Analysts Discuss Rumsfeld Resignation and Iraq Study Group Report

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• JIM LEHRER:

  And to the analysis of Shields and Brooks, syndicated columnist Mark Shields, New York Times columnist David Brooks.

  Mark, what are your thoughts about Donald Rumsfeld tonight?

• MARK SHIELDS, Syndicated Columnist:

  In many respects, a tragic figure, Jim. I mean, Donald Rumsfeld became the one symbol of accountability in an administration where they evaded and avoided accountability during the four years of the war and the setbacks there.

  And he became a very convenient scapegoat for an awful lot of people. For the neocons, who had advocated the war and supported it, he became the person to blame. The Democrats who had backed the war, he became the person to blame.

  For all manner of folks, for the military, many of whom, brass, I think, had chosen their careers over their conscience, he became somebody to blame.

  And he paid dearly for having shown contempt for the Congress, a Republican Congress. He didn't consult; he had no oversight. He paid dearly, I think, for micromanaging, because there was nobody else to share the responsibility of the blame for when things did go south on him.

  And he's a tragic figure, I think, for somebody who is the youngest secretary of defense in our nation's history. And…

• JIM LEHRER:

  The first time, the first time.

• MARK SHIELDS:

  … when he first came, and leaves as the oldest secretary of defense. And certainly, a figure — on the way out, it kind of unleashed the military to start being candid about what had gone wrong and their objections.

• JIM LEHRER:

  Does he deserve all the blame he's getting, David?

• DAVID BROOKS, Columnist, New York Times:

  I do. I think he does deserve quite a lot of blame. I don't think he's a scapegoat.

  I mean, I understood going into Baghdad and the first rush up with whatever he had, 130,000. What I don't understand was why he didn't adapt the number of troop levels after that.

  When it became clear to people in the White House, when it became clear to John McCain, when it became clear in what has become clear in every single book and article that's been written about what went wrong, there wasn't enough troops, and there was no order in society.

  Why he didn't adapt in May of '03, in June, in July? And more than that, why did he suppress any sort of debate that could have happened about that within the military? And he didn't.

  And one of the things he did not do was cultivate a climate of open debate. So a lot of people within the military who privately held one opinion didn't say it, and maybe they should have. But it would have taken a lot of courage, and part of that was his fault.

  And then the final thing I'd say about him — and I agree he was the most well-qualified public servant maybe of our lifetime and the most destructive at the same time — but the final thing I'd say about him — and this he shares with, I think, a lot of people in the White House and in the Pentagon, was that he saw the war as killing bad guys and controlling territory.

  And as many essayists and reporters over there made clear, the enemy saw the war as controlling the narrative and winning the war of ideas. And they were playing a different game than we were, and they were beating us at it.