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David Axelrod

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David Axelrod

Political Adviser and Commentator

David Axelrod served as a campaign strategist and political adviser to President Barack Obama. He is currently the director of the Institute of Politics at The University of Chicago and a political commentator for CNN.

The following interview was conducted by FRONTLINE’s Michael Kirk on Nov. 4, 2021. It has been edited for clarity and length.

This interview appears in:

Pelosi’s Power

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Pelosi’s Early Life

So, when did you first hear of Nancy Pelosi?What was her reputation at the time?

Of course I had heard of Pelosi, as someone who is a journalist covering politics, very early.I mean, she was a figure in California politics, chairman of the state party out there, very close to Jerry Brown and others.And then she went to Congress in the late '80s, and very quickly you heard her name mentioned quite a bit as someone with a future.

But I really didn't get to know her very well until I was in the White House with President Obama.

Do you know her well enough to know how—you certainly would know about Baltimore and Baltimore politics.Tell me a little bit about how that may have formed some part of her.

I think the greatest mistake people make about Nancy Pelosi is that they think of her—the people who don't know her, at least in the past, thought of her as kind of a dilettante from California: a wealthy, liberal San Franciscan.She is not that.I mean, that is an element of her biography, but she is completely formed by her experiences as the daughter of a ward boss and mayor of Baltimore.

And I had this discussion with her.I've done three podcasts with her, and I asked her once, "What did you learn from your father?"She didn't hesitate; she said, "I learned how to count," OK?"And I learned that 'I hear ya' isn't a yes.'OK' isn't a yes.Only 'yes' is yes."She has the sensibilities of an old-time ward leader, and that appealed to me greatly, because I've spent a lot of my life in Chicago, covering ward politics for Chicago, and I have a great reverence for people who do politics on a granular level like that.

So that's, you know, she has—she has, I think, deep convictions about what government should do and be.She's obviously a person of great faith, and those beliefs help formulate her thinking.But when it comes to politics, she was trained at the ward level about how to count votes, how to get votes and how to produce a result.

… Her mom kept what was called the "favor file," and she worked with her mom on the favor file.People would file in from all over the city, with "I need a favor; I need something," and then they would write on a yellow slip of paper what it was and who they were, and they would call those favors in later on.I'll bet you—I haven't asked her yet, but I'll bet she has a favor file right now, and you can only imagine how big it is.

Oh, there's no doubt, you know.Nancy is someone who you can call at the busiest moments, and she will file away your concern, and she will call you back and say, "I've looked into this."And she may call you back at 11 o'clock at night. You know,she may call you back early in the morning.But she never forgets.And that is a—those are habits formed in the politics of Baltimore, in the ward politics of Baltimore.

Old-style city politics was all about the symbiotic relationship between officeholder and constituent, officeholders doing things for their constituents and asking their constituents for their support.And that relationship is fundamental to how that politics worked, and it's how she approaches her politics.

Yeah, because she doesn't have a city now.She certainly has San Francisco, her district, but she has a caucus that's a city, in lots of ways.

No doubt.

And a fractured caucus, and that's how she's running it.

That's a great—that's a wonderful observation, because the thing that you know when you work with Pelosi is that she has a very, very precise understanding of every member of her caucus, of what's important to them, what drives their districts, of their donors, every element of their politics she's aware of, and particularly the things that are most important to them.And those are really important data points when you're trying to move people on a particular piece of legislation.She is a maestro at manipulating all of these different data points to bring about 218 votes or, you know, whatever number she needs to get a particular piece of legislation passed.

Pelosi’s Rise to Power

David, how did she fit in the Washington of the 1990s and 2000s?Things were—howdid she rise in Washington, do you think?

Well, I think she rose through steely resolve and acumen.There's no doubt that, as women became a more important part of American politics, and, you know, '92 was a big year for women, after the Clarence Thomas nomination to the Supreme Court, and there was, you know, there was a much greater interest, particularly in Democratic politics, Democratic Party politics, to elevate women, as women were becoming more numerous in the councils of government.And so she, you know—I'm sure that that helped.

But Pelosi fundamentally is such a disciplined and canny operator—and I mean "operator" in a positive sense—that any legislative leader would recognize that, as she recognizes talent in her own caucus today, and would want to elevate her, because they know she could get things done.

You know, she was on the Appropriations Committee.You put people on the Appropriations Committee who you know can handle the, you know, myriad interests, requests, pressures, and come to a good result and get things done.You know, you see a lot of leaders arise from among the appropriators.

But, you know, she got there because of all the habits and all of the skills and all of the discipline that we now see today.

A Partisan Fighter

Things in that period in Washington, as I look back, or even as I remember it, things were increasingly divided.Eric Cantor told us yesterday that she was a partisan fighter, somebody who understands—who understood that the parties were moving apart.Do you agree of that characterization of who she was?

Well, there's no doubt that she's a partisan fighter.She grew up in a Democratic household and the, you know, sort of fulcrum of that.California was a battleground in the '70s, when she was a party leader there.Remember, Ronald Reagan was the governor of California in the early '70s.And so it was a very competitive state.

And, you know, I think she is a partisan, but a partisan in the best sense of the word, because I think she believes in some fundamental principles that she associates with the Democratic Party, and she disagrees with fundamental principles that she associates with the Republican Party.So to me, she's always been a great mix of practical partisan fighter and idealist.And there are principles for which she is in this business.It's not just about whether the blue team wins; it's why.

And that's what I've always appreciated about her.She's not—there are plenty of people in Congress who are very good at politics, but they don't necessarily appreciate why they're in the business or why they should be.She sees it as a vehicle to do good things, to try and help people.And, you know, she's always willing to compromise, because compromise is part of the process.She understands that you can only get what you can get, and you try and get as much as you can get.She's as sharp-elbowed as anyone in taking out people who are challenging her, and certainly people on the other side who are equally fierce.

But it isn't just for the acquisition of power.That, to me, seems less interesting to her than how you use it.

Pelosi and Bush

So she becomes whip; she decides to take on [President] George [W.] Bush about the war.This is a forward stance at the time.Yes, it was tending in that direction, but there she was, going right out front and trying to take the Democrats with her, talking about troops dying, and she's accused of being a sympathizer or a traitor or whatever.Certainly the GOP goes after her.What's her strategy there, David, in 2005-2006?

Well, I'd say a few things.One is, you know, that is partly informed, I'm sure, by her district and the politics of her district.That's one element of it.She also was on the Intelligence Committee and probably saw a lot of the data that many others didn't that helped inform and inflame her thinking about the nature of that war.And it was very clear that the war was going to become a line of demarcation.

And let's be clear.I can't exactly remember.I don't know what year it was, but Karl Rove spoke to the Republican National Committee, and he said that Americans would rally behind the president because of the war, and that was an advantage to the Republican Party.So no one should get on their high horse about politicization of the war.

But I think she fundamentally thought the war was a mistake, was going poorly and wasn't going to end well.But she also, I'm sure, saw that this was going to divide the country, and it was better for the Democratic Party to be on the right side of that issue, which was in opposition.

Do you think Iraq laid the groundwork for Obama to win?

I don't think there's any question that if Barack Obama had not taken an early position as a candidate for the U.S. Senate in Illinois, when most other Democrats and Republicans were supportive of the authorization for the use of force in Iraq, if he had not taken that position, I don't think he would have been elected president of the United States.The thing that distinguished Barack Obama from most of the other major candidates for president is that most of the other major candidates for president had voted for the war in Iraq, and he had spoken out against it.

So, you know, Iraq was fundamental to the politics of the 2000s.

The Financial Crisis

… There is an important bipartisan moment in her rise to the top of her career, which is the TARP [Troubled Assets Relief Program] bipartisan bill.Society's crashing.She gets together with the GOP.She and Bush aren't talking, but then suddenly she knows she has to talk to him.[Secretary of the Treasury Henry] Paulson is talking to her almost every day.It crashes; it fails.We all remember that scene with the stock market sinking, people yelling, "The bill failed; the bill failed."She says—we have lots of people who say they've talked to her, and she says that that was [House Minority Leader John] Boehner's failure.His failure to bring that caucus along was a turning point, from her point of view, about how she approached Republicans, and how she was going to …

Well, I do know something about this, because Barack Obama was running for president in the fall of 2008, and we had a strategy meeting, and I can tell you the exact date, for a reason that will be apparent in a second.On September 14th of 2008, we had a strategy meeting at my office, because [John] McCain had named Sarah Palin as his vice presidential running mate, and they were making a little surge, and we had a strategic meeting to talk about it.Senator Obama asked to attend the meeting, which he normally would not, and at the end—and he was very pensive during the whole meeting.

At the end of it, he said: "I spoke to Hank Paulson last night.Something's going to happen overnight.I can't share it with you, but it's going to have a really big economic impact, negative.And I told him that we would be as helpful as we could to try and deal with it."And he cautioned us not to—he said: "Sometimes good government really is good politics, and we've got to try and be helpful here.I don't want to go awry here."And it turned out the next day that Lehman Brothers collapsed.

The following week, you know, Congress was trying to put together this TARP legislation to right the stock market as it plummeted.President Bush called Obama.We were in the middle of debate prep down in Florida, and he said, "McCain has asked for a meeting at the White House with you and the legislative leaders to talk about this."

They went up to the White House, and there was this very strange meeting, where McCain really didn't have that much to say; even though Senator McCain called the meeting, he didn't have that much to say about where he wanted to go.But what became apparent in that meeting was—and Obama was designated by Pelosi and others to speak for Democrats—that the House Republicans were not on board with the TARP legislation that the Republican president was offering.And Obama was sort of stunned by this, as were all the leaders, and he said, "Well, I guess we can start all over again."And the only thing Bush said in that meeting was, "We're not starting all over again."

And they adjourned, and Hank Paulson found where the Democrats were huddled, got down on one knee and begged Pelosi not to walk away from the TARP.And in fact, it was Democrats who provided the votes that were necessary to pass the TARP.

And it was a big bipartisan moment.It was a historic moment in the Senate—

I'm sorry to interrupt you, David. Go ahead.

No, please.

The thing that galls her is, she made her caucus, her Democrats, pay for bailing out the billionaire bankers and banks on Wall Street.She said, "If I would have known these guys were so soft on this, I would have asked for more in the bill that protected us from"—what eventually you and I will talk about—"the long-term consequences of the TARP vote," right?I mean, I wonder about how much this affected her or reinforced her understanding of the GOP.

Well, I think there's another element of this, and I'm sure that this entered into her thinking, as well.So Obama, Pelosi and the Democrats supported President Bush—even as Republicans in the House caucus walked away—and helped pass the TARP.Three months later, when we were in the full throes of the Great Recession that was caused by the collapse on Wall Street, President Obama was trying to put together a recovery act to steady the economy and prevent a second Great Depression, and the Republicans in the House and Senate walked away from him.

And so, you know, that was a sobering moment for Obama and probably an enraging moment for Pelosi, having produced the support for President Bush and the TARP just a few months earlier.

Let's step back to 10,000 feet for a second, David, and talk about the consequences of the TARP vote.Where the Democrats, it seems like, owned it, had to own it; it was forced on them to own it.I'm thinking about the Tea Party, Occupy Wall Street.How far-reaching were the consequences on American politics over the decades?

We were concerned during the presidential race that McCain, that John McCain would turn on the TARP bill and that he would wage a kind of populist revolt to it.He did the responsible thing, to his credit, and did not, because the truth was, if the financial system collapsed, we would be in a second Great Depression.

But we understood that bailing out Wall Street was not a popular position, and, you know, once we were in the teeth of the recession, there were millions and millions, millions of Americans who felt like: "I'm not getting a bailout.Why are the guys who are responsible getting a bailout?Why are these wealthy people getting a bailout?"And it was very, very politically burdensome.It was irksome to people.It was angering to people.And it was some of the fuel behind the Tea Party movement.I'd argue that race and culture and a lot of other things entered into it, but there was a populist furor about what Wall Street had done to the country and how little a price they had to pay for it.

What are the consequences for her?That happens; Democrats are tagged with it.What does Nancy Pelosi tell herself, looking to the future, do you think?Or how does this change what she does?

She had been restored as speaker in 2006.Her majorities were extended in 2008.But I think everyone recognized—I certainly did, and I spoke to President Obama about it—that 2010 was going to be a bloodbath for Democrats.And the reason I felt that was because economists told us it's going to take years and years to recover from this recession.That's the way it works with financially induced recessions.They don't—there's not a V-shaped recovery.So people are not going to really feel the recovery by 2010.

That alone, and the fact that we were holding a lot of seats that we took in Republican territory, said to me we were going to have a tough election in 2010.Pelosi obviously understood that.I mean, she's as shrewd as there is, and I'm sure she was being told that.

I think what it did do was, it probably fueled her ambitions to get as much done in those first two years of the Obama presidency as possible, out of fear that you—he wouldn't have the opportunity after 2010. They wouldn't have the opportunity. And also the idea that, you know, if they got a lot done, that it might reduce the chances of big losses in 2010.

So she was very eager to—Obama laid out a very ambitious agenda for the first two years of his presidency, and Pelosi was more than a willing partner.

This is a phrase that we hear today: Go big and go fast.

Yeah.No, I mean, look, I said today to someone that Democrats are treating this reconciliation bill that she's trying to pass as the last plane out of Kabul, you know.They want to get their priorities on, because they think this is going to be the last chance for a while.

Pelosi, Obama and the Affordable Care Act

This brings us to ACA, with which you're very familiar.

Yes.

A lot of people we've talked to say there was a—that there is, in the territory of that, in the high story of that, a real difference of opinion between Pelosi and Obama about politics and bipartisanship in Washington.She was, you know: "We've got a supermajority. Let's just go for it. Forget them." And Obama, being Obama, was not there.He was much more interested in—the way the story goes—getting Republican participation on things, stimulus and other things.Talk a little bit about: Did you perceive the difference?Did it manifest itself in anything, in those early days?

Well, look, I am sure that Speaker Pelosi was frustrated at the pace of the Senate deliberations on the Affordable Care Act.And at the same time, Senator [Harry] Reid [D-Nev.] and Max Baucus [D-Mont.], who was chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, were urging Obama to wait and work on getting Republicans.And they—you know, Baucus was absolutely convinced that he could bring some Republicans along.

And out of deference to them, and also the notion that a, we had run on the idea of forging better cooperation between the parties, and b, that major social legislation tends to fare better if it's done on a bipartisan basis, we gave it a chance.In retrospect, you know, we did wait too long.Pelosi was probably right.She was a realist about what was likely to happen, based on her experience and what she had viewed.

But remember, she also had spent the last 30 years or—well, at that point, less, but—in the hothouse of Washington politics, as it became more and more and more partisan.So her expectations were low.The country's expectations may have been higher.But there's no doubt that there was—there was tension, because the House was ready to go, and the Senate was diddling, and, you know, ultimately that supermajority in the Senate did pass a bill.And then we didn't have a supermajority anymore, very quickly, because [Senator] Ted Kennedy [D-Mass.] died, and the Republicans won his seat.

That [Senator] Scott Brown [R-Mass.] election almost kills ACA, doesn't it?

Yes.And in fact, I think most of Washington was reading last rites over the ACA when Brown won.Then there were only two people, I think, in Washington who actually believed the ACA could still happen.One was Barack Obama, and the other was Nancy Pelosi.

And, you know, we met after the election in Massachusetts, in the White House, and Obama said, "We're not giving up," and, "We're going to go underground, and we're going to put this together." …

The House was unhappy with the Senate bill.They felt it was not progressive enough.It didn't include a public option, which was very important to many members of the House.And there is natural enmity between the House and the Senate.There is friction between the House and the Senate.So all of that was at play.

But once we lost the supermajority in the Senate, it was clear that the only way to pass the ACA, at this point, was for the House to embrace the Senate bill and then fix some aspects of it through the budget reconciliation process that wouldn't require a Senate majority.It was very, very complicated.

And when the president asked Phil Schiliro, his legislative director, where we were in the House, Phil said we're probably 20 votes short, based on what the speaker was telling them of support for the ACA.

And so it became Pelosi's task to try and win those 20 votes, member by member.And it was a virtuoso performance on her part, most of it done outside of the view of the public, to figure out what it was that each member needed to get to where they had to go on this bill.

And there is no doubt that there would be no Affordable Care Act today but for Nancy Pelosi.

And I'm not sure many other leaders, or any other leader, would have been able to put together the majority that we needed at that time.

When we go down into the sausage-making moments—she's expressed this publicly and so have others to us—that there was real anger on her part, you and Rahm advising that they go smaller, the president go smaller.She wants to go big.She says Rahm's undercutting her.

Yeah, it's not me.Let me just make clear.I did not have that view.My view, at the front end—and I was very cross-pressured, because I have a child with a chronic illness.I almost went bankrupt in the healthcare system.I knew how urgent it was, but I was worried about the political consequences for Obama of doing what seven presidents had tried and seven presidents had failed to do.And his attitude was, "If it costs me the presidency, it will have been worth the fight, because this is of such moment."And once he said that, I was all in.

So I was on her side of this fight.

So it was Rahm, really, who was out there undercutting her?

Well, he—and you'd have to speak with him, but there's no doubt that Rahm felt that we should—and there were others who felt that we should go smaller.And we had one great meeting in the White House, in the summer of 2009, when we really began to see the impacts of this, the political impacts of this.And an argument was made to go smaller, and the president turned to Phil Schiliro and said, "Phil, what do you think our chances of passing this are?"And Phil said, "Well, it depends how lucky you feel, Mr. President."

And Obama just laughed.He always sat under this chair with George Washington's portrait behind him, and he said: "Phil, I'm a Black guy named Barack Hussein Obama, and I'm president of the United States.I feel lucky every day."And he just laughed, and it was clear he was not going to give up.He was not going to go smaller.

And I'm sure that Pelosi was bucking him up on that, you know, "Do not—do not do that."So she was in every way a hero of this story.

… It passes.What you foresaw in 2010 begins to happen in a big way, partly as a result of that and maybe as a result of TARP—

Partly.I think it would have happened regardless.I mean, it may have been a less—a little less, you know, dramatic, but we were destined to lose large numbers of seats in 2010.History would have suggested that, you know?

Republicans Campaign Against Pelosi

She becomes the subject of Republican campaigns—$70 million, something like 131,000 ads and pieces of whatever.Not Barack Obama. Nancy Pelosi.Maybe because she's a woman, partly, maybe, but she certainly made herself plenty controversial.But does it hurt Democrats for her to be so toxic in 2010?

Well, I don't think that—Pelosi was in a long line of, kind of, faces that Republican ad makers and Republican strategists used to kind of shorthand liberal coastal elites, which is how they wanted to paint the Democratic Party.You know, Ted Kennedy for years filled that role.Today, you know, it's AOC [U.S. Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, D-N.Y.].And so, you know, it was shorthand for "They're out of touch."

Did it make it worse?I don't know.All I know is that the—if you cost out the net benefits versus the net liabilities of Nancy Pelosi, it very much calculates out in her favor. …

Yeah, I think that the negative caricature of her may have been effective in some of their precincts around the country, Republicans.On the other hand, her leadership in the House and her tough-mindedness was central to how Democrats recaptured the House the first time and the second time.And her leadership, day in and day out, on the Hill was sort of indispensable, and that will be apparent when she's gone.

So, you know, it's all part of one package.You can't be a strong, dynamic leader and not end up, in some way, being caricatured in negative ways by your opposition, and she certainly was.

You know her well enough.I keep trying to penetrate people to find out: How does she feel about this?What are Nancy Pelosi's personal reactions to a $70 million campaign that vilifies her?

You know, it's so funny that you say you can't penetrate.I don't really know the answer to that, but my strong feeling about it is that she has an incredibly tough hide about these things.She knew—she knows who she is.She knows what she's about.She knows, you know, what she's fighting for.And you know, I think—I've never heard her sort of bemoan the fact that she became a target.I'm sure it was unpleasant, but she is such a fighter and she's so disciplined about her goals that I really have never seen her distracted by that.

And there are others who may give you a different view.She's got lots of longtime friends in the House who may share that.I don't know if you've talked to Rahm, but you should.

Yeah, we're on the way to him.And we've talked to Barbara Lee and lots of others who talk to her all the time.

Anna Eshoo is a really good friend of hers.

I think Anna's this afternoon.I think we're going to talk to her.

Yeah, she'd be a great source.But, I mean, I think just Pelosi is so focused at all times on whatever the goal is in front of her that she just doesn't allow herself to get distracted.She gets irritated when people—I think, my guess is she probably gets more irritated by members of her own caucus when they are less than focused on what they should be focused on than she does by, you know, name-calling from the other side.

I mean, look, look at the iconic photo of Nancy Pelosi in the Trump White House, while everybody was sitting, and her standing and basically confronting Trump on his lies and on his, you know, on his practices.That's who she is.I mean, she's fearless.

There's two stories about her that you are part of in some way.You're not in by name.One is that she just felt, even though I know at the East Room signing ceremony, Obama said, "Nancy, Nancy," and gave her lots of credit, she never felt that she got the credit she deserved.This is a very private thing she's conveyed to people, but it's known.And the second is that, in 2012, she does a kind of victory lap about 25 years in the House and doing events all over the country, and the way the story goes, she wanted Obama to appear with her at an event, but he wouldn't.In fact, he doesn't even return her call.Is that what happened?And so, the implication, of course, other than, gee, it's too bad for Nancy and whatever, is, is this an indication that Obama and Democrats distanced themselves from Pelosi after the 2010 elections?

No, not at—I mean, I can tell you without any—I mean, I was involved in the Obama reelection effort at a high level.There was never any discussion about "don't get near Pelosi."That was—no.I mean, you know, I can only speak from my vantage point, but there was a lot of reverence for Pelosi and a lot of respect for Pelosi.Anyone who went through the Affordable Care Act fight had to come away with deep, deep reverence for her, because there would be no Affordable Care Act without Nancy Pelosi.

And I don't know the details of that story.I was out of the White House by then, and I don't know what was going on at that moment.But all I know is that Barack Obama would say, to this moment, that he was blessed to serve with Nancy Pelosi, that many of the important things that he was able to accomplish in Congress would not have happened without Nancy Pelosi.

So, you know, again, I don't know about that particular incident.And—but just on the—I mean, I've said it several times.She deserves every bit of credit that she gets, and more, for the Affordable Care Act, and that's most important when you think of the millions of people whose lives were impacted positively by what she did.

And I think she sees a straight line between the kind of battles she's fighting and the lives that people are leading and the lives that she could—that they may have helped save.

So, you know, it hurts me.It hurts me to hear that she feels she didn't get enough credit, because she deserves every bit of credit she gets.

Let's talk about the 2018 midterms, moving along on our history on horseback, David.

You know, let me just go back to the 2006—when they took the majority back.She designated Rahm Emanuel [D-Ill.], who was a relatively junior member of the House, and I remember Rahm calling me and saying, you know: "They want me to do this.I really don't want to do it."But it was absolutely a brilliant thing to do because, you know, Rahm is a heat-seeking missile, much like Pelosi.When he gets a target in his mind, he's relentless.

They went out, and they recruited an extraordinary class, extraordinary because the members, the candidates they recruited very much fit the districts that they were running in.And they were very disciplined about message and not getting drawn into fights that would undercut candidates in the more moderate districts in which they were running.

So, you know, it was a master class in organizing the 2006 election that propelled her to the speakership in the first place.

So, anyway, go ahead.

Just as an aside to all of that, if you look at the history of just those two, I can't wait to talk to Rahm about this, but so much, so close, so close, all the way through that time period, then Obama, then ACA, then Rahm in a different job, but she thinks he's talking to her caucus; it used to be his caucus, too.And the personal antipathy between the two of them, which apparently emerges, has got to be sad for you to see and know about.

Although I would tell you that, today, they're very close.I mean, they talk all the time.I think that at some level Pelosi understood that, even though it enraged her, that Rahm thought he was doing what he felt was best for the president, which was his job as the chief of staff.I don't think she liked it.I think she, you know, I think she saw it as encroachment in her domain, which is something she doesn't countenance.But they repaired that relationship.

You know, in some ways, they share this—they share a level and appreciation for the tactical elements of politics on a kind of high plane that very few people understand. …

Let's talk about the 2018 midterms, because it's such a difference between the '06 run: what she did, what she had to do, what she and Rahm did.In a way, she encourages her members not to run about Trump, said that's already activated; don't do that; let's get ahead of it; let's deal with issues.But also the moderates become her real focus, because she wants to win in Trump districts; she wants to flip them over.It seems like a more mature Nancy Pelosi, not wanting to go after Trump, not wanting to fight with the president.… What does it tell you about her and where she is on the arc of her own discovery?

Yeah.Well, look, it goes back to the lesson she learned as a child in her household: Politics is a lot about learning how to count.She wanted to get to 218 and above, and she was more interested in what it would take to win that majority than in entertaining her own vengeance and hatred for what Trump represented.And she understood that, by making it about policy questions that resonated broadly, and in these swing districts, that Democrats had a much better chance to get to that 218 and above.

And she enforced that discipline on her caucus, on these campaigns, and it was the right thing to do.And she won because of it.Ultimately, scoring rhetorical points against political opponents is a lot less satisfying than beating them, and she was determined to beat them.

Division in the Democratic Party

And then, David, the same members tried to take her out as speaker.Why do they see her as a liability, and how does she deal with that?

… I think Pelosi understood that there may be some political profit for some of her members, in some of these swing districts, to distance themselves from her as candidates.I'm sure it was irritating to her, to have to put together the vote to become speaker again.

And, you know, the thing about that that was so noteworthy was, there are a lot of people in Washington who were sort of counting her out.There were a lot of people in Washington who said: "Hey, she can't put this together.There are too many people who have pledged not to vote for her as part of winning their campaigns in their districts."And she employed these prodigious legislative skills on her own behalf there, going member to member, having the conversations she needed to have.And you know, again, just by her own election as speaker, when people were ready to give her the gold watch and send her away, she proved why she shouldn't go away: Because she was so damn good at this, and so smart about how she dealt with that body.

And of course everyone would look back now on that and say, "Man, I'm sure glad she didn't go," because she was the—she was actually trying to be the minority leader.… She was the bulwark against Trump.I mean, she was the thin blue line between Trump and his trespasses on democracy and democracy itself.

And so her steeliness and her wiliness became, you know, in the period when she was minority leader and when she was speaker, the thing that reined Trump in.And I think most Democrats recognized that.

She's in a tough situation around that time.The caucus is split, progressive and moderates.They want impeachment.She's trying to protect the moderates, and impeachment won't work anyway; she knows it's not going to work, so she's got a strategy to avoid the impeachment.What do you think that was?What was she doing? …

Even though she understood that there were many Democrats who were—who really believed that impeachment should happen, there were some who wanted to impeach Trump almost on election because, when the Russia involvement became known, Pelosi understood that's not where most of the country was, that most of the country did not want them to be absorbed by impeachment.

And it was really only when the—when the details of Ukraine came up that she felt like he had crossed a line, and she could not stop and had a responsibility to proceed on impeachment.

Let's talk about the progressives, who were pushing for it and many other things.There's tensions between Pelosi and AOC.Is the heart of the tension, as you can see it from your perch, kind of how they understand politics?

… You know, AOC came to Congress as an activist, as a young activist representing other young activists who were impatient with what they view as the incremental nature of policymaking in Congress and who, you know, loathed the influence of special interests in reining in their ambitions and so on.

I mean, I think they were very well motivated.They wanted to get as much done as they could possibly get done.They wanted to deal with big problems.And the realities of the legislative process were not something that they were particularly concerned with.They weren't particularly familiar with it.That is the place where Nancy Pelosi has lived much of her life. …

The irony of it all was that Nancy Pelosi, who for years and years and years was reviled in Republican ads for being this left-wing, you know, San Francisco crazy, was now being attacked by young activists for not being progressive enough.And the fact is that Nancy Pelosi is a pragmatic progressive.I mean, there's no doubt that her views are progressive and that she has big ambitions for what government should be doing for people.But she also has the realist's understanding of how one has to make that progress and where the limits are of a legislative process in a deeply divided country.

So there were going to be tensions between the unbridled idealism and ambitions of the activists who were coming into Congress and, you know, the more pragmatic approach that she took, that was necessary to actually get things done.

That's so interesting.It's true that she says—she always talks about hard power versus soft power.She, of course, has hard power.Hard power is votes, and that's power.Influence is something when you have 5 million Instagram followers.And that's how she draws the distinction.

No, I think that, you know, and I think it's a frustration for her that there are members of Congress for whom that Instagram following is fundamental.And you don't—you don't arouse your base through moderation.You don't build your following through compromise.But that often is how you have to make progress in a democratic society.

And so that conflict is something that Pelosi understands, but, you know, as a leader, it has to be frustrating.

Especially nowadays, as we've just walked away from a president who believed in social media.

Yeah.Look, Nancy Pelosi is serious about governing, and governing is a messy and difficult process.It involves compromise.It involves settling at all times for less than 100% of what you want.And that's a hard lesson to impart to young activists for whom—for whom incrementalism is a—is an invective, is a dirty word.

And so it's become increasingly difficult, I think, for her, as she's moved on in her leadership, to deal with these new forces and still cobble together the votes she needs to move things forward.Obviously we're seeing that right now.

Jan. 6 and the Aftermath

When you watched Jan. 6 and you see what she was doing, you watched her as closely as we now are—and you, certainly, because you know her and are clued into the events.The days after, in the days immediately after, calling, trying to reach Pence to remove Trump, calling [Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark] Milley, working to get through those moments, did it seem almost like she was running the government to you?It certainly looks that way to us.

What it seemed like was a person who believes in the fundamental tenets and institutions of our democracy, who genuinely felt that they were at threat, who genuinely felt that there was a chance that we could lose it all, and that there was an uncontrolled, you know, madman in the White House, and who was worried that these institutions would not hold.

You know, I viewed Nancy Pelosi's conversations in the days in and around Jan. 6 as conversations that she initiated as an officer of the government, as a trustee of the democracy, not as the leader of the Democratic Party.I think this far transcended partisanship for her.She was worried we were going to lose our democracy.

Cantor, when we were talking to him yesterday, had a different view.He said, instead of coming on camera and reassuring the American people, she was pouring gasoline on the fire in those days, risking everything and making it worse, because she's so partisan.

Yeah.Well, I mean, look, I mean, Eric Cantor's views are formulated through 1,000 legislative fights, and I'm sure it shapes his view of Nancy Pelosi.But we now have a pretty keen lens on what the president of the United States was doing in and around Jan. 6, and anyone who is not concerned about the 187 minutes when insurrectionists were overrunning the Capitol, and the president sat inactive and watching television as these events unfolded, you know, is missing something really fundamental.

I think this was a—this was a watershed event in our history and, you know, if you want to talk about partisanship, it is fear of Trump and his influence within the Republican Party that would cause people to look away from the events of that day and say this was just a normal—this was the normal course of events; the president behaved properly.

You can't—whether you're Republican or Democrat, you can't look at those events and conclude that, unless you're concerned about the political implications of coming to that conclusion.

Pelosi and Biden

Let's talk about the big bill now that's moving through.… Our film will air in February, so we're going to know the results of this, but still, it's a film mostly about process anyway.How is legislating and convincing the members to sign on different than it was during ACA, for example?Let's start there.

You know, I think it's harder today than it was even 12 years ago to pass a major piece of legislation, because of the tension within the Democratic Caucus between progressives and moderates and, you know, especially because you have a 50/50 Senate and an almost 50/50 House.So Pelosi is up there on a high wire without a net, and it is a really, really difficult task to put this together.

You know, what progressives in the House saw was [Sen.] Joe Manchin [D-W.V.] and [Sen.] Kyrsten Sinema [D-Ariz.] using the leverage they had in a 50/50 Senate to produce the result they wanted.And the lessons they took from—the lesson they took from that was: "We can do that, too.We can hold up their priority, if they're going to hold up ours."And they have used that leverage to try and produce the kind of bill that they want.They've made deep compromises.But at some point, you have to—you have to say, "This is as good as it's going to get, and we're ready to more forward."And that's the point that Pelosi has tried to get them to reach.

The measure of how much things have changed was reflected in the fact that the president of the United States went to Capitol Hill before he left for Europe, for the G20 meeting, and told the members of the House caucus how important this legislation, these two pieces of legislation, were for him and his presidency and the future of the country.Pelosi told them that they—she didn't want him to land in Europe without this legislation in hand, because there were issues like climate change that were important to these meetings.And they didn't move.They couldn't get the votes.

So, you know, that was a measure of how much things have changed, that a president of the United States could come to the Hill, and members of his own party would frustrate his ambitions.

Democratic leaders seem to believe, it seems to me, that passing these bills is going to help them win in 2022, obviously.Is that still true?

Look, I think—here's what's true: Not passing the bills would add to the burden of Democrats in 2022.What is true is if Joe Biden's standing in 2022 is still in the low 40s, that will affect every Democrat running for Congress.They have a vested interest, a political interest.Beyond the policy impacts of the things that they're working on, they have a political interest in helping Biden achieve his goals, and they need to have things to run on and tangible things that they can say, "Here is what we produced that actually go to the day-to-day concerns in your lives."

It may not stave off the historic forces that are massed against them.It may not cut the headwinds sufficiently.But without it, they're looking at much larger losses.

My last question.We've talked about how different the politics of the day are today from ACA and '08—AOC and others.Where she used to work inside her caucus rather than Twitter and all that stuff.She focused on legislating.Is this it for her?Is this it for her kind?Forget whether Nancy's even here anymore.Is she the last of the boomers? Is this her—

Well, I'd say a few things about this, Mike.First of all, it is a measure of how extraordinary a legislator and politician Nancy Pelosi is that she has survived these different epics in American politics, these transitions in American politics.She has—she has been counted out, you know, time and again, and she's come back, and she has adjusted and adapted to the challenges that have emerged over time.And it's a real tribute to her, you know, extraordinary skills.

But it's obvious that this is the end of an era.I don't think there's anyone who will be able to command a caucus—and by command, I mean produce the results that she wanted—in the way that Nancy Pelosi has.She has an old-style facility for pulling the right levers, pressing the right buttons, understanding how to motivate people.Now, there are other levers that are beyond the control of a speaker of the House or a minority leader of the House that come in the form of Instagram and Twitter.

So I do think the job is going to be different.And to do what Pelosi has done so well for so long is going to be almost impossible for speakers in the future.

… You want to tell me a couple stories?

Yeah, a couple of stories.During the first year of the Obama administration, I think it was during the early Obama administration, he was determined to try and pass a cap-and-trade bill on climate change, and it was going to start in the House.And it was, you know, very controversial, and particularly in some of the swing districts where there were energy industries, and people were concerned about those.

And Pelosi was concerned about the impact on her members of the fight, even though she was committed to the issue, and she agreed to sign on.And as that thing was unfolding, and it was really a heavy lift, they asked me to come down to the House to speak to the caucus, which almost always meant that they wanted to beat up on some representative of the White House, and I was usually the sacrificial lamb in that regard.

I walk into the caucus, and literally before I cross the threshold, Speaker Pelosi was on me.She was pointing her finger in my chest, and she said: "Your president said he would be out there campaigning for this bill if we were going to take it up.Well, I took it up, and I don't see him out there.And if I—and just." And then there's this pause, because there was going to be an invocation.And she clasped her hands, and she looked down as the invocation was delivered.And as "amen" was sounded, she crossed herself.And in the same gesture, she started pointing her finger back in my chest. She said, "And if he doesn't get out there, I'm going to pull this bill from the floor!"

And that's Pelosi, you know.That's Pelosi.

And the second was—and this is a story. I didn't observe this; this was shared with me.There was a caucus; she was asking for a vote.It was a difficult vote.She was walking out, and a member from Louisiana, Democratic member from Louisiana, was heard in a loud voice saying, "It's easy for her to say; she's from San Francisco."And she turned, walked back to that member, got in his face and said: "Let me tell you something.I don't see my grandchildren on weekends because I'm traveling the country raising money from liberals for people like you," she said. "So don't give me that."

And she left.And of course everybody then said, "You owe her an apology; you"—but that's her.That's Pelosi.She's direct.You know, you never guess where—what she's thinking.And she's a leader.And even in choppy waters, she's managed to get her caucus to follow.

She will be missed.I mean, I believe that Nancy Pelosi—everybody refers to Nancy Pelosi as a historic figure.And she is a historic figure.She was the first woman to get elected speaker of the House, but she's a historic figure for more than that.She is the last of the great legislators in that role.She is among those historic figures who we will—who we will remember as, you know, masters of the House.

And so, when she leaves the scene—and she will leave the scene soon; you know, that's pretty clear.When she leaves the scene, she will be etched in the marble of those Capitol walls as one of the truly great leaders in American history.

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