Q Sir, what time did Greeneville come to periscope depth?
A The Greeneville came to periscope depth at 1337 as indicated here on the chart. I think that’s when it started to proceed to periscope depth, perhaps that’s when the order was given and then they would take the minute or so to get to periscope depth there.
Q Is that briefing required for the watch commander before you come to periscope depth?
A Well, we have a routine, and it’s specified in the ship’s procedures and the force’s procedures, and this routine requires certain reports to be made, particularly between the Officer of the Deck and the Commanding Officer, so that the Commanding Officer is fully apprised of what the OD knows of the contact picture before he grants permission to come to periscope depth.
Now, that presupposed the Officer of the Deck has to catch the CO from ground zero on what he’s doing. In the case where the CO is part of that process, and directly involved in understanding that picture, the whole way through, it would be routine for the CO to direct the OD to go to periscope depth because that — that assumes that this Captain is fully aware of whatever the OD knows. I’ve done that many times myself, I think that’s what happened here.
The Captain felt he knew what the OD knew and he made a decision that it was safe to go up, because he had been part of the process.
Q Sir, when a ship arrives at periscope depth what other sensors in addition to sonar become available for it?
A Well, first of all, the reports that you would normally expect an OD to make for the CO in requesting permission to go to periscope depth were not made in this case. I’ve already described why I think that was probably appropriate, but the other actions by the Officer of the Deck to prepare the ship’s systems and to execute the routine I think were taken as they normally would be.
For example, you verify that you have the correct alignment on your periscope, once you raise it while still deep, you look at certain switches and knobs on that periscope that align it electronically and visually so that it’s in the right mode when the periscope breaks the surface.
You make sure that your acoustic intercept receiver nebular (phonetic) nine is properly aligned and has the right volume on its speaker because it could tell you as you’re working your way up to PD that you have a close contact. So, those actions were taken by the Officer of the Deck to the best that I can ascertain.
The only point I was trying to make earlier was that the preparatory request for permission to go up liturgy was not followed by the OD because the CO had understood it before he made it.
Now, please repeat your last question.
Q Yes, sir. In addition to sonar, when you — when a ship arrives at periscope depth what other sensors become available to it?
A Okay. Predominently visual sensors, and electronic sensors.
The visual sensor is the periscope, the optical portion of the periscope, and on this particular ship for the periscope they were using, the number two periscope which is a type 18 periscope, the optical height above the keel is 64 feet 7 inches or 64 and a half feet, that’s where the flat COM, if the ship was perfectly even in — on zero angle and coming up if you will like an elevator, you would first start to see above the waves is at 64 feet 7 depth. And as the depth becomes more shallow than that you would see farther and farther, ’cause the periscope would be higher and higher above the surface.
So, that’s one of the two sensors that you have is the visual acuity associated with the eyepiece of the periscope.
The second main sensor is an antenna in the periscope that feeds the electronic signals in the area back to the ESM watch who’s in that space with radio aft of the control room ready to analyze both orally and visually on his displays the radar signals that are present in the area when the scope breaks the surface.
Q Sir, would you describe how a ship typically conducts a periscope visual search?
A Well, I think at this point I should make a distinction clear. We have a tremendous amount of tactical guidance available to the submarines, and it predominently assumes you’re on a mission, you’re in a posture where you must remain covert. And so let’s call that tactical guidance for mission accomplishment where stealth is important and the ship’s position, the ship’s safety could be endangered if you givethat stealth away.
So, in general a lot of the guidance our submarines operate under, sonar, periscope, you name it, is with the presumption that you’re on a mission.
So, you have to do some interpolation in your own manner of execution when you’re not on a mission. When your priorities are different than they are on a mission, when your main priority is safety of ship, such as is in this case. So, if you go to the guidance that we provide submarines in general, you won’t find a section that says if your only criteria is safety of ship, operate the periscope this way, otherwise if you’re on a mission operate it in a different way.
So, from the guidance that’s mission oriented that is available to our ships, it would describe how to conduct the search in this way.
As you are ascending to periscope depth from 150 feet, your scope will already be raised and the Officer of the Deck will be looking through it, he’ll have it in low power, it will be generally centered on ship’s bow. And the reason for that is he’s looking for shadows, he’s looking for shapes that may be from surface contacts as he’s approaching that shallow periscope depth, but he recognizes that the ascent rate, the traveling through the water and the low visual distance you can see under water there’s not any point in turning that scope. You might as well just point it straight ahead because if you turn it there’ll be large sectors because of the low visibility level that you won’t see.
And the point — the place that really counts is out ahead of the ship.
So, where approaching the periscope depth from 150 feet and I’m looking on the bow, generally trained upwards and down horizontal, upwards and down to horizontal, trying to continue to watch that surface as it becomes brighter and brighter. As I start to have the head window break the surface, I’m now up where my actual depth from the keel to the surface of the periscope is 64 feet 7 inches. I’m starting to see something visually. As soon as I see that I’m the Officer of the Deck in low power, I do two or three rapid revolutions, the guidance says three, and what they are trying to do is you go around in about eight seconds, a full 360 degree circle, and so you’re now at 24 seconds of revolutions, three total, and you’re in a by-stable mode.
Now, at this point it should be very solid in control, you should not be making reports throughout the ship that would affect the concentration of the Officer of the Deck on the scope, and he’s waiting to say one of two things, emergency deep or no close contacts.
You hope to hear no close contacts, ’cause that means you don’t have somebody close filling a large fraction of his visual display as he sees them in the short revolutions, in the quick revolutions, or if he does see a close contact
during a time, that’s an automatic command, several things happen immediately, automatically by the watch standards. He doesn’t need to say anything more, and the ship will try to quickly get down to 150 deep or deeper, lower the periscope, increase the propulsion valve, bring water valves down to make you heavier, use planes and angle to get down so you don’t have a collision.
So, once he says no close contacts, after that three revolutions, then he switches to a more deliberate search where he periodically uses high power to search sectors, and the — the guidance says 90 degree sectors in 45 second intervals with intervening low power rapid searches until you work your way through all 90 degree sectors of the circle around the ship.
So, if you follow the guidance, three minutes plus for the time for the low power searches, and once — and I haven’t brought in the added complication of looking in the air, which the guidance does address because you’re worried about being detected by aircraft, and just leaving all that aside and the safety of ship scenario you would not expect the ship to be executing air searches, so in summary if you followed me for all of that, three minutes or more to complete that search per guidance.
Q And sir, during your preliminary inquiry were you able to determine how much time Greenville spent doing her periscope search?
A I think at this point, we need to have the digital history of the ships depth brought into evidence.
Q Commander Harrison, would you have the next chart marked as Exhibit Number 9, I believe it is?
LTCMR HARRISON: This will be marked as Exhibit 9.
Q Admiral, you are being shown the expand depth the periscope depth chart. Could you please describe how much time the Greenville spent at periscope depth? Could you please put it up onto the tray?
And if you would begin in the lower left-hand corner of the chart, and take us through the series of black dots that you see beginning over here.
A Let me say a few preliminary remarks first.
What you are going to see here is a display of ships depth by the digital depth dectector versus time, with depth along the left vertical access — shallow to deep, deep at the bottom, going shallower at the top, and increasing time along the right hand as you work right along the base.
Now, the data recorded here is automatically recorded by the same system that is recording the fire control solutions and the sonar data and so forth, in other words, the ARCI fire control sonar data recorder. And this information was not available to me
when I conducted my investigation and signed off my report. This has come out subsequent. Really, this came to light at about the time I was completing my report, so my recollection is I may not have seen this before I signed my report it may have been within hours afterwards.
But what you have to understand when you look along the vertical axis of this report, this chart, is that these are not to be applied absolutely to the real depth of the submarine for two reasons.
One angle of the ship might cause error and submarines generally have a slight angle at periscope depth, because of the hydrodynamics of submarines.
Q I have a question for you up-angle would tend to reduce the absolute angle of the periscope above the waves?
Q And the other reason that is more significant here is that there is usually an error, an absolute fixed error in the depth detection system from truth from the real keel depth to surface, and I would guess in looking at this data that error was 3 to 4 feet on Greenville on this day.
So you have to take the left-hand axis as a relative reference more than an absolute reference and apply approximately a 4 degree — I’m sorry — a four-foot change to what you’re reading in the more shallow direction to know what the Greenville’s real depth was.
And I say that with some confidence, because I know the officer of the deck and the commanding officer were looking out the periscope which has a fixed distance above the keel, and they were seeing things, and additionally, all submarines generally pick their most reliable depth indication which is not generally the digital, but is a mechanical depth indicator, and every time they dip the scope, they note the depth that that happens, and they correlate that to their in-use most reliable indicator and that is generally in within a foot.
And I think from reports from the diving officer that we interviewed that was the case here, so to make a long story short, as we start to now work through this chart recognize that you are being shown depths that are about four feet deeper than reality when you read this chart.
Okay. The most important thing that I got out of this chart was the following. It gave me boundary conditions, because of the large slope of the change in depth over time I knew the ship was not periscope depth, or was proceeding below periscope depth. So it allowed me to calculate with pretty high assurance how long the ship was at periscope depth. And my estimate is about 80 seconds based on this data.
And in my report I have put about two minutes, and I think that was in hindsight generous, because I didn’t have this data available to me, and was using log to the nearest minute data when I did my investigation. So duration of periscope depth in my estimation from this data is about 80 seconds. And the second thing that this does is it does correlate to the many witnesses who stated that the officer of the deck ordered 60 feet, which is the ships standard practice to proceed to periscope depth, and then the captain took the scope and he ordered a high school at 58 feet.
The driving officer was trying to meet the needs of both depths wasn’t perfect, and so there was some cycling as he attempted to achieve these depths, but he did a pretty good job of very quickly achieving them, so this correlates well to the captain coming up for a higher look than the officer of the deck had. And the sequence of events is after the safety sweeps, two or three quick revolutions in low power, the offices yielded the scope up to the captain who did similar sweeps, and also according to some statements, did a high power search in a sector to the north, where he knew two contacts on sonar were.
So he generally did a sector search in high power to the north, as well as safety sweeps around in low power when the captain was on the scope. But this was all done with some alacrity in a depth of ordered 60, and then 58 feet, and then the ship went deep, and used the emergency deep method to go deep.
Q Admiral, why would Commander Waddle have ordered a high look?
A Remember, the purpose of this periscope depth is to truly ascertain that the area is free of surface contacts so that you can quickly get down and do an emergency blow to the surface. So you need to be assured that there are no surface contacts in this area, so he did that high look, I am sure, to further assure himself that even though he didn’t think sonar was telling him there were close contacts, he was verifying that visually.
That was his intent, I am sure.
Q Sir, what was the weather and sea state on the afternoon of the 9th?
A Well, that’s a good question. It kind of depends on who you talk to or what data you look at and that’s typical when you reconstruct weather in a marine environment.
We had reports that varied from 4 feet to 10 feet in wave and swell height, depending on the source of the data. Let me start with the most objective data.
The nearest moored Metok Buoy, a buoy that the government pays for to provide constant weather information via satellite for all users, all customers for the nation and internationally is about 200 miles to the southwest of the site of the collision. That is the nearest Metok Buoy, these are open ocean buoys.
And it said that the wave and swell height was 8 to 10 feet. Now it’s possible that that was higher than the more local region to Oahu.
There was perhaps some re-shore effect in the environs of wind that would provide a more sheltered environment and hence dampen the waves to some degree.
Q In looking at the video on CNN that was provided from film footage from a local TV station I would estimate six to eight feet, just from my looking at the swells. I would say that the most consistent average of the people we talked to from the Greenville made it six to eight feet, and finally, the master of the Ehime Maru related it was a see state of approximately 3.
And if I correlate all of that together, I would say six to eight feet is the best average I can come up with of the wave and swell height. That is only one of the parameters you asked about. The weather is a more general question.
The background haze in the environment made visibility more difficult. In periscopes, looking out in the hazed condition, it tends to make light objects more difficult to see.
So the darker the object, the more likely you will see it, despite the haze, and the lighter the object you are looking for, the more difficult to see
in a generally hazy day. Of course it was an overcast day, so there was less sun and light than normal. Periscopes are light-hungry, they always need more light. So on darker days, they are less able to see.
Q Admiral what was the — what color was the Ehime Maru?
A That’s another issue here.
Of course, she had every right to be whatever color she wanted. And her color scheme was basically white. And that’s not completely true, she had a black stripe around the top of her stack. And that would have been helpful to notice through the periscope.
But in general, the mass which — and do we have a display we can show to the court. Can we refer to that now?
ATTY A: I will have this marked as court Exhibit 10. Exhibit 10 marked.
Q Commander Harrison, if you could take down the extended TD chart for a moment.
A As you can see, the Ehime Maru is basically a white scheme of colored paint. There is the exception of the stripe at the top of her stack which most vessels have black at the top of their stacks because of the soot comes out of the diesel engines.
I think you can honestly say — and incidentally, the central mass is the highest mast, and my recollection — I think we should refer perhaps to the recorded data but my recollection is the very top of that mast to the water line is approximately 70 feet. Is that correct?
Do you have that data? While you are getting that data let me just say that the way a periscope works is as an object comes over the horizon from distance to close the first thing you would see is the tallest point of the ship, the tip of the tallest mast. And as it comes closer over the curvataure of the earth, more of the ship would start to emerge, you would see more of the mass, and now you would start to see the shorter mast fore and aft, and the next thing you would see is the top of the dark stack because it’s getting closer and closer over the curvataure of the earth through the periscope and then you would see the top of the bridge, and then the main super structure of the ship.
And as more of these solid objects that look different from just these thin masts start to appear as it gets closer, the observer through the periscope would be more and more likely to see it on a hazy day, particularly the top of the bridge with the dark windows and the top of the stack which start to make it much more likely to see in a hazy day in a periscope.
Q Sir, would she have been more difficult to see given her — the course she was on, and the target angle from the Greenville?
A What we call the angle on the bow is as you look from Greenville up towards the Ehime Maru, would be if — if you could see it coming straight at you, that would be 000 angle on the bow, and then as you work your way — as this shows on the starboard side, you would start to see a starboard angle on the bow, it would be 90 degrees off the beam 180 astern 0, in front.
This orientation you would see is very close to what you would have actually seen through the periscope of about a — roughly a 25 degree angle, starboard 25 degree angle on the bow for most of the convergence of the two tracks. So this is sort of the picture you would see.
Of course, depending on the range you would only start to see small upper portions, and as you would get closer, you would see more and more until this would be fully visible.
So again, this is one of the issues related to whether optics and scopes on how easy it would be to see the Ehime Maru on this day.
Q How would you characterize taking into account wave height, taking into account the weather, the haze the whiteout conditions, and taking into account the angle on the bow, and the white color of the Ehime Maru, how difficult would it be to have seen her?
A If you use the most shallow depth ordered by the ship of 58 feet, giving you about roughly a — roughly a 6 and-a-half foot amount of scope out of the water, if you assume that the wave height and swell height was about 8 feet, and if the ship is occasionally in the trough of the wave, the periscope is in the trough of the wave, that is, the wave will partially obscure your vision.
If you recognize that some of the paint scheme shown her on the upper reaches of the highest elevations of Ehime Maru were painted white, and would tend to blend into the back drop, and you put all of those parameters into consideration and you have kind of a very short duration of a periscope depth where you have the worse case of being in the trough of the wave, and so forth, it’s possible you would not in my estimation not seen the Ehime Maru until she was within about 2000 yards.
Now the longer you stay holding your periscope depth constant in that condition and continue to look in that direction, the longer out you will see, because those averages of visibility and wave troughs and so forth will tend to become less worse case. Over time, they will average out, and you will get a longer and longer range you are able to see. But for a brief periscope depth period, it’s possible that the Greenville was not able to see much beyond 2000 yards for this particular target in that weather condition that she faced.
Q Sir, in your opinion, after you completed your preliminary investigation, was the Human Resource that the CO ordered high enough?
A Clearly, in hindsight, it was not. We know in fact from reconstruction the ships were certainly less than 25 hundred yards apart when the ship was — when the Greenville was at periscope depth, it was just over a mile to the Ehime Maru in reconstruction, perhaps a mile — 2000 yards one nautical mile.
And that ship should have been seen given enough time by the periscope operator. Now, one of the things I was not able to ascertain was the visual acuity of the officer of the deck and the visual acuity of the two individuals to looked out of the scope.
I wish I had an opportunity to make sure their eyesight was okay, because that’s one of the issues that I just was not able to pursue in the time that I had.
Q Admiral, kind of a follow-up question here — I just may go back and review this, but when the ship, the Greenville, they obviously had a Metok brief before they went underway, they had some indications, I assume to the officer of the deck in terms of current Metok conditions, when the order of periscope depth of the 60 feet, as I recall it that you said — did they take into account what was already assumed to be the swell and wave heights to build automatically a higher condition that they should have gone to — a higher periscope height for the boat?
VADM NATHMAN: Admiral, I would say that they ordered generic depths.
THE WITNESS: And probably submarines in general do this because for the most part they are not in daily audits, they don’t have immediate data. They transit a while, they come up shallow, and look.
So you program to — you take what you get you assess it when it’s there, it’s a little difference in aviation, you have to know in advance just to safely fly in your envelope.
So we are pretty much conditioned to take what we get when we’re there.
Q So you would modify what you saw as a periscope, based on what you say, and not do it in a pre-determined manner?
A Yes, sir. That’s what we would expect a submarine to do.
Now you asked me if this was a high enough look. What was the range of options open. The top of the sail if it was fifty feet above the keel, if the commanding officer ordered the keel broached, you could get at least a range of three more miles to the horizon, added to what he already was getting at 58 feet. So it would have been significantly more and would certainly help overcome the sea state that the admiral is alluding to, it would have been a correction that is conservative, but perhaps appropriate.
Second guessing the CO, he could have ordered — he has significant more amount of scope, he could have put out of the water. I might also add he could have done it for longer, because some of these impacts of weather, wave and swell height that I’m talking about averaged over time tend to be reduced and mitigated because I am assuming kind of worse case in the trough, and so forth, and eventually, the eye, given several repeated attempts to see this contact will see it. It may not see it the first revolution or the second revolution, but eventually you would see it.
So time is a great ally in these events, and from a visual standpoint more time would have been helpful — a shallower depth, more time.
Q Sir, how do you assess the — I think you testified that it was 70 seconds that the — that you estimate the —
A I think I estimate now 80 seconds.
Q Do you think that was a long enough time to spend at periscope depth?
A Well again, with the great benefit of hindsight, no.
I have one other issue which is why I say that. The master reported he was operating their surface search radar on a twelve nautical mile scale essentially it’s max power scale since he left Honolulu Harbor. So that was a sense of energy, a radar that the BSM system on the Greenville probably did detect.
Now the wave at the ESM works on a submarine when your scope first breaks the surface, your antenna is automatically starting to catch these signals, but you have a dilution of signals, particularly when you are operating near land nine miles south of Oahu. Land-based signals are going to be inundating the operator.
So it takes a finite amount of time not only to determine if any of them are close that are of a ship worth that he variety, but also analyze them further and refine that input.
The time they were at periscope depth of 80 seconds only provided that ESM operator an opportunity to do oral analysis on those signals. He has some sophisticated video digital analysis equipment which allows you to rather quickly break down the parameters categorize them and assess them for range, at least rough correlation of range through signal strength. But the operator in ESM did not have time to do that because they were only at periscope depth for about 80 seconds. So this is one more way that the bell ringer that could have helped the CO know that there was a close ship was not able to be utilized.
Now I took the parameters as best I could obtain them through Captain Kyle and his interface through the NTSB with the master, and I had some technical authorities at SUBPAC analyze for these ranges, we knew the ships were apart from, whether or not that signal strength would have logically been high enough for the ESM operator to record that they were a collision threat.
Because again, when you first come to periscope depth, just like the officer of the deck is in a bistable mode of either MCD for no close contacts the ESM operator, is for a brief period of time is — I do or I don’t — an equivalent to the officer of the deck.
He didn’t get much beyond that period, where analysis could have helped him come to that conclusion before they went deeper then. So because of the challenges to a good visual search, and the lack of ESM time to analyze the ship went deep too quickly. And incidentally, one more point of criticism is that the sonar information was not verbally cued to the officer of the deck or the captain in a rigorous way to do high visual searches down those bearings.
Again, I don’t think the ship expected a close contact based on its analysis of the sonar picture, so it didn’t have a close contact to disprove in the ship’s calculus, but it did have sonar contacts out there, and a direct correlation of the current bearing to that contact with a high poured search from the scope perhaps longer and shallower, would have further warranted to disprove that they weren’t close.
Q Did anyone report either the OOD or the commanding officer that there was a close contact at periscope depth?
A No. There was no — no one on board who made any reports to the commanding officer or the officer of the deck that there was that potential.
Q Sir, should the — would they have known in sonar — would the sonar supervisor or should he have known that they had a close contact, based on the — the information he was getting?
A There are ways for sonar and the sonar supervisor to indirectly make that determination. They are fairly crude, and they are not nearly as reliable as determining that kind of information through analysis of data on a fire control system.
For example, though, the sonar operator and supervisor can tell in some environments. Where some depression elevations are where you are seeing the strongest signal — and that’s — to
digress just a second. A DE angle is where the passive sonar is getting the most energy are in a vertical plane. Is it getting it from somewhere up here, somewhere straight out ahead, or somewhere down here, and the actual from zero or horizontal that it’s getting that and there are ways to correlate the various DE beams that it gets that energy to range because there is some DE angles that can’t be far away if that’s your strongest source.
So there are indirect or full course methods that the sonar and the sonar supervisor can use to make determinations of a close range, but they are not reliable, and they are certainly much more difficult to arrive at and take longer than what the fire control operator should have in the fire control system.
Q So you mention the fire control technician in the watch. Did he know that he had a close contact at periscope depth?
A What I can’t understand is he did have — first of all, he did have indications that there was a contact that was generating in by his fire control system solution on the ship.
Now, the time frame where this happened is very close to when the ship was arriving at periscope depth. And I’ll have to digress for a minute here. This right-hand chart that you see posted vertically here is a chart for Sierra 13 in the same time frame as this whole track history of time versus range to the target.
And this solid red line that you see starting out distant here at the 12:30 time, and coming down to where the collision occurred at 13:43, which is zero range at the collision — so starting out at 20 miles, and coming into zero miles — is a continuum of just connecting the range that each point in time on the two correlating tracks generates down to collision zero, so that’s reality there, that red line.
These — these dashes and dots here are an indication of in the fire control system what the operator has entered for Sierra 13 as the fire control solution range for that contact over time. Now, you should recognize that the fire control solution is a guess. It’s never probably absolute. It’s never perfect.
And it’s frequently not correct at all. It’s a process of using more and more data over time to eliminate bad solution options, until you finally hone in on the correct solution option, and given time, these sonar and fire control systems that we have on our digital equipped ships now are pretty good at getting to the right answer.
And in some cases, it depends on the aspects of the ships, the quality of the signal, how often it’s interrupted, and the operator proficiency, and so forth. But over time, they eventually get there. And in this case, it seems to me that the operator had figured out that this guy was getting in pretty close, just at or before PD. And the — and the operator did not make that report to the officer of the deck or the captain.
Q Admiral, you say “close” I can’t see the scale on that. I can’t see — is it a thousand?
A This is zero yards, this is five miles here or 10,000 yards so each major increment is 5,000 yards. That is 0, 5,000 yards, 10,000 yards, 20,000, 30,000, 4,000.
Q So when you say close you are indicating 2000 to 25000 on that scale?
A Yes, sir. And where I have the dot is about 4000 yards. That’s about 2000, and this is zero. So in this period here, the FT of the Watch is entering into the system what I would call close ranges, ranges inside 5000 yards and he was not reporting that to the supervisory, watchstanders.
Q Would you expect him to make those reports based on the data he had?
A Yes, I would expect that to be very relevant information for the officer of the deck and very helpful.
Q And sir, you mentioned that these data points, they take a physical act by the FTOW to enter this information, he has to know what he’s doing — that’s not automatic, correct he has to physically do something?
A Yes. In general, there are automatic entries into the fire control system. They are not the ones being displayed here, though. These are the ones that have to take manual operator entry to make. And so he was making them.
Q Sir, in your investigation were you able to determine why the FTOW did not report this close contact to the officer of the deck or the commanding officer?
A I tried. And I think I know why. But further testimony may be helpful for the court to understand that. There were two basic issues going on here.
One is that there were a number of people that were physically an obstruction to his line of sight and communications with the OD and the captain. Many of them were civilian guests of the
embarked visitors. They were in the control room in a line of — they were standing on the side in the periscope stand area in a position where they were in the way for the FT of the Watch to physically look at and talk to the officer of the deck or the captain. And are you going to bring out that diagram again?
A Yes, sir, we’ll put up the diagram so you can show that visually to the court. Now I only have kind of an aggregate sense of where the visitors were from a number of interviews, I am sure I don’t know exactly where they were in my own mind.
That is difficult to know after-the-fact. So what I am describing for you is my sense of where they were and it may not be totally accurate. This is not a lot of room to put extra people in. We have already put in watchstanders in an earlier discussion. The watchstand is the only place they could go to observe
Would be in this L-shaped area right here, starboard and forward center line and then to some degree, you can put some more aft over here to the left port side of the periscope stand. So my sense is that the 16 visitors and captain Brandheuber were filling in the space on the port side of the periscope stand, and also center line and starboard of the periscope stand, where I am outlining here with the laser pointer and the area over here.
Remember the FT of the Watch is about right here, approximately. People that would be standing just inboard of him, where I am circling now with my laser pointer filling up the starboard side of the control room would all block him from talking easily to the arbitrary place we placed the CO here and the officer of the deck here but generally you would expect them somewhere on the con, although they could be elsewhere.
Q Admiral, would you have expected FTOW if he thought the visitors were a barrier to communication to ask them to move?
A I certainly would. A physical barrier is not insurmountable, particularly when you have an urgent report. So there is no question that the visitors presence although perhaps a passive deterrent was not the only reason here, there was something else going on, and I am still not sure what that something else was except from some of the interviews I got the impression that this point in the game the CO was talking very directly to sonar. He was either physically going to sonar, asking the XO to go into sonar, or he was talking to sonar, and for whatever reason, the FT of the Watch felt that the CO had the picture he wanted to get from his discussions with sonar, and that the FT of the Watch was not part of the communications loop.
So it was some mixture of physical barriers from people, and the FT of the Watch kind of feeling — I don’t know — almost like he was benched in the game at that point in the game from being a part of it.
Incorrectly so. Clearly, he should not have felt that way. He, in my opinion, should have taken it on his own volition to volunteer this information just as it would be helpful for the OD to go observe this information, but for whatever reason, this fire control information, again, at the n-th hour, is developed the range has dropped way in from out here around 15,000 yards, to inside of 5,000 yards for only a few minutes time, and the ship is distracted at periscope depth. A lot of things going on in a short amount of time.
Nevertheless, this is key information that didn’t get to the CO or officer of the deck.
VADM NATHMAN: Counsel, this just sticks out in my mind. You talk about physical barriers, and you talk about reports receiving reports of the fire technician of the watch. Now his reports go to the officer of the deck, is that correct?
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. His reports should go to the officer of the deck.
VADM NATHMAN: Okay, so regardless of how busy the CO was, the officer of the deck should have still received reports, and the physical barrier side, it doesn’t prevent the FTOW from speaking up, regardless if somebody is standing if his way, does it?
THE WITNESS: There is no reason why he shouldn’t speak up period, his primary duty is the assure the safety of the ship. He was the one analyzing the contacts. He had information that should have told him that the contact was close or potentially close.
Remember these are arbitrarily solutions in the machine and not necessarily true but it certainly was an indicator and for whatever reason he didn’t relay that information.
I just want to add it’s not real clear to me when this range was out spotted to 9,000 yards. This last data point on this whole graph white before the collision is 9,000 yards and in interviewing the FT of the Watch, he indicated to me that he out-spotted the range, based on the reports by the OD and the CO that they had no visual contacts.
That would be a logical action because again, these are not ground truth solutions, these are potential solutions, and he thought his potential solutions had fallen apart when the CO and the skipper told him he had no visual to beyond the visual horizon for a contact just prior to the collision.
Q Admiral, in reviewing the actual data logs, were you able to determine if he out-spotted before or after the collision took place?
A When I had signed out my report, my understanding was it was before. I have subsequently talked to Commodore Bias, that was done after the collision. Now it’s very close in time, so I think that’s a matter for the court to examine further.
Q Admiral, again, if the “as do” had been working the repeater, would that have automatically displayed the fire control screens that the FTOW had been looking at so this data would have been repeated on the as do for the OD?
A No, the “as do” is strictly sonar data, the raw data. The fire control data is, however, readily available on the starboard side of control, should you choose to look at it, or should you get reports from the operator to you that it’s occurring.
Q Is that something that is a matter of routine that the OOD should be doing in addition to looking at the as do, should he be looking at the FTOW displays in order to get the complete picture along with the other information he’s got?
Q Sir, what time did Greenville leave periscope depth?
A Greenville left periscope depth at 13:40. That is indicated by the arrow here on the blue track of Greenville. And it’s the annotation, conducts emergency deep for training, commences turn left to 340.
Q And can you tell us what happened on Greenville when she ordered emergency deep?
A The captain was on the periscope and ordered the emergency deep and directed to go to 400 feet. The default would be 150 feet otherwise from that direct order. Anybody on the scope can order emergency deep. That is how we train because that’s the person that can ** That’s why the skipper ordered the OD to go to 400 feet instead of 150 to set up for the emergency blow. The captain was doing a couple of things when he did this.
First of all, he was getting down quickly to set up to quickly do the subsequent emergency blow before the surface picture changed and degraded, and secondly, he was demonstrating an impression evolution of how rapidly these ships can go deep when they sense a need to from periscope depth.
Q Did the Greenville change course as she went down to emergency deep?
A Yes, she started to turn left. This was based on a recommendation from the nav picture to the captain of where the best course was to go to to once surfaced, head back to the barn.
And it’s a logical question and a logical decision to start heading towards the — the point where you want to transit back to home port after the evolution.
Q How well did she execute emergency deep?
A Despite the fact that there were distinguished visitors on a few of the controls, they were in a very passive condition, actually. They were closely supervised and it had no bearing on this collision, in my determination.
The procedures were followed exactly and the ship did a emergency blow in a normal manner which requires controlling the rudder, controlling the angle up on the ship to between 10 and 20 degrees, placing the air in both forward and aft ballast tanks for a set amount of time, ten seconds, and she did all of that very well.
Q And sir, when she executed the emergency surface, and the collision occurred, can you describe to the court where she struck Ehime Maru on her way up?
A Yes. The ship — the Greenville initially struck the Ehime Maru my guess is probably somewhere near the bow with the portside of her hull just aft of the sail, and then as she continued upward with her momentum that she is the Greenville — the Greenville’s rudder sliced through the hull of the Ehime Maru and caused the rapid flooding and the loss of the Ehime Maru.
Now the top of the rudder of the USS Greenville is especially hard steel because in the horizontal slow surfacing under ice scenario, it needs to be not to be damaged when you breakup through the ice when you have to surface through ice, so that is part of the ships structure that is hardened to do that.
Q So did Greenville detect contact Sierra 13 the Ehime Maru during her ascent?
A No, there was no question in my mind that the Greenville did not know Ehime Maru was there until she hit her. I am sure this was a terrible shock, and the first that anyone on the USS Greenville anyone on the Ehime Maru was there was when the collision occurred and that was the first indicator.