The FRONTLINE Interviews

Gérard Araud

Former Ambassador

Gérard Araud served as ambassador of France to the United States from 2014 to 2019. Previously, he served as permanent representative of France to the United Nations Security Council. He is currently a trustee of the International Crisis Group and a senior distinguished fellow of the Atlantic Council.

The following interview was conducted by FRONTLINE’s Jim Gilmore on April 15, 2021. It has been edited for clarity and length.

This interview appears in:

America After 9/11

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Gérard Araud

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Global Reaction to 9/11

This film starts out on 9/11 and goes up to the present day.… Talk about that time in history and how America was viewed by the world.

So I think the first thing we have to do is to try to remember that where—what was the American foreign policy or what was the American administration before 9/11, because we were in very special circumstances after the election of George W. Bush.It's undeniable that there were a lot of questions about the U.S. foreign policy after the neoconservative victory.Our embassy in Washington was trying to assess what will be the consequence of the election, and on the top of that comes the 9/11 [attacks].

At the time I was the secretary for strategic affairs.In theory at least, there was a worry that it will be—the 9/11 will be immediately followed in a sense by your very bellicose and very strong and very military response of the United States.

Here I'm not expressing, of course, the human feelings that we had, all, when looking at the towers collapsing, the bodies falling.Of course, we were extremely, extremely moved by the horror.But there were immediately—there were some concerns, especially in Paris, about what will happen.And by chance, I think, you know, 9/11, it was a few days before the U.N. General Assembly and Jacques Chirac actually were supposed to go to New York.He went there, and I think he was one of the first one, or maybe even the first one, to overfly the 9/11 site and to meet George W. Bush.

And when he came back, I remember a meeting with Jacques Chirac and also our foreign minister, Hubert Védrine, and the feeling was sort of, they were reassured.They had the impression that the U.S. were not going to rush to the warpath, but they were going to assess the situation and decide a reaction, I think, not on the spot, but after a while.And I think that was the first analysis in Paris, is OK, this administration is less bellicose that we feared.

And the significance of NATO's support for the invasion of Afghanistan?Even at that point in the world, Russia was very supportive of the United States and that mission.It almost seemed like there was a new world order to some extent.

If you allow me, in a sense, not to answer to your question.The event … was so spectacular.It was so horrendous that all of us, we remember where we were on 9/11, and all of us will remember the images of the bodies falling or the towers collapsing.And I think our brain is nearly numbed, and it's nearly impossible to shift from the emotional mode to the analytical mode.We are all emotional, all emotional because the human sufferings, the meaningless attack, but also because it's New York City.You know, New York City and the twin towers are sort of a symbol of modernity.

And I think that has been, of course, the reaction of the Americans, and I think it's quite legitimate, but it has also been the reaction, I think, of the Europeans and of most of the world, because most of the world had been mesmerized by the same—the same images.

So the Americans had been attacked.There was no excuse, no explanation possible, and the world in a sense was in revenge mode.We had to kill the murderers.And the 9/11 was, first of all, seen as a crime and not as a foreign policy crisis.

Even historically, NATO, as the organization, supported the invasion of Afghanistan.Even that, the significance of that?

Because, you know, when NATO supported the invasion of Afghanistan, it was not supporting the invasion, but it was supporting, you know, really the fact of looking after bin Laden, you know, where it was seen as a chase of the criminal and as of the destruction of the cell which was supposed to be behind the attack.In a very strange way, for me, it's more a sort of policy decision than a political decision.

Bush on 9/11 came back to the White House, and he made a speech where he quoted from the Bible; he talked about a war between good and evil.The administration also talked a lot in that time about the fact that this war had to be bigger than just taking out bin Laden.It had to be a war where democratic values were chief at hand and needed to be spread to the areas that we were moving into.Did we understand at that point what this enemy was, what their views were?Did we know what we were taking on when we began this quest to bring down bin Laden?

You know, even before 9/11, the victory of George W. Bush had raised a lot of questions in Europe, and I guess elsewhere.It was the victory of the neoconservatism.And neoconservatism, you know, is basically considering that extending democracy is extending peace, and so—which means that the domestic policy of foreign countries are of interest to the Americans.So obviously, after the attack of the 9/11 and after the speech we're referring to, there were a lot of worries in Paris.We were concerned that actually the neoconservatives had found a good pretext to implement their policy.

But by chance, it was just before, a few days before the U.N. General Assembly, so Jacques Chirac, the French president, went to the U.S., met George W. Bush.… And the fact is that Jacques Chirac and the French Foreign Ministry were sort of reassured by the tone of the conversation.They had the impression that the Americans were not going to rush on the warpath; that they were going to have first an assessment of the situation.

So the first reaction on the French side was, as I told you, worries, but a sort of getting reassured by what George W. Bush told Jacques Chirac.

The Dark Side

There was another voice in these early days helping to define what this war would become, and it was the vice president, Dick Cheney.He came out on a Sunday morning show talking about the fact that this was going to be a different kind of war, that some of it would have to be fought in secret.He called it the "dark side."And of course, what this led to was the CIA's involvement with black sites and torture, and a very different dichotomy was defined here between what President Bush had defined as this was a war of democratic values.Talk a little bit about how the world, how France viewed this turn and what it meant on how this war might be fought.

You know, what will be quite symbolic on the 9/11/2021 will be the fact that it will be also the day when the American forces are leaving Afghanistan.And let's be frank: It's a failure. They are leaving Afghanistan, and they can't say "Mission Accomplished."We had Iraq before; Iraq was also a big failure.And we have this endless war on terror.I think we can assess that after 20 years, that 9/11 in a sense may be a success to bin Laden if it was his intention because it has led actually the West into this endless and meaningless war on terror, into invading Afghanistan, into invading Iraq, and in a sense not only failing really the policies—the policies failed in Afghanistan and Iraq—but also feeding the anger and the resentment of the Muslims and, I guess, maybe, beyond the Muslims against the West.

Invading Iraq

… We'll turn to Iraq now because of the importance of it, Bush's speech on how we were taking on the "axis of evil."How was that seen in Europe, in France, as a warning sign?

You know, the question mark that you have maybe to answer will be whether you can say Europe as such, because as you know, when we come to Iraq, Europe was deeply, deeply divided.And versus an American administration, you have always, always—you have the same situation when the British are trying to be, you know, the Athenians or the new Romans, so the British are trying, you know, really basically to influence the Americans while the French are taking the lead of the resistance and the Germans are trying to be forgotten in the fight.So we were exactly more or less in the same—in the same situation.

Now, of course, for a Frenchman, the speech about the axis of evil is simply impossible to understand.You know, it's really coming from another world for us, while at the same time we know that the Americans have always needed a sort of cloak of decency to hide their realpolitik.So really, maybe we are cynical by saying that, but, you know, the Americans don't want to see themselves as doing what everybody is doing in foreign policy and that they are doing themselves.So they want to always to be able to say they are defending bigger values.

So on one side, we said, axis of evil. What does it mean, you know?It was worrying because usually when you are talking about the axis of evil and when you have the means to do it, and when you have people like [Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul] Wolfowitz or Cheney or [Secretary of Defense Donald] Rumsfeld, you can think that they may do it.But at the same time, you may also hope that it's only a rhetoric for the American public opinion.

And your thoughts on the day, listening to [Secretary of State] Colin Powell make that presentation at the United Nations?

First, after that, you have the speech by [Minister of Foreign Affairs] Dominique Villepin on February the 14th, where we wrote it in the plane, in the official plane, you know.And it was long and—but it was a great speech.It was applauded by the people.And—but that was really a moment where we knew that we were going to a crisis with the Americans.And there was another meeting of the Security Council where the poor Powell was really showing the world, you know, he had, you know, I don't know which, something in the hand and trying to convince us that there were WMD in Iraq.

But to be frank—but again, I'm not impartial—we didn't find it very convincing.

But Americans did, and we went to war.The attack was certainly victorious, but the consequences afterwards of the post-invasion was something that didn't seem to have been thought out very well.Your thoughts on the post-invasion period of time, the decisions made by America, by Rumsfeld, by [Coalition Provisional Authority head L. Paul] Bremer, on how to deal with the Iraqis, with the Baath Party members, the military being disbanded.

The prime, you know—basically, we had long conversations with the Americans, you know, before slamming the door.And we were trying to tell them, "Beware."Iraq is—you have the Shiites, which are a majority.It's a dictatorship.But at least the dictatorship is keeping the unity of Iraq.And there was also this basic idea that democracy is not elections.You know, it's not because you arrive anywhere saying, "OK, you can vote; now you have a democracy."You know, actually it took two centuries for my country to become a democracy because you need to have a civil society; you need to have political parties; you need to have the rule of law.It's a long process.

And so we considered with disbelief this idea in Iraq, with the history of Iraq, the violence of Iraq especially, simply to arrive and to have elections and to say, "That's a democracy; that's peace and democracy."We considered it was not only naïve, but it was false and dangerous.

On the top of that, we told them also that the geopolitical balance of the region was based about Iraq being the dam against Iran, and they were going to destroy the dam, and even to deliver Iraq to Iran because of the Shiite.But again, in a sense, which is where the Americans were the ideologue.They were ideological, and the French were pragmatic.I think it's one of the rare occasions where the American diplomacy was ideological.It was really neoconservatism, the apex of the neoconservatists' hubris in this situation.

So after, when the Americans arrive, we can argue about was it a mistake to disband, you know, really the army.The problem was that all the political system of Iraq was based on the dictatorship or the dominance of the Sunni Arab minority.And there was a contradiction in the American policy: on one side to say, "We arrived; we imposed democracy," and the other side to say, "And we want to keep the Sunni Arab minority."It was impossible.

So once the Americans have invaded Iraq, I think that whatever their decisions, really the decisions taken by Bremer, I think that eventually we will have arrived at the same result.Really, it's the breakup, the breakup of the country.

… The fact that no weapons of mass destruction were found, was that a turning point?Did it change how America was viewed?

We knew it.We really, frankly, we have always, you know, we have always considered, and Europeans—I think I can go beyond the French—have always considered that George W. Bush and Cheney and the others have twisted the intelligence towards really saying that there were WMD in Iraq. …

The disasters that struck during those years, there is one after the other.But then a very symbolic thing happened, which was in April of '04 the Abu Ghraib pictures come out.A lot of people say it was a turning point for the American public and probably for the world in how they viewed this and how it defined the degradation of the moral values that we said we were selling.What was your view?What was the view of Europe and France when Abu Ghraib came out?What did it define for you?

You know, I think we have first to remember that beyond France, a large majority of the European public opinion, including Spain and including the U.K., was [on the side of] the war.You know, really.So in a sense, all these incidents to which you were referring—first, the fact that there was no WMD; after that, you had Abu Ghraib, but also all the images of violence, of the bombings, and major—all the incidents that we have seen in a sense were simply reinforcing the opinion of—the public opinion, you know, in Europe, saying, "This war was a mistake," you know, basically.And I don't think that it has really changed really the basic feeling of the Europeans. …

The Obama Years

… When President Obama was elected, what was the world's expectations?It's defined in some ways by his Nobel Peace Prize, which he received soon after he became president, before he really had done very much.What was the expectations of the world?

The expectations were huge because here you have—first you have a Black person, you know, really, an African American, young, sophisticated, elegant. And it was—he was greeted in Europe with enthusiasm.You know, there was a sort of huge expectations after eight years of George W. Bush frankly, who was partly despised or mocked, not only because of his policies but also because of the doubts that people had about his—his brain, his intelligence.And here suddenly you have, you know, really, somebody appearing like—he was greeted as the second Messiah by the Europeans, you know.

So there were huge, huge expectations, hopes.I think <i>Le Monde</i>, the French newspaper, had the title of 9/11, "We Are All Americans," I think had a quote really saying, "That's the America we love."And in a sense it was summarizing, I think, the opinion of a large majority, a huge majority of the Europeans.

He came in, and he had seen, and he campaigned on the idea—he got elected to a large extent because of his disagreement about the Iraq War.He saw Iraq War as the "bad war," but he called Afghanistan the "good war."He focused on it to begin with.Iraq, he actually handed off really to Vice President Joe Biden to sort of handle.But he saw [Afghanistan] as the good war.But yet, he underestimated what it would take to, quote/unquote, "win this war" or to bring a democratic government to this nation.Talk a little bit about those hopes that did not come true.He certainly changes soon after with a very different policy, and he pulls back in the ways that he's acting.But how was it seen – his inability to jump on Afghanistan and really change things?

First, I think we all, I think, made the mistake then when looking at this young guy and in a sense to think that he will be your sort of idealistic leader.In foreign policy, he was a realist.You know, really, I think that, I think it's Fareed Zakaria or Thomas Friedman who called him Barack Kissinger Obama, and which is very difficult to admit by Europeans.Europeans, when I tried to tell them that, they can't.They are totally under the spell of Barack Obama.But actually, he was a realist, and, as you know, a realist who considered that he had to limit the foreign interventions, foreign American interventions.But he was not so much claiming about human rights and democracy.He was not talking about spreading democracy.

As for Afghanistan, it's another aspect of Barack Obama, which is interesting, because people, you know, you remember that it was this debate about the surge, you know, sending 40,000.Actually, it was very Obama way, Obama-like, because it means that there were nearly six months of discussions at the White House, you know, hours and hours.You know, really people were telling me that everybody was agonizing on the same arguments again and again, you know, really—because he's an intellectual.Obama is an intellectual, and he has the doubts of the intellectuals.That's a difference with Kissinger, who doesn't have the doubts of intellectuals at all.

And eventually he decided—he decided the surge.But I was told that he decided without any enthusiasm and under the maximum pressure of everybody around him, and he was not convinced that it was the right, the right policy. …

But he found himself between a rock and a hard place, because the military surge of 20,000 really wasn't doing the job, and he wasn't accomplishing it.And he turns to a different way of war.He thought a much more surgical war and a good war, which is the use of drones and the use of small military incursions by special forces.How did the allies view this new war that he had come up with? …

First, if you allow me, going back to the fact that the military wanted more soldiers, any political leader will tell you that the military always wants more soldiers. …

As for the drones, … it didn't draw the attention of the public opinion in Europe.There were, of course, specialists who had an article from time to time, but there was no real debate about it, maybe because what Obama did was good by definition because it was Obama.So there was absolutely no campaign of criticism, of accusation against Obama for this policy, I should say even in the sense in the anti-American circles.And also because nobody knew, really, how many civilians were killed, and nobody had any sympathy for Islamist terrorism, which actually was frightening Europe also.

The joke over here, of course, was we kept on taking out the No. 3 of Al Qaeda, and after the No. 3 was taken out, we'd take out the next No. 3.And after that we'd take out the next No. 3.It was very difficult to show how this was successful.The war certainly wasn't shortened.The war was extended into many more countries.And Al Qaeda grew, and terrorism grew, and ISIS popped up.I guess, what is the moral of the story here, of trying to fight a war like this in the Middle East which you don't quite understand, perhaps, is the real truth?And attempting any direction, but especially this new kind of surgical-precision way of taking out the leadership, what did we learn from this?

I think that all the lessons that we drew from 9/11 actually were wrong lessons, were wrong answers, and have increased, actually, the disaster.So on one—the first ones were Afghanistan and Iraq, and we can say now in a very assured way that it was—it led to disasters.But you have another aspect, which is more difficult to assess because it's done in the shadows, really what I think Vice President Cheney was calling the dark side, which is this war on terror, because on one side, every specialist, every expert was telling us war on terror is meaningless; it's a meaningless expression because you are confusing a war, you know, and fighting, fighting terror, and you don't fight terror with soldiers or marginally with soldiers.There are many, many other instruments that you have to use.And so that's also the lesson, is war on terror was a big mistake, because as you say—and again, we could say it also for the French right now, which the French who are in the Sahel region—you know, fighting terrorism, you kill terrorists, you kill terrorists, but there are always new terrorists coming.You know, it's an endless—really an endless fight.And even the specialists are telling you that you kill the No. 1, but the new No. 1 is younger and more aggressive and more reckless than the previous No. 1.So it's still—it's still worse.You know, actually, it's worse.

So in any case, yes, the war of on terror was actually continued by Obama, really in a slightly different way but with the same result.And you're right.Actually the result that we see on the ground is a worsening of the situation, an extension of the field, extension of the battlefield, and for instance, to the Sahel region.

Obama’s Legacy

So at the end of Obama's second time in office, how does the world look at his legacy and these wars, where we end up compared to the hopes of the world when he first came in? …

I think that along the specialists, the experts, the diplomats, there was a big disappointment.Obama in foreign policy has been a real disappointment, you know.He has been basically continued previous policy, but, you know, sort of staying halfway, really.He didn't withdraw while withdrawing.He didn't support the Syrian resistance while supporting it.He didn't support Ukraine while supporting it.So it was the worst policy because it was a sort of half-baked policy.You felt that actually he was, in a sense—really I'm using a word which is, of course, excessive—he was an isolationist, but that he didn't dare to go to the end of his instincts.And the result was this sort of washy-washy foreign policy.

So I think that there were different assessments, but when I was talking with my German and British colleagues, the feeling was a sort of disappointment.

The Trump Years

Donald Trump. You called him at one point a "political phenomenon," a "symptom" of America today.Talk about the view of Donald Trump coming into office and the long-term effects that he brought with him.

So it's—I think the problem that we have been facing, especially the Americans have been facing, and especially the bubble, the Washington bubble has been facing was to be obsessed by the person of Donald Trump in a very antagonistic way, so—and The Washington Post and The New York Times were also part of this trend.It meant that whatever he said or whatever he did was bad, and was considered as being to his unbearable personality.But you know, frankly, and even in Europe, there were really some of his assessments were not seen as totally stupid or totally aggressive or meaningless.For instance, you know, North Korea: When he decided to meet Kim Jong-un, everybody was screaming.But all the previous presidents had failed.And you can assess that if there is a solution, it would be with Kim Jong-un.So after that, you can argue that—and that's very often the case—that Trump as there is no follow-up because he doesn't know what is diplomacy; he simply doesn't know what is a bureaucracy.He believes that foreign policy is what he says, and that's enough.But the idea of meeting Kim Jong-un really was not seen as stupid.

When, for instance, he said why the Americans should defend Montenegro.Frankly, Montenegro was imposed on the allies by the United States under Obama as member of NATO. But the simple question, really, ask the small guy in Wisconsin, "Are you ready to die for Montenegro?," really I think it's a good question, really.If I were an American citizen, I would say, "Of course, what is—why are we guaranteeing the security of Montenegro?"

And also the way he was simply saying—and here there is a continuity with Obama—but basically saying we have to limit the foreign commitment of the United States after the neoconservative outburst, I think it was—I think it was right to do it.He was right in some places, but he was wrong on a lot of other places, actually.And I think that everybody was so much obsessed by his fantasies that people were not able to listen to what he was saying, which was not stupid.

You know, I remember I told some Americans, but they were outraged, that for me, Trump was reminding me of the tale of [Hans Christian] Andersen, "The Emperor Has No Clothes."… You know, in this extremely small world of the American foreign policymakers in Washington, he was the guy simply saying things that the bubble was unable to see and which were very simple.

One of the things he would say, of course, is his famous slogan, "America First."How was that translated in Europe?

I think at first in substantial terms, America First, every country has a foreign policy which is France First, Britain First or America First.You know, really the problem is that most of European countries really basically don't want to admit it.You know, we are living in a postmodern world where we are supposed to be multilateralists and defending values.So there was at first a shock in a sense by what Trump said, even if in itself it was not shocking at all.

But what was really shocking was that what he meant was not "America First," but "America Alone."And that was the problem.It meant simply sending the message that the alliances were bad for America, that the allies were ripping off the Americans, really.His inauguration speech was horrendous, you know, and extremely, extremely violent.And especially the European Union, he really—he has always shown a very, very really violent hostility towards the European Union, the U.N. and so on.In a sense, he was killing all the sacred cows of the Europeans.

So the reaction, of course, the reaction of the Europeans were a reaction of alarm, and especially alarm among the East European countries, because they are worried about the Russian threat.There was a deep grief—and the word "grief," I choose the word "grief" on purpose—in Germany, because the Germans have a sort of a very emotional link to the United States, who rebuilt a democratic Germany.And it's a country, in a sense, which suddenly was facing something they couldn't think of, which was an America which was not supporting democratic values anymore, and rule of law.

So for the Germans, it was really—it was really a shock, really, which was a bit different with the French, really.We knew what is the world, so really we were—we were less concerned by what was happening.And the British were totally lost because of Brexit.You know, really, they were thinking into the Brexit stories.They didn't have time for anything else.And the Brexiters, of course, could find in Trump support in their fight.

You were in Washington.I'd like to get your overview of this.There is also a debate between, in Washington, between Trump and supporters like Stephen Bannon, with the "establishment," quote/unquote, military and State Department officials like [Secretary of Defense James] Mattis and [Secretary of State Rex] Tillerson, about the role of the United States in the world. ...What was your take on the debate in America, the debate within the White House and government about the role that the United States should play in the world?

In a sense, you know, there was no debate in the White House, because there was only one person who was deciding, and it was Donald Trump.And he was not listening.The interagency process was totally broken.He was taking decision from the back of his mind.

You know, for instance, we were expecting his decision on the nuclear deal, the Iran nuclear deal in May 2018.So I was asking the people on the White House, at the National Security Council, saying, "Is the president going to take his decision next week?"And the answer was, "No, no, it doesn't—he won't take the decision because there is no scheduled meeting really next week, so he can't take a decision without scheduling a meeting of the National Security Council."It was on Wednesday.

On Thursday, a tweet saying: "I will take my decision on Tuesday."So I sent the tweet to my national security adviser who was on the phone—I swear was on the phone with John Bolton.And so my national security adviser tells John, "Oh, John, so you are going to announce the decision on Tuesday?"And there was a silence on the phone, because John Bolton was not even aware of that, you know?

So very often, Paris was asking me to make démarche, to ask something, and I was obliged to answer actually the only solution is for the president to call Trump, because nobody knows what Trump is going to decide tomorrow, and nobody knows what means what Trump has decided yesterday.He really— he was convinced—in the beginning, in the first months, and he was really wary because he didn't know how it worked.But very quickly he felt that he knew and that he didn't need other people.Again, he had never been head of a bureaucracy.He didn't know what meant bureaucratic process.He considered that he could take the decision, and after that, that's what was—what mattered.

So as a good ambassador, I take my hat and my cane, I go and meet the national security adviser, [H. R.] McMaster at the time, and I ask him, I said, "What will be the topic in the note that you are preparing for President Trump?"And the answer was, "We don't prepare a note.President Trump is taking part in this meeting without a note."Basically, you know, try to imagine, he was meeting Xi Jinping without having any note with him about the very technical issues which were at stake.

America’s Reputation Abroad

Did this diminish the role of the United States, the world role of the United States because of the understanding of the way that he was acting, because of the diminishment of his attitude towards the allies?

Of course, you know, basically you can say that American diplomacy has vanished in 70% or 80% of the world.You are totally unable to say what was the American foreign policy in Africa, for instance, or in Latin America, Venezuela or Central America because of immigration.He basically—the foreign policy of the American foreign policy was what was on the radar screen of the president.And what was on the radar screen of Donald Trump was what was on Fox News, basically.So it was Iran, of course.Really, there was also North Korea.But it was very limited, you know, really basically—he was not really interested by foreign policy.And so the allies had to manage by themselves, really, to—so we were trying.At the same time, as he was not very—he was not a micromanager compared to Obama, who was a micromanager, so in a sense everything which was under his radar screen was managed by the secretaries the way they wanted.You know, really, so for instance—and we had a very good relationship with Mattis, Secretary Mattis, so we could cooperate a lot with him in our military operations, in our common military operations.And Mattis knew how important alliances were.So we could keep a very close cooperation in our operation in Syria or in the Sahel region in North Africa, because again, it was under the radar screen of Trump.

And when Mattis resigns because of the decisions about pulling out the troops in Syria, did that make Europe concerned?Did that create havoc in France?

It was more complicated because the new secretary of defense was less really oriented towards alliances.But at this time, we were working with the American military—the American military, you know.I don't remember the name of the chief of defense, the chief of defense.We could work with him.And so we succeeded on a military field actually to keep a very active operation with the Americans.

The legacy, then, of Trump as far as his war policies, he doesn't achieve basically what he wanted to achieve.He's kind of held back from his as dramatic actions as he wanted to.But what is, by the time that it's wrapping up, and he's going to be out of office, how does the view of America change, especially when dealing with his—looking at the foreign decisions made in foreign affairs?

I think a general opinion in Europe is that—again, Trump is not an accident.Trump may come back, not maybe as Trump himself or as another Trump; that we are facing actually a major change in the America domestic and foreign policy.And that's a big question mark, a big question mark.

And the Europeans are divided on that, because a lot of them are in denial, because, you know, for the Germans or for Italians or the Spaniards, it would mean that they have to increase their military budget, really, for instance.For the Poles it's terrifying, because of course the Poles and the Baltic states are suddenly—they see the American guarantee in question.

So I think that with the election of Biden, the election of Biden is allowing the Europeans basically to remain in denial.But I should say a lot of experts, a lot of really—and even a lot of politicians, Chancellor [Angela] Merkel, for instance—you know, are acknowledging that something critical is changing in America.Of course, it's much better to have Joe Biden, but we don't expect, for instance, Joe Biden taking care of all our security problems.You know, the environment of Europe is in flames, from Ukraine, Syria, Libya, North Africa.And we know basically that the GIs are not going to go to Damascus or Kiev or even Libya; that Joe Biden is going to follow a policy which has been actually inaugurated by Obama, which has been followed in a sort of haphazardly way by Trump, really, the Americans don't want to be anymore the policeman of the world.

The Attack on the Capitol

… And so Jan. 6, how do you view it?How does the world view the U.S. Capitol building being raided by Trump supporters who are trying to stop a democratic election from being affirmed?

Well, on one side, I should say, again, here I am expressing maybe more French aspect, is on one side, of course, it was one of the spectacular events because of the TV. You know, it was on all the world TVs, so everybody was transfixed by really the idea of the storming the Congress.You know, really, it's something which was totally amazing.But at the same time, as a French man, I would say that really we have had much worse riots in France, you know, really.The violence is more in the streets is, I should say, unfortunately, is more characteristic of a French political riot, so maybe that we were less scandalized that the Americans were.

But the sad irony of the country that for 20 years has been overseas, for more than that, trying to spread the democratic values and to spread elections to undemocratic countries, and here we have a group of people taking over the U.S. Congress because of a president that is claiming that the election was a fraud and that they're backing him up in trying to stop the election from being affirmed by Congress.What's the sad irony there?

No, I think, you know, I immediately concluded it when Trump was elected, and now, looking at Biden's policies, I think really I'm reinforcing my conviction, is that we are leaving the end of the new liberal era.We are out of this political economic era which has been inaugurated by Reagan, and by Thatcher in a sense, on the right, and on the left it was Clinton and Obama.And I think that the rebellion of the voters is largely against the system.The system, as you know, was, you know, really taxes are bad; borders are bad; the state is bad; globalization is good, and so on.And actually, the people say enough is enough.We have seen everywhere in Europe, in America, the inequalities, the industrialization of the Midwest.We have exactly the same problem, the same problem in Europe.

… It was striking that Trump invented a new American right.You know, the American right was, you know, a budgetary, really budgetary constraints, free trade and an active foreign policy.Trump arrived and said, "No, no, free trade, I don't want it.Protectionism."And saying the budget, you know, really, the budget deficit exploded under Trump, and in a time of growth.We have never seen that."And active foreign policy, no way.I don't want any interventions."

So yes, really, totally swept away the sacred cow.I don't know if you can sweep away a sacred cow.The sacred cows of the Republican Party.And there is a new Republican Party on identity, borders, anti-immigration.And so that's something very important which is going to stay.

And now I have the impression that you have a new left.

Leaving Afghanistan

… And Biden's decision on Afghanistan and pulling out the troops?What's your take on that? And what will be the result of the Taliban taking over 20 years later?

You know, really, when you have lost a war, it's better to really to end it as soon as possible, really.I remember, you know, when Nixon and Kissinger arrived in 1969, during four years they tried to find an honorable way out for the U.S. And I love a quotation by John Kerry who said, "Actually, we lost 30,000 soldiers so that the previous 30,000 dead soldiers didn't die for nothing."And it basically—it's always the problem when you are in a war you can't win, the natural reaction is to try to prolong it, to try to, in the very vain hope to have an honorable end.And I think it was courageous—really, what President Biden is doing is courageous, is running risk, is going to be criticized, especially by the military.As I was telling you, the military never accepts the responsibility of a failure, and always shift it to the civilians.And there are risks; you are right.If the Taliban take Kabul, how are they going to behave?But I frankly, the only alternative was leaving right now or having an endless war, you know, because the people who are criticizing President Biden are simply saying, "We should have stayed."Five years, 10 years, 20 years?Frankly, it's not possible.

And finally from me, is the America that you knew back before 9/11, how different is the America today?

Well, it's an America which is much less optimistic.You know, as I told you, it was a triumphant America who basically believed that they are the one, and definitely one.There was—a liberal democracy was the only model, and the American diplomacy was trying to expand it, and also expand.Really there were a lot of agreements on human rights, on chemical weapons. So it was a sort of a new world order was coming.And I think the expression "new world order" was used by George H. Bush—Bush, the father—after the war against Iraq, which was, in a sense, the signal, the first signal of the American supremacy.

And—but after the attack, really, when it came, the Iraq, the failures, the division of the country, and now you have China.So it's a very—it's a country—first, it's much more divided.It's a country incredibly polarized.But again, my country also is incredibly polarized, so that's really the crisis of our societies.

And there is this major challenge, which is to define a coexistence with China.And again, we are back to this problem that the Americans are always describing fights as good against evil, while with China the problem will be impossible to do it because the economies are so intertwined, the interests are.So there are so many common interests that you can't simply dismiss China or push back China.We have also to embrace China.

So I think it will be complicated.There will be bumps on the road.But the world—interests of the world is that they succeed, both of them.

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