Middle East analysts on what the Iran war has accomplished and how it might end

Geoff Bennett:

Meantime rescue efforts are under way tonight for an American refueling aircraft that went down in Western Iraq. A second aircraft landed safely. U.S. Central Command says the incident was not due to hostile or friendly fire.

For an assessment now of where things stand with this war, we get two views.

Alan Eyre served in the U.S. government for four decades and was part of the Obama administration's negotiating team for the nuclear deal with Iran. He's now at the Middle East Institute. And Behnam Ben Taleblu is at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, where he is the senior director of its Iran program.

With a welcome to you both to the program this evening, Alan, we will start with you.

When you read this statement from Iran's new supreme leader, what stands out to you?

Alan Eyre, Middle East Institute:

Well, first of all, the fact that he made it, because what's most important for those running Iran now is continuity of the hard line during this time of war.

And, again, it hit all the usual spots. The things that I found most important were the emphasis on keeping the straits closed, the statement that he's going to seek either reparations from the West or causing an equivalent amount of damage to Western assets. And then the rest was just the usual rhetoric that his late father used to use.

So, again, this wasn't Ayatollah Khamenei issuing this. This was Ayatollah IRGC, showing that the IRGC and the (INAUDIBLE) the leadership apparatus around the new leader, is still firmly in control and are moving forward.

Geoff Bennett:

Behnam, do you read the statement the same way? What does it say about the regime's mind-set right now, in your view?

Behnam Ben Taleblu, The Foundation for Defense of Democracies: Pleasure to be with you all.

I read it similarly, but not exactly the same. The fact that first this is a press release, rather than audio, rather than video, rather than actually any images or signs of life really from the new supreme leader, is perhaps the most telling part that he's operating in the background, that his lack of presence is leading to jokes in Iran, that he's the new -- quote, unquote -- "hidden imam," and that the regime would play to this myth to try to limp along and signal continuity or even feign continuity.

That, I think has to be said. But, otherwise, yes, this is the Middle East. The trend line, unfortunately, is that things will go from bad to worse. And three supreme leaders into a 47-year Islamic Republic, it's interesting that neither the Islamic nor the republican institutions are the ones that matter.

This is a coarsening national security deep state that we see in Tehran today and one that is best exemplified by the son of Iran's longest-serving contemporary autocrat, Ayatollah Khamenei, now being at the helm and putting out such a firm and aggressive statement.

Geoff Bennett:

And I want to come back to this, but, Alan, first, looking at the battlefield so far, what has actually been accomplished in this war launched by the U.S. and Israel?

Alan Eyre:

Lots have been accomplished. Unfortunately, most of it is not good.

But when you look at the disparate spectrum of U.S. administration goals that have been put forward, one of them has been destroying Iran's ability to project power. And we have by and large done that in terms of the nuclear program, in terms of missiles, in terms of the navy, putatively in terms of its ability to support proxies.

Unfortunately, at the same time we have destroyed their current ability to do so, we have vastly increased their future desire to do so. So this war is -- almost in a way locks us in terms of path dependency to future policy of mowing the lawn in Iran if they do, in fact, try to reconstitute strategic deterrence or being faced with Iran has got lots of missiles and quite possibly is very close to or has a nuclear weapon.

Geoff Bennett:

Behnam, from your perspective, how significant are the losses for Iran and how fundamentally weakened is the regime's strategic position right now, if at all?

Behnam Ben Taleblu:

Well, a couple of interesting dichotomies here. Week does not necessarily mean not lethal. And that's what we have seen from the Islamic Republic in 2025 and 2026.

The regime is weak and has been getting weaker even really before the 12-day war last year, even really before the protests in the month of January. This regime was becoming or auditioning to become the next failed state in that part of the world anyway due to central government policy.

The war certainly is accentuating that. If you want to put a fancy military label on both what Israel is doing and what America is doing in terms of military capacity right now, that's a combination of decapitation and defanging.

But there's an outsized question here right now as to, can a military victory take the place of a political victory? And even if President Trump or Prime Minister Netanyahu does get a military victory, credibly setting back the regime's missile program, nuclear program, ability to project power abroad, how will it, if at all, take it to the next level, given that, of course, the forcing function for the crisis is not the nuclear issue, not the missile issue, not the drone or terrorism issue.

But, really, again, back to the month of January early this year in the biggest nationwide anti-regime uprising and where President Trump not once, not twice, but between eight and nine times promised help to Iranian protesters.

So how this military win is nested into a larger political strategy is going to matter very, very much for the future of U.S.-Iran policy and matter very much for the future of what comes next inside Iran, whether that's Islamic Republic 2.0 or 3.0 or potentially something else.

Geoff Bennett:

So, at this point, Alan, should President Trump be thinking about declaring a military victory and bringing this conflict to a close? Or does that risk leaving the job, however the job is defined, leaving it unfinished?

Alan Eyre:

Yes, I mean, rule number one, when you're digging a hole and you want to get out, is stop digging. The U.S. administration should stop digging. President Trump should declare a victory. He could say, we have eliminated Iran's ability to project power past its borders, which was one of the stated goals of this war.

And he can also say, and with -- the rest of the job is up to the Iranian people, even though he's made it much harder, in fact, for the Iranian people to try to seize government and try to move Iran toward a better future.

But, yes, the physician's oath is first do no harm. We should stop doing more harm. We should just stop and pull out.

Geoff Bennett:

How do you see it, Behnam?

Behnam Ben Taleblu:

Listen, I think there's nothing more than the Islamic Republic would want would be for the president to prematurely pull out and declare victory at the moment.

I mean, Iran's most powerful person, which is not at the moment Mojtaba Khamenei, but I would argue Ali Larijani, the secretary of the supreme National Security Council, a deep state veteran and bureaucrat of this regime's myriad Byzantine institutions, someone like him has literally just said, that he wants time to be on his side and that they're going to be forcing America to prematurely end operations.

Whether you were for the conflict or not, I think we are in one right now. It's one that the Islamic Republic is intent to widen. I think it is going to be a core interest for U.S. policy to make sure that the regime doesn't win this war of wills and pays a price for it, because the price of leaving the regime standing, the price of not actually having a larger containment and rollback policy if major military operations commence is going to be significant here, given the stakes.

And, again, the stakes are not just nuclear, missile, military, but it's that we have a massive chasm between state and society inside that country. And that will be the yardstick by the end of the Trump administration's term by which success or failure will be judged.

Geoff Bennett:

Alan, if this regime survives this conflict, to use Behnam's term, regime 2.0, does it come out more cautious or more emboldened and therefore more dangerous?

Alan Eyre:

I think, again, all of this prediction is hard. So I don't want to give a false certitude.

But it seems probable to me that this regime, if it emerges, will be more oppressive to its own people and will be more frantic in trying to reestablish strategic deterrence by rebuilding its missiles, by possibly moving deliberately, not necessarily racing, toward a nuclear weapon.

So I think the possible consequences, the probable consequences are unfortunately destabilizing for the region.

Geoff Bennett:

Alan Eyre...

Alan Eyre:

Though I hope I'm wrong.

Geoff Bennett:

Yes.

Alan Eyre and Behnam Ben Taleblu, our thanks to you both.

Behnam Ben Taleblu:

Thank you.