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General Lee Butler's Speech and His Joint Statement with General Goodpaster
December 4, 1996
General Lee Butler, ex-commander of the Strategic Air Command, called for the
elimination of all nuclear weapons at a National Press Club luncheon on
December 4, 1996. He also issued a Joint Statement with General
Goodpaster.
The next day a statement was released with the signatures of dozens of generals
and admirals from seventeen countries, including Russia and the United States,
that called for deep reductions in nuclear stockpiles.
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB REMARKS
General Lee Butler, USAF (Retired)
Wednesday, December 4, 1996
Washington, D.C.
Thank you, and good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Let me say first that I'm
both professionally honored and intellectually comforted to share this rostrum
with General Andrew Goodpaster. He has long set the standard among senior
military officers for rigorous thinking and wise counsel on national security
matters. He has been a role model for generations of younger officers, and
most certainly was for me. His views of the risks inherent in nuclear weapons
and the consequences of their use have long been a matter of public record. I
found them very compelling as I made the long and arduous intellectual journey
from staunch advocate of nuclear deterrence to public proponent of nuclear
abolition.
This latter role is not one that I ever imagined nor one that I relish. Far
from it. It have too much regard for the thousands of men and women who served
under my command, and the hundreds of colleagues with whom I labored in the
policy arena, to take lightly the risk that my views might in any way be
construed as diminishing their service or sacrifice. Quite to the contrary, I
continue to marvel and will always be immensely gratified by their intense
devotion and commitment to the highest standards of professional discipline.
I would simply ask them to understand that I am compelled to speak, by concerns
I cannot still, with respect to the abiding influence of nuclear weapons long
after the Cold War has ended. I am here today because I feel the weight of a
special obligation in these matters, a responsibility born of unique experience
and responsibilities. Over the last 27 years of my military career, I was
embroiled in every aspect of American nuclear policy making and force
structuring, from the highest councils of government to nuclear command
centers; from the arms control arena to cramped bomber cockpits and the
confines of ballistic missile silos and submarines. I have spent years
studying nuclear weapons effects; inspected dozens of operational units;
certified hundreds of crews for their nuclear mission; and approved thousands
of targets for nuclear destruction. I have investigated a distressing array of
accidents and incidents involving strategic weapons and forces. I have read a
library books and intelligence reports on the Soviet Union and what were
believed to be its capabilities and intentions...and seen an army of experts
confounded. As an advisor to the President on the employment of nuclear
weapons, I have anguished over the imponderable complexities, the profound
moral dilemmas, and the mind-numbing compression of decisionmaking under threat
of nuclear attack.
I came away from that experience deeply troubled by what I see as the burden of
building and maintaining nuclear arsenals; the increasingly tangled web of
policy and strategy as the number of weapons and delivery systems multiply; the
staggering costs; the relentless pressure of advancing technology; the
grotesquely destructive war plans; the daily operational risks; and the
constant prospect of a crisis that would hold the fate of entire societies at
risk.
Seen from this perspective, it should not be surprising that no one could have
been more relieved than way I by the dramatic end of the Cold War and the
promise of reprieve from its acute tensions and threats. The democratization
of Russia, the reshaping of Central Europe....I never imagined that in my
lifetime, much less during my military service, such extraordinary events might
transpire. Even more gratifying was the opportunity, as the commander of US
strategic nuclear forces, to be intimately involved in recasting our force
posture, shrinking our arsenals, drawing down the target list, and scaling back
hugh impending Cold War driven expenditures.
Most importantly, I could see for the first time the prospect of restoring a
world free of the apocalyptic threat of nuclear weapons.
Over time, that shimmering hope gave way to a judgment which has now become a
deeply held conviction; that a world free of the threat of nuclear weapons is
necessarily a world devoid of nuclear weapons. Permit me, if you will, to
elaborate briefly on the concerns which compel this conviction.
First, a growing alarm that despite all of the evidence, we have yet to fully
grasp the monstrous effects of these weapons, that the consequences of their
use defy reason, transcending time and space, poisoning the earth and deforming
its inhabitants. Second, a deepening dismay at the prolongation of Cold War
policies and practices in a world where our security interests have been
utterly transformed. Third, that foremost among these policies, deterrence
reigns unchallenged, with its embedded assumption of hostility and associated
preference for forces on high states of alert. Fourth, an acute unease over
renewed assertions of the utility of nuclear weapons, especially as regards
response to chemical or biological attack. Fifth, grave doubt that the present
highly discriminatory regime of nuclear and non-nuclear states can long endure
absent an credible commitment by the nuclear powers to eliminate their
arsenals. And finally, the horrific prospect of a world seething with
enmities, armed to the teeth with nuclear weapons, and hostage to maniacal
leaders strongly disposed toward their use.
That being said, let me hasten to add that I am keenly aware of the opposing
arguments. Many strategists hold to the belief that the Cold War world was
well served by nuclear weapons, and that the fractious world emerging in its
aftermath dictates that they will be retained...either as fearsome weapons of
last resort or simply because their elimination is still a Utopian dream. I
offer in reply that for me the Utopian dream was ending the Cold War. Standing
down nuclear arsenals requires only a fraction of the ingenuity and resources
as were devoted to their creation. As the those who believe nuclear weapons
desirable or inevitable, I would say these devices exact a terrible price even
if never used. Accepting nuclear weapons as the ultimate arbiter of conflict
condemns the world to live under a dark cloud of perpetual anxiety. Worse, it
codifies mankind's most murderous instincts as an acceptable resort when other
options for resolving conflict fail.
Others argue that nuclear weapons are still the essential trappings of
superpower status; that they are a vital hedge against a resurgence of
virulent, Soviet-era communism; that they will deter attack by weapons of mass
destruction; or that they are the most appropriate choice for response to such
attack.
To them I reply that proliferation cannot be contained in a world where a
handful of self-appointed nations both arrogate to themselves the privilege of
owning nuclear weapons, and extol the ultimate security assurances they assert
such weapons convey. That overt hedging against born-again, Soviet-style
hardliners is as likely to endanger as to discourage their resurrection. That
elegant theories of deterrence wilt in the crucible of impending nuclear war.
And, finally, that the political and human consequences of the employment of a
nuclear weapon by the United States in the United States in the post-Cold War
world, no matter the provocation, would irretrievably diminish our stature. We
simply cannot resort to the very type of act we rightly abhor.
Is it possible to forge a global consensus on the propositions that nuclear
weapons have no defensible role; that the broader consequences of their
employment transcend any asserted military utility; and that as true weapons of
mass destruction, the case for their elimination is a thousand-fold stronger
and more urgent than for deadly chemicals and viruses already widely declared
immoral, illegitimate, subject to destruction and prohibited from any future
productions?
I am persuaded that such a consensus is not only possible, it is imperative.
Notwithstanding the uncertainties of transition in Russia, bitter enmities in
the Middle East, or the delicate balance of power in South and East Asia, I
believe that a swelling global refrain will eventually bring the broader
interests of mankind to bear on the decisions of governments to retain nuclear
weapons. The terror-induced anesthesia which suspended rational thought, made
nuclear war thinkable and grossly excessive arsenals possible during the Cold
War is gradually wearing off. A renewed appreciation for the obscene power of
a single nuclear weapon is coming back into focus as we confront the dismal
prospect of nuclear terror at the micro level.
Clearly the world has begun to recoil from the nuclear abyss. Bombers are off
alert, missiles are being destroyed and warheads dismantled, former Soviet
republics have renounced nuclear status. The Non-Proliferation Treaty has been
indefinitely extended, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is now a de facto
prohibition, and START II may yet survive a deeply suspicious Duma. But, there
is a much larger issue which now confronts the nuclear powers and engages the
vital interest of every nation; whether the world is better served by a
prolonged era of cautious nuclear weapons reductions toward some indeterminate
endpoint; or by an unequivocal commitment on the part of the nuclear powers to
move much greater urgency toward the goal of eliminating these arsenals in
their entirety.
I chose this forum to make my most direct public case for elimination as the
goal, to be pursued with all deliberate speed. I firmly believe that practical
and realistic steps, such as those set forth by the Stimson Center study, or by
the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, can readily be
taken toward that end, But I would underscore that the real issue here is not
the path - it is the willingness to undertake the journey. In my view, there
are three crucial conditions which must first be satisfied for that journey to
begin, conditions which go to the heart of strongly held beliefs and deep
seated fears about nuclear weapons and the circumstances in which they might be
used. First and foremost, is for the declared nuclear weapon states to accept
that the Cold War is in fact over, to break free of the norms, attitudes and
habits that perpetuate enormous inventories, forces standing alert and
targeting plans encompassing thousands of aimpoints.
Second, for the undeclared states to embrace the harsh lessons of the Cold War;
that nuclear weapons are inherently dangerous, hugely expensive, and militarily
inefficient; that implacable hostility and alienation will almost certainly
over time lead to a nuclear crisis; that the failure of nuclear deterrence
would imperil not just the survival of the antagonists, but of every society;
and that nuclear war is a raging, insatiable beast whose instincts and
appetites we pretend to understand but cannot possibly control.
Third, given its crucial leadership role, it is essential for the United States
to undertake as a first order of business a sweeping review of its nuclear
policies and strategies. The Clinton administration's 1993 Nuclear Posture
Review was an essential but far from sufficient step toward rethinking the role
of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War world. While clearing the agenda of
some pressing force structure questions, the NPR purposefully avoided the
larger policy issues.
Moreover, to the point of Cold War attitudes, the Review's justification for
maintaining robust nuclear forces as a hedge against the resurgence of a
hostile Russia should now be seen as regrettable from several aspects. It
sends an overt message of distrust in an era when building a positive security
relationship with Russia is arguably the United States' most important foreign
policy interest. It confides force levels and postures completely out of
keeping with the historic passage we have witnessed in world affairs. And, it
perpetuates attitudes, which inhibit a willingness to proceed immediately
toward negotiation of greatly reduced levels of arms, notwithstanding the state
of ratification of the START II Agreement.
There you have, in very abbreviated form, the core of the concerns which led me
to abandon the blessed anonymity of private life, to join my voice with
respected colleagues such as General Goodpaster, to urge publicly that the
United States make unequivocal its commitment to the elimination of nuclear
arsenals, and take the lead in setting an agenda for moving forthrightly toward
that objective.
I left active duty with great confidence that the imperative for this
commitment, and the will to pursue it, were fully in place. I entered private
life with a sense of profound satisfaction that the astonishing turn of events
which brought a wondrous closure to my three and one-half decades of military
service, and far more importantly to four decades of perilous ideological
confrontation, presented historic opportunities to advance the human
condition.
But now
time, and human nature, are wearing away the sense of wonder and closing the
window of opportunity. Options are being lost as urgent questions are unasked,
or unanswered; as outmoded routines perpetuate Cold War patterns and thinking;
and as a new generation of nuclear actors and aspirants lurch backward toward a
chilling world where the principal antagonists could find no better solution to
their entangled security fears than Mutual Assured Destruction.
Such a world was and is intolerable. We are not condemned to repeat the
lessons of forty years at the nuclear brink. We can do better than condone a
world in which nuclear weapons are accepted as commonplace. The Price already
paid is too dear, the risks too great. The task is daunting but we cannot
shrink from it. The opportunity may not come again.
December 4, 1996
Joint Statement on Reduction of Nuclear Weapons Arsenals: Declining Utility,
Continuing Risks.
As a senior military officers, we have given close attention over many years to
the role of nuclear weapons as well as the risks they involve. With the end of
the Cold War, these weapons are of sharply reduced utility, and there is much
now to be gained by substantially reducing their numbers and lowering their
alert status, meanwhile exploring the feasibility of their ultimate complete
elimination.
The roles of nuclear weapons for purposes of security have been sharply
narrowed in terms of the security of the United States. Now and in the future
they basically provide an option to respond in kind to a nuclear threat or
nuclear attack by others. In the world environment now foreseen, they are not
needed against non-nuclear opponents. Conventional capabilities can provide a
sufficient deterrent and defense against conventional forces and in combination
with defensive measures, against the threat of chemical or biological weapons.
As symbols of prestige and international standing, nuclear weapons are of
markedly reduced importance.
At the same time, the dangers inherent in nuclear weapons have continued and in
some ways increased. They include the risks of accidents and unauthorized
launches - risks which, while small, nevertheless still exist. Seizures or
thefts of weapons or weapons materials and threats or actual use by terrorists
or domestic rebels, are of additional concern. Moreover, despite the nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty, nuclear weapons could spread to additional nations,
with risk of their use in crisis or war. And if they should spread, the risks
of accidents and of unauthorized, inadvertent, or deliberate use will spread as
well.
We believe the nations that possess these weapons should take the necessary
steps to align their nuclear weapons policies and programs to match the
diminished role and utility of these weapons, and the continuing risks they
involve, joining in reducing their nuclear arsenals step by step to the lowest
verifiable levels consistent with stable security, as rapidly as world
conditions permit. Taking the lead, U.S. and Russian reductions can open the
door for the negotiation of multilateral reductions capping all arsenals at
very low levels. Added safety and an enhanced climate for negotiations would
be achieved by removing nuclear weapons from alert status and placing the
warheads in controlled storage. These arrangements should be applied to all
nuclear weapons, discarding the distinction between tactical and strategic
weapons, limiting nuclear warheads rather than launchers, and subjecting all
weapons to inspection and verification measures.
The ultimate objective of phased reductions should be the complete elimination
or nuclear weapons from all nations. No one can say today whether or when this
final goal will prove feasible, but because the phased withdrawal and
destruction of nuclear weapons from all countries' arsenals would take many
years, probably decades, to accomplish, time will be available -- for work on
technical problems, for political progress in ameliorating the conflicts and
political struggles that encourages countries to maintain or to acquire nuclear
weapons, and for building confidence in the system of safeguards and
verification measures established to support the elimination regime.
We believe the time for action is now, for the alternative of inaction could
well carry a high price. For the task that lies ahead, there is need for
initiatives by all who share our conviction as to the importance of this goal.
Steady pursuit of a policy of cooperative, phased reductions with serious
commitments to seek the elimination of all nuclear weapons is a path to a world
free of nuclear dangers.
Signed,
General Andrew J. Goodpaster, U.S. Army (Ret.), former Supreme Allied Commander
in Europe (SACEUR) (1969-74)
General Lee Butler, U.S. Air Force (Ret.), former Commander-in-Chief, United
States Strategic Air Command (1992-94); former Commander-in Chief, United
States Strategic Command (1992-94).
--------------------------------------------------
STATEMENT ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY INTERNATIONAL GENERALS AND ADMIRALS
December 5, 1996
We, military professionals, who have devoted our lives to the national security
of our countries and our peoples, are convinced that the continuing existence
of nuclear weapons in the armories of nuclear powers, and the ever present
threat of acquisition of these weapons by others, constitutes a peril to global
peace and security and to the safety and survival of the people we are
dedicated to protect.
Through our variety of responsibilities and experiences with weapons and wars
in the armed forces of many nations, we have acquired an intimate and perhaps
unique knowledge of the present security and insecurity of our countries and
peoples.
We know that nuclear weapons, though never used since Hiroshima and Nagasaki,
represent a clear and present danger to the very existence of humanity. There
was an immense risk of a superpower holocaust during the Cold War. At least
once, civilization was on the very brink of catastrophic tragedy. That threat
has now receded, but not forever -- unless nuclear weapons are eliminated.
The end of the Cold War created conditions favorable to nuclear disarmament.
Termination of military confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United
States made it possible to reduce strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, and
to eliminate intermediate range missiles. It was a significant milestone on
the path to nuclear disarmament when Belarus, Kazakhastan, and Ukraine
relinquished their nuclear weapons.
Indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995 and
approval of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by the UN General Assembly in
1996 are also important steps towards a nuclear-free world. We commend the
work that has been done to achieve these results.
Unfortunately, in spite of these positive steps, true nuclear disarmament has
not been achieved. Treaties provide that only delivery systems, not nuclear
warheads, will be destroyed. This permits the United States and Russia to keep
their warheads in reserve storage, thus creating a "reversible nuclear
potential." However, in the post-Cold War security environment, the most
commonly postulated threats are not susceptible to deterrence or are simply not
credible. We believe, therefore, that business as usual is not an acceptable
way for the world to proceed in nuclear matters.
It is our deep conviction that the following is urgently needed and must be
undertaken now:
*First, present and planned stockpiles of nuclear weapons are exceedingly large
and should now be greatly cut back;
*Second, remaining nuclear weapons should be gradually and transparently taken
off alert, and their readiness substantially reduced both in nuclear weapon
states and in de facto nuclear weapon states;
*Third, long-term international nuclear policy must be based on the declared
principle of continuous, complete and irrevocable elimination of nuclear
weapons.
The United States and Russia should -- without any reduction in their military
security -- carry forward the reduction process already launched by START: they
should cut down to 1000 to 1500 warheads each and possibly lower. The Other
three nuclear states and the three threshold states should be drawn into the
reduction process as still deeper reductions are negotiated down to the level
of hundreds. There is nothing incompatible between defense by individual
countries of their territorial integrity and progress toward nuclear
abolition.
The exact circumstances and conditions that will make it possible to proceed,
finally, to abolition cannot now be foreseen or prescribed. One obvious
prerequisite would be a worldwide program of surveillance and inspection,
including measures to account for and control inventories of nuclear weapon
materials. This will ensure that no rogues or terrorists could undertake a
surreptitious effort to acquire nuclear capabilities without detection at an
early stage. An agreed procedure for forcible international intervention and
interruption of covert efforts in a certain and timely fashion is essential.
The creation of nuclear-free zones in different parts of the world,
confidence-building and transparency measures in the general field of defense,
strict implementation of all treaties in the area of disarmament and arms
control, and mutual assistance in the process of disarmament are also important
in helping to bring about a nuclear -- free world. The development of regional
systems of collective security, including practical measures for cooperation,
partnership, interaction and communication are essential for local stability
and security.
The extent to which the existence of nuclear weapons and fear of their use may
have deterred war -- in a world that in this year alone, has seen 30 military
conflicts raging -- cannot be determined. It is clear, however, that nations
now possessing nuclear weapons will not relinquish them until they are
convinced that more reliable and less dangerous means of providing for their
security are in place. It is also clear, as a consequence, that the nuclear
powers will not now agree to a fixed timetable for the achievement of
abolition.
It is similarly clear that, among the nations not now possessing nuclear
weapons, there are some that will not forever forswear their acquisition and
deployment unless, they, too, are provided means of security. Nor will they
forgo acquisition if the present nuclear powers seek to retain everlasting
their nuclear monopoly.
Movements toward abolition must be a responsibility shared primarily by the
declared nuclear weapons states -- China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom,
and the United States; by the de facto nuclear states, India, Israel and
Pakistan; and by major non-nuclear powers such as Germany and Japan. All
nations should move in concert toward the same goal.
We have been presented with a challenge of the highest possible historic
importance: the creation of a nuclear weapons-free world. The end of the Cold
War makes is possible.
The dangers of proliferation, terrorism, and a new nuclear arms race render it
necessary. We must not fail to seize our opportunity. There is no
alternative.
Signed,
INTERNATIONAL GENERALS AND ADMIRALS WHO HAVE SIGNED STATEMENTS ON NUCLEAR
WEAPONS
CANADA
Johnson, Major General Leonard V.. (Ret.) Commandant, National Defense
College
DENMARK
Kristensen, Lt. General Gunnar (Ret.) former Chief of Defense Staff FRANCE
Sanguinetti, Admiral Antoine (Ret.) former Chief of Staff, French Fleet
GHANA
Erskine, General Emmanuel (Ret.) former Commander in Chief and former Chief of
Staff UNTSO (Middle East), Commander UMFII (Lebanon)
GREECE
Capellos, Lt. General Richard (Ret.) former Corps Commander Konstantinides,
Major General Kostas (Ret.), former Chief of Staff, Army Signals
Koumanakos, Lt. General Georgios (Ret.) former Chef of Operations INDIA
Rikhye, Major General Indar Jit (Ret.), former military advisor to UN Secretary
General Dag Akmmerskjold and U Thant
Surt, Air Marshall N.C. (Ret.)
JAPAN
Sakonjo, Vice Admiral Naotoshi (Ret.) Sr. Advisor, Research Institute for Peace
and Security
Shikata Lt. General Toshiyuki (Ret.) Sr. Advisor Research Institute for Peace
and Security
JORDAN
Ajeilat, Major General Shafiq (Ret.) Vice President Military Affairs Muta
University
Shiyyab, Major Gen. Mohammed K. (Ret.) former Dep. Commander, Royal Jordanian
Air Force
NETHERLANDS
van der Graaf, Henry J. (Ret.) Brigadier General RNA Director Centre Arms
Control & Verification, Member, United National Advisory Board for
Disarmament Matters
NORWAY
Breivik, Roy, Vice Admiral Roy (Ret.) former Representative to NATO, Supreme
Allied Commander, Atlantic
PAKISTAN
Malik Major General Ihsun ul Haq (Ret.) Commandant, Joint Services Committee
PORTUGAL
Gomes, Marshall Francisco da Costa (Ret.) former Commander in Chief, Army;
former President of Portugal
RUSSIA
Belous, General Vladimir (Ret.) Department Chief, Dzerzhmsky Military Academy
Gareev, Army General Makhmut (Ret.) former Deputy Chief, USSR Armed Forces
General Staff
Gromov, General Boris, (Ret.) former Duma international Affairs Comminee;
former Commander of 40m Soviet Arms in Afghanistan:former Dept. Minister,
Foreign Ministry, Russia
Koltounov, Major General Victor (Ret.) former Deputy Chief, Department of
General Staff, USSR Armed Forces.
Larionov, Major General Valentin (Ret.) Professor, General Staff Academy
Lebed, Major General Alexander (Ret.) former Secretary of the Security
Council
Lebedev, Major General Youri V. (Ret.) former Deputy Chief, Department of
General Staff, USSR Armed Forces
Makarevsky, Major General Vadim (Ret.) Deputy Chief, Kouibyshev Military
Engineering Academy
Medvedev, Lt. General Vlad-rmr (Ret.) Chief. Center of Nuclear Threat
Reduction
Mikhailov, Colonel General Georg - (Ret.) former Deputy Chief, Department of
General Staff, USSR Armed Forces
Nozhin, Major General Eugene (Ret.) former Deputy Chief, Department of General
Staff, USSR Armed Forces
Rokhlin Lt. General Lev (Ret.) Chair, Duma Defense Committee; former Commander,
Russian 4th Army Corps
Sleport, Lt. General Ivan (Ret.) former Chief, Department of General Staff,
USSR Armed Forces.
Simonyan, Major General Rair (Ret.) Head of Chair, General Staff Academy
Surikov, General Boris T., (Ret.) former Chef Specialist, Defense Ministry
Tehervov, Colonel General Nikolay (Ret.) former Chief, Department of General
Staff USSR Armed Forces
Vinogradov. Lt. General Michael S. (Ret.) former Deputy Chef, Operational
Strategic Center, USSR General Staff
Zoubkov, Rear Admiral Radiy (Ret.) Chief, Navigation, USSR Navy SRI LANKA
Karunaratne, Major General Upali A. (Ret.) USF, U.S.A. WC (Sri Lanka)
TANZANIA
Lupogo, Major General H. C. (Ret.) former Chief Inspector General, Tanzania
Armed Forces
UNITED KINGDOM
Beach, General Sir Hugh (Ret.) Member, U. K. Security Commission Carver, Field
Marshall Lord Michael (Ret.) Commander in Chief for East British Army
(1967-1969), Chief of General Staff (1971-73) Chief of Defense Staff
(1973-76)
Harbottle, Brigadier Michael (Ret.) former Chief of Staff, UN Peacekeeping
Force Cyprus
Mackie, Air Commodore Alistair (Ret.) former Director Air Staff Briefing
UNITED STATES
Becton, Lt. General Julius (USA) (Ret.)
Bums, Maj. General William F. (USA) (Ret.) JCS Representative, INF Negotiations
(1981-88) Special Envoy to Russia for Nuclear Weapon Dismantlement (1992-93)
Carroll, Jr., Rear Admiral Eugene J. (USN) (Ret.) Dept. Director, Center for
Defense Information
Cushman, Lt. General John H. (USA) (Ret.) Commander, I. Corps (ROK/US) Group
(Korea) 1976-78)
Galvin, General John R., Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (1987-92)
Gavler, Admiral Noel (USN) (Ret.) former Commander, Pacific
Horner, General Charles A. (USAF) Ret.) Commander, Coalition Air Forces, Desert
Storm (1991); former Commander U.S. Space Command
James, Rear Admiral Robert G, (USNR) (Ret.)
Kingston, General Robert C. (USA) (Ret.) former Commander, U.S. Central
Command
Lee, Vice Admiral John M. (USN) (Ret.)
Odom, Gen. William E. (USA) (Ret.) Director, National Security Studies, Hudson
Institute; Dep. Asst and Asst Chief of Staff for intelligence (1981-85);
Director, National Security Agency (1985-88)
O'Meara, General Andrew (USA) (Ret.) former Commander U.S. Army, Europe
Pursley, Lt. General Robert E., USAF (Ret.)
Read, Vice Admiral William L. (USN) (Ret.), former Commander, U.S. Navy Surface
Force, Atlantic Command
Rogers, General Bernard W. (USA) (Ret.), former Chief of Staff, U.S. Army,
former NATO Supreme Allied Commander (1979-87)
Seignious, II, Lt. General George M. (USA) (Ret.), former Director Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency (1978-1980)
Shanahan, Vice Admiral John J. (USN) (Ret.) Director, Center for Defense
Information
Smith, General William Y., (USAF) (Ret.) former Deputy Commander, U.S. Command
Europe Wilson, Vice Admiral James B. (CSN) (Ret.), former Polaris Submarine
Captain
Source: The Henry Stimpson Center
(back to Primary Sources)
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