‘Traumatized’ Afghanistan Could Take Decades to Fix

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• JUDY WOODRUFF:

  Now another in our occasional conversations on Afghanistan.

  Last week, Margaret Warner talked with Bruce Riedel, who headed an Obama administration policy review team on Afghanistan and on Pakistan. He favored sending more U.S. troops there.

  Today, a different perspective, and again to Margaret Warner.

• MARGARET WARNER:

  This is what Afghanistan looked like in November 2001, after the U.S. and its Afghan allies swept the Taliban from power.

  Six weeks later, author, activist, and former British diplomat Rory Stewart began a walk across Afghanistan, part of a 6,000-mile trek across Asia. He chronicled the Afghan journey in his book "The Places in Between." He went on to found and run the Turquoise Mountain project, which is regenerating an historic part of Kabul and training craftsmen in traditional skills. Stewart is now director the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard University. And he recently returned from a trip to Afghanistan.

  And, Rory Stewart, thanks for joining us for this.

  RORY STEWART, author, "The Places in Between": Thank you very much.

• MARGARET WARNER:

  What does President Obama need to keep in mind about Afghanistan, as he wrestles with what to do there?

• RORY STEWART:

  I'm afraid that what he needs to keep in mind is that Afghanistan is a very, very difficult place to turn around or fix.

  It's a very poor, fragile, traumatized country. It could take 20 or 30 years investment in Afghanistan before it began to reach the levels of Pakistan in terms of its civil service, its army, its police, just its basic educational and health structures.

  So, whatever we're doing in Afghanistan, if we really want to achieve change, it's going to be a very, very long-term process. It's not something that you're going to be able to achieve by a short-term injection of troops and money.

• MARGARET WARNER:

  So, what should the U.S. goal be, do you think, based on your experience there?

• RORY STEWART:

  Firstly, it should be trying to protect its own national security, which I think may turn out to be not that difficult.

  In other words, if your only objective is to stop al-Qaida from having a serious base in Afghanistan from which to attack the United States, I think that's achievable with relatively few troops. But you would have to keep a presence there for some time.

  The second thing is, you would try to help the Afghan people. We do have an obligation towards the Afghan people. The United States is a benevolent power. It would like to deliver development. But it's not a blank check obligation. It says, we're going to do what we can to help with infrastructure, health, education, support the positive elements in society and reduce the negative elements.

• MARGARET WARNER:

  Now, you said that this shouldn't be — that the U.S. has an obligation, but it's not a blank check. Yet, there are Afghans, people in the region who say, the U.S. funded the mujahedeen in the '80s, helped create this problem. You have a moral obligation to basically stick with Afghanistan until it's fixed.

• RORY STEWART:

  I think that's very, very dangerous language. I think, when people start talking about a moral obligation, you have got to stick with it until you have fixed, you have to come back and say, you don't have a moral obligation to do what you cannot do, that "ought" implies "can."

  Once you start saying you have a moral obligation, failure is not an option, you get tied into very unpleasant co-dependent relationships. We need to detach a little bit and be a bit more realistic about what we can actually achieve in the country, because there's no point panicking and saying we have an obligation, we have an obligation, if we don't look clearly at what our resources are, what our power is, what we can do to help.

• MARGARET WARNER:

  So, do you want to venture an opinion on more troops or not more troops?

• RORY STEWART:

  My opinion is, we should certainly not put in more troops, because the danger of putting in more troops is, you just create this very expensive, unpopular presence, unpopular not just with Afghans, but even with people back in the United States.

  And that will just increase the pressure for withdrawal, and we will run out the door again in two, three years' time, leaving Afghanistan much worse off than before. I would much have rather seen us stick at about 20,000, 30,000 troops, which is where we were back in 2004.