a NewsHour with Jim Lehrer Transcript
Online NewsHour Online Focus
SUPREME COURT: BUTTERWORTH ARGUMENTS

December 1, 2000

The nine justices of the U.S. Supreme Court heard arguments in a legal challenge of Florida's election recounts by George W. Bush's campaign.

The following are oral arguments by Paul Hancock, lawyer for Florida Attorney General Bob Butterworth.

realaudio

 
NewsHour Links

Supreme Court Hearing:
Gov. Bush arguments

Florida Sec. of State Harris arguments

Florida Atty. General Butterworth arguments

Vice President Gore arguments

Final Bush arguments

Online NewsHour Special Report:
Election 2000

Nov. 30, 2000:
Debating cameras in the Supreme Court.

Nov. 30, 2000:
Florida legislators consider choosing electors.

Nov. 29, 2000:
The ongoing Florida legal battles.

Nov. 28, 2000:
The campaigns file briefs for the Supreme Court hearing.

Nov. 28, 2000:
Regional commentators talk about the election.

Nov. 27, 2000:
Sen. Joe Lieberman discusses his campaign's legal case.

Nov. 27, 2000:
GOP Gov. Marc Racicot addresses the Gore challenge.

Nov. 27, 2000:
Shields and Brooks look at politics after certification.

Nov. 24, 2000:
Shields and Gigot discuss the political landscape in Florida.

Nov. 22, 2000:
Legal Experts discuss the Florida Supreme Court ruling.

Nov. 22, 2000:
Shields & Gigot assess the political ramifications of the Florida Supreme Court decision.

Nov. 21, 2000:
Editorial writers from across the country discuss Florida.

Nov. 20, 2000:
The Florida Supreme Court hearing.

Nov. 20, 2000:
Journalists Brooks, Broder and Oliphant discuss Florida.

Nov. 17, 2000:
The Florida Supreme Court halts the vote certification.

Nov. 16, 2000:
Four senators discuss this year's election.

Nov. 15, 2000:
Foreign nations and markets react to the U.S. election deadlock.

Nov. 15, 2000:
Cultural scholars assess the election deadlock.

Browse the NewsHour coverage of Politics & Campaigns and Law.

 

 

Especially for Students: The ongoing legal battles of election 2000

 

Outside Links

U.S. Supreme Court

 

MR. HANCOCK: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the court: In accordance with Article II of the United States Constitution, the Florida legislature has directed the manner of selecting presidential electors in Florida. That manner is pursuant to a popular vote that's implemented pursuant to the general election laws of the state of Florida.

JUSTICE O'CONNOR: I guess Article II permits the legislature in general to make a choice, it could itself select the electors.

MR. HANCOCK: Yes, Justice O'Connor, we agree with that. In implementing the election law, each branch of the Florida government plays a role. For example, the judiciary -- the executive branch of our government has not found itself bound by the technical -- hypertechnical requirements of the election law. An example of that is that the executive branch has implemented a rule, not a law, but a rule that allows absentee ballots from overseas military voters to be received up to 10 days after the close of the polls.

Under the law of the state of Florida, all absentee ballots have to be received by the time the polls close on Election Day.

JUSTICE KENNEDY: In your brief, you say you conclude that the Florida Supreme Court, like -- I think it's at page 12 -- like any state court, exercises inherent equitable powers to remedy a threat to fundamental constitutional rights. And it rewrote the certification deadlines according to that power, did it not?

MR. HANCOCK: The only -- yes, Justice Kennedy. The only equitable power exercised by the court was setting the deadline.

JUSTICE KENNEDY: Isn't that such an amorphous, general, abstract standard that it can't possibly be said to be a law that was enacted and in place at the time of the election?

MR. HANCOCK: No, the laws were enacted well before the election. What happened was --

JUSTICE KENNEDY: Of course the Constitution is there before the election, the due process clause before the election. But what we're talking about is having laws of sufficient specificity and stability that people can rely on them in advance and not have them changed after the fact. And your briefs make it very clear that they exercised their equitable powers to remedy a threat to fundamental constitutional rights and changed the deadline accordingly. It seems to me that's no -- it's an enviable standard, something we probably all agreed with in the end, but so far as the requisite specificity to satisfy 3 USC Section 5, I just don't see that it's there.

MR. HANCOCK: The court had to do something, Justice Kennedy. It was faced with conflicts in Florida law. They had conflicting opinions from the Florida attorney general as to the meaning of the law and the secretary of state as to the meaning of the law. As a result --

JUSTICE KENNEDY: Maybe it had to do something, but did it comply with 3 USC Section 5?

MR. HANCOCK: I submit, Justice Kennedy, that 3 USC Section 5 doesn't require the state to do anything. It merely says --

JUSTICE KENNEDY: Did it comply with that part of 3 USC Section 5 that requires that laws be enacted and in place prior to the election in order to get the safe harbor?

MR. HANCOCK: Yes, it did. The laws were in place before the election, and those laws granted to the judiciary the --

A dramatic change

JUSTICE O'CONNOR: Well, but certainly the date changed. That is a dramatic change. The date for certification. Right?

MR. HANCOCK: Yes.

JUSTICE O'CONNOR: And it was done by the court.

MR. HANCOCK: Yes, it was done --

JUSTICE O'CONNOR: And the legislature had very clearly said, you know, seven days after, that's the date. And it just does look like a very dramatic change made by the Florida court. And I'm wondering if that is consistent in fact with the notion expressed, at least, in Section 5, so that the result would be if it did go to Congress it would be a change.

MR. HANCOCK: I agree that the date was implemented pursuant to the court's equitable powers. Other than that, it was a routine exercise in statutory construction. The court was faced with a situation, first of all, where because of conflicting advice, the counties had started and then stopped conducting manual recounts because of advice from the secretary of the state, which the supreme court ultimately concluded to be erroneous.

JUSTICE SCALIA: Yes, and that advice was -- and this was really the beginning of all of the problem -- her advice was that the provision providing for recounts, manual recounts, not requiring them, but giving them as one of the options, only came into play when there was some defect in the machinery and it was not available for voter error, that is for voters who didn't punch the cards the way they were supposed to. And the attorney -- your office came out with the opposite conclusion.

The secretary's brief contends that that had always been the rule in Florida. Is that the case? Do you know of any -- any other elections in Florida in which recounts were conducted, manual recounts, because of allegation that some voters did not punch the cards the way they should have, therefore -- no problem with the machinery, it's working fine, but, you know, there were -- what? -- pregnant chads, hanging chads, so forth?

MR. HANCOCK: No, Justice --

JUSTICE SCALIA: Did it ever happen before --

MR. HANCOCK: I'm not aware of it ever happening before. But I can say that the Supreme Court of Florida, for 100 years, has put a duty on election officials to discern the intent of the voter. And while the secretary of the state refers to it as "voter error," when the ballot is punched, that's -- under the laws of the state of Florida, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, that voter has cast a ballot, even if the chad did not completely fall off the ballot.

JUSTICE KENNEDY: Is it your position that any interpretation the Supreme Court of Florida makes to implement the will of the people is never a new law?

MR. HANCOCK: That -- the Supreme -- yes -- I can't say "ever", but I'd say on the case before the court, all that was before the court was ordinary statutory construction which must be -- the result of it, whether this court would agree with it or disagree with it, must be respected by this court. That's the very foundation of
federalism.

JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Hancock, are you relying on the Florida Supreme Court statement, at least twice in its opinion -- now I looked at the page to which Mr. Klock referred me, 37-A; it says for the second time that section -- the section governing manual recounts appears to conflict with the sections that set a deadline. And it's reconciling that conflict.

MR. HANCOCK: Yes, that's --

A mission

JUSTICE GINSBURG: Whether it was wrong or right, that's what it said its mission was, and that's what it did.

MR. HANCOCK: Yes. In -- both in words and in operation, the statutes could not work together, because of the time for requesting manual recount, the extent of the job of manual recounting --

JUSTICE SCALIA: What is the section that requires manual recounts?

MR. HANCOCK: It's 102. -- well, 102.166 authorizes manual recounts.

JUSTICE SCALIA: That's different from requiring.

MR. HANCOCK: Yes, but once it starts, Justice Scalia, once it's authorized, if the initial sample recount shows an error that might affect the outcome of the election --

JUSTICE SCALIA: Then --

MR. HANCOCK: -- the board is then required to, among other things, conduct a full manual recount.

JUSTICE SCALIA: No, it's required to do one of three things --

MR. HANCOCK: Right.

JUSTICE SCALIA: -- one of which could be a manual recount.

MR. HANCOCK: Yes.

JUSTICE SCALIA: But it could decide to do one of the other two instead.

MR. HANCOCK: Yes. The problem faced by the counties --

JUSTICE SCALIA: So there is -- I mean, the court says that there's a requirement of a manual recount, but I don't see anything in the text of the statute that requires a manual recount.

MR. HANCOCK: The statute requires that the election officials attempt to discern the cause of the error. Here the cause of the error was that -- in these counties was that the machines were not able to read ballots. Ten thousand ballots in Palm Beach County the machine did not read as including a vote for president. That was the issue, so that the solution to that was not -- the machines, even when they're operating properly, would not read these ballots. So the -- what was left to the county canvassing boards, then, was to do the full manual recount. And the language of that statute, again, says they shall do a full manual recount in those circumstances.

JUSTICE SCALIA: Mr. Hancock --

JUSTICE O'CONNOR: Well, it says that the board may authorize the manual recount. It doesn't require it.

MR. HANCOCK: No, that --

Counting teams

JUSTICE O'CONNOR: But if it does authorize it, then it tells it how to do it and says they shall appoint as many counting teams as necessary -- presumably as necessary to do it within the time limit.

MR. HANCOCK: Yes, Justice O'Connor. But again, these -- under the law, these requests can be made up to the time of canvassing. That means up to six or seven days. And also, even in -- the number of ballots at issue here are between 650,000 in Palm Beach County and also 900,000 -- up to 900,000 in Broward County. It's --

JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, if that is a statutory problem, the court's resolution didn't really solve it, did it? Because even with her extended time period, the same statutory problem exists; there still isn't enough time, under the extended deadlines, for some of these counties that have an enormous number of votes to conduct a manual recount. Isn't that right?

MR. HANCOCK: Well, let me --

JUSTICE SCALIA: I mean, to resolve a supposed conflict in the statute in a manner that leaves in place the same problem that existed before seems to me not a real resolution of the statutory problem.

MR. HANCOCK: Well, the supreme court tried to blend it all together to make it work, Justice Scalia. And again, it came up with a solution it -- the secretary of state's argument here is based on -- the secretary of state herself recognized that she had the discretion under Florida law to accept returns filed outside of that seven-day deadline. A breakdown of the machines, in her view, would justify late returns. A failure of the machines to read ballots would not justify late-filed returns. The supreme court said that the legal standard she was using was wrong. That -- we submit that that decision of the supreme court is the law in the state of Florida --

JUSTICE REHNQUIST: I'm going to extend your time two minutes, Mr. Hancock, because you haven't had a chance to say a lot yet.

MR. HANCOCK: Well, I will -- I don't need the extension time, Your Honor. If there are no further questions, I will stop. Thank you.