tehranbureau An independent source of news on Iran and the Iranian diaspora
nextback

Revolutionary Guards Criticize Ahmadinejad

by ALIREZA NADER

05 Nov 2010 10:131 Comment
AhmjadIRGC.jpgCore of president's power base increasingly in question.

[ comment ] Recent criticism of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the Revolutionary Guards' publication Payam-e Enghelab (Message of the Revolution) is in some ways unprecedented. Yet it is also not completely surprising. Ahmadinejad, who has been opposed by the reformists and the pragmatic conservatives, is increasingly viewed as a divisive figure even within the principlist (fundamentalist) camp. And it appears that his support base within the Guards is no longer assured.

More importantly, the criticism highlights two key, but possibly incompatible, trends in Iranian politics: the growing role of the Guards as the Islamic Republic's ultimate powerbroker and the deep and dangerous divisions within the political system, including within the Guards.

Ahmadinejad has come under a lot of criticism from the principlist camp in recent months. His reelection, which entailed purging the reformists and pragmatic conservatives from the political system, is nevertheless seen by some principlists as weakening the system in the long run by redefining the rules of Iranian politics.

Ahmadinejad's attempt to purge political opponents has not been limited to key figures such as former Prime Minister Mir Hussein Mousavi and former President Mohammad Khatami. He has also targeted principlists such as Ali Larijani, current speaker of the Majles (parliament) and trusted advisor to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Ahmadinejad's claim that the executive branch supersedes the legislature is viewed as an attempt to sidestep principlist figures who pose a threat to his authority.

The Islamic Republic, though hardly a liberal democracy, has been traditionally defined by a system of checks and balances that includes institutional and factional competition. It is one thing to sidestep reformists who constitute a threat to the "ideals" of the Islamic Republic. But marginalization of a respected fundamentalist and former Guard member such as Larijani is an entirely different matter.

The protection of the regime's ideals, and indeed its very existence, has fallen to the Revolutionary Guards. The Guards ensured the principlist domination of the political system through their support of Ahmadinejad in the 2005 and 2009 presidential elections, with Khamenei's approval. But the force is also demonstrating that it is willing and able to rein him in, especially if he threatens regime interests.

Ahmadienjad's attempt to monopolize government authority is one reason for airing criticism in public. Another is his poor economic and foreign policy performance. The effects of U.S. and U.N. sanctions on the Iranian economy appear to have raised the ire of important Guard figures.

For the Revolutionary Guards, a policy of "resistance" against the United States is ideal even if it entails costs, but it has to produce tangible benefits for the regime's military elite. The U.N. sanctions and Iran's loss of support from key partners such as Russia have been interpreted as failures not mitigated by Ahmadinejad's recent "triumphant" tour of southern Lebanon.

The Guards may have become Iran's most powerful economic and political actor, but the force also appears to be dangerously divided. Some members support Ahmadinejad; others support Mousavi or principlist politicians, such as Larijani and Tehran Mayor Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf.

Indeed, the regime's greatest source of weakness is not Ahmadinejad. Its main vulnerability is its inability to achieve consensus and act decisively. As a result, the Guards' role as interpreter and enforcer of the regime's interests may be secure for now, but it is hardly guaranteed.

Alireza Nader, an international policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, is coauthor of "Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads: An Exploration of Iranian Leadership Dynamics." This article is presented by Tehran Bureau, the U.S. Institute of Peace, and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars as part of the Iran project at iranprimer.usip.org.

Related reading by Alireza Nader | The Revolutionary Guards

SHAREtwitterfacebookSTUMBLEUPONbalatarin reddit digg del.icio.us

1 Comment

The IRGC occupies the same place basically, after the rigged election, that the KGB did during the Soviet period. They both have the inside knowledge that the system is broken and a stake in keeping it together somehow. If they become inactive as the KGB did during the Gorbachev years the whole edifice will come crashing down. I doubt if there is any branch of the gov't that can rein them in, the SL included. Most KGB personnel ultimately chose business over the business of repression but the Guards are trying to embody both and there is the added ingredient of (pseudo)religion involved.

pirooz / November 9, 2010 12:39 AM