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Naval Investigator Testifies Before Inquiry Part II

Q Sir, what time were the afternoon DV events scheduled to begin? That’s in accordance with the POD.

A Looking at the plan of the day, again, the first scheduled event after lunch would be 12:30, it was called angles, high speed or large angles.

Q And, sir, during your investigation did you determine

what time angles actually began that day?

A Yes. They began at approximately 1316, and I would imagine that the reason for this primarily was the need to feed the second setting of guests in the wardroom, and then also clean up from that arrangement, because the angles will cause things to move around in the submarine if they’re not properly secured, so you need to take time to clean up from a meal before conducting angles.

And if I might add, the Captain emphasized spending considerable quantity — quality time with the guests at the lunch time period in the wardroom, and that’s very appropriate.

One of the highlights of, in general of visitors coming aboard a submarine is the opportunity to spend some time conversing with the Commanding Officer. There’s no better setting than attack submarine which are very small and confining, there’s no better setting to conduct that quality time and the informal ability to really converse than there is at a meal in the wardroom. So I think the Captain was wisely emphasizing this portion of the day’s events, and he took his time and I’m sure had some very valuable conversation with the guests in the two signatures.

So that ran over, and now we’re beyond 1300. There were some other activities on the ship, including in the propulsion plan to be in a condition to be ready for these angles, and I believe that completed at about quarter after 1300 and hence they commenced the angles at 1316.

Q Sir, you testified earlier that Greeneville had a Papa hotel time of 1400?

A Yes.

Q Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q And she actually began her afternoon events at 1316?

A Yes, and by her original schedule she wanted to conduct the emergency blow at about 1300, so she was running about three quarters of a — well, it turns out it will be about three quarters of an hour late.

Q Sir, during your investigation did you — did you discover that anyone on Greeneville was concerned or worried about how far behind they were?

MR. GITTINS: Objection, calls for hearsay.

RDML STONE: Military Rules of Evidence do not apply with respect to hearsay, sir.

MR. GITTINS: Witness is (inaudible).

VADM. NATHMAN: Objection is noted for the record. We’ll hear the question.

THE WITNESS: Yes. The — I don’t know if I would say concerned. I would say a professional reminder was provided from the navigator through the Exec. to the Commanding Officer that the ship was behind schedule and the Captain acknowledged that.


Q So that was the navigator, Lieutenant Sloan?

A Yes.

Q And he notified the Executive Officer, Commander Pfeifer?

A That’s my recollection, that the chain of events was to pass that notification via the Executive Officer to the CO.

Q Do you know during your investigation whether or not the

Commanding Officer, Commander Waddle acknowledged the comment from the Executive officer that they were behind?

A Yes. Based on my review of the interviews that Commadore Bias conducted the Captain acknowledged that input with an I have it under control response, something to it, I have it under control.

Q Admiral, from your preliminary investigation were you able to determine the major sequence of DV events that the ship performed from 1316 until the time of collision?

A Yes, I was.

Q And was your investigation able to reconstruct the tracks of the Greeneville and the Ehime-Maru starting at approximately 1230 on the 9th of February?

A Yes, I was able to have that accomplished by delegating that task to N7 at SUBPAC and Captain Kyle had his folks generate those tracks.

Q Sir, can you describe for us generally how the reconstruction was accomplished? And let’s begin first with the Ehime-Maru. What information went — or what data went into the reconstruction of the tracking of the Ehime-Maru?

A The most important source of data that generates the track of the Ehime-Maru was the comments of the Ehime-Maru’s master that he related to the National Transportation Safety Board and which were then indirectly relayed to me through the offices of Captain Kyle who was in attendance with the National Transportation Safety Board. And that comment, to wit, was that we know he had set a course and a speed flew the auto pilot of the Ehime-Maru upon exit gone Honolulu harbor, and provided the basis for us to generate that track. Or this was during the time I conducted the investigation that I knew that much.

Q Sir, have you subsequently learned of any other input from any other organization that — with respect to the reconstruction of the Ehime-Maru’s track?

A There were subsequent — the answer is yes. There were subsequent inputs from the master, which indicated that there was a period of time upon her initially exiting Honolulu harbor, and I believe that was commencing at 12:15 local, when she passed buoy hotel, the exit point of Honolulu harbor heading south, that she proceeded at a slower speed initially three — correction, four to five knots in order to safely secure and stow her anchor in the seas.

An evolution that required a slower speed, and this proceeded for about half an hour, roughly, and then at around 12:50 she then accelerated to her normal transit speed of 11:00 or so knots.

Q Sir, how about the Greeneville, what —

A I’m sorry, there’s additional part of that answer. In addition to that additional input from the master, we had some confirmation from a radar at Honolulu airport operated by the federal aviation authority, FAA, which confirmed the last three miles of the Ehime-Maru’s track was consistent with that reports — those reports from the master.

Q Sir, what — generally how was the Greeneville’s track reconstructed?

A The Greeneville’s track was reconstructed from all the data that we had. Predominently we used the deck log, we used the position log, and we used a computer algarythm combining the SINS (phonetic) or inertia navigator of the ESGN position with the orders that we noted in the deck log, and orders of course and speed, and depth. And a computer algarythm to balance and transfer and acceleration and de-acceleration to execute those orders with this particular class of submarine to basically DR the ship on a head from the 13 hundred ESPM position to the point of collision.

We also combined sonar data that was logged on paper logs and then later from the ship’s digital recording logs from fire control and sonar to correlate that data to the track of the Greeneville.

Q Sir, did you include the reconstruction of the Ehime-Maru and Greeneville’s tracks in your inquiry report?

A Yes, I did. It’s enclosure one in the preliminary inquiry.

Q And that’s the? I ask the court reporter to mark —

A While that’s occurring, I want to mention that putting that initial set of data together, we came up with an offset from the reported collision point of 750 yards to the southwest from that collision point, so we provided a graduated vector correction to the Greeneville’s track of that 750 yards so that it was fully accomplished over that last 43 minutes of track.

And we did it along the entire length of her track to move her position in that 750 yards to where the Ehime-Maru was known to have collided with her.

Q All right. Sir. The court reporter has marked this exhibit as Exhibit 4.

Sir, do you recognize this exhibit?

A Yes, I do.

Q And sir, is this the track reconstruction you included as Enclosure 1 to your preliminary inquiry report?

A It’s close, but it is not the same.

Q How is it different, sir?

A There were some corrections that were — I would call refinements made to the Greenville and Ehime Maru’s tracks since I generated my report. This issue of the initial four or five knot speed exiting Honolulu Harbor of Ehime Maru was not known to me at the time I generated my report so the track correction for Ehime Maru that you see here does accommodate that.

Additionally, with regard to Greenville’s track, the logged data that is digitally recorded in the sonar and fire control system was not fully utilized by me at the time that I did my report but it includes own ships parameters, and it’s recorded every second.

So that degree of refinement exists in this Greenville track you see here, so it did slightly alter the track by making it more accurate.

Q Sir, since the time that you did the original reconstruction in your preliminary inquiry report to now, have you had an opportunity to look at the additional data?

A Yes, I have. And frankly, this is a better chart as you would expect because it is more refined data. It also resolves some of the slight differences between the recorded sonar data that I had prepared in my report and the bearing on DR positions for the sonar for the two tracks, I had this slight bias when I generated my report. This has eliminated that bias so this is a better track.

ATTY E: Just one second. One question I have. You have used the word “refined.” Do I take it you mean more accurate? When you say “refined?”

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir I believe this is more accurate. It’s very close to what I had to work with, but it’s even more accurate.

ATTY E: I’m sorry, sir.

Q Admiral, do you believe the chart is an accurate representation of the tracks of the two vessels on 9th of February?

A Yes, I do.

Q Commander Harrison, if you would put that one down. Admiral, I will have you go through the two reconstructed tracks.

We actually have a Power Point production which will be showing shortly on the screen, but I would like you to first describe activities on the Greenville, the watchstanders who manned it on the 9th of February, and I would like this chart to be marked as Court Exhibit Number 5.

If you would show it to Admiral Griffiths.Sir, do you recognize this chart?

A Yes, I do.

Q And what is it, sir?

A This is a rendition of the watchstanding arrangement on a typical attack submarine such as the Greenville that would be pertinent to understanding the events leading to this collision and sources are such references as the ship’s organization and regulations, manual, and other documents, plus my own experience and the experience of the drafter.

Q All right, sir. Commander Harrison, if you would put the diagram up on the ledge there. Commander Harrison, if you would get the next chart, please, and I would like this marked as court Exhibit 6.

ATTY E: Sir, at this time, I have a question.

ATTORNEY C: Right here, that line.

MR. GITTINS: We’ll describe it as we go.

Q Commander Harrison, if you would show Admiral Griffiths court Exhibit 6.

Sir, do you recognize that?

A Yes.

Q Would you explain to the members what it is?

A That’s an orientation of the general arrangement of the control room and just forward, a little to my right, the lower right of this document, the sonar control room of the USS Greenville and the class of ship, that Third Flight 688 submarine, and I think it would be a useful format to describe the watchstanders, most of whom are shown on this diagram already on the bulkhead there, as it would relate to the operation of the Greenville that day.

Q Sir, do you know how it was constructed?

A I think it was constructed from available references, plus a site visit to the submarine, and I think it generally looks close to my recollection of this class of ship’s control room and sonar.

Q Okay, sir.

A I also might add, I rode a sister ship of the Greenville a few weeks ago here in Pearl Harbor, the USS Cheyenne, which although it’s not identical, has a similar layout, and this seems to purport.

Q Commander Harrison, if you would put up the overview of the control room and sonar room.

Sir, with the laser pointer, what I’d like you to do if you would is describe for the court the layout the actual watchstations that were manned on board Greenville on the afternoon of the 9th of February.

And what I’d like to you do, sir, is to start with the key watchstanders sections of the key watchstanders, and we’ll place them where they actually stood their watch in the diagram to the right.

So if you could take us and kind of inter-relate us and show us the chain of command, and then where they actually stood their watch and what their duties and responsibilities were.

A All right. Starting with the ship’s control party, which is comprised of five individuals, the senior one is the diving officer of the watch. He is the second senior person in the control room in charge of the watch team. He is, if you will, the number two in command of the forward end of the command’s watch party.

Generally, an enlisted senior — enlisted watchstander can be an officer, and would normally sit here and operate between the outboard and the inboard stations of the ship’s control panel or SCP, in the forward port corner of the control room, as I have indicated here with my laser.

Q Commander Harrison is putting a sticker up on the chart that indicates the diving officer of the watch.

Is that the correct position?

A Yes, that is essentially where he would stand his watch.

Q Okay. Continue, please.

A His primary function is to be sure the ship achieves or maintains depth, but he also has an overall supervisory role.

Q Secondly, the Chief of the Watch or COW here would stand his watch at the ballast control panel at the forward port, at the ballast control panel.

Normally he would be seated here, and he generally operates all the auxiliary systems of the ship — trim and drain, hydraulics, and indications that a ship needs to have operated so that it maintains the right buoyancy and the right conditions.

So the chief of the watch would sit here at the ballast control panel. He is the number three guy and generally controls — backs up the diving officer of the watch and ensure the routines are executed properly. And he has to reach out and watch all the other watchstanders throughout the sub.

These two subordinate drivers of the ship, the helmsman and the planesman, the helmsman is normally at the inboard station, was in the inboard station on the Greenville that day, and would sit here. And his primary function is to control the direction the ship takes in the course, and also the depth that the ship is achieving through the use of the bow planes, so the rudder and the bow planes are simultaneously controlled by the different movements of the yoke that he operates as the helmsman. And the course, the planesman has the starboard planes and he generally controls the angle on the submarine.

So I didn’t mention the messenger, he’s a Jack-of-all-trades, rotates in to these seats when they become fatigued, either at the helmsman or the planesman position, generally is qualified to be in either of these two seats, but also runs messages, brings coffee, and does other duties.

That completes the ship’s control party, and they live their life on watch in the forward port corner of the control room. The contact management team listed here, I have discussed. Next — I will start next with the ESM operator.

Now the ESM is a station aft of the control room, off to the left side of the picture shown here, because this over here, to the right side of the picture is forward, and this is aft in this orientation.

So the radio room and the ESM space combined exist here, aft of control. That’s where the ESM would be stationed, and he uses antennas to obtain communications and electronic signal data, interpret that tactically, and provide input to the officer of the deck for the safety of the mission.

And the radar man is in a similar space, even though I am jumping over to navigations, back here in the — coming back to the contact management team, the fire control technician or FCOW normally stands his watch on the starboard side of control on the lower side of this picture operating all these consoles here.

Now the installed fire control system includes these file consoles that I am showing here, plus some other ancillary machines and graphs that he may maintain on paper.

On the particular day in question, the fire control technician or the watch for the hour prior to the collision, I believe, was maintaining his watch station seated at a bench on the third-from-forward of the four installed fire control panels.

Although he would operate all of these four panels, this one is only used for weapons employment and is NA on the day in question, except for the water slugs in the morning, but these panels would be useful in understanding the contact picture of surface contacts, and he would operate all of them and have additional duties of maintaining a paper chart plot maintained in the corner here where he works.

So again, to summarize, he takes the sonar raw data on contacts obtained from sonar, either passive or active sonar, and analyzes that data to try to determine the course, range, and speed of those contacts that sonar is detecting, so that the officer of the deck can understand those parameters in relation to his own ship.

Now, let’s move forward to the sonar space. I am outlining here with my laser pointer the sonar control room or sonar I will call it on the Greenville. You can see it’s not a lot of room in there.

A lot of it is taken up with lockers and equipment, but the four panels of primary use are these four right here that are indicated in these blue boxes. These two are associated with the arrays the ship was using that day.

These two were dormant on the day in question because they are only useful when the ship is streaming to arrays ** which are streaming before the ship.

Q So you are indicating that the first two dark blue boxes, the busy one, the BQR terminals were not in use that day?

A That’s correct. The two main systems at use were the two busy one legacy consoles here operating pass of sonar in various modes.

Q And who would have been on those two consoles?

A This says “sonar operators” here under the sonar supervisor for the sonar shack. The sonar operators in question this day, they had a third-class petty officer in one of the stacks and a seaman on the other one, and the sonar supervisor overseeing their actions would be in this area here.

Q Now, there are other equipment in here that they were using and that did have value in their passive sonar employment, but the two main systems were the ones that were seated here.

Now if you look at the guidance from higher authority for this particular class of ship with this variant of equipment in that particular mission of local operations that they were in that day, they should have had a minimum qualified watch of an operator here, an operator here, and a supervisor. All of them should have been qualified.

Q And what did your investigation discover with respect to the qualifications of the sonar team?

A They met the guidelines with the exception that one of these two operators here was a under instruction watch, new to the submarine, new to under-way operations, not yet qualified in sonar and in a learning situation.

And unfortunately, he was not being consistently supervised by qualified operators which would be the requirement. If the trainee is in the seat, you have a qualified operator with that person at all time and assigned on watch, in other words, to be that watch in reality.

Q So, sir, you would have expected to see another sonar operator next to the operator that was under instruction?

A Yes, another sonar operator in addition to the sonar supervisor who was overseeing all operations in the sonar space. I would expect the individual operator at the stack to have a qualified operator with him overseeing all his actions.

On the day in question, I discovered through interviews that that was only periodically the case, they had a more senior and qualified sonar operator who periodically would supervisor him, but that was not the assigned duties of that more senior operator, and there were periods when he was not in sonar and exercising them, nor was he assigned on the watch bill to do that.

Q Sir, what were his assigned duties that day?

A Which “he?”

Q The operator that was coming in and out of sonar that day.

A His assigned duties officially were to be a tour guide for the guests.

Q And that was for the distinguished visitors?

A Yes. Now you should understand that is an important duty, and one that has to be fulfilled by fairly senior people.

There were a number of tour guides assigned, as you would expect they should do. The commanding officer doesn’t have time to be personally with them all the time.

So you would expect to see fairly senior people assigned throughout the ship, for the various spaces, whenever the group would come through their space, and incidentally, perhaps not of the same impact and value as eating lunch with the commanding officer. These are very sharp sailors, they leave a great impression. They are very knowledgeable of their ship. So I am not commenting whether it was appropriate for this first-class petty officer to be a tour guide, it probably was.

What I am commenting, somebody qualified should have been continuously overseeing that operator on the panel.

Q The sonar supervisor could not have done that, sir?

A No, he couldn’t have done it well enough, and certainly wouldn’t have been authorized to do it per the watch bill, because his duties are too widespread.

ATTORNEY: By “expectations” you meant expectations that he would sit physically in the space as the qualified operator for duty — if the operator —

A It should have been as if the senior watchstander had the watch. The other does not count as a watchstander under the watch bill.

Q Sir, would you continue with the key watchstander’s chart and tell us where the Quarter Master of the Watch would stand his watch?

A The Quarter Master of the Watch is now over here, under Navigation and Operations, and is the one subordinate watchstander I have not mentioned. He would generally stand his watch between the two navigational plotters, and use one of the two plotting tables to keep track of the ship’s position at all times, geographically on a navigational chart.

Q Sir, where would you expect the officer of the deck to stand his watch?

A Technically, the officer of the deck would maintain his watch in the control room at all times. He is authorized briefly to go into sonar, if necessary to confer with the sonar supervisor.

That is generally not done because he has some redundancies in those displays and control. Normally, and there is enough things that happen to require his full attention. More specifically, in general, you would tend to see him in the central part of the control room on the com, because he has the best vantage point there for watching all the operations in control. But theoretically, he could be anywhere in the control room, and be within the guidance of the CO to operate as officer of the deck.

It depends on what the ship is doing at the moment, where he may want to be. When you are doing a particularly strenuous type of maneuver, he might want to be in a vicinity where he can directly oversee the ship’s control party such as angles and dangles.

If you are preparing to come to periscope depth, and you are conducting passive sonar evolutions, he may want to bias his watch more to the starboard side, where he can watch sonar display here, analyzing contacts.

So to some degree, what he’s doing at the time overseeing navigation ship’s control, contact management, determines where he physically stands.

Sir, all of the watchstanders that you mentioned below the officer of the deck, ship control, contact management, navigation, operations — they all work for the officer of the deck?

A Absolutely.

The officer of the deck is by definition when he’s on that watch, he’s the senior watchstander on the ship. And unless there is a special mission scenario, not applicable here, where the captain would direct a command duty officer who frequently might be the captain. But that is NA here. In local operations, the officer of the deck would be the senior watchstander.

Q Sir, continuing up the charts from the officer of the deck, I notice a dotted line here over to the executive officer.

Would the executive officer on the afternoon of the 9th — was he on the bridge or in control, rather?

A Yes, the executive officer and the commanding officer were generally in control for that period of time leading up to the collision for that last hour or so of submerged operations.

Neither of them were actually on watch. Both of them have a role to play in the safe operation of the ship. By regulations, the commanding officer directly has that role. The executive officer role is indicated by a dotted line here as a backup to the commanding officer.

Again, neither of these officers is technically on watch. As the two senior officers on the ship, they are watchful to everything that occurs on the ship, and the commanding officer will frequently give orders to the officer of the deck on how to com the ship.

Q On the 9th of February, where were the CO and XO actually were?

A In general, the captain was in control in the general environs of control, and would periodically go into sonar. And so I think it only fair to say he was mobile.

And the executive officer similarly, I am sure, was mobile, but as I understand it from interviews, biased his location to the forward starboard area of control and going into the sonar as well as the captain periodically.

Again, though, I don’t want to imply they weren’t mobile. I am just trying to bias where they may have been in general, particularly the exec.

Q Okay, sir. Sir, what I’d like to do now is start up the Power Point presentation. And I’d like you to take the members of the court through the reconstruction that we saw earlier on the chart.

We have a Power Point slide that we’d like to put up.

ATTORNEY: Admiral Griffiths, I have one question for you.

Can you elaborate for us what is available for the officer of the deck at the accounting station on board the Greenville?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. Perhaps the most important display that is directly on the con is a repeater called the “as do” which is an analog video display unit that exists in the central overhead of the con, here forward of the periscope. And what it allows is the officer of the deck to display any of the screens on the main legacy consoles, in this case the two consoles here, in the aft corner of sonar control that they are watching in sonar.

So he is able to watch the passive sonar display or the classification coming from sonar displays there on the central part of the con. And it’s much more than just an oversight of how sonar is doing. That display allows a good ship-driver to make assessments of the parameters of contacts without the use of the fire control system and just mentally, in his head, based on thumb rules and experience, so it’s a powerful display and as will come out later, it was broken this day, and was not available to the captain or the officer of the deck on the con.

There are other indications that are repeaters if you will of electronic signals that come from — or sonar signals received passively, such as WLR9 or WLR12 which would record any fedometer or active sonar such as a fast-finding sonar or a warship’s active sonar searching for them would display the parameters of that to the officer of the deck and also provides another source of just hearing passive noise in the water from other ships as well as by logics.

So those kind of displays are generally in this region. If you are use radar, there is a console on the deck. Radar is not normally useful, unless you are surfaced or broached, and that console is here. And then the fire control system here, the officer of the deck is certainly able to come over and personally observe all of these fire control system consoles and even manipulate them, assisting the fire control in understanding the contact picture.

So these are repeaters, or they are processes that the officer of the deck is able to directly use or oversee their use.

Q Admiral, you mentioned that with respect to the CO and the executive officer, that they were moving in and out of sonar on the afternoon of the 9th. Is that because the “as do” that you described earlier was out of commission? Is that what you found during your investigation?

A Yes. I’d say for the most part, that was the reason. A good skipper in an XO will go on sonar even when the “as do” is working, periodically just to show interest and to gain any extra insight that the watchstanders can directly provide that the display would not.

But in general, you would be in sonar much more often if this “as do” was broken than you would be if it was operating because it’s a pretty vital piece of gear for ship safety…

VADM NATHMAN: Did the “as do” go out of commission during embark, or was it out of commission when they left the port?

THE WITNESS: Admiral, my investigation has revealed that it was noted to be failed during the first part of the underway, before submerging early in the underway.

I don’t think it was clear to the captain until the underway was in motion, but it was before they submerged.

VADM NATHMAN: Thank you.

THE WITNESS: And the determination at that point was made that repairing it would be too disruptive, so they would defer repairs until return to court.

Q That’s what you would do — wouldn’t you, if your repeater in control was out, isn’t that your backup, if you will, if you were moving in and out of sonar?

A Well, I have the advantage, as in all my actions in this investigation, of hindsight. When I was a submarine CO, and that piece of equipment was broken, I felt somewhat naked. It was a big deal.

And I would establish a temporary standing order and direct the crew to add in an additional conservative layer of actions to reduce the risk that was created by having this key aide to the officer of the deck out of commission.

Of course, with hindsight, I can say the ship should have done that. Maybe the ship did consider doing that, but clearly, you would not operate with less margin than normal to safety if that was broken, you would bias to operate with more, because it’s a vital piece of gear.

Q Okay sir, sir, I would like to direct your attention to the screen that has the reconstructed track of the Ehime Maru and the Greenville.

Sir, I know you described briefly the data that was used to reconstruct both tracks. Could you begin at 12:30, and begin up at the top by Buoy Hotel, and describe again the track of the Ehime Maru for the members of the court?

A Sure. Starting at the top of this track, there is a green “x” in Buoy Hotel.

That would be the exit of Honolulu Harbor and it was about 12:15 that Ehime Maru transited by that buoy on this track of 166 degrees to the southeast. And it was until about 12:50.

Roughly half an hour — stowing her anchor for sea that she increased her speed from 4 to 5 knots to 11 knots or so, and set that in her autopilot while maintaining her course of 166, and thereafter, her track is consistent until the point of collision with those parameters.

Q Sir, do you know where the Ehime Maru was going that day?

A According to the reports from her master as provided to the National Transportation Safety Board, she was heading on that course because that was the most efficient way to open the exclusive economic zone of the United States to the point where she could legally fish in international waters. So he did that purely for efficiency and getting back to the business of fishing.

Q And you stated, sir, earlier in your testimony, that most of the reconstruction of the Ehime Maru’s track came from her master, Captain Onishi?

A That’s correct.

Q And also, that the last three miles I think you said came from Honolulu Airport, from the Federal Aviation Administration?

A Yes, and really, that confirmed what the master had provided.

Q Sir, what I’d like you to do now is if you could walk the members of the court through the USS Greenville’s track very, very briefly and begin, sir, at 12:30 on the afternoon of the 9th.

A Okay. Well, just as an overview coming north at 12:30 the USS Greenville appears on this blue track.

And as I work my way up this track, when the color changes to red. It’s an indication that the ship is at higher speeds, in this case greater than 20 knots during the period you see the red track, and she slows and gets back to less than 20 knot speed before the collision.

So in general, she’s less than 20 knots, except in this region here, she proceeded. At this period of time, the ward room was in its first and second seatings, the crew had completed being fed, and was leaving the ward.

And the officer of the deck was directing the ship in normal activities preparing for the afternoons events.

Q And on the chart, you are indicating the time between 12:30 and 13:00, correct?

A Yes, I am.

And at about this point here, the ship commences her first afternoon evolution which is the angles — large up and down angles — which I can describe later.

And at about 13:25, she phases into the next demonstration, which are high speed turns. These are speeds in excess of 20 knots and turns using 35 degrees of rudder, which is fairly dramatic.

And she terminates that at 13:31, at which time she makes preparation to go to periscope depth. And she goes to periscope depth, and completes her time at periscope depth, and goes deep to conduct the emergency blow for training, and then does the emergency blow for training, and that leads to the collision at 13:43 and 15 seconds.


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