Threat and Response: The Senate Iraq Hearings

KWAME HOLMAN:

Tomorrow it will be 12 years to the day since Iraqi military forces stormed across their southern border into Kuwait and seized the country within hours. U.S.-led coalition forces succeeded in driving the invaders back into Iraq, but American troops stopped short of entering Baghdad. Today, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee continued hearings trying to determine the risks and consequences of a U.S. military attack that would include entering Baghdad, removing Saddam Hussein from power, and establishing a new government.

This morning's witnesses were asked to paint a "day after" scenario, the dynamics that would be at work in Iraq the day after Saddam is removed. Rend Rahim Francke, executive director of the Washington-based Iraq Foundation, relished the thought.

REND RAHIM FRANCKE, Iraq Foundation:

I have spoken to Iraqis over the past ten years– it is my business to speak to Iraqis every day. And there is a unanimous desire for pluralism, representation, participation, accountability in government– in short, all the things that we call democracy. I have to tell you Iraqis desperately want to be freed of Saddam Hussein, and they also know that the only country that can help them with this is the United States, and they are ready to welcome the U.S. as liberators.

But equally, because of the history of the Gulf War and because of its aftermath and because Iraqis believe that the U.S. abandoned them in 1991 and later, there is, unfortunately, a deficit of trust among Iraqis of U.S. intentions. We must make clear that the United States comes to Iraq as a friend and not as an occupier, and that the U.S. will help the Iraqis rebuild the country from the devastation of 20 years of war.

KWAME HOLMAN:

However, Phebe Marr, an Iraq expert formerly at the National Defense University, described a possible breakdown of Iraqi society beginning the day after Saddam is removed.

PHEBE MARR, Iraq Expert:

If the U.S. embarks on this project, it needs to be prepared to see it through to an acceptable outcome, including, if necessary, a long-term military and political commitment to ensure a stable and more democratic government. If it is not prepared to do so, the intended benefits could vanish. As we know, Iraq is a multi- ethnic, multi-sectarian country with boundaries that were imposed by foreign powers at the time of this formation in 1920. It has three main demographic components, consisting of the Kurdish-speaking population in the North, about 17 percent; the Arab Shiia in the South, about 60 percent; and the Arab Sunnis in the center, somewhere between 15 percent and 20 percent. Under the current regime, a narrowly based Arab Sunni community uses repression to enforce its rule over all communities; hence the fear that if the regime is removed, the country will fragment into its ethnic and sectarian components.

How accurate is that assessment? First, in my view, it is very unlikely, indeed inconceivable, that Iraq will break up into three relatively cohesive components– a Kurdish North, a Shiia South, and an Arab Sunni center. None of these communities is homogeneous or shows any ability to unite. Moreover, in many cities– Baghdad, Mosul, Basra, Irbil– the communities are thoroughly mixed. Most important of all, the overwhelming majority of the population, except possibly for a few Kurds, has consistently shown a strong desire to keep the state together and profit from its ample resources. However, the removal of the regime under certain circumstances could result in a breakdown of the central government and its ability to exercise control over the country.

There are two dangers here. The first is short-term. If firm leadership is not in place in Baghdad on the day after, retribution, score-settling, blood-letting, especially in urban areas, could take place. On a broader scale, without a firm government, parochial interests could take over both in the North and the South and the center. Such a collapse of authority could trigger interference from neighbors. Turkey could intervene in the North, as it has done before. Iran, through its proxies, could follow suit. There could even be a reverse flow of refugees as many Iraqi Shiia exiles in Iran return home, possibly in the thousands, destabilizing areas of the South. And over the long term, if a new government in Baghdad fails to take hold, if it is not more inclusive of Iraq's communities and acceptable to the population, Iraq could gradually slip into the category of a failed state, unable to maintain control over its territories and borders. This is not the most likely scenario, but is a little more likely than a decade ago.

While most Iraqis do want the unity and territorial sovereignty of their state, their sense of identity as a nation has eroded under the Baath, and in my view is weaker than at any time since 1945. In some respects the state is already in the process of failure and needs revival.

KWAME HOLMAN:

Indiana Republican Richard Lugar said the myriad ethnic and religious factions make him wonder where the new leadership in Iraq would come from.

SEN. RICHARD LUGAR:

I don't see in my mind's eye how this happens, even though I see the daunting circumstances that you have described. Can any of you give an idea as to who physically might offer leadership?

REND RAHIM FRANCKE:

First of all, you do need this coalition that represents a myriad of political and social interests in Iraq. But that given the fact that there is going to be a period of time when leadership in Iraq will have to emerge, we have to start somewhere. And I'm suggesting that the kernel that we use is the opposition that is now in northern Iraq– in other words, the Kurds– plus the opposition which is outside Iraq. And that is only used as a kernel to be added to. I've called it the open circle, to be augmented, to be added to, as leadership comes from within Iraq.

KWAME HOLMAN:

This afternoon, former Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and former National Security Advisor Samuel Berger testified. West Virginia Democrat Jay Rockefeller challenged both to explain why in fact the United States should target Saddam.

SEN. JAY ROCKEFELLER:

Are we talking About, in fact removing Saddam Hussein because he's Saddam Hussein alone or because of the weapons of mass destruction?

SAMUEL BERGER:

To me, it's the combination of both. It is the capability and the intent together. To me, the greatest threat is Saddam with nuclear weapons capability believing that that capability is essentially deterrence against us acting if he then seeks once again to take aggressive action against his neighbor. I think that's the single most dangerous threat of this threat.

CASPAR WEINBERGER:

We all agree that the regime is terrible, that Saddam Hussein is a beast of the worst kind and must go. But then everybody starts pointing out the enormous difficulties afterwards. The departure of Saddam Hussein doesn't guarantee chaos in the region, and I would think that a victorious group of armies or a group of nations that participated in his being eliminated and the regime changed would also want to participate in whatever is necessary to keep the situation basically stable and secure.

KWAME HOLMAN:

As the hearing ended, Chairman Biden said there was much more to explore on the issue of dealing with Iraq, and the foreign relations committee will continue its inquiry in the fall.