Boeing and FAA face scrutiny over safety inspections after door panel incident

Geoff Bennett:

We are learning more about what went wrong when a door panel blew off an Alaska Airlines flight midair. Officials are looking into whether four bolts that were supposed to hold the panel in place were actually missing.

The investigation grounded at least 170 other planes from Alaska and United Airlines, and it's leading to many questions about Boeing and the role of the FAA.

Jon Ostrower covers this all closely as the editor in chief of The Air Current. That's a site with reporting on the aerospace and aviation industries.

Thanks so much for being with us.

And, Jon, we should say that you were the first to report that United Airlines found loose bolts during its early inspections of the 737 MAX 9. Alaska Airlines also said it found what it called loose hardware. Based on your reporting, what accounts for this, faulty installations or poor design?

Jon Ostrower, Editor in Chief, The Air Current: Well, I think you're hitting exactly on what Boeing, the FAA, Spirit AeroSystems and the NTSB wants to understand.

How did these bolts become loose? Did it happen during flights? Did it happen during manufacturing? Did it happen during assembly? And getting to the bottom of that is really the key question about what actually caused this door on the Alaska Airlines flight to depart the aircraft at 16,000 feet.

Geoff Bennett:

The CEO of Boeing today acknowledged the company's mistake. This was during a company-wide town hall meeting.

What more can you tell us about that and what all this means for Boeing, which has come under fire for a series of safety issues connected to this very plane?

Jon Ostrower:

Well, yes, today's — the town hall in the factory in Renton, Washington, where Boeing builds the 737, was a moment for Boeing to pause and talk to its employees about what they know, what they don't know, what they can say, and what they're doing to make sure that any issues in the factory don't become safety issues in the field.

And I think that's something that they're going to continue to reiterate publicly. I think one of the really important things, I think, as we look at this and look at the span of the history that has befallen Boeing over not just the last five years with the grounding of the 737 MAX and twin accidents in Ethiopia and Indonesia, is that coming off of that and rolling through the pandemic, there was really a major shift in how Boeing was producing the airplane, which was that production had halted during the grounding.

And then the pandemic caused a huge turnover of staff. And those are both discrete events. But I think what's really important to put into context is that Boeing has tried to move beyond that — the tragedies that befell Ethiopian Airlines and Lion Air back in 2019 and 2020.

But what they — keep what keeps recurring is a series of quality missteps that are not nearly as severe as what we saw in the crashes in 2019 and 2020, but certainly have not mitigated these quality escapes, so to speak, that cause tremendous disruption for Boeing, for the airlines, in this particular case, a very cute safety situation, safety crisis for the MAX — for Alaska Airlines and the 171 people, passengers that were on board that airplane.

I think when Boeing looks at how they move forward from this, I think it's important to put into context that Boeing's strategy fundamentally as a company has not changed. They have adopted new safety procedures, an ombudsman and reemphasized various tactical moves in terms of how they approach safety.

But I think, fundamentally, the company's strategy in terms of its goals for its — both its shareholders and its customers has not changed in the last 20 years. And so that strategy currently is not, by all accounts in the conversations that we're having with senior leaders all across the aviation industry, whether it be it Boeing's best customers or their suppliers or other stakeholders who are interested in their success as a national asset, are looking at a strategy that is producing the opposite results that they want to achieve.

And so that's going to be really the legacy of this immediate issue once the aircraft is expected to reenter service when more is known and the initial investigation takes place.

Geoff Bennett:

And in the minute we have left, there are also questions about what this all means for the FAA, that United and Alaska, which are the two airlines that fly the specific aircraft, that they have both found loose parts in their early inspections of the grounded aircraft.

It leads to questions about the FAA's inspection processes and its overall oversight. I mean, what does accountability look like for the FAA right now?

Jon Ostrower:

Well, certainly, Congress is going to be asking questions about that in the weeks to come, I think, from an oversight perspective.

It's really important to remember that while the conversation has focused on Spirit AeroSystems, the supplier to Boeing, and Boeing itself, when the MAX returned to service in the end of 2020 following the grounding, the FAA took back responsibility for key delegated tasks, including the final inspection and airworthiness ticketing of each and every delivery.

So the FAA has played a role and been integrally involved in Boeing's factories and their deliveries since then. So, certainly, how they have approached this is going to be an important question going forward.

Geoff Bennett:

Jon Ostrower of The Air Current, thanks so much for being with us.

Jon Ostrower:

Thanks so much. Appreciate it.