In the election, one of the issues that comes up fairly late is
campaign finance. Gingrich and Dole are bringing it up every single day. You
develop a strategy basically to keep the president away from reporters. Tell
us about that.
It was a strategy born of necessity and it was not very comfortable because
Bill Clinton enjoys the repartee and the interaction with the press. I think
he would have preferred not to have an environment in which he couldn't do what
candidates normally do.
But when there is a singular focus of a press corps that is 180 degrees
different [from] the communication you're trying to have with the American
people in the midst of an election campaign, there's not much you can do. ... I
threw in the towel at that point.
The press wanted to focus exclusively on questions related to campaign
finance. It was their big story. They chafed at the fact that Bill Clinton
had coasted through the entire reelection campaign, remaining very ahead in the
polls. They had never really gotten at him and the race [wasn't] as close as
everyone had thought it would likely be.
The press corps collectively wanted an issue that they could use to put
Bill Clinton on the griddle and cut him down to size a little bit and we just
didn't make that opportunity available. It was painful for the press
secretary, I'll tell you that. But it was also necessary. ... When you're in
the final weeks of the campaign, the voters actually pay attention to the race
and what the candidates are talking about and they listen. The candidates,
because they have multiple opportunities to talk directly to the voters, can
deliver their message that way. So, it's a flow of information. It's not like
you're hiding in a bunker somewhere.
We just elected to have our conversation directly with the voters and not
through the press corps and it was irritating to many of the reporters. Still
is to this day.

Are you convinced that helped Clinton win?
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Bill Clinton delivers his victory speech on election
night 1996.
(11/5/96) |  |  |
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I think we would have won anyhow. We would have won even if we had elected
to confront some of these issues and dig in and try to unravel some of the
questions that were being asked by, for example, the Riyadi family. If we had
gotten into that, I think we could have weathered that storm and still have
comfortably been reelected because, frankly, there was not much of a campaign
developing in opposition to President Clinton.
So, we probably were better off being there than going back and forth about
campaign finance. On the other hand, matters have only gotten worse since
then. Maybe if we had paid more of a political price during the course of
1996, some of the practices that we're now seeing four years later would not
have developed, because there's essentially no rules now at all covering
campaign finance.

On the '96 election, as you say, your strategy was to keep the president
from the press because of the singular focus the press had. In the wake of
what were pretty rocky relations between this administration and the White
House press corps, was this another insult for the press that turned out later
to poison the well or hurt further down the road?
Clinton never got to a point where that relationship with the press corps
was a comfortable one. It was always contentious and something always happened
to make it less than the kind of easygoing banter that some presidents have
enjoyed. It may just be impossible to create that kind of relationship now.
It may be no longer available to any president.
It's too bad. I famously tried several things to warm relations between the
press corps and the president by making the president more available in relaxed
settings. None of it worked particularly well. The formality that comes into
only having the president available in these public occasions and occasionally
in press conferences, that might be the rule for the future.
But the truth is, there was just always a contentious relationship. There
was not a lot of trust on either side. The press corps didn't trust Bill
Clinton very much and Bill Clinton didn't trust the press corps to present
fairly the work of his administration.

In '97, you say the major accomplishment is the balanced budget. Do you
remember any particular moment that stands out or anything that the president
had said to you that jumps out as an anecdote?
There was some sense that you really were redefining the center of the
Democratic Party, ... a real sense that the Democrats finally owned the issue
of fiscal discipline and could legitimately portray themselves as a party that
knew how to use government but knew how to use it prudently.
The times in which you could really tag the Democratic Party with the label
"big spender," "tax and spender," that that was going to go by the wayside, because
we had demonstrated that a Democratic president, a Democratic White House would
work to balance the budget.

Fast forward to January '98. How do you hear about the Lewinsky scandal
developing? What is your first recollection? Was it Drudge over that
weekend?
Yeah, it was Drudge over the weekend and information that was not taken
very seriously at first because it sounded so utterly improbable. Early the
following week ... Tuesday night, we hear that the Post is going to go
with the story, that the three-judge court has authorized this new line of
inquiry for the Independent Counsel's Office and it revolves around these
allegations about a relationship with a young intern.

What do you find out about it and what do you try to find out about
it?
I remember this. It's sort of the quality of being in a state of
disbelief. The human instinct is to say, "Well, that can't possibly be true.
That's more sludge from Drudge." That was the instant take on the story. So,
we marched off looking for the ammunition we needed to knock the story down
and, of course, it just didn't come.
We kept asking lawyers and others, "Where is the strong denial? We need to
have a very strong denial." The president, as he struggled with the story the
day that it broke, went through a lot of contorted answers in three interviews
that he gave that day in which there were questions about which verb tense he
had used. We were all looking at each other, saying "He didn't deny it strongly
enough."
We didn't listen carefully as a staff. If we had listened more carefully
initially to the way the president struggled with the answer, warning lights
would have gone off.
My own personal reaction was--as it has been every time there was a matter
involving allegations or scandal or anything else--is to tread very carefully.
Rely on what you get from lawyers, because you cannot violate the president's
rights by going to him and asking him what's going on.
If I had gone to him and said, "What's the deal with you and this intern?" and
he had answered the question, that information would have exposed me to great
legal liability. I would have been subpoenaed and the president would have
forfeited the right to deal with this matter with his attorneys in confidence.
It was a very, very awkward and hard situation.
Nobody wants to talk about it and yet you have to come up with some kind of
denial. Once the signal from the president was that he was denying the story,
then we said, "You've got to get in there and deny the thing with every ounce
of energy you've got." Of course, that was bad, bad advice. He got that
advice obviously from more than several of us.

Just to back up a minute in the storytelling of this. So, Tuesday
night, you know the story is going to break. You make some phone calls.
Wednesday morning, you see the Post headline. What is your gut, visceral
feeling when you see that?
I don't think I want to describe what my gut was telling me to do at that
point, because it had more to do with vomiting than anything else. But you
read this and you said, this is incredible and it was hard to believe. It was
hard to imagine that any of this amounted to anything other than sort of a
weird bender that we were on for the day.
It was totally bizarre to be sitting there, looking at this paper, reading
this kind of story about the President of the United States of America. You
[wondered], what country did I wake up in this morning? I'm reading this about
the leader of the free world.

So, you make phone calls and what did you find out?
We didn't make phone calls. We were quite accustomed to being in crisis
mode. So, we were in crisis mode and everyone was methodically thinking about
the things we need to do. Where is the president going to be publicly
available to the press? How do we adjust his schedule given this story? Do we
suspend some of these interviews that are scheduled to occur? Do we go ahead
with them?
We had practical decisions to make and this was true throughout the whole
period of 1998. There was a government to run. We had jobs to do. You know,
we were not appointed by the president nor was the president elected by the
American people to dwell on this very awkward personal story, this matter that
was really about Bill Clinton, the man. It wasn't about Bill Clinton the
president.
So, all of us had to remember that we still had to get up and report for
duty and do the work that the American people expected of us everyday. That's
how you get through something like that. You just don't get wrapped up
personally in the story.

You say that advice was given to the president from you and others that
he wasn't being forceful enough.
Right. I'm accepting your chronology, I think. But the story breaks on a
Tuesday night. We go through Wednesday. The president gives some interviews
on Wednesday that don't sound particularly convincing. He stumbles through
questions in some of these interviews that had been long, long
scheduled.
So, we then see where we are going. And I think it was Thursday that
everyone convinces the president to get out there and be adamant about his
denial. Of course, he had been hearing the same thing from his friend, Harry
Thomason, and others who were there helping him through this very difficult
moment.

Thomason comes in because, according to him, he thinks the problem is
one of stage craft.
Yeah, right and [that we hadn't] found the right venue to be convincing
about this matter. All of us were giving him the advice that it would best for
you to go and confront this matter and demonstrate that you are passionately
denying it. It was, as I say, very bad advice, given the reality.

Do you remember the first press briefing that you conducted on
this?
I don't remember specifically the first one. I remember they all blend
together to one period of torment that I'll never forget. I guess what I
remember most about that briefing was walking into the briefing room and saying
to myself, "There is no physical way to fit this many cameras and this many
people into this room."
I remember almost laughing to myself saying, "This is definitely a fire
hazard or this is an occupational safety violation waiting to be served on
somebody." It was a circus. I certainly was not the lion tamer. I was there
more as the morsel to be served up, I think.

Was your confidence somewhat shaken at this point, early on?
I think my confidence was shaken. I didn't have access to the truth. There
were reasons for that that I understood. It wasn't because anybody was
deliberately not giving it to me. It's because I think the lawyers were trying
to assemble the answers to some of these questions. They were dealing with a
very determined, aggressive prosecutor and we just didn't have facts.
Because we didn't have facts, we had this kind of flimsy little statement
that I wasn't going to budge from and that's what I waved around as my only
line of defense for most of those briefings.

Later on, as the investigation proceeds, first of all, Monica Lewinsky
agrees to cooperate with the Independent Counsel. And you give a briefing in
which you say the president's basically pleased. I remember Sam gave you a
hard time about that. The president couldn't have been pleased at that
moment.
But ... if she cooperates there won't be any problem because the truth is
the truth. ... He lived with that fiction and allowed all the rest of us
to live with that fiction, too. But you see the logic of it. If you're
denying that you've had any inappropriate relationship with this woman, then of
course you want her to cooperate to tell the truth, because that's the truth.
So it was perfectly logical. The fact that no one was buying that had put us
in the awkward circumstances that we were in.

The day before the president's grand jury appearance, there's a
front-page story in the New York Times which hints that the president is
going to change his version of events. What did you think when you read that
story?
This is in August, fast-forwarding to August?

Right, right.
This was the most frustrating period I had as press secretary. There was a
story in the New York Times with four bylines on it of all solid, good
reporters, indicating that the president is about to change his story, that
he's going to admit to a very inappropriate relationship with the intern,
Monica Lewinsky, that he's prepared to accept whatever the consequences are for
that.
I wandered all throughout the White House, talking to all the president's
lawyers and all the president's men and women, trying to say, "Somebody has a
media strategy here that I haven't been clued into." ... And not a single person
took any responsibility for that.
In fact, everyone who is a likely source of that story specifically told me
that they didn't give it out. In fact, some of them said it would be crazy for
us to leak a story like that because we wouldn't want to give Ken Starr a
roadmap in advance of the president's deposition.
But clearly someone did it. Or, what is entirely likely as well, a number
of people politically trying to be helpful to the president started exploring
with senior figures of the party. What if the president gives this kind of
testimony? What would be the reaction? There was some attempt to take
temperature.
And then from that, people thought they had some authoritative signals that
the president was going to give X, Y and Z testimony. [Even though] the
Clinton administration is often accused of having these clever strategies for
dealing with the press, there was completely zero advance planning over the
flow of those stories. There was a New York Times story citing four
sources the following day. Bob Woodward has a byline in the Washington
Post with much the same kind of take on what the president's testimony
would be.
No one said to me, "You can go and confirm that story because that is, in
fact, what the president is going to do." But of course, no one said you can't
deny it either. ... So, I was sitting there once again looking like a complete
idiot because there was no information that I had that I could use to answer
obvious questions.

Did you at any time get the sense that the president was using this leak
as a way to prepare his wife?
I don't know. That has been speculated upon as a possible theory. There
may be truth to that, I just don't know.
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