Eisenhower rejected the notion of a "fortress America" isolated from the rest of the world, safe behind its nuclear shield. He believed that active U.S. engagement in world affairs was the best means of presenting the promise of democracy to nations susceptible to the encroachment of Soviet-sponsored communism. Additionally, Eisenhower maintained that dialogue between the U.S. and the Soviet Union was crucial to the security of the entire globe, even if, in the process, each side was adding to its pile of nuclear weapons.

The death of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, two months into the Eisenhower presidency, gave rise to hopes of a more flexible, accommodating Soviet leadership. In 1953, Ike delivered a speech underscoring the potential human cost of the Cold War to both sides. Hoping to strike a more conciliatory tone with Georgi Malenkov, Stalin's successor, Eisenhower suggested the Soviets cease their brazen expansion of territory and influence in exchange for American cooperation and goodwill. The Soviets responded coolly to the speech, especially to the U.S.'s insistence on free elections for German unification, self-determination for Eastern Europe, and a Korean armistice. The two sides would not meet face-to-face until the Geneva summit of 1955.

At the summit, Eisenhower asserted, "I came to Geneva because I believe mankind longs for freedom from war and the rumors of war. I came here because my lasting faith in the decent instincts and good sense of the people who populate this world of ours." In this spirit of good will, Eisenhower presented the Soviets with his Open Skies proposal. In it he proposed that each side provide full descriptions of all their military facilities and allow for aerial inspections to insure the information was correct. The Soviets rejected the proposal. Eisenhower was disappointed, but not surprised. In truth, the Open Skies proposal would have benefited the U.S. much more so than the Soviets: the Russians already knew the location of most American strategic defense facilities, it was the Americans who stood to gain new information.

On the heels of the unproductive Geneva summit, came a 1956 Soviet invasion of Hungary that strained U.S.-Soviet relations even further. In the face of such Soviet aggression, Democrats in Congress were insisting that the Eisenhower administration had allowed a "missile gap" to develop. Their accusations became more piercing in October 1957 when the Soviets launched a space satellite called Sputnik. Panicked Americans feared that a rocket that could deliver a satellite into space could as easily deliver a nuclear bomb.

Eisenhower took a measured approach to the launching of Sputnik. He refused to be swept up in the rush to increase weapons production and defense spending. His goal, he made clear, was to end what he considered a wasteful arms race, not accelerate it. To that end, Eisenhower instructed U.S. negotiators to continue working with their Soviet counterparts on an agreement to ban nuclear testing in the atmosphere. In 1959 Eisenhower and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev agreed to a September meeting in the United States to further discussions regarding a test ban and arms reductions.

Eisenhower held out great hopes for Khrushchev's U.S. visit. As he began to look toward his final year in the White House he knew time was running out on his opportunity to end the Cold War. Khrushchev's visit yielded promising results as the two sides agreed to meet again in May 1960 in Paris, a city that held fond memories for Eisenhower. But the promise of Paris would be buried in the wreckage of a downed spy plane called the U2.

Since

1956, Eisenhower had authorized the U2, an ultra-light, high-flying spy plane, to conduct secret reconnaissance missions over the Soviet Union. Ironically, Ike approved of the flights in order to obtain information that would squelch rumors of Soviet military superiority. The data gathered by the U2 might also help silence Eisenhower's critics, who were claiming that his administration had compromised U.S. security. Because the Soviets lacked the interceptor aircraft and missiles to shoot down the U2, the U.S. could always deny its existence even when it was spotted on Soviet radar. Eisenhower was never comfortable with the provocative nature of the U2 missions. In fact he admitted that he would consider a similar violation of U.S. airspace by the Soviets an act of war.

As the Paris summit approached, the cautious Eisenhower allowed one last flight -- the longest and most daring to date. On May 1, 1960, pilot Frances Gary Powers left Pakistan and started his overflight across the Soviet Union.

Hours later, Eisenhower was informed that the plane was missing. His worst fears were coming true.

A

belligerent Khrushchev announced to the world that the Soviets had shot down a "bandit" U.S. spy plane. He then went on to charge the U.S. with willfully sabotaging the upcoming Paris summit. Since no proof of pilot or plane was presented by Khrushchev, Eisenhower denied the charges, saying only that a U.S. weather plane may have accidentally strayed into Soviet air space. Days later Eisenhower was stunned to learn that the Soviets not only had the downed U2, but that they had captured the pilot. Eisenhower's denials had been revealed to be duplicitous.

Khrushchev used the downing of the U2 to present the Soviet Union as the wronged party in a game of superpower espionage. He attended the Paris summit only long enough to storm out when Ike would not apologize for the incident. No treaty was signed. Eisenhower left Paris sadly convinced that U.S.-Soviet relations had been dealt a serious setback.

Presidential Politics
The

end of World War II saw the United States defeating two enemies -- Germany and Japan -- and gaining a new one, the Soviet Union. The wartime alliance between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. had proven to be a marriage of convenience. With the ink barely dry on the treaties ending the war, the two new dominant world powers found themselves locked in a battle over the course of postwar events. The Cold War had begun.

As the relationship between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. deteriorated, the fear of a Red Menace gripped America. Such sentiments were eagerly exploited by politicians seeking to fan the flames of communist hysteria. Republican senator Joseph McCarthy was one such politician. McCarthy grabbed headlines in 1950 with his claim that he held a list of 205 State Department employees who were "known Communists." When pressed for details, he reduced the number of names on the list to fifty-seven, but still maintained his fiery demands for their expulsion.

Dwight Eisenhower found Joseph McCarthy's demagoguery reprehensible. As a military man he had been able to distance himself from petty political crusades in the name of the greater cause. But in 1952, as a first time candidate for the office of the presidency, he found it would be a good deal more difficult to maintain his political purity. When McCarthy delivered a blistering attack against former Secretary of State George C. Marshall, calling him "a man steeped in falsehood," candidate Eisenhower was faced with a dilemma. A popular member of his own party was publicly disparaging a man Ike considered a valued mentor. Eisenhower's personal and political instincts came into conflict during a campaign stop in McCarthy's home state of Wisconsin. Eisenhower was prepared to deliver a defense of Marshall, praising him "as a man and a soldier," and condemning the tactics of McCarthy as a "sobering lesson in the way freedom must not defend itself." But noble intentions gave way to political reality. Aware of McCarthy's huge base of support and not willing to risk losing votes in a crucial state, Eisenhower delivered his speech minus the defense of Marshall and the condemnation of McCarthy. It was a decision that would haunt him for the rest of his life.

McCarthy's influence did not abate after Ike had entered the White House. In an apparent effort to demonstrate that he, too, was tough on communists, Eisenhower supported legislation extending the reach of espionage and sabotage laws, and authorized the FBI to step up its efforts to infiltrate and disrupt Communist Party activities. Eisenhower refused to grant executive clemency to Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, who were convicted of spying for the Soviets, even though he admitted being "impressed with all the honest doubt" concerning the fairness of their trial. Ike allowed the execution to go forward in "the hope that it would deter others." But various news organizations, including the generally supportive Time magazine, criticized what they called the Eisenhower administration's "disgraceful episodes of appeasement" of McCarthy and his anti-communist crusade.

President

Eisenhower defended his refusal to denounce McCarthy publicly, claiming that to do so would only further polarize the nation and reward McCarthy with additional publicity. To his aides, Eisenhower vowed, "I will not get into the gutter with this guy." By the end of 1953, polls indicated that at least half of all Americans had a favorable impression of McCarthy and his tactics. Emboldened by such support, McCarthy set out to widen the scope of his investigations. This time, however, he would go too far.

When McCarthy, armed with little more than hearsay and innuendo, set out to expose communists within the U.S. Army, Eisenhower decided enough was enough. He instructed his staff to present information that would discredit McCarthy. It was revealed that McCarthy had petitioned the Army to award preferential treatment to his assistant, David Shine. Finding himself on the defensive, McCarthy demanded notes of meetings between Eisenhower administration personnel and Army officials. Eisenhower established a presidential precedent by invoking executive privilege in refusing to turn over the notes. Claiming that matters of national security might be breached if administration officials were forced to testify under oath, Eisenhower robbed McCarthy of the opportunity to perpetuate his inquisition. From that point on the Army-McCarthy hearings degenerated into a series of increasingly unfounded and paranoid accusations.

Eisenhower quietly exerted pressure on Republican senators to go forward with a censure of McCarthy. In December 1954, the Wisconsin senator was condemned for conduct unbecoming a Senator. Eisenhower had been successful in undermining McCarthy by employing "hidden-hand" tactics, but critics contended that more decisive action could have prevented many innocent people from being forever tainted by groundless charges.

Legacy
Just

prior to leading Allied troops in an invasion of North Africa in 1942, General Dwight Eisenhower made an astute observation about the nature of leadership. He wrote, "I firmly determined that my mannerisms and speech in public would always reflect cheerful certainty. Without optimism, victory is scarcely obtainable." Eisenhower would maintain this credo throughout his eight years in the White House. As an embodiment of unity and tranquillity, Ike vigorously maintained an air of optimistic dignity, regardless of the crisis at hand. There were, to be certain, instances when a positive countenance was about all he seemed to be able to offer; the crises surrounding Little Rock and the U2 incident, for example. But more often than not, the restraint and moderation he exercised was a fitting antidote to the dangerous rhetoric of those early Cold War days.

Eisenhower promoted a stable economy and fought to balance the budget. While he accepted the basic premise of the New Deal, his economic policy followed a moderate course. His two terms produced eight years of growth and relative prosperity. Nearly every indicator of economic health -- GNP, capital investments, personal savings and income -- showed substantial upswings. Additionally, Eisenhower refused to further fuel the economy with politically popular tax cuts.

Critics

have contended that Ike was too content to merely administer over the status quo, while pressing social issues, such as civil rights, cried out for attention. They described a scenario of "the bland leading the bland." But by the 1980s new research revealed an active politician behind the calm exterior. Scholars pointed to the success of Eisenhower's "hidden hand" tactics in solving problems quietly, while avoiding the pitfalls of partisan bickering that had stymied many of his predecessors.

In the arena of foreign affairs, Eisenhower was confident. His commanding, yet subdued presence on the world stage resulted in the U.S. being at peace for over seven years. He and the nation emerged from several potential international crises -- Quemoy and Matsu in 1955, Formosa in 1958, Berlin in 1959 -- without so much as losing "a soldier or a foot of ground." On keeping the peace in volatile times, Eisenhower commented, "People asked how it happened -- by God, it didn't just happen, I'll tell you that."

In

his January 17, 1961 farewell address to the nation, Eisenhower sounded a cautionary note to his fellow Americans. While taking pride in the prosperity he had helped foster, he made an appeal to reject the lure of materialism and "the impulse to live only for today, plundering, for our own ease and convenience, the precious resources of tomorrow." As he urged the nation to maintain its vigilant stand against communism, which he termed "ruthless in purpose, and insidious in method," he saved his most forceful words to warn against a force already existing within our borders. The military legend issued a stern warning against "the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex." For years he had battled forces in Congress and within his own administration over increases in defense spending. He preached eloquently about how "every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed." And he reserved a special disdain for the arms merchants who took advantage of the Cold War paranoia of the day to increase their profit margins. Eisenhower predicted that unless restraints were placed upon these un-elected factions, "the potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power" would exist.

It would take another decade and a national fissure over the Vietnam War before Eisenhower's words of caution would begin to penetrate the national psyche.