The U.S. Army released a report Monday outlining the problems that kept it from being able to stabilize Iraq after the U.S.-led invasion in March 2003. Military experts discuss the report's findings.
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What did the Army do right and wrong in the first 18 months after President Bush declared an end to major combat operations in Iraq in May 2008?
Today, the Army released its official history of that period. The 700-page analysis says, in part, that "few commanders foresaw that full-spectrum operations in Iraq would entail the simultaneous employment of offense, defense, stability and support operations by units at all echelons to defeat new, vicious and effective enemies."
For more on what's in the new Army study and its significance, we turn to Donald Wright, the lead author of the study; retired Gen. Barry McCaffrey had a 32-year career in the Army, he's been to Iraq numerous times since the U.S. invasion; and retired Army Col. Douglas Macgregor writes frequently about military issues and is the author of "Transformation Under Fire: Revolutionizing How America Fights."