Interview Transcripts: The Bomb

2 of 8

Historian Walter LaFeber on the Atomic Bomb

The first time that Truman found out about the bomb was about 12 days after he became President. Stimson had mentioned the weapon to him before, but about April 25th, Stimson sat down and explained in some detail exactly what this weapon was all about that was being developed out in New Mexico. Truman and Stimson immediately began to see the diplomatic implications of the bomb, that the bomb would give them something that they didn't have in terms of leverage on the -- on the Soviet Union, as well as on the Japanese. The remark became common at those time that if, ah, somebody around Truman said, "If this thing works like we think it will, we'll certainly have the hammer on those boys." And I think "those boys", in this context, meant both the Japanese in terms of winding up the war, and the Soviet Union. The question became again, how do you translate this weapon in terms of diplomacy? It's a very difficult thing to do. Ah, what Truman did was try to hold off dealing with the Russians until he was certain that the bomb was going to work. And that timing seemed in to indicate that he would meet with Stalin sometime in the middle of July. He we Pot-- at Potsdam with Stalin and Churchill in, ah, July 16th to 27th.

From the time that Truman found out about the bomb from Stimson in late April of 1945, I don't think there was ever any doubt but that Truman intended to use it. The bomb had been built to use. It was built initially to use against Germany, but now that the Germans were on the edge of surrender and they were going to surrender within several weeks, it was clear that the bomb would be used to shorten the war with Japan. Roosevelt had built this bomb to be used. Truman was going to carry out Roosevelt's policy. Billions of dollars had been put in -- put into the bomb project. Truman was not going to waste that money. Ah, moreover, it was quite clear that the bomb, if it did work, if it would go off, would give Truman tremendous diplomatic leverage that would not only shorten the war, but it could be the kind of weapon that, ah, the other powers with which Truman had to deal would be in awe of. And Truman understood the -- the nature of this right from the start. Consequently, the question was never whether or not to use; the question was when to use it. Now the -- the -- the question of when to use it and how to use it in Japan, I think, had been made much easier for Truman because of the massive bombing raids that the United States had carried out over Japan during the previous months. Several of those raids, the raids on March 8th and 9th, 1945, for example, had killed 80,000 Japanese in Tokyo. It had -- it had turned glass to liquid. I mean it had been -- it had been an inferno in Tokyo and in some of the other Japanese cities, as well. In fact, things were -- were at the point in April and May of 1945 that Stimson said to Truman at one point, "I'm not sure if we can find a city that's still standing enough to show just exactly what the bomb can do." And Truman, according to Stimson's diary, laughed and said, yes, he understood. There wasn't a whole lot left standing in -- in Japan by May and June of 1945. But they did find several cities that hadn't been bombed extensively. Those cities -- the first city was, of course, Hiroshima. The second city, which was actually an alternative site for the August 9th bombing, was Nagasaki. Consequently, there was no question about whether or not Truman was going to use the bomb. The question was when and how and where?