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TRANSCRIPT GLC 2437.05.039
Henry Knox. Letter (copy): Morris Town, to George Washington,
1780 March 29. 3 p. + doc.
Morris Town, 29 March 1780
[inserted - different hand: Opinion for Genl Washington]
Sir,
I have endeavored to consider in every point of view the
important information which your Excellency gave your general
officers yesterday, and the question arising from it, viz.
Whether any troops should be detatched from this army to the
Southward, with a view of forming a force to cover the country,
supposing the event at Charlestown to prove unfortunate?
An addition of continental troops to the Southward would
certainly be a matter devoutly to be wished. The great number
of negroes and disaffected people in North & South Carolina
will always render the conquest of the country comparatively
easy with the more northern parts of the continent, and are
circumstances, added to others which might be named, that
loudly demand assistance from the neighbouring States. But
however forcible the demands are on these States, I cannot
think it obligatory on Your Excellency to detach any troops
at present from your finale army; especially as you will be
necissitated to garrison West Point with parts of it, and
will lose a very large proportion by the expiration of the
mens engagements before the first of June. The present prospects
of recruits or levies made, on the expaitation of having it
speedily replaced by them.
The posts on Hudson’s river have hitherto been regarded,
by every person of judgement as the object of the greatest
magnitude on the continent, and the maintanence of which every
thing else ought to give place. Were the garrison at West
Point and its dependences complete, and left to rely upon
itself and the support it could derive from the assistance
of the militia, without the possibility of aid from the continental
army, I do think its safety would be extremely precarious,
if besieged by ten thousand regular troops. It appears by
your Excellency’s estimates, the enemy at [2] New York
would bring that number against it in 12 hours, had they nothing
to apprehend from the continental army. The defence of New
York could be entrusted to a very few regular troops and the
militia of the islands in their possession, assisted by the
shipping.
The grounds in the vicinity of our works at West Point are
such, that should they be suddenly seized on by the enemy,
it would require more vigourous exertions to dispossess them
than are commonly made by militia. Probably the place and
its stores are incapable of sustaining more than twenty five
or thirty days [inserted: close] siege. If so, and the object
is of the first consequence on the continent it follows that
a body of disciplined troops ought to be so near as to afford
it relief in the above mentioned time, or the place would
fall into the enemy’s hands, – an event to be feared,
in proportion to its importance and the difficulties of recovering
it again.
From the information which your Excellency gives us, it is
probable that your army by the first of June will be scarcely
sufficient for the purposes [struck: of] for the garrison
of Hudson’s river, and to curb the incursions [inserted:
of parties] of the enemy. The importance of the operations
to the Southward is so great, that were we certain of receiving
as many new recruits and new levies by the first of June as
would supply the place of the Maryland line, I should be for
that line or a body of troops equal to it, marching to the
Southward, but not until the designs of the enemy were more
unfolded than at present – such as, whether they intend
to send more troops from New York to Charleston, whether they
intend to undertake the conquest of that place only as a desirable
object to obtain a favorable peace – or, whether they
intend [struck: intend] it as a preliminary step to an attempt
to subjugate the Southern States. Their intentions in these
respects being fully known would enable me to be much more
decisive in my opinion than I can be at present. The enemy,
by being in possession of the water, have it amply in their
power to distress and harrass us; but it would be highly imprudent
and unwise in us to divide our force so as to be incapable
of making opposition in [3] any place.
Were a body of troops today to be ordered to be in readiness
to march, it would be ten or fifteen days at least before
they could comply and begin their march. The distance from
here to Charleston is reputed to be 900 miles. Were the troops
to march 12 miles one day with another including the halting
days, bad weather, crossing ferries and other contingencies,
they would not perform the march in less than 75 days, which
would bring it to the latter end of June, a season in which
it is said to be almost impracticable for troops to act in
that climate.
I think therefore it would be rather improper at present
to detatch any troops, because the situation of the force
under Your Excellency relative to that of the enemy in New
York would not permit it – that the designs of the enemy
are not sufficiently known with respect to transfering the
principal stress of the war to the Southward, and because,
that were any troops to be ordered immediately, they would
not arrive in time to operate before the hot months would
come on.
I have said nothing of the comparative strength of the Southern
militia with that of the Northern, because Your Excellency
cannot rely for a certainty on having any but continental
troops. There have been times when the militia have been obliged
by the distresses of war to turn out – and the time now
is when the Militia of North & South Carolina and Virginia
ought to exert themselves. And if the different States will
compleate their respective quotas of continental troops according
to the direction of Congress, Your Excellency may find it
possible to detatch to the Southward a respectible force –
: but under the present circumstances, I think disgrace, and
perhaps ruin, would attend such a measure.
I have the honor to be with the
highest respect
Your Excellencys most
obedt Servt.
H Knox
Copy
His Excellency
Gen. Washington
[docket]
Copy
An opinion
delivered to his Excly
Genl Washington
29th March 1780
Notes:
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