 |
TRANSCRIPT GLC
2437.05.046
Henry Knox. Letter
signed: Morristown, New Jersey, to
George Washington, 1780 May 23. 23 p. + doc.
Morris
Town 23d May 1780.
[inserted
- different hand: HK to W.] [inserted
- different hand: plan of Operation <?> 1790]
Sir
To
digest a perfect plan of operations, of the magnitude of those propos’d
by your Excellency demands a much greater extent of abilities, and military
experience, than I can pretend to have – It requires a mind, able to
comprehend, and to provide, for every possible exigence, so that in case of
success, we might be ready, to urge it to the utmost; or of misfortune, to
render it, as little distressing as the event could admit, however, Zeal, and
duty, induce me, chearfully to comply with your Excellencys request, in the best
manner I can, and I shall be happy, if any ideas of mine, will in the least
assist, <your Excellency> in the arduous business before you. –
In the
first instance, as a preliminary step, to every other exertion, the departments
of the Quarter master [inserted: Genl.]
and commissary of provision, must be plac’d on such a footing, as to answer
the end and design of their institutions. – those are the main springs of an army, and unless they
are in perfect order, every movement depending [2] on them, must be wrong, and
will in the end, produce destruction.
There
must be many things [inserted: in the
Qmg’s depatmnt,] essentially necessary to be done, previous to the intended
operations, but what they are, and whether they can be effected, will better be
determind by the Q.M.G. Forage, is
included in that department – it is essential, that a very large collection of
dry forage be made, with the utmost expedition, and deposited, in the places
that shall be agreed on hereafter. –
Magazines
of provision ought to be establish’d at proper places, antecedant, to any
important expedition, being undertaken. [strike-out]
[inserted: It [struck: will] [inserted:
would] be superlative fully] to enter upon an enterprize, which will require
much time [struck: in its execution] [inserted:
to execute], without an adequate supply of provision, for a certain time, and [inserted: an] assurance of the supplies being continued.
[struck:
The supplies] The provisions wil I presume, be principally furnish’d by the
States of Pennsylvania, Connecticut, and Massachusetts, and in some degree
New-York. I suppose Jersey, to be almost exhausted, and that Maryland,
have already furnished a very large proportion, of the Quotas [3] assign’d by
Congress. Virginia perhaps is too
remote, to expect much assistance from, in the present case. – [inserted
at margin: besides beef and
Pork, bread & flour, Rum is too material an article, to be omitted. no
exertions ought to be spar’d to provide ample quanties of [struck:
that article] [inserted: it.]]
I
think it a very material arangnt, that the Governors, or presidents, of those
States, on which the main stress will lay, should be call’d togethr at Head
Quarters, or to whoever, shall have the principal direction of affairs – This
step is necessary as well [inserted:
to infuse into them, a proper degree of energy] as to determine the supplies to
be furnish’d the Quarter Master, and Commissarys departments and the number of
men, each state shall respectively raise. – if this is not eligible, or
practicable, persons of influence, ought to be dispatch’d to the different
States, to press the requisitions, and Expedite the supplies.
If the
different states will not or cannot, grant the means to supply the [inserted:
deficiencies of the] two great departments of QM, and Commisary, I do not see
how any expedition of importance, can be attempted consistent with reason, or
military principles. – But I flatter myself, that the country possess ample
resources [4] for the occasion, and that as soon, as a prospect of great success
shall be held out, to the public there will be found vigor, to draw them out for
the good of the service.
The
two departments, upon which the existence of the army depend, [inserted: being properly establish’d] the next object will be to
enquire, what expedition shall be undertaken?
This will be necessary to determine what force [inserted: to call upon the states be] in aid of the french army and
continental troops. [struck: to call]
To
adjust this point properly, we we must suppose
1st
That
the Enemy have taken Charlestown, and garrison’d it, with with 3000 of
the troops, who went to the southward, and that the remainder of the force, of
perhaps between 4, and 5000, men effective men, influencd, by the intelligence
of the designs of the French, have return’d to New-York
2.dly
That they
have not succeeded at Charlestown, but rais’d the siege, in consequence of
the above intelligence, and with their whole force, except the diminition of
kill’d, wounded, dead and sick, [5] amounting perhaps to 1200, have returnd to
New York.
3dly.
That
the french fleet, and army arrive safely, previous to the supposd junction, of
the troops under General Clinton, with those in New-York
It is
likely, that one of these suppos’d events, will happen, and considering the
importance of New York; to the enemy and its being their primary object, of all
smaller ones, will be oblig'd, to yield to it -
therefore I am inclin’d to believe, that Sir Harry Clinton, upon the first
intelligence he received, of the intentions of the French rais’d the siege of
Charlestown, if he had not reduc’d it, or had a moral certainty of reducing
it, in two, or three days – he will not stay there, upon the uncertain or even
certain favorable isue of the seige, if it must be protracted, and suffer, the
power of Britain, in America, to be torn up by the roots.
The
British ministry, knowing the [6] designs of France, would not content
themselves with sending one frigate only, to New-York, which was liable to many
accidents, of the Seas and enemies. [strike-out]
[inserted: probably] besides that, they sent one to New-foundland [inserted:
and Hallifax] and a third, directly to Charlestown.
if so, we may conclude, that Sir Harry received the information, nearly
as soon as they had it in New York and that by the time, of montagues arrival at
South Carolina, the preparations for raising the siege, and returning to
New-York, were pretty mature. – But even if this should not have happen’d,
yet from the time the Iris sail’d from New York, it is probable, that Sir
Harry, at this period, is on his return, and that he will arrive, on [inserted:
or] before the 10th of June.-
I am
afraid that the french fleet will not arrive, or the condition [inserted:
of our army] be such, as to be ready in all respects, to commence on operations
by that time.
From
the circumstances thus stated, it is rational to suppose, that Genl Clinton,
will have [7] form’d a junction of a certain portion of his force, with the
garrison of New-York, before it will be possible for us, to be in readiness to
act with vigor.
But, it
may be possible for the french to arrive, previous to the suppos’d
junction and take their station, [struck:
and take their station] off sandy hook, with a force, superior to the british
naval power, in these seas. in that case, New-York ought decidedly to be our
object, because the chances of success will be greater than of a failure
and more beneficial, than than the latter will probably be distressing.
But
even under those circumstances, our force ought to be as respectable, as if
General Clinton had form’d the junction, for his inducement to it, will be so
great, that we ought to believe, that he will leave no exertion untried, to
effect a measure of such infinite importance to him – our force indubitably
ought to be proportion’d to probable events.
From
the popularity of an attempt on New-York, I am induc’d firmly to believe that
any [8] number of men might be obtaind, for that purpose, on such terms, as we
could wish indeed some have doubted whether we could subsist them, but I should
suppose, that it would be easy to procure provisions, if the respective
Governments will exert themselves.
But I
do not conceive this to be the first part of the military plan. – for if a
General shall receive orders to beseige a place, the first thing he requests,
will certainly be an adequate force to reduce it. – if the Country, or his
employers, are unable, or decline, to furnish subsistence of men, indespensably
necessary for the purpose, is it his fault, if the seige shall not be
undertaken? most certainly not, provided he has requested the necessary means.
In the
divided state of the enemy New-York is clearly our object, – let us then
suppose their force join’d, and examine whether that event, ought to make any
change in our measures. The number
of the enemy that went from New-York last winter in both <?> divisions,
[9] might have been about 8500, – suppose 1200 of these, to have been wasted
in the campaign, the remainder will be about 7000. – again, suppose Genl
Clinton, has taken Charlestown and garrison’d it with 3000 -
the number that will be to return may amount to about 4000, which number, added
to those in New-York, are not in my opinion sufficient to divert us, from
attempting the siege of that place.
But if
that should not be the case, and that Sir Harry Clinton sent no troops to
Pensacola, (which is rather improbable considering the serious demonstrations
the Spaniards were making against it,) he will be able, to bring back about 7000
men. this is, undoubtedly a
respectable body of troops, especially when added to the Garrison of at least
equal numbers: yet under this
event, if we could obtain an army proportnd to the attempt, and provisions to
subsist them, together with a decided naval superiority I should perfer a siege,
or if that is not practicable, a blockade of New-York to any other enterprize
whatever. – a succesful [10] operation, against New-York, would totally
annihilate, the British power in america, and terminate the War which would not
be the case with any other object we should undertake – however, if it should
be thought upon a more critical investigation, having a proper, and full
knowledge of all circumstances, an attempt superior to the combin’d exertions
of the French and American force, an Expedition to the southward after the
sickly season be past, might be form’d, to be pointed against Charlestown (if
in the enemies possession) Georgia, or <?> Florida. – the composition of
the troops to be principally french, aided by a few continental battalions and
officers. – Halifax, to people in our circumstances, without a navy, I think
would be an improper object for us to attempt. – much might be said upon the
propriety of an expedition to Canada, supported by a french fleet, and army –
of the facility with which the conquest might be made, by a Double Invasion, by
the St. Laurence, and the Lakes. – of the utility, and importance of it, but
[11] as the matter does not appear to have been in contemplation, I shall only
say, that in my opinion, <?> next to New-York, Canada is, the most
important object that can claim our attention. – this however, to be
understood, upon the principles of the enemy having rais’d the siege of
Charlestown, and form’d a junction, of their force at New York, so as to
render it unattainable by us.
If we
undertake the siege of New-York which has or probably will have a garrison of
nearly 14000 men, we ought to have double that number for the purposes of York,
and Long Islands and their communications, exclusive of [struck: 4,000] 5000,
which must be in Jersey – The force in Jersey will be necessary, to beseige
the posts, which the enemy have, or may have, on the West side Hudsons river, to
cover the communication from Pensylvania, to prevent the enemy making any
excursion into Jersey, previous to the reduction of <?> Hook, and [struck:
to] [inserted: they must] be provided with proper [12]
means of throwing themselves, on York or Staten Islands, or wherever they
may be orderd – upon the whole, I should suppose that the siege ought not to
be undertaken without [struck: less than] [inserted:
we have] 31 or 32000 [inserted:
effective] men. [struck:
and] [inserted: exclusive] of which number, a garrison of a thousand, or
1200 will be wanted for west point –
It is
presum’d that Congress, will direct the Maryland line, to return to this army,
with the utmost expedition. – the propriety of such a direction, is as clearly
evident as any axiom whatever, and if they do not give it, I confess, I shall
conceive it, to be a bad omen of our success, & of the vigor, and decision,
which ought to animate that body, upon whom so much, according to the
constitution, must depend.
If the
Maryland line returns, we may estimate the continental troops at 8000, and the
french at 6000, – the deficiency there according to my estimate will be about
19000 men, which the states must be calld upon for.
If the
quotas of men assign’d by Congress [13] last winter, upon the different
states, to serve during the War, cannot be obtaind, as I believe they cannot, at
least so speedily, as to be of any service in the intended operations, then, for
the men to be draughted to serve during the campaign, to end the first of
January, or sooner, as circumstances shall permit. – These men to be
incorporated into the continental battalions. – <loss>When
we consider the great number of veteran soldiers, which have been discharg’d
in the past winter and at other periods, who would perfer this union, to serving
under the militia officers, there can be but little doubt, that the requisite
number of men might be easily obtaind, and generally of those, who organiz’d
as above, would render essential service to their Country.
To
depend principally on militia, form’d into battalions, under their own
officers, for the arduous service, we are about to engage in, will be to deceive
ourselves most wretched to accumulate a monstrous debt, ruin [14] the hopes, and
entirely prevent the future exertions of the Country, disgust our allies, and
perhaps annihilate us as a nation. this
plan, besides being infinitely more energetic, then any other formation of the
Militia, will strictly be the most oeconomical, that can be devis’d, as it
will save, [strike-out] the vast
expences, of an army of Militia officers.
I have
as high a veneration, and respect, for the militia, as any person can have.
I know them to be individually brave, and in many instances to behave in
such a manner, as to reflect the highest honor on themselves, as well as their
country, but a siege, requires troops of an essentially [strike-out]
[inserted: different]
composition. We must be explicit,
the object in view is too great, and its consequenses too infinite, to be enterd
upon, without the means shall be such, as rationally to promise, an happy
termination, – without such principles, no success can justify to a thinking
mind, an enterprize voluntarily and deliberately undertaken.
the glare of victory, may for some time produce an eclat, but the [15]
judgement of sensible men, will effectually prevent its being perpetuated;
whilst on the other hand, a failure under such circumstances, will instantly,
and forever, merit the folly of the attempt.
I
would with due deference, propose that the states be colld upon for the men
wanted, for the Campaign, in some degree proportiond to the following seale –
vzt.
New
Hampshire 1000
Massachusetts 5000
Rhode Island
1000
Connecticut
3500
New York
2500
New Jersey
2500
Pennsylvania
4000
19.500
The
force being obtaind, and every necessary arrangement [strike-out] [inserted:
made], I would propose that we should commence our operations by the way of
Morrissania, and its vicinity. – that, appears to me to be the most proper
place for many reasons. – The french transports can come into the sound,
guarded by a proper force, and land their troops, as near as [16] may be thought
necessary. whether the principal part of the heavy ships, are endevoring to
force a passage by the Hook, & narrows, into the harbour of new-York, the
transports after having landed the troops, and stores, may either ride in the
sound, or put into New-London harbour if it should be necessary.
Being
at Morrissania with our boats or pontoons, we shall be in a situation to
distract the enemy, by making points to land, on York Island, by the North, or
East river, which will oblige them, to withdraw their out posts from the upper
part of the Island, or so to divide their force, as to leave us an easy passage
over to it.
By
commencing our operations that way, we may procure a safe passage over to long
Island, establish our communication with, and secure a retreat from it, by
fortifying the Islands which will also prevent the passage of any of the enemies
Vessells through Hell-Gate: these
are material points, to be attended to, for long Island is essential to the
reduction of New-[17]York.
As
many of our manoeuvres will be by water, it will be of the first importance
that an hundred boats be provided, each to carry 50 or 60 men, besides the
rowers, and for the mangegement of them, there ought to be a body of 1000, or 12
hundred sailors, obtain’d from the eastern States. – each boat, must have a
sea officer. – a certain number
of boats, to constitute a division, under its proper officers and the whole, to
be [inserted: under] the direction of
the most intelligent, docile, brave, sea officer, that can be found, who must be
perfectly skill’d, in the doctrine of tides, and currents, in the places where
he shall act. – these sailors and officers, must be taught to place, their
point of Glory, in the perfect management, and care of their boats, and
obedience to orders. –
[struck:
The]
The
detachment in Jersey, to have a number of these boats, [struck: as well for bridges] as well for bridges, as for
transportation.
The
boats must be plac’d on cariags, and move with the troops when necessary. –
besides being properly fixd with oars, to transport the troops, [18] there must
be plank, timber, cables, anchors and every other material to fix them as
bridges, – also artificers, to repair or arrange them upon every occasion –
This department appears to be the pivot
upon which our manoeuvers by water will depend, and I cannot help
repeating that no pains, or expence ought be omitted to put it in perfect order
– it may possibly be alledg’d that, the french, and our own vessells, may
provide us with sailors for such purposes, as shall be necessary, – to this it
may be answer’d, that altho it is possible they may, yet they cannot execute
the critical business of the minute water matters, so well, as persons who will
place their reputation upon the right execution of what shall be entrusted to
them – and besides, the sailors [strike-out]
[inserted: may] be otherways wanted, at the same time our demands for them, may
be the most pressing –
Our
supplies, could be convey’d to us through the sound, and in some measure down
Hudsons river, to a certain distance and from thenc by land carriage to
Morrissania. A [19] magazine must
be establish’d at Morris Town, to receive flour, and other articles what may
be brought from Pennsylvania and from thence [inserted:
transported] to such parts, of the North River, as shall be safe, and most
convenient to our army – to transport flour from Philadelphia, and the various
parts of Pennsylvania, a holling by water, would be tedious and uncertain if not
hazardous – our existence will depend so much on bread which I presume will
mostly be expected from that State, that the conveyance ought to be safe and
regular, altho’ the expences, and trouble, thereby should be exceedingly
extended.
The
point [strike-out] [inserted:
from which] to commence on operations being determind, the intention [strike-out]
[inserted: must] [struck:
to] be kept a profound secret, and not a single demonstration of it, untill all
things shall be ready, for forming a junction of the french, and continental
troops, and then our movements, ought to be as rapid as lightening, to prevent
the enemy from strengthening [20] himself in the places where we intend to
strike – But if any previous movements could be made by which the enemy would
be deceivd it might amply compensate for the trouble.
Providence
in Rhode Island on many accounts of convenience of buildings, and security from
the Enemy, would be a proper place for the french to establish, their Hospitals,
and deposit their heavy stores. But
I should perfer Norwich, in Connecticut on account of its being nearer to the
seat of action – it would be as secure but not quite so convenient as
Providence, But whever the hospitals are establish’d, there must be every kind
of produce the coin affords, procured, for the refreshment of the sick, and all
kinds of live stock and vegetables, at the place where the troops shall land,
– it will be necessary to have large quanties of these articles, in first
instance, as a means to conciliate the affections of our allies.
The
principal [21] article, of ordnance stores, of which we are deficient, is
powder, and we shall not have a sufficiency of that article, even if the
quantity expected by the alliance, should arrive safe and except we can borrow
some, of the different states, we shall have rather a small allowance, for the
contingencies of a siege.
[struck:
The] The shot, and shells, in this state, must be transported, to
such parts of the North [inserted:
River as shall] be proper relatively, to their safety, and the situation of our
army – The shot, and shells in Pennsylvania, to be brought round by water, if
there should be no probable danger from the enemy, -
The military stores that shall be procur’d in Massachusetts and Rhode-Island,
to be also brought round by water, under the same circumstances, and deposited
at New-London, except such, as may be wanted, for immediate service.
those, which shall be obtaind from Connecticut, and Springfield, to be
brought down the river; and deposited in some plaice, near its mouth untill they
shall [22] be call’d for.
An
Estimate of the material articles, wanted in the ordinance department, and
necessary for a siege, [strike-out]
together, with what we have on our possession, shall be made out, as speedily as
possible, and [strike-out] [inserted:
laid] before your Excellency.
Your
Excellency asks, how far with safety to both Armies, could the french troop act
seperately, or with a few continental troops? – In an operation against the
Enemy in New-York, I do not conceive it would be prudent, either for the french,
or us, to act separately. – The perfect knowledge of the Country, character,
language, genius, and temper of the people which most of our officers possess,
are circumstances, of infinite importance in favor of a junction of forces, and
cannot possibly be gain’d by the french troops, in any considerable degree, in
the course of a Campaign and the want of which, might [inserted:
be] of the most fatal consequences both to us, and them –
I
would propose that the french [23] troops as auxiliaries form the left wings of
the first & second line and Corps of Repose commanded throughout by their
own officers, and that all their out pickets have some continental soldiers
mix’d with them, whose fidelity can be relied upon, and a continental officer,
subordinate to the french officer commandg the picket. – There might be some
reasons, adduced to support an opinion; for the troops to act seperately, but
they are trivials when compared with the safety of the armies.
These
are the outlines of the general plan of operations, which in my opinion, would
be most proper for us to prosecute, – if my sentiments should in any
considerate degree accord with your Excellencys Ideas on the subject, and you
should wish to have any part explain’d or enlarg’d I shall [strike-out]
[inserted: do it willingly]
I have the honor
to be with [inserted: the most
perfect] respect and
attachments
Your Excellencys
Humble servant
H Knox
His Excellency
General Washington.
[docket]
an opinion deliverd
23rd May 1780.
to His Excellency
General Washington
|
