Interviews and bios of the key players:
Montesinos Kurlander Blanca Romero Benavides Crespigny Maugein Gamarra
This interview between Antoine Blanca and correspondent Lowell Bergman took place on August 16, 2005, at Blanca's office in the fifth arrondissement in Paris. It is edited for clarity.
Antoine Blanca with President Jacques Chirac of France. You were preparing to go to Peru in 1997, and you had a meeting with President Chirac before you went. What happened in the meeting? The president traditionally receives all ambassadors before they're going to their new embassy. I was not surprised that the main preoccupation of President Jacques Chirac was the problem of the mine in Yanacocha. France was directly involved through the French government-owned company BRGM. Bureau de Recherches Géologiques were at that time about to be robbed... Robbed? Yes, by their [BRGM's] associate people [its partners in the mine], especially Newmont, and the director associated [with] Buenaventura armed by the family Benavides [the Peruvian family that owns Buenaventura], and the trial was in the ultimate phases, about to be transferred to the [Peruvian] Supreme Court. But all the trials in all the levels of justice, Peruvian justice, were evidently rigged and [in] the control of Mr. Montesinos, who was a superman of the political life at that time, and the Fujimori presidency. Let me understand. You're having your first meeting with President Chirac before you go to Peru, and he wants to talk about Yanacocha, about the gold mine? Like I said, he was very angry with Mr. Fujimori. Why? Because Fujimori came to Strasbourg, he spoke most fluently French, and Mr. Chirac thought that it was an opportunity to work with him. … And every European, and even in the United States, was keen to have a relationship with Mr. Fujimori despite many things related to his way of governing. After learning that there was a big problem with the gold mine in which France directly had interests, Mr. Chirac wrote a letter, a personal letter, long personal letter to Mr. Fujimori... President Chirac wrote a long personal letter to Fujimori? Yes, and long before I went there -- one year before I was appointed as ambassador. It was a kind letter from head of state to another head of state talking about how he did his studies in Strasbourg and incidentally talking about Yanacocha and saying, "I know this is in the hands of the judges, but please if you could, take some interest in it." Like that. The response from Fujimori was four lines: "I received your kind letter … and my answer is that as you know, I am a democratic president and justice is justice and I can't mix up justice and political office. Best regards." So President Chirac, when you met with him, was upset? He was evidently quite upset. He didn't show it very much, but he was evidently upset by Fujimori's attitude. He even informed me that in the last general assembly of the United Nations -- you know, the heads of state usually go there in September and take advantage of it to meet between themselves informally -- … a good friend of President Chirac was the president of Brazil at that time and he said [to President Chirac], "Mr. Fujimori is very keen to talk with you to clear up some misunderstanding, and he's over there. Maybe you can shake hands with him when you leave." But there was no answer from Chirac and when he left, he ignored Fujimori, who was there like a puppet waiting for him. So he ignored Fujimori? He ignored him totally. And he told me that. And I, of course, got exactly the message from the president that Mr. Fujimori is not my friend; secondly, [that my] main concern has to be Yanacocha. Your main concern when you went to Peru was to be the Yanacocha Mine? I understood. It was not written, but I understood that clearly. When you went to Peru, what did you discover was going on? I discovered that the Supreme Court was about to vote, and the vote was 3-2 in favor of our position. Let me take you through this one step at a time. You arrive in Peru and the Peruvian Supreme Court has an unusual way of doing cases. First you had a vote of 3 to 2 in your favor, in favor of the French. But you needed four votes. Yes. Four to one was needed to settle the case in our favor. So they appointed new judges? They appointed a new judge, Judge Beltrán. And in a week he decides... He decides very quickly, very quickly. I was surprised; everyone was. But so quickly decided -- in favor of Newmont. How much money was involved? How much money did France lose, if you will? The estimation of the value of the French part then was usually for $500 million. We estimated that Yanacocha would be worth much more today -- $2 billion. The problem is that Judge Beltrán was filmed on videotape by Mr. Montesinos when he asked him to vote in favor of Newmont. And you know this videotape? Did you see it? Yes. It's a very interesting one. You didn't know this at the time? No, no. Evidently, no. You would never have settled had you seen the videotape? No. I saw that video four months before leaving my post in Lima. When you saw the videotape, what was your reaction? Someone woke me up during the night, informing me, "Tomorrow you are going to watch a video that will be very interesting for you." It was being broadcast on Peruvian [television], and the video was the proof that everything in justice related to Yanacocha was rigged up. Everything was rigged? Everything. Everything. So your reaction? For me, it was definite proof that Mr. Montesinos was [urging] Mr. Beltrán to vote against our interest in favor of Newmont. He told Mr. Beltrán, "You know we need to have a good relationship with the United States, you know that." Do you believe that the government of the United States and/or Newmont Mining were influencing Montesinos? Maybe Mr. Montesinos didn't need to be influenced. He knew exactly where his interests were. You know Mr. Montesinos was a CIA man, he worked for the CIA, for American interests. … My American colleagues were always speaking up in favor of Newmont, always. Your American colleagues -- meaning the State Department? Especially my best friend, Denny Jett, who was the ambassador and a democratic man. When the [Peruvian] Supreme Court voted, he said that was the proof, the reason he [Montesinos] is on the side of Newmont. He said that, even though he knows that there are some problems in Peruvian justice. He was very honest about that. But the American ambassador obviously was promoting the cause of an American company? Certainly, I think he received a clear instruction for it. Newmont also met with Montesinos. You know that now. We know that today, but at that time, I left Lima without knowing it. I learned that a few weeks after coming back to Paris. I've interviewed Mr. Kurlander from Newmont and Peter Romero of the U.S. State Department, and they say the reason they were doing this was because the French were already intervening -- that your president was writing letters, that representatives of the French company were meeting with Santiago Fujimori -- President Fujimori's brother -- and that he was brought to see Chirac. BRG[M] was a French state-owned company. The government appointed the president, the director general, everybody there. It's very directly French and under French government control. It was the duty of course of the ambassador to defend the interest of such a company.. Weren't French representatives meeting with the administrator of the Supreme Court in Peru and members of the legislature in Peru? I never, never. No French representatives? No, not at all. Never. Never a telephone call to them. I refused to meet them. You refused to meet with any Peruvian authorities? I refused to meet any Peruvian in the justice system. Never, I'm telling you. I refuse because I can tell you openly today, I was always thinking of the possibility of a trap. It was not only my honesty that was at stake. It was also living in a country with a government where traps were very common. Because the world of Montesinos was dangerous? It was very dangerous. I'm sure that they were thinking about sending me a very strong message sometime. I remind you that the last 15 years in Peru were very painful for this country because of the war between the government and the guerrillas, especially bloody in the region of the Yanacocha mountains. Let me ask you, when you got to Peru, what was Montesinos exactly, the secret police chief, the power behind the throne? What was he? Officially he was nothing. Officially he was a low-level counselor of the president. Even Fujimori told the press that Montesinos was a low-scale advisor and that it wasn't worth talking about him. But you knew that wasn't true? Of course. He was the true head of the secret services. … Today we know that he had bank accounts in Switzerland and the United States, totaling $1 billion according to some accounts. So when he asked to meet with you in Lima, why wouldn't you go to see him? Don't you need his influence? Never, never. Every time a French businessman would come and ask me about the possibility of meeting Mr. Montesinos, I would tell them, "You are not going to come to the embassy again if you have an appointment with him." Did you say that to Patrick Maugein? He never asked me about it, for my advice. Did you ever meet Patrick Maugein? Ah, yes. I met many times Patrick Maugein. We have plenty of common interests with Mr. Maugein. … we're both from the same region, so regional interests, but also Yanacocha, of course. He worked at that time for Normandy, an Australian company associated with the French government-owned BRGM. But he was certainly the man, especially the businessman, who knew the problem of Yanacocha the best. He is also a friend of Chirac. Oui. Everybody says that. I have no proof of that, but it is not a secret. He knows Chirac and has met with him many times. Both are from the same region of France. Some say that the relationship has been very close for many years. I have no proof of it. No, but Maugein came to Lima, and he has said through his representatives that he tried to meet with Mr. Montesinos and he was unsuccessful. Certainly, he never confirmed that to me. But he was not in a video. If it's true that he tried, I think he tried -- it was good for him that he didn't succeed. Here's what Newmont Mining says. They say that Santiago Fujimori, the brother of the Peruvian president, meets with Chirac. Chirac sends a letter. The ambassador is very active on behalf of the French. They say there was "active intervention to influence the government of Peru." That's a nice story. But that is not the truth. We always try to defend French interests or jobs. The job of the president, because it was a state-owned company, was to protect its interests. It was also on the side of the truth because BRGM was a company working together with Peruvian friends in the mining [venture at Yanacocha] for many, many years. The French company was very close to Buenaventura, the Benavides family-owned company. And the Benavides family were the official friends of France for many, many years. And we thought it was a sort of betrayal for them to associate themselves directly with Newmont interests. The U.S. government got involved because the president of France is writing letters... That is all cynical. We were doing our job, but we don't break laws. The Americans broke laws? I don't know if you can say that. But certainly their man was Montesinos. Montesinos was a permanent law-breaker -- international law, Peruvian law -- he's in jail right now. It is not the same to meet Mr. Santiago [Fujimori], the friend of our president. He was visiting Paris; it was normal that we have talks with him. So you're saying Montesinos was a criminal? A criminal, of course. And he was America's man? He worked for the CIA. He was a CIA man. I don't know if CIA is involved with America. You know that in one of the Vladivideos, one of the secret videos, Montesinos is talking with the American CIA station chief. And he says he has intercepted emails and correspondence that show that the French are paying money -- he says $7 million -- to judges and people in the Peruvian government to influence the case. Documentary evidence. That is not evidence. You know that you can fabricate it. It's fabrications? In my view, yes. In my view, I cannot prove it, but it's only fabrication as justification for the CIA behavior, or Newmont, or I don't know. Maybe the same. Let me ask you some specific questions so I get them very clearly. Did you ever have contact with Montesinos? Never. Not even on the phone? Never. To your knowledge, did the French ever pay any bribes to any judges or anyone in the government? Never. Myself, never. And the people under my control, never. And I know for French government, nobody. Maugein, you don't know about? Maugein isn't the French government. I don't know. Did the American side pay bribes? Did the American company or government pay bribes to Peruvian officials? Yes, certainly. I believe that. I can't affirm it. Can't prove it? I can't prove it. You knew that the courts weren't clean? Of course. We were not Boy Scouts. Did French intelligence get involved? Did you get any assistance? Never, never. You didn't ask for assistance to find out what was going on? No, never. Even though there were hundreds of millions of dollars involved with the French government for BRGM -- that's French money, government money, potential profits in the billions, the president is interested -- but you don't mobilize your agencies to help? No. Not true. No, no. Certainly not. So the French, no one in the French government to your knowledge met with any judges, any administrator of the courts? No. No one. I tried of course to talk to journalists, to newspaper dailies friendly to us -- and trying to make them friendly to us without succeeding, I can tell you. … I love to think that I was, I did a good honest job for my country. The only thing that counts for me. But you lost? Yes, I lost. I lost in the Supreme Court. I lost because BRGM, our French government agency, is no longer in gold mining affairs. But it's better because they are polluting everything in the region where the mining is done. You mean in the end it may have been to France's advantage to not be involved in Yanacocha because of the pollution? When I was in the fight, I did the fight for the French interests or at least what I think were the French interests. But now, after leading a life out of gold mining for a lot of years, I read a lot of books or papers about consequences of gold mining in the world, and it's amazing what is happening to poor people in the Third World countries. So I prefer today that the French company were not involved in such a thing. So really, what's the moral of the story? The moral to me is that [when] you have to serve interests like a government or your country, you have always to preserve part of yourself for moral behavior. I can tell you that after 23 years of serving as French ambassador, I can talk morals to my grandchildren and be proud of everything I did.
