U.N. Weapons Inspection: Hans Blix

JIM LEHRER:

Inspecting Iraq. If and when there are new U.N. weapons inspections, they will be conducted by the United Nations Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission known by its initials acronym UNMOVIC.

Its executive chairman is Hans Blix, a career diplomat, former Foreign Minister of Sweden. I talked with him late this afternoon from the United Nations.

JIM LEHRER:

Mr. Blix, welcome.

HANS BLIX:

Thank you.

JIM LEHRER:

Are your inspectors ready to go to Iraq?

HANS BLIX:

Yes. We have been training people now since the year 2000, and we have some 220 who have been trained, and they are ready but they have to be brought from the various parts of the world; they are not sitting here in New York.

JIM LEHRER:

And when do you anticipate now sending in an advance team?

HANS BLIX:

We had a timeline that we presented to the Security Council, which aimed at the middle of October, and if the Security Council now is going to work out a new resolution, which might in some ways change our mandate, then we think that it would be reasonable to wait for that mandate, at least for some little time, so still hopefully before the end of October.

JIM LEHRER:

Before the end of October. Now your advance group is how many of your – you say two to three hundred inspectors, is that right, altogether in your team?

HANS BLIX:

We have trained now well over 200 – some 220; and we have a training course now running in Vienna with another 50/60. The advance group that I'm talking about is the group that will go in and as it were open and look at the logistics. We have lots of jeeps there; we need to have airplanes. We need to have helicopters, et cetera.

So that's an advance team. And perhaps about a week after that advance team comes in we will have the first persons who actually will go out — can go out into the field, but it's still more of a trial inspections and what we call trial re-base lining. To get a larger number of people, and we aim at having some 80 people, there at any given time will take a number of more weeks.

JIM LEHRER:

On what will be the information on which – when the time does come – let's assume for discussion purposes that there is a resolution from the U.N. Security Council and you're given the go ahead, okay, go, what information will you and your team take with you as to where to go, what to look at, et cetera?

HANS BLIX:

Well, there's a vast amount of information available from the UNSCOM times; we may have something like 15,000 images from the various sites that the inspectors have visited, and we now —

JIM LEHRER:

Excuse me. UNSCOM – that's during the earlier inspections back in 1991 and before.

HANS BLIX:

Yes. Up till the end of 1998. Since then of course there have been no inspections but we have satellite images for many places – from which we can see what have they repaired, what have they built up – and when we were in Vienna last week we received from the Iraqis a number of CD-ROMs, which will tell us what new dual use items there have been in facilities which were declared and also some new facilities, which UNSCOM never visited, so there will be a need for what we term "re-base lining"; that's they go into the facilities and see what has been changed in them.

JIM LEHRER:

Now what did the Iraqis — on these CD-ROMs –they say, look, this is where we have weapons of mass destruction, we have plants or could make weapons of, what did, what's on there?

HANS BLIX:

There will be lots of factories in the chemical field, and there will be pharmaceutical industries, which could be used for dual use purposes. Of course, they deny that they have any weapons and they deny that they have further information.

So we will analyze and see what from our present sources, see what questions can we put to them. We can have perhaps ask for interviews; we are also following what has been said in media, and other sources, which often get their material from intelligence organizations. And we may have information from governments too suggesting where we should go. They have come out lately with a number of suggestions.

JIM LEHRER:

So you will use intelligence information gathered by member states of the United Nations, right?

HANS BLIX:

If they're willing to provide it to us, yes, we have it; that's clearly in the mandate.

JIM LEHRER:

At this stage, do you feel you have a good handle on where to go and what the general picture is for your inspections if and when they come off?

HANS BLIX:

Well, we have a great many places that we want to visit, and we will hope that we will get more information from governments, but one must realize and remember that the Iraqis have had plenty of time to hide whatever they wanted to hide since 1998. They were quite capable at that before, and they would be even better at it now. We read stories to the effect that they have been putting things on mobile — on trucks and moving it around in the country – there could be underground installations – and we would need to have an idea where we could find that and look for it.

JIM LEHRER:

Well, if they in fact have hidden something, would it be realistic to expect them help you find what they have hidden?

HANS BLIX:

No, not really. I think that it is more likely they've hidden something, and as you come up to it, there would be a denial of access but a denial of access is also a very significant event, and I don't think that the Security Council today would be willing to go along with the kind of cat and mouse play that they had in the past.

JIM LEHRER:

Well, let me make sure I understand that. Let's say you go to a particular location and you and your inspectors believe that there's something there you want to look at, and the Iraqi government says no. Now, so what happens then?

HANS BLIX:

We report to the Security Council immediately. We will report very regular to them, and if anything like that happens, we will report immediately.

JIM LEHRER:

Now did you explain that to the Iraqi officials you talked to in Vienna?

HANS BLIX:

Of course, they are totally aware of that

JIM LEHRER:

Did you get the feeling from that meeting that they understand that if – what were the consequences – what do they seem to understand what the consequences would be of their denying you access [sic] – did you talk in those terms at all?

HANS BLIX:

No, I don't think we need to explain to them that; they are fully aware that we will report even lesser events than a denial of access, and that it goes to the Security Council, and they are fully aware that the Council is now discussing what would be the consequences of any kind of material breach on their part.

JIM LEHRER:

Much has been said, Mr. Blix, about full cooperation by the Iraqi government. Who defines what full cooperation is?

HANS BLIX:

Well the term in the resolution that governs our work is not full cooperation but cooperation or respects, because I think there have been some quarrels about that in the past. Well, we will have to determine and to assess and exercise our judgment as to whether we think they are fully cooperating or not. This is a great responsibility and it's one given to us and we will have to exercise.

JIM LEHRER:

But do you feel that is your responsibility to determine whether or not they are cooperating with you on the ground at a particular time and a particular incidence?

HANS BLIX:

Well, I will report that to the Security Council but there is nothing that forces the Council to accept my judgment in the first place; however, the Resolution 1284, which was adopted at the end of 1999 – has a concept that I think has to be reconciled with whatever new resolutions there will be adopted. Under the old concept the purpose would be that the Council could suspend the sanctions but if thereafter the monitoring the Iraqis did not provide full cooperation – and I reported that – then the sanctions would fall back automatically on them. Maybe the Council has some different ideas now; I don't know. We are the instruments and the servants of the Council.

JIM LEHRER:

Now, back to the inspectors themselves – you have two hundred already trained and you say another fifty or sixty are being trained in Vienna. Now who are these folks? What are they trained to do? Where do they come from? What are their backgrounds?

HANS BLIX:

Well, the instruction of the Council has been that we should have the broadest possible geographical representation – and they should be suitably merited and qualified, as it says; and they are all experts in one particular field, either in biology, microbiology or in chemical sphere or regarding missiles — so they all have a good professional background; we have interviewed them all before we take them; they come from all over the world — least from developing countries because they do not have so much expertise — but they come from China, they come from Korea, from Russia, Eastern Europe, the United States, France, or Western Europe, and some Latin Americans as well, rather few from Africa, but a few biologists we have from Africa.

JIM LEHRER:

And you hired them. They were not hired by some political group at the U.N. to make sure they're all — all areas were represented, et cetera?

HANS BLIX:

No. We have taken care that we have people from all over the world. And we hired them, and the difference between us and the former inspection organization — UNSCOM — is that we do have resources to hire them on U.N. contracts, and the UNSCOM period they turned to government and said, can I have two biologists, can I have the three chemist, and they were seconded from governments and once they were finished with inspections, they went back into their government service.

Our people will have to take a leave of absence for some time and to be on U.N. contracts with the loyalty to the organization here.

JIM LEHRER:

Does Iraq have any say so as to who these inspectors are?

HANS BLIX:

Absolutely none.

JIM LEHRER:

Now, you have an inspection function but you also have a monitoring function, which in some ways is separate from inspection function. Explain the difference so we understand what that means.

HANS BLIX:

Well, it used to be, under the concept that they adopted in 1991, the idea was that Iraq would declare all its weapons of mass destruction and equipment, et cetera, and that would be verified and then it would be eradicated, and when that was over, which was thought to be a relatively short process, then one would enter into a monitoring process – and say, one would trust that yes, we done away with the dangerous hardware — now it is for us to go around in the various sectors, et cetera, and see that nothing new is produced or that nothing new is imported; however, as time went by, it became perfectly obvious that the Iraqis did not declare everything and that things were left and therefore the new concept at the end of '99 was one which combined the inspection with monitoring – and they talk about the system of reinforced monitoring verification — so we will be able to switch on all the powers we have in a very intrusive way if we had any suspicion that there could be some weapons of mass destruction.

In places where we are convinced that they have done away with them, and it's fairly routine, well, then the monitoring, — well, you term it monitoring – the monitoring would also be more routine.

JIM LEHRER:

But you would have personnel who would stay there —

HANS BLIX:

Right.

JIM LEHRER:

— and continue to monitor an area — that you suspect the possibility at least that they might reactivate it or do something.

HANS BLIX:

Yes. Of course. We would do both the intrusive inspection and monitoring; we will have about 80 inspectors stationed in Baghdad at any given time; that's the idea.

JIM LEHRER:

Permanently, more or less?

HANS BLIX:

Well, I mean, we hope that the Iraqi situation will not be a permanent one but that there will be some solution but the Council has envisaged that even if you felt convinced there were no more weapons of mass destruction, then monitoring can continue. Now it's not said that it will be forever. The Council, of course, can decide it's over.

JIM LEHRER:

All right. Help us understand the timeline here. Let's here again, assume for discussion purposes that there is a U.N. resolution and that you and your inspectors and monitors, your teams, go back into Iraq. Based on what you know now and what information you think you will have available and the situation you will face, how long do you think it's going to take to accomplish your mission?

HANS BLIX:

Well, under the resolution, which still is guiding us — there is no new resolution on the table — they're out of timelines.

First of all, I would assume that if we have a new resolution, it would be about ten days before we have chartered planes and organized ourselves to go on the advance team — but under the old resolution the idea was that we would have some time to set up the logistics before we can say that we start to work. You would need to have the instruments available — both inspectors coming from various parts of the world and laboratories and instruments, jeeps, et cetera, and that will take perhaps — we said to the Council perhaps even two months before we really can say we can start to work.

Now after there is the Council has told us that you have 60 days to define what do we consider to be the key remaining disarmament tasks; and then the Iraqis will have under the resolution to cooperate with the inspection team and with UNMOVIC for 120 days, and if they have cooperated in all respects, including resolution of some of the key issues, then we will report that to the Council and it's open for the Council to suspend the sanctions.

Now, the whole of this system of course is somewhat open to discussion when a new resolution comes in, and I do not know what the members of the Council will do; they will certainly watch the Iraqi cooperation in the early phases, and see whether there is full cooperation or not, and they will have consequences if they do not.

JIM LEHRER:

But are you in a position to say, if somebody comes up with a deadline, let's say a resolution, comes up with a specific deadline, are you in a position to say, wait a minute, we cannot give you what you want in that period of time?

HANS BLIX:

Well, if the resolution asked us to come to the Council and say, can you say within two months that there are no weapons of mass destruction left in Iraq, I think it is very unlikely that we will be able to say so; it depends so much upon the Iraqi cooperation.

We will be able to say have they cooperated with us in all respects, have we been able to make progress on key remaining tasks, yes, this is doable; but to verify that there is nothing left, you know, even in this country when you talk about anthrax; there's a tremendous search of anthrax, these are small pieces, where is the laboratory that produced that anthrax, this is not so easy to answer; to my knowledge they have not yet answered it here; anthrax is also a problem in Iraq.

JIM LEHRER:

Do you have finally, Mr. Blix, based on here again — you're not directly involved obviously in the U.N. Security Council deliberations, et cetera, but you are very much a part of this whole process.

Do you have the feeling that this in fact is going to happen, is something telling you that you really are going to go back into Iraq and there are going to be inspections?

HANS BLIX:

Well, you're asking for my gut feeling, and I think we are more of the humble servant to the Security Council. I – it is for the member governments to weigh the options they have – the inspection is one of the options; it has its shortcomings – we may not be able to find everything on the ground or something that is mobile – inspections can, as we know, be thrown out – it has its shortcomings, and I'm not saying more, claiming more for it than I can – but one also has to see what are the shortcomings and drawbacks of other solutions.

JIM LEHRER:

Did you come away from the meetings in Vienna with the Iraqi officials with the feeling that they are in fact going to cooperate and get this thing done?

HANS BLIX:

I think they realize that there must be very good cooperation on the ground and opening up the sites. We did away with something called the modalities for sensitive sites — where in the past the inspectors had to wait until the arrival of an Iraqi official and any delay of the inspection when you get to the site is one that reduces somewhat the credibility of the inspection.

Now there is much talk about presidential sites about which there exists an agreement between the U.N. and the Iraqis and that is also would have entailed a much longer waiting several days before you can set up such inspection. I think the Iraqis realize that they will have to increase the facility for inspection, the credibility of inspections. Whether that amounts to full cooperation or respect, well, we will see; the proof of that pudding is in the eating.

JIM LEHRER:

But whatever happens you're ready?

HANS BLIX:

Yes.

JIM LEHRER:

Mr. Blix, thank you very much.

HANS BLIX:

Thank you very much.