that ships use to notify each other where they are just to avoid collisions and they will try to via something called GPS spoofing, make it look like they are in a different place from where they are. That’s for example, how you may have ships transferring sanctioned oil or trip — ships, transferring weapons in a way that they try to hide from intelligence collection or from satellite systems around the world. 

 

Or for example we saw it in Russia’s Middle East operations. They would do GPS denial. They would essentially block ships, planes, people from connecting to GPS as part of kind of trying to hide military operations that may be occurring. That has real danger for commercial aircraft. Planes that are, that use GPS to connect and figure out traffic, figure out navigation routes. And it also causes real complications for military operations. 

 

So because GPS sensors, because quantum sensors operate without ties to that satellite constellation, they’re a really effective way to essentially figure out where one is, navigate, and as a result have links without connecting to those satellite systems. So there’s that technology is more mature than the technology of potentially breaking encryption of a quantum computer that is large enough to actually break encryption. So I think we’ll see applications of quantum sensors first.

 

ISAACSON: Well you say in your piece that China is already using quantum sensors to — on submarines and other things. And one of the things you point to is they’re able to do so because we didn’t put export controls. Is that — why don’t we just put export controls or export controls pretty useless in this day and age.

 

NEUBERGER: So China is for that reason starting to deploy quantum sensors in its different military systems. You know, the technologies around quantum sensors are broadly available and we find it’s pretty hard to make export controls enforceable in a number of these areas because some of the technologies are dual use. There are non, there are non-military applications of it. For example, quantum sensors, there are legitimate uses for commercial aircraft that want to navigate through GPS-denied zones. And as a result it’s a tougher set of technologies for us to export control ’cause there are legitimate non-military uses.

 

ISAACSON: You say we can’t fix it the way we used to with the old machines, which is add a few gears and rotors. You say it takes the entire infrastructure – from beginning to end will have to be changed. Explain what that would require and how long that would take.

 

NEUBERGER: Absolutely. And that’s already started frankly. So again, I’ll use the example of, you know, the padlock that comes up on our browser when we’re accessing medical or financial records or shopping online. So behind that padlock is something called, is, are digital certificates that validate that when you think you’re visiting amazon.com, it really is amazon.com. And it validates to amazon.com that you are indeed who you say you are. So that allows you to set up a trusted connection to enter your credit card information. 

 

Similarly on the broad pipes that for example, like cloud computing companies or social media companies use to transmit information at scale, they similarly implement that kind of end-to-end encryption to allow bulk traffic to be secure as well. So what it takes is both the main digital infrastructure companies like Google, for example, announced that they are implementing elements of post quantum cryptography in Android 17. Like Apple that has implemented post-quantum cryptography, this new kind of cryptography across iMessage. Those companies implementing it ensure that the broad amounts of traffic actually have post-quantum keys. 

 

Post-quantum keys are very, very large. So potentially they take longer to process and compute. And that’s why, you know, for these companies making the transition, it’s also not so quick and easy. They have to ensure that the systems they’ve built in the past can actually work with these much larger keys and potentially slower computation. They don’t want it to be slower so they have to make some changes there as well. So that gives you a picture of both kind of the stack all the way to your laptop as well as the broader pipes that the world’s digital traffic runs on.

 

ISAACSON: Well one of the things that struck me in which you just said — it’s also in your piece — is that Google is doing, you know post quantum cryptography and that Apple is going to have to do it and that a lot of the quantum computing is done by major companies and corporations. That’s also true in artificial intelligence. This isn’t the government doing these things, it’s Anthropic or OpenAI or Google doing it. Explain to me how that makes it either easier or harder for us to solve this problem.

 

NEUBERGER: It’s a really interesting point, and there’s also a really interesting contrast between the American quantum ecosystem and China’s quantum ecosystem, to your earlier question. You know, in the US for some quantum applications like breaking encryption, the main customer is the government, the national security community that may want to figure out another country’s secrets. And as a result, for example, in the Trump White House recent executive order, you see the request, the demand, for the Department of Energy to actually work with a private ecosystem to build a quantum computer. So what you have in the US ecosystem is government demand and in some cases government money kind of both leading to driving, encouraging, the private sector ecosystem, which is made up of both very large companies like you noted as well as smaller startups. 

 

In China’s ecosystem, what China’s really good at is driving massive state capital and creating these advanced technology hubs. In quantum’s case that’s in a place called Hefei, where they have the combination of universities, R&D labs and large amounts of government capital. Because China has said quantum is one of its top technology goals for its current five-year plan all coming together. So it’s much more of a state-driven ecosystem competing with the US ecosystem, which is a mixture of state capital and demand and really an innovation base of large and small companies alike.

 

ISAACSON: So is China ahead of the United States?

 

NEUBERGER: China’s ahead in some areas of quantum technology like quantum communication, allowing, you know, ostensibly secure communication across a quantum wire. America is ahead on quantum hardware: building out the very cold equipment and some of the unique components of quantum computing that are very different from classical computing. But what’s really most important is who has the commercialization of applications first. You know, who can deploy quantum sensing first to be — to allow to navigate safely in a GPS denial environment. Who can build a fault tolerant, big enough quantum computer that could potentially, you know, break cryptography and and, you know, have impact in stealing another country’s national security secrets.

 

ISAACSON: So this quantum computing though, is this really a race and if we lose to China, we’re in real trouble or is the problem that the competition just makes all sides go faster? And that’s the problem.

 

NEUBERGER: It’s a good point. It’s the latter. Because at the end of the day if we can deploy a new generation of post quantum cryptography, we believe we’d be secure against China’s deployment of a quantum computer. And that’s why you’ve seen the US government pressing and accelerating its timeline from the original one of 2035 that was set in the first quantum directive during the Biden administration to the now updated 2031 timeline and the latest Trump executive order. Because of a sense that there’s been advancements in quantum hardware that force us to bring that date closer so we can be secure against an adversary deploying a potential quantum computer.

 

ISAACSON: As you say in your piece, we’ve been cooperating with our allies — France, the United Kingdom and Japan — on creating quantum computing and perhaps post quantum cryptography. Is China coordinating and working with Russia and is that a problem if Russia gets this?

 

NEUBERGER: We’ve been cooperating even with China on the post quantum standards. We’re in a global world where we need globally secure digital infrastructure. You know, for American banks who do business with Chinese banks or American companies that do business all around the world. So as a result it’s in all of our interest to have secure post-quantum standards that we all implement together. With that said, the competition and the race is really in building a quantum computer, is in the hardware space. And we do cooperate very closely, as you noted with Japan, the UK, France. 

 

China has deepened its cooperation with Russia and deployed a secure quantum link with South Africa almost 8,000 miles away. Some question the value of quantum communications simply because in order for that to really be a secure link, it still needs that quantum secure two ends that require the deployment of post quantum computers and as a post quantum cryptography. So as a result, I think many in the US system really question Chinese advancements in quantum communications and quantum key distribution and believe that the US edge in quantum hardware and the partnerships — Japan notably has a real ecosystem in quantum — will actually prevail.

 

ISAACSON: President Trump has just signed two executive orders dealing with quantum computing and post quantum cryptography. What did those orders do and are they enough?

 

NEUBERGER: They did two important things. First on the defense side, they accelerated the transition of US government systems to this new generation of cryptography that can protect and still be secure against a quantum computer that was accelerated by several years to 2031. That reflects as we talked about the developments that have been happening in quantum hardware and the concern that an adversary, notably China, would build a quantum computer that could break American government secrets. So that was the first part. And that was an important part. 

 

The second key part was that it tasked the Department of Energy to build a quantum computer working with the US private sector ecosystem. And then it also set some timelines for deployment of quantum sensing and military applications to help navigate through GPS denial zones and potentially manage against an adversary’s attempts to disrupt military communications and coordination by disrupting GPS. So a number of important things that those executive orders did, both defending and innovating.

 

ISAACSON: Anne Neuberger, thank you so much for joining us. Appreciate it.

 

NEUBERGER: It’s always a pleasure to be with you.