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20/20 Hindsight
by Joseph S. Levine
On March 20, 1996 the British government announced a potential
link between "Mad Cow Disease" (or B.S.E.) and a new variant
of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (or C.J.D.). The impact on the
cattle industry was immediate and profound; the British beef
market fell by 30 percent within two days. In the Middle East
consumption fell by more than 80 percent.
Yet it's possible that if the announcement had been made
earlier, at least 20 people could have avoided falling prey to
a slow-acting, insidious, and ultimately fatal disease.
Even more frighteningly, it is possible that hundreds, even
thousands, of people who ate British beef products during the
previous decade are also infected. Mass media and critics of
the government demanded to know why more wasn't done to
protect public health.
Unfortunately, hindsight in science, as in life, is nearly
always 20:20, and can be self-righteously omniscient and
rational. Foresight in the face of uncertainty, on the other
hand, is often myopic, subjective, and fraught with bias. If
scientific knowledge could leap predictably and confidently
from one paradigm to another, the situation would be less
complicated. But in the real world, science often progresses
rather more hesitantly and tentatively. The translation of
newly emerging scientific findings—with their
accompanying uncertainty—into recommendations that have
profound effects on individuals, on public health, and on
large industries is no simple matter.
At what point does slowly accumulating and often incomplete
scientific information justify major new public policy
initiatives? In any situation, there are inevitably two sides
to each issue, and numerous difficult decisions to be made.
Should government regulations enforce intensive (read:
expensive) precautions to provide the greatest possible
protection to the maximum number of people—with no
regard to cost? Or should regulatory agencies restrict their
actions to more lenient directives that incur minor calculated
risks to public health—while keeping corporate profits
up and consumer prices down?
When policy decisions can protect public health with little or
no economic impact, barriers to making such decisions are
minimal. But when the first cases of B.S.E. emerged in Britain
during the 1980's, the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and
Food (M.A.F.F.) realized that any statements it made
concerning the safety of British beef products would
profoundly affect an industry that was worth roughly four
billion pounds each year (approximately $6,497,000,000) and
which employed somewhere in the vicinity of 136,000 people.
Did this peculiar new affliction of cows present a real threat
to humans? Did it even present a serious threat to cattle
herds?
No one yet knew for certain what caused B.S.E., or how it was
transmitted. In February, 1989, a M.A.F.F. committee headed by
Sir Richard Southwood of Oxford University made what seemed at
the time to be a reasonable judgment. The committee supposed
(although it did not know for certain) that the infectious
agent responsible for B.S.E. was the same as the cause of
scrapie in sheep. It knew that scrapie had been present in
British sheep for at least 200 years without ever crossing
over into humans—or any other animal species, for that
matter. Based on its interpretation of data available at that
time, the commission issued an opinion that it would be "most
unlikely that B.S.E. will have any implications for human
health." In the committee's judgment, the species barrier
between ruminant animals (cud-chewers such as cows, sheep and
goats) and humans would protect us from infection. That
judgment—along with modest estimates of the number of
British cattle likely to be infected over time—proved to
be tragically, disastrously wrong.
With acute hindsight, recent critics have been quick to
condemn M.A.F.F. and its committee as grossly uninformed
and/or overly beholden to business interests at the expense of
public health. (See, for example, the excellent New Yorker
article cited in
Resources.)
But, for better and for worse, conservative judgments of the
sort made by M.A.F.F. in this case are the rule rather than
the exception in situations where radical new discoveries are
in the offing and new models of living systems are still an
elusive, moving target.
By curious coincidence, the mid 1980's was also the time when
fierce battles were raging in the United States over public
health recommendations related to another mysterious new
disease. AIDS had appeared and had clearly begun to spread.
But its causative agent had not yet been positively
identified, and its modes of transmission were still under
dispute. Frontline researchers had already convinced
themselves that AIDS could be carried in blood and blood
products; they were fighting an uphill battle (largely behind
closed doors) to convince operators of major blood banks that
new, more stringent (and more expensive) precautions were
needed to protect the blood supply.
There again, a series of conservative decisions proved
tragically wrong. Procedures to screen donated and purchased
blood were not put in place until it was too late—and
thousands of units of HIV-contaminated blood and clotting
factor had infected unwitting patients and hemophiliacs.
Environmental change and invisible enemies
The emergence of new diseases such as HIV and B.S.E. may have
been unheard of in recent decades, but it is no longer a
surprise to organizations like the World Health Organization
and the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta. Our species
has been responsible for extensive environmental change since
the dawn
of civilization. That in and of itself is not necessarily a
bad thing. But the change human activity is now causing in
local and global environments, in the way we obtain our food,
and in the ways in which members of our species interact with
one another all expose us to new and previously unexpected
risks from disease-causing organisms. Here's why.
We as a species have enough trouble recognizing the effects of
our activities on organisms large enough for us to see:
whales, redwoods, owls, and the like. Not surprisingly, we
(and, until recently, this "we" has meant scientists as well)
have long remained oblivious to the effects of our actions on
the environments experienced by our invisible enemies:
bacteria, viruses, and other parasites. We don't always
understand the ways in which those microorganisms interact
with us, with the plants and animals we raise for food, and
with each other. Unfortunately, that lack of knowledge can
prove fatal.
Once again, AIDS is an obvious example of how social and
environmental change can lead to the emergence and spread of a
deadly new disease. In the case of HIV, encroachment of human
populations on previously remote African environments, social
upheaval and migrations of human populations across Africa,
extensive international travel for business and recreation,
and changes in sexual behaviors among both heterosexuals and
homosexuals around the world have all dramatically changed the
"environment" for human diseases—and worked together to
unleash the AIDS epidemic. More local versions of the story
include such frightening cautionary tales as Ebola Fever
which, luckily for the rest of the world, remained localized
in a small area of Africa. Other examples waiting in the wings
include diseases such as Dengue Fever and Yellow Fever;
tropical mosquitoes which carry diseases are slowly moving
north into the continental United States and other "temperate"
countries as an ecological consequence of steadily rising
average temperatures in the Northern Hemisphere.
The story of Mad Cow disease provides a fascinating, if
frightening, new example of how an apparently innocuous
human-caused change in the food chain resulted in the
transmission of a new disease to humans. Ever since ruminant
animals such as cows and sheep evolved their modern anatomy
and physiology, they have lived by eating plants, largely
grasses. As these animals evolved, they also co-evolved with
their own particular assortment of parasites and diseases,
just as humans have. Some parasites whose primary targets are
grazing animals (certain forms of sleeping sickness, for
example) can infect several different ruminant species as well
as humans. Many more parasites are
restricted to a single primary host, and "jump" to new species
very rarely, if at all. Generally, these sorts of
host-parasite relationships remain fairly stable—unless
and until a major environmental or ecological change comes
along.
Human societies around the world have recognized this
stability, and have responded to it in various ways. Old
Testament dietary laws concerning the eating of meat, for
example, require (among other things) that animals chew their
cud. Carnivores and scavengers were declared "unclean."
Cows and sheep remained plant eaters throughout human
history—until the advent of certain modern agricultural
practices. Not all that long ago, farmers began feeding cows
and sheep with dietary supplements containing rendered body
parts of other cows and sheep. This dramatic change in the
domestic animal food chain effectively turned both sheep and
cows into partial carnivores (if not cannibals). While
rendered animal-part supplements provided additional protein
that encouraged more rapid growth of cows, they also opened a
completely new series of doors through which the infectious
agent of T.S.E could first cross from sheep into cattle, then
sweep through cattle herds with extraordinary speed and
efficiency, and finally jump another species barrier into
humans.
Once again, 20:20 hindsight in this case is trivially easy.
The important question is whether or not we have our eyes open
for other, new, unexpected, and potentially lethal threats to
public health that may be brewing in other parts of our food
supply.
Joe Levine is a biologist, educator, and science
journalist. He is the author of six books and numerous
articles on scientific subjects, and the co-author (with
Kenneth Miller) of two widely acclaimed biology textbooks
for high school and college students.
Photos: (1) Reuters/Dave McHugh/Gloucestershire
Echo/Archive Photos; (2) Visuals Unlimited/©SIU; (3)
Visuals Unlimited/©Walt Anderson.
When Science Faces the Unknown
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