William C. Potter
(Director of the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies)
"Arms Control Today"

October 1995

The West no longer can rely on luck to prevent nuclear leakage from the states of the former Soviet Union (FSU). By mid-1995, the number of confirmed cases of significant nuclear smuggling had grown to at least four. The size of the seizures also has increased to kilogram quantities of weapon-usable material. Additional quantities of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium have been diverted from Russian nuclear facilities, but were seized prior to their experts.

Clearly, we have now moved beyond the realm of hypothetical threats of nuclear leakage, and denying the problem is counterproductive. But a nuclear deluge is not inevitable and can be averted with short and longer-term corrective measures.

Many of the important characteristics of each of the significant cases of diversion or smuggling of HEU and plutonium that originated in the FSU are summarized in the table on p. 10. What follows are brief summaries that highlight the patterns of behavior of suppliers, smugglers and endusers in those cases.


The first confirmed case involving the diversion of HEU or plutonium from nuclear facilities in the FSU occurred at the Luch Scientific Production Association in Podolsk, a town about 40 kilometers southwest of Moscow.

Between late May and early September 1992, Leonid Smirnov, a chemical engineer and long-time employee of the plant, stole approximately one-an-a-half kilograms of weapons-grade HEU. He accumulated this quantity gradually by taking material out of the plant in the form of uranium dioxide (UO2) powder in 50-70 gram-size glass jars on 20 to 25 occasions and storing it on his apartment balcony.

Smirnov had no accomplices and was apparently motivated by an article he read in Komsomolskaya Pravda about the fortune to be made selling HEU. He was apprehended at the Podolsk railroad terminal on October 9, 1992, along with most of the HEU concealed in three lead cylinders. Smirnov had planned to travel to Moscow to sell nuclear material, and while he initially confessed to having in mind a specific customer from the Caucasus, the official investigation concluded that no concrete buyer had been contacted.

Smirnov was convicted under Articles 223.2 and 223.3 of the 1988 Penal Code for stealing and storing radioactive material and could have received up to 10 years of imprisonment. Instead, on March 11, 1993, he was sentenced to three years probation and released from prison.


One of the earliest confirmed thefts of HEU occurred in late July 1993 at a storage facility of the Northern Fleet naval base at Andreeva Guba, 40 kilometers from the Norwegian border. Two naval servicemen were arrested in the case and accused of stealing 1.8 kilograms of HEU from two fuel assemblies. The material, which was recovered, was enriched to approximately 30 percent uranium-235 (U-235) and used as fuel for third-generation naval reactors. The men said they were operating under instructions from two naval officers--both of whom continue to deny involvement in the theft. The case is expected to go to trial this fall, with at least four people likely to be charged. Additional suspects associated with a Murmansk-St. Petersburg criminal ring are still under investigation.


On November 27, 1993, Captain Alexei Tikhomirov and Oleg Baranov slipped through and uprotected gate and into the Sevmorput (Rosta) shipyard near Mirmansk--one of the Russian navy's main storage facilities for nuclear fuel. Tikhimirov, a retired naval officer whose brother Dmitry was working at the shipyard, climbed through one of many holes in the fence surrounding Fuel Storage 3-30 and sawed through a padlock on the back door and pried open the door with a metal pole he found next to the building. Inside, he located the containers of fresh submarine fuel, broke off parts of three assemblies from a VM-4-AM reactor core, stuffed the material containing 4.5 kilograms of uranium (enriched to approximately 20 percent U-235) into a bag, and retraced his steps.

The theft was soon discovered because the perpetrators carelessly left open the back door of the storage building. But the culprits were not apprehended, and the material was not recovered from Baranov's garage in the town of Polyarny until six months later when Dmitry Tikhomirov told a fellow officer about the theft and asked for help in selling the stolen merchandise. Apparently, despite months of careful planning to steal the material, the men had not figured out a way to dispose of it.

In early 1994, the three defendants, all active duty or retired naval officers with no prior criminal records, went to trial. Two received three-and-a-half year prison sentences; the third was freed. According to the military prosecutor investigating the case, at the time of the theft, "potatoes were guarded better than naval fuel," even though most of the fuel was highly enriched and some of it was weapons-grade.(1) The first and last time the contents of most of the fuel canisters were checked, the prosecutor says, was at the fuel fabrication plant. Because of the inadequate material control and accountancy, he contends, the diversion "could have been concealed for 10 years or longer" if the open back door had not attracted the guard's attention.(2)


The first known smuggling case involving more than minuscule quantities of HEU or plutonium occurred May 10, 1994, when German police in Tengen, Baden-Wuerttemberg, inadvertently discovered a vial containing 5.6 grams of nearly pure plutonium-239 (pu-239) in the garage of Adolf Jaekle. At the time, Jaekle was under investigation for counterfeiting.

Although the origin of the super-grade material has not been determined definiteively, there are indications it was produced for non-weapon purposes at the Soviet nuclear weapons laboratory Arzamas-16 (recently renamed Kremlev). According to the prevailing theory at the U.S. Department of Energy, the vial of Pu-239 was part of a total inventory of no more than several kilograms of very pure plutonium used as a "standards sample" to measure fission cross-sections and the energy levels of nulcei. Energy officials hypothesize that samples similar to the amount seized in Tengen may have been distributed by Arzamas-16 to dozens of nuclear research laboratories in the FSU, as well as in Eastern Europe.

At present, many important questions about the Tengen case remain unresolved, especially the plutonium supply route and the intended end-user, if any. But the case is significant--if for no other reason than that it was not a police "sting" operation.


In August 1994, Bavarian authorities reported that in Landshut on June 13, 1994, they had seized 800 milligrams of HEU enriched to 87.7 percent U-235. On August 8, they arrested a German real estate dealer as the central figure in a group accused of illegal commerce in, and possession of, nuclear material. Also arrested as part of a sting operation were five men from Slovakia and Czech Republic. Based on spectrometric analyses of the HEU and its enrichment level, authorities at the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), the organization responsible for applying safeguards to all civilian nuclear facilities within the European Union, believe the material most likely was produced for naval reactor or research reactor fuel, not weapons. Although only a small quantity of HEU was seized, the case is potentially significant because the material is identical to a much larger amount seized in Prague six months later.


The last of the significant German smuggling cases occurred August 10, 1994, when the Bavarian Landeskriminalant (LKA) seized a suitcase being unloaded from Lufthansa Airline Flight 3369 from Moscow at Munich's Franz Jozef Strauss Airport. It contained a plastic bag with several hundred grams of lithium-6 (used to make tritium) and a metal container holding 560 grams of mixed oxides of uranium and plutonium. The result of a sting operation, this was by far the largest seizure of weapon-usable material (363 grams of Pu-239) recovered in the West. Authorities arrested Justiniano Torres Benitez, a Columbian national, and Spaniards Julio Oroz and Javier Bengoechea Arratibel at the airport.

Initially, German authorities asserted that the plutonium seized in Munich was produced in Russia for use in weapons. Russian officials not only denied those charges, but maintained the material did not originate in Russia. In Moscow's view--or at least that of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM)--the entire operation was staged to embarrass the Russian nuclear industry and undercut its international competitiveness. Some MINATOM spokesman went so far as to accuse German intelligence agents of planting the plutonium on the plane.

German authorities now concede they knew in advance that the plutonium would be on the flight from Moscow, but justify their failure to notify Russian officials by saying they were concerned about links between Russian criminal groups and security personnel.

Western authorities are now convinced this plutonium, like that recovered in Tengen and Landshut, was not produced for weapons. Although strong circumstantial evidence suggests the plutonium is of Soviet origin, as Mark Hibbs points out, the absence of a catalog of "signatures" from Soviet fissile material production facilities makes it impossible to conclude on technical grounds that the plutonium--possibly from a batch of experimental reactor fuel--comes from a Russian reactor fuel depot instead of one in Kazakhstan, Ukraine or Eastern Europe.(3)

The Luftansa case was significant in demonstrating that sizeable quantities of weapon-usable material could be procured. However, in this instance the demand appears to have been artificially created by German intelligence and security service officials. This possible violation of German law by the German foreign intelligence agency (BND) and its head, Bernd Schmidbauer, came under investigation in April 1995, by the Parliamentary Control Commission. Reportedly, millions of dollars were made available to the smugglers as a bank credit to purchase the material. The BND and the LKA also are accused of offering their undercover operative a bonus of 300,000 Deutchmarks ($215,000) if he succeeded in obtaining plutonium from a smuggler.

Largely because of the way the parties were enticed to commit the crime and the absence of evidence demonstrating the involvement of any buyer other than the BND or LKA, in July 1995 the Munich District Court gave light sentences to the three confessed smugglers.

Although they might have gotten up to 10 years under the Federal Weapons of War Control Act, the harshest sentence was four years and 10 months, given to Benitez. Arratibel received three years and nine months, and Oroz received three years.


On December 14, 1994, Prague police, acting on an anonymous telephone tip, seized 2.72 kilograms of HEU from the back seat of a car parked on a busy street in the Czech capital. The HEU, contained in two cylindrical metal canisters and enriched to 87.7 percent U-235, was in the form of UO2 powder.

Police arrested the car's owner, Jaroslav Vagner, from the Czech Republic, and his two car companions from Belarus and Ukraine. All three had backgrounds in the nuclear industry. Vagner worked for several years at the Nuclear Research Institute at Rez and at nuclear power stations at Dukovany and Temelin, reportedly leaving Temelin over poor wages. Czech police say the others also were "nuclear workers" who had come to the Czech Republic in the past year. Media reports in March 1995 indicate that Czech police have arrested two more people, one allegedly a Prague police officer.

The material--the largest quantity of weapon-usable nuclear contraband found outside of Russia to date--appears to be identical to the 800 milligrams of HEU recovered in Landshut in June 1994. As in the Landshut case, there is no consensus as to origin. Czech officials first claimed the material was irradiated in a reactor, separated in a reprocessing plant and then re-enriched. Some analysts think the material may be a "cocktail" consisting of uranium from several sources--perhaps designed intentionally to mask the production site(s). Others think the material has been reprocessed from spent RBMK fuel or is a blend of reprocessed uranium and other stock. All experts agree, however, that the material did not originate from weapon stocks and was more likely produced to fuel naval or research reactors. Consistent with this interpretation, Czech police think the HEU they seized may have been provided by criminals who supply stolen submarine or icebreaker fuel from Russia's Northern Fleet.(4)

Additional Cases of Concern

The seizures of nuclear material in Podolsk, Andreeva Guba, Polyarny, Tengen, Landshut, Munich and Prague have been singled out as proliferation-significant because, unlike other reported cases of attempted nuclear smuggling, they involved more than minuscule quantities of HEU or plutonium and without question occurred and are not mere rumor. At least three more cases are also likely to be of proliferation concern, but do not as clearly meet the standard of unambiguous evidence with respect to either independent sources to corroborate the diversion, or the size or enrichment level of the material. The three cases involve the seizure of a large cache of beryllium, including a far smaller quantity of a beryllium and HEU alloy, in the basement of a bank in Vilnius, Lithuania, in May 1993; the reported recovery in St. Petersburg, Russia, in June 1994 of 3.05 kilograms of weapon-usable HEU in the form of uranium dioxide powder, allegedly stolen from a nuclear facility (most likely Electrostal) near Moscow in March 1994: and, the seizure of six kilograms of enriched uranium (probably 20 percent U-235) in March 1995 in Kiev, Ukraine.

The St. Petersburg case is potentially the most serious of the three in terms of reported quantity and enrichment level. However, after initial Russian press accounts, there has been no new information on the case or news of any criminal investigation or trial (if any took place). Nonetheless, a number of U.S. government agencies believe the theft occured. FBI Director Louis Freeh included it in a list of possible nuclear thefts in his May 1994 congressional testimony. There is also speculation that the material is part of the same HEU stockpile from which the Landshut and Prague material were supplied.

The Vilnius case, discussed in more detail below, is intriquing mainly because of the possible complicity of government authorities. At issue in the March 1995 Kiev seizure is the level of enrichment of the six kilograms of uranium. Although the U.S. Energy Department is inclined to categorize the fuel as low-enriched of the six kilograms of uranium for power reactors--based upon the cylindrical shape of the pellets in which it is contained--analysis of the material by the Kiev Institute for Nuclear Research indicates an enrichment level of 20 percent, consistent with much naval reactor fuel.

In examining various areas of nuclear proliferation, attention also should be given to the largely unnoticed but flourishing trade in nuclear-related, dual-use materials and technologies. These are 65 items such as beryllium, zirconium and hafnium that have civilian and nuclear weapon uses and are subject to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) export guidelines. Russia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine are major producers of dual-use nuclear goods, and the Baltic states have served as principal transhippers, especially of rare-earth metals.

The seizure by U. S. Customs agents of over seven tons of Ukrainian-produced zirconium in June is the most celebrated case.

Patterns of Behavior

Analysis of confirmed cases of HEU and plutonium theft or diversions reveals some interesting, if not statistically significant, patterns. For example, it is apparent that although the number of proliferation-significant instances remains small, the quantity of nuclear material offered for sale has increased. Most material recovered to date has been enriched uranium, usually in the form of uranium dioxide powder. The preponderance of seizures involving definite or possible fresh fuel for propulsion reactors also is striking. The other cases involved nuclear material similar to that found in many of the more than 50 sites in the FSU at which HEU and plutonium are present. Although a number of these facilities in Russia are engaged in civilian and military-related nuclear activities, none of the seizures to date provides evidence of having come from nuclear weapons.

Based upon available information, it is difficult to generalize about the initial procurers of proliferation-significant nuclear material. Most reliable information is limited to those parties who were unsuccessful in selling the material. Nonetheless, we know that many suppliers were "insiders" who had worked or were then working at nuclear research institutes or naval bases. Most of the perpetrators apparently did not have customers in hand (other than perhaps German intelligence authorities) at the time of the diversions. Rather, evidence suggests that the thieves--especially those who were apprehended--generally were ill-informed novices in the business of nuclear trafficking who were disaffected with their economic lot and looking to make a quick profit. This applies even more clearly to traffickers in nuclear material of no proliferation significance, some of whom perished through careless handling of their radioactive contraband.

Many analysts think an "end-user market" exists for weapon-usable nuclear material. The most likely end-users--those who would actually use the material, not resell it for a profit--are perceived to be rogue states with nuclear-weapon ambitions. However, a review of cases in which HEU and plutonium actually have been diverted does not provide reliable evidence that end-users have been active in the illicit Russian nuclear marketplace to date.

One legitimate question worth examining is "How confident should we be that proliferation-significant smuggling of nulcear material from the FSU has simply excaped detection?" It is known, for example, that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Iran bacame particularly interested in Kazakhstan's nuclear-related assets, including those at the Ulba Metallurgy Plant in Ust-Kamenogorsk. Concern about this prompted Kazakhstan and the United States to cooperate in "Project Sapphire" to airlift 600 kilograms of HEU from the Ulba plant to the United States in November 1994.

Some media reports also suggest that prior to his arrest, Jaekle might have had discussions with represenatives of a nuclear weapons aspirant. But this nuclear supply chain thesis is not yet borne out by the available date. There are, however, indications that some states may be seeking to exploit imprudent state-sanctioned nuclear exports from Russia to meet their nuclear weapons aspirations.

New and Old Nuclear Threats

In contrast to 1994, most evidence for 1995 indicates a pause in the acceleration of proliferation-significant diversions, but it also suggests the existence of conditions conducive to an exponential rise in the rate of nuclear leakage from the FSU. These factors include enormous inventories of weapon-usable materials, underdeveloped safeguards, inadequate export controls, a rise in political instability and corruption and a corresponding decline in the perception of national (as opposed to individual and organizational) interests. The material shortages so commonplace in the Soviet Union did not apply to nuclear weapons or weapon-usable material. Russia's nuclear material inventory--distributed over more than 50 sites --is estimated to consist of 1,100 to 1,300 tons of HEU and 165 tons of separated, weapon-usable plutonium.

The bulk of Soviet nuclear assets are concentrated in Russia, but proliferation-significant quantities of weapons-grade material are in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Although there are unlikely to be any more hidden caches the size of that discovered -- and removed -- from Ust-Kamenogorsk, it would not be surprising to see the declared nuclear material inventories in a number of the post-Soviet states increase as International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections take place. Indicative of this phenomenon was the five-fold increase in weapons-grade uranium reported to the IAEA this year at Ukraine's Khar'kiv Physical-Technical Institute (up from 15 to 75 kilograms of HEU enriched to 90 percent U-235), and the IAEA's discovery during its February 1995 visit to Sevastopol of a previously undeclared research reactor at the Navy Academy of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.

Underdeveloped Safeguards

International safeguards are designed to deter national governments from diverting nuclear material from peaceful to military purposes and to detect diversion if it occurs. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, all of the non-Russian successor states have acceded to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states and many (Armenia, Belarus, Estonia, Zazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine and Uzbekistan) have concluded safeguards agreements with the IAEA.

Although safeguards agreements are currently only in effect for Armenia, Latvia, Lithuania and Ukraine, there is no longer much worry that any Soviet successor states will attempt to divert nuclear material for indigenous weapon programs.

Of far greater concerns is the prospect that post-Soviet states with nuclear assets will be unable to meet reasonable standards for safeguards directed against non-state actors. These safeguards emphasize physical security, material control and accounting (MPC&A) and refer to the measures undertaken by national governments "to detect, deter, prevent or respond to the unauthorized possession or use of significant quantities of nuclear materials through theft or diversion and sabotage of nuclear facilities."

Conventional wisdom has it that the Soviet nuclear fuel cycle was secure from penetration by outsiders because of the country's authoritarian political system, pervasive network of internal security and the close integration of its civilian and military components. The vulnerability of the most sensitive nuclear facilities--uranium enrichment and conversion plants and plutonium reprocessing and storage facilities--also was reduced by their location in relatively remote and stable regions.

Physical protection probably remains better today at Russian uranium enrichment and plutonium production sites than at research institutes, fuel storage facilities for propulsion reactors and non-standard fuel cycle facilities. But an underdeveloped physical protection culture, along with declining resources for workers in the nuclear sector, combine to undermine the security of all Russian nuclear installations. This is apparent even at those sites where large quantities of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium are present. Although security against external threats generally is high, until recently little attention has been given to the threat of diversion by insiders. The threat is a function of both inadequate physical security and the remnants of the Soviet approach to material control, which emphasized centrally-planned production targets and personal responsibility, rather than facility-specific inventory accounting. Especially prone to neglect in terms of measurement and reporting, and a point of diversion vulnerability now recognized by MINATOM, were fissile material waste streams and scraps that did not count toward the production quota. This less-than-systematic approach to material accounting may help to explain the extraordinary recovery by members of the Project Sapphire team of more HEU than Kazakhstan thought was in its Ulba plant inventory.

Progress now is being made to provide Western assistance to upgrade MPC&A at key Russian nuclear facilities, but a tremendous gap remains between the magnitude of the national safeguards problem and efforts so far directed toward its resolution. Among those nuclear sites identified by the United States as most in need of safeguards improvements are fuel cycle facilities at Tomsk-7 (Seversk), the Mayak Chemical Combine, Krasnoyarsk-26 (Zelenogorsk), Sverdlovsk-44 (Novouralsk), the Electrostal Machine Building Plant and the Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrate Plant. Other research centers targeted for priority MPC&A assistance are the Kurchatov Institute (Moscow); the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering (Obninsk); the Scientific Research Institute for Atomic Reactors (Dmitrovgrad); and the Luch Scientific Production Association (Podolsk).

Although security at military facilities probably remains much higher than at civilian nuclear sites, the situation may be less sanguine than previously recognized. According to one recent report, "many nuclear warheads are now being stored in facilities constructed for the storage of conventional munitions under less than adequate physical security." These warheads may be particularly vulnerable to theft by disgruntled former or active duty Russian Special Operations (Spetsnaz) troops who are trained to use atomic demolition weapons and who may have knowledge of, and access to, nuclear weapons storage depots.

On occasion, MINATOM officials have acknowleged that interim storage facilities from dimantled weapons are "not very safe" and "are not adequately guarded." Warhead security during transportation also is a source of official concern, as is the lack of trained personnel and modern safeguards equipment. Russian officials privately have confided that security is particularly suspect at warhead disassembly facilities in Zarechny (formerly Penza-19), Trekhgorny (formerly Zlatoust-36) and Lesnoy (formerly Sverdlovsk-45), as well as at certain weapons component facilities at Kremlev (formerly Arzamas-16). Although there are not yet any confirmed cases of warhead diversion from these or other sites, Russian scientists familiar with the case have told this author there is at least one instance in which a fissile material component from a warhead may have been lost and then recovered.

In another alarming case, inspectors from the Russian Defense Ministry reportedly discovered a temporarily deserted SS-25 nuclear missile battery. Its crew had left the site for several hours to find food. While it is hoped such stories are apocryphal, the general state of disarray and economical malaise in the Russian military and nuclear weapons complex argues against dismissing them out of hand.

Nuclear Terrorism

The risk of nuclear terrorism was minimal in the Soviet Union, due partly to the pervasiveness of internal security measures. Although still low, the probability of non-state actors resorting to nuclear violence has risen with the fracturing of the Soviet state, ethnic upheaval and the location of nuclear assets proximate to regions experiencing organized violence. The probability is likely to increase if political turbulence in the FSU grows, economic chaos ensues, ethnic violence escalates and central authority and control diminish. Nuclear terrorism subsumes a variety of threats. The one most often discussed in the Western press involves the seizure of nuclear weapons by a renegade military movement. This possibility was reduced, but not eliminated, by the transfer of all tactical nuclear weapons to Russian territory. Tactical nuclear weapons are apt to be preferred by terrorists because they are relatively small and because the older ones do not have "permissive action links" (PALS) to protect their unauthorized use.

A second potential terrorist threat is the possible use of conventional weapons against a civilian nuclear power facility. Although the probability of success is not high, Russian officials take seriously the possibility of terrorist attacks by Chechen commandos against nuclear power installations. Some nuclear power facilities, for example, reportedly are now guarded by rapid reaction troops as well as police units. Armenian authorities are also alert to the potential terrorist risk that is posed by the scheduled restart later this year of the Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant, which was shut down in 1989.

Implementing planned physical protection upgrades at nuclear sites in Russia and other Soviet successor states will go a long way toward reducing the danger of nuclear terrorism in the region. However, the vast stocks of weapon-usable material in Russia and the difficulty at the present time of distinguishing between "material unaccounted for" and stolen material, enhances the credibility of extortionist threats by terrorists--even if they are unfounded. Illustrative of this dilemma was the decision by Lithuanian authorities in November 1994 to shut down temporarily the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant in response to a terrorist threat by local organized crime figures. The threat had to be treated as credible, especially because two years earlier an employee at Ignalina sabotaged the plant's computer system by introducing viruses.

Organized Crime

There is broad agreement among analysts that crime is mushrooming in the FSU, and while they may differ on what constitutes "organized crime," most discern rampant organized criminal activity. But there is little agreement --and even less reliable information--on the extent of organized criminal activity (or interest) in nuclear material trafficking. To date, most evidence linking organized criminal groups to nuclear material smuggling is anecdotal and not well documented. U.S. officials thus continue to maintain there is no solid evidence that organized criminal groups--as distinct from individuals with possible ties to organized crime--have been directly engaged in the theft or trafficking of sensitive nuclear materials. This assessment is consistent with a careful analysis of the open source literature on nuclear smuggling, but a definitive study has yet to be written.

Less reassuring, however, are indications that a blurred line separates legal and illicit nuclear trade and criminal and state-sanctioned activites in the FSU. The ambiguous divide is illustrated by the May 1993 Vilnius case where authorities discovered 27 boxes in the basement of the Innovation Bank that contained approximately four tons of beryllium pieces, some of them mechanically implanted with HEU. Only the presence of a small amount of U-235--probably no more than 150 grams--allowed authorities to seize the cache, because Lithuania had no laws or regulations governing possession or commerce in dual-use nuclear-related material.

A team of U.S. reporters that investigated the case conclude the material probably originated at the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering at Obninsk and was shipped to Vilnius by a firm from Sverdlovsk. Officials from Sverdlovsk region were also reportedly involved in the deal. Although Russia does have regulations governing the export of beryllium, and notwithstanding the use of improperly documented export papers by the Russian shippers, Russian authorities chose not to treat the transaction as an illegal export. As a result, the beryllium--minus those pieces contaminated by HEU--has been returned to the Innovation Bank, where it now sits as collateral for a loan (presumably made to its Russian owners.)

Under such circumstances of under-developed law and governmental acquiescence in questionable nuclear commerce, it is difficult to say what constitutes organized criminal nuclear activity. But it is possible to think of a number of reasons why organized criminal groups might rationally decide to shy away from nuclear smuggling. As Renselaer Lee has noted, "few other activities seem as likely to arouse the interest of Western security service and to generate international pressure for a Russian government crackdown on the organized crime sector." And, as Lee points out, unlike narcotics, no mass market for sensitive nuclear materials exists, buyers may be hard to locate, and special precautions must be taken in handling the contraband. These are persuasive disincentives. They may not always prevail, however, especialy among criminal groups willing to take high risks for short-term profits rather than developing long-term extortion relationships. Some research shows that in the revolutionary economic and social conditions of post-Soviet Russia criminal groups appear less inclined than their Western counterparts to seek "long-term relationships that allow both organized crime groups and businesses to prosper." It also should be anticipated that organized crime will gravitate toward nuclear smuggling if weapon-usable material is, first of all, accessible in quantity and if, secondly, real end-users become active in the nuclear marketplace. Regrettably, the sting operations of 1994 have confirmed the first of these two conditions, and in so doing also may unintentionally stimulate end-user activity.

Export Controls and Problems

Most nuclear material and related technology and equipment that leaves the FSU is exported through official channels. Foreign access to nuclear supplies from the successor states, therefore, depends on both national export policy and the effectiveness of each state's export controls.

As the inheritor of the well-developed Soviet export control structure , the Russian system from the outset possessed considerable technical know-how. As a result, most of the formal changes introduced since 1992 have involved efforts to reorganize the existing bureacracy and to make the prior system more compatible with the rise of non-governmental exporters and more market-based activities.

One of the major organizational innovations was the creation in April 1992 of an intergovernmental Russian Federation Export Control Commission, which was set up to coordinate state export control policy in pursuit of Russia's non-proliferation objectives. In practice, however, export decisions involving nuclear material and technology increasingly have been taken by MINATOM and the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, with little input by the Foreign Affairs Ministry or the Export Control Commission. This fact, together with the difficult economic and political constraints under which the Russian export control system functions, helps to explain a number of recent, imprudent Russian nuclear export initiatives. These include contracts to provide nuclear assistance to Iran (involving completion of the Bushehr nuclear plant and training for Iranian nuclear scientists); to assist the development of China's nuclear program, including the provision of reactors and a uranium enrichment plant; and to build two 1,000-mega-watt (electric) VVER-type reactors at Koodangulan in India.

The Indian deal, if implemented, is especially serious because it would appear to be at odds with Russia's pledge to insist upon full-scope international safeguards as a condition of nuclear export. These state-sanctioned nuclear initiatives, which subordiante non-proliferation objectives to those of economic gain, also send the wrong signals to private nuclear entrepreneurs within Russia and to other Soviet successor states.

Unlike Russia, the other post-Soviet governments inherited little in the way of export control structures or expertise. Although there has been some progress in developing new export control procedures in Belarus, Kazakhstan and expecially Ukraine, there is no apparent high-level political commitment to stringent export controls in these states. There are recent instances, for example, in which Ukraine has approved dual-use nuclear exports that were not consistent with its own established export control procedures.

The effectiveness of Russia's export controls also is undermined by the absence of effective customs controls between Russian and the other post-Soviet republics. This factor, combined with underdeveloped export controls outside of Russia and a lack of equipment for monitoring illicit nuclear trade means that sensitive defense goods--including nuclear material and technology--can pass readily from Russia or Ukraine to other post-Soviet states, and from there to countries of major proliferation concern. If anything, this problem of the 'weakest link" will increase if recent agreements to establish customs unions, and unregulated trade between Belarus and Russia and Russia and Kazakhstan, are implemented.

Corrective Measures

Many Western analysts and officials maintain that the seizures of HEU and plutonium last year were the first wave of the long-anticipated flood of nuclear contraband. This forecast has not yet been borne out in 1995, although the potential for a sharp rise in nuclear leakage persists. A coordianted plan of short- and longer-term corrective measures should be vigorously pursued to reduce the chances that these dire predictions become true.

The first area for improvement involves U.S.-Russian cooperation. U.S. denuclearization assistance through the government-to-governemnt Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program and the lab-to-lab effort have contributed significantly to safeguarding Russia's nuclear assets, especially in the past nine months. The potential impact of U.S. assistance, however, has been diminshed by the asymmetry in the donor-recipient relationship and by perceived differences in the program objectives of the donor and recipient states. Officials in the FSU, particularly, have resented the CTR legislative requirements for stringent audits and the purchase of U.S. equipment.

To minimize these impediments and expedite improvements in national safeguards, the United States and Russia must move from a donor-recipient relationahip to true cooperation, with both sides working together to promote non-proliferation objectives at home and abroad. As Graham Allison and his colleagues at Harvard point out, this means forging a bilateral "shared sense of mission" and introducing a greater degree of reciprocity in MPC&A activities--even when the problems of safeguards may not be perfectly symmetrical.

Institutional resistance in both countries is a serious obstacle to greater collaboration. The U.S. Navy, for example, has been unenthusiastic about Russian proposals to extend MPC&A cooperation to naval fuel because of the reciprocal access and transparency such an arrangement might entail. MONATOM understandably is wary of assistance that might discredit its past operations and undermine its present dominance in the nuclear sector. U.S. offers of financial assistance for inventory accounting and material control thus may be resisted, even if such assistance might serve other institutional objectives. An effective joint program to secure Russian nuclear stocks must therefore include appropriate incentives that will ensure MINATOM's cooperation.

Probably the most financially lucrative incentive is the timely implementation of the 1992 U.S. agreement to purchase 500 tons of surplus Russian weapons-grade HEU (blended down to low-enriched uranium) for $12 billion. The United States should seek to accelerate the HEU deal, which has moved very slowly until recently, and to purchase additional weapon-usable fissile material from dismantled weapons and non-weapons stocks. It may be possible, for example, to purchase up to 100 tons of surplus Russian weapons-grade plutonium for fabrication into reactor fuel at the nearly completed Siemens plant at Hanau, Germany. A portion of the payments could be earmarked for MPC&A improvements and to assist in the conversion away from plutonium activities of Russia's three "plutonium cities"--Tomsk-7, Krasnoyarsk-26, and Chelyabinsk-65.

The second area for improvement involves expansion of the safeguards effort. The Energy Department has an extremely ambitious program which, if implemented on schedule, should go a long way toward stanching the illicit flow of sensitive nuclear materials from states of the former Soviet Union. Under current plans, by the end of 1996 the United States hopes to to provide the resources to: upgrade significantly MPC&A upgrades at a wide range of additional Russian sites, including a cross-section of those within the MINATOM weapons complex and at civilian and naval propulsion reactors; facilitate the development of a national nuclear material accounting system; foster the growth of an effective national regulatory program in Russia; and facilitate a sustainable indigenous Russian MPC&A program. (The fledgling Russian nuclear regulatory body, Gosatomnadzor (GAN), suffered a major defeat on July 25 when Yeltsin declined to sign a new Atomic Energy Act passed by the Duma, which codfied GAN's MPC&A oversight responsibilities in both the military and civilian sectors. On June 26 Yeltsin signed a new decree stripping both GAN of some of its regulatory authority in the military domain.) (16)

These all are vital steps that deserve the highest level of political support in both countries. The estimated cost of approximately $70 million to implement the program through fiscal year 1996 is a modest amount to pay for improved physical protection and material control.

However, not all safeguards problems are amenable to "technical fixes." Probably most difficult to correct, but also significant for the long-term security of Russia's nuclear assets, is what may best be called an "underdeveloped physical protection culture" among the staff and custodians of the post-Soviet nuclear industry. In part, this tendency to undervalue physical protection rules and regulations is the product of the Soviet political and economic system, which bred such work and management practices as the avoidance of individual initiative and responsibility and the neglect of employee safety. These habits persist, even though many Russian nuclear industry officials acknowledge that plant security and material control improvements must be made.

Changing attitudes and instilling a new philosophy cannot be done easily or quickly. Nor will an influx of money alone solve the problem. A sustained educational effort is required. The plan proposed by Moscow and agreed to by Washington to create a training center in Obinsk to reinforce indigenous MPC&A efforts by educating a new generation of specialists who will serve as practitioners and instructors is a step in the right direction.

Programs, Policies and Solutions

Most nuclear security problems are inextricably linked to the region's troubled economic, political and social conditions. As such, they are unlikely to be completely resolved without substantial progress toward stabilizing the economy and renewing public trust in government institutions and law. This is not likely to occur soon, and the United States will thus continue to face at least some threat of nuclear leakage from the former Soviet Union for the forseeable future.

The precise nature of the threat will be determined by a combination of factors, including the pace of corrective actions, national decisions about the disposotion of excess fissile material from weapons and the demand by end-users for weapons material.

The United States should not exaggerate its ability to influence the course of these developments, but it can make a difference--and should endeavor to do so. Part of its long-term strategy to contain fissile material proliferation should be to seek to create a safeguards regime that extends to [all] nuclear weapon-usable material in the nuclear-weapon states.(17) In 1994, the United States took a step in this direction when it voluntarily took one ton of plutonium and 10 tons of HEU out of its active weapons inventory and agreed to place the material under IAEA safeguards. In March 1995, President Bill Clinton announced that the United States had "permanently withdrawn" another 200 tons of fissile material from its nuclear stockpile.

It will not be easy to persuade Russia to participate in such a comprehensive multilateral regime, given MINATOM's current opposition to an IAEA presence at its military facilities. Some decision makers in the U.S. government can also be expected to resist. It may, therefore, be preferable, at least initially, to pursue an expanded safeguards regime with Russia on a bilateral research and development basis. As Tom Cochran of the National Resources Defense Council has stressed, the primary focus of the initiative should not be to compel the parties to make a political commitment to adopt comprehensive bilateral or multilateral safeguards, but rather to engage them in a fully reciprocal research, development and demonstration program.

This approach not only embraces the principle of truly joint U.S.-Russian cooperation to achieve non-proliferation objectives, but it has the added virtue of redirecting U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons scientists and laboratories to work in non-weapon areas.

The presidential summit scheduled for next spring in Moscow would be an excellent occasion to launch a new joint U.S.-Russian initiative in the field of nuclear safeguards. It has already been announced that the meeting, which was proposed by President Boris Yeltsin, will focus on nuclear safety and security. What better forum to demonstrate to the non-nuclear-weapon states that the two nuclear superpowers also take seriously their fissile material control responsibilities?


1. Russia's eight nuclear-powered icebreakers, for example, use uranium enriched to 90 percent, as do some other naval reactors. For amplification on this point, see Oleg Bukharin and William Potter, "Potatoes were guarded better," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 1995., pp. 46-50.

2. Interview with Mikhail Kulik in Yaderniy Kontrol, January, 1995, pp.12-13. Kulik also was a chief investigator in the Andreeva Guba case.

3. Mark Hibbs, "U.S. Agencies Lacking Data on Source of Seized Plutonium," Nucleaonics Week, May 25, 1995, p.17.

4. Hibbs, "Which Fissile Fingerprint?" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June, 1995, p.10.

5. Phil Williams and Paul Woessner, "Nuclear Material Trafficking: An Interim Assessment," Ridgeway Viewpoints, Working Paper No. 95-1, 1995, p.12.

6. Thomas B. Cochran, Robert S. Norris and Oleg A. Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb: From Stalin to Yeltsin, Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1995, p.51.

7. U.S. Office of Technology Assessment, Nuclear Proliferation and Safeguards, Vol. 1, New YOrk, Praeger, 1977, p. 194.

8. Interview with a Project Sapphire member (June 1995). Graham Allison et al. report that the United States recovered 104 percent of the declared inventory. See Graham Allison. Owen Cote, Jr., Richard Falkenrath and Steven Miller, "Avoiding Nuclear anarchy," CSIA Discussion Ppaer 95-08, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, July 1995, p. 23.

9. Thomas B. Cochran, "Testimony before the Military Application of Nuclear Energy Panel of the House Armed Services Committee," April 19, 1994, p.2.

10. Alexei Lebedev, in "Russian Weapons Plutonium Storage Termed Unsafe by Minatom Official," Nucleonics Week, April 28, 1994, p.1.

11. Allison et al., p.6.

12. VATESI, the Lithuanian Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate, says the cache consisted of 3, 860 kilograms of pure beryllium and 140 kilograms of beryllium-uranium alloy containing 150 grams of uranium enriched to approximately 50 percent. This is corroborated by other sources and appears more reliable than the two-kilogram quantity of U-235 cited by U.S. officials in a letter to Tom Cochran, November 23, 1994.

13. Personal communication with reporters, August 17, 1995.

14. Rensselaer W. Lee, III, "The Organized Crime Morass in the Former Soviet Union," Demokratizatsiya, Summer 1994, p.400.

15. Louise Shelley, "Post-Soviet Organized Crime," Demokratizatsiya, Summer 1994, p. 343.

16. Rossiyskaya Gazeta, August 2, 1995, p.4.

17. For amplification, see Thomas B. Cochran and Christopher Paine, "U.S. Assistance to Improve Physical Security and Accounting of Fissile Materials in Russia." Paper presented to the Panel on U.S.-Russian Cooperation to Control and Account for Fissile Material, President's Commission for Advisor's on Science and Technology, Washington, D.C., January 27, 1995.

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